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THE TRUTH ABOUT CHICKAMAUGA

BY

ARCHIBALD GRACIE

"It is the first and fundamental law of history that it should neither dare to say anything that is false, nor fear to say anything that is true, nor give any just suspicion of favor or disaffection."
— *Cicero.*

BOSTON AND NEW YORK
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AND DEDICATED TO THE LOVERS OF TRUTH
AND JUSTICE EVERYWHERE

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PREFACE

EXCEPT Petersburg, where the final issue was settled, there was no more important battle of the Confederate war than Chickamauga. The highwater mark of this issue, Southern Independence, was reached on this 20th of September, 1863, more than on any other occasion where the decision was left to the arbitrament of arms. Because Gettysburg was the only great battle fought on Northern soil, and because regiments from Eastern States composed the great majority of the troops engaged, all the interest of the East seems centred in Gettysburg alone. In consequence a greater mass of historical writing and oratory has been lavished on this Eastern battle than on all the others together.

There were other great battles besides Gettysburg, each of which has claims to historical recognition which should be respected.

The most pretentious and most inaccurate of Gettysburg's claims is that it was a decisive battle and the most important one of the war.

It is true that the Army of Northern Virginia here sustained the greatest repulse in all its history, but what right is there in calling this great battle a decisive one when the entire Confederate army retained possession of its position on the battle-field for a whole day after fighting had ended, and challenged the Army of the Potomac to renew the contest, which it prudently refrained from doing, making no counter-assault and allowing the Army of Northern Virginia to withdraw unmolested from the field and across the Potomac!

At Chickamauga, on the contrary, on September 20th

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every division of the Army of the Cumberland was engaged, and after "every one had been in turn beaten,"[1] the whole Federal Army abandoned the field in "a general rout,"[2] leaving their dead and wounded to the tender mercy of the foe and strewing the ground with their accoutrements and all impedimenta to their flight, so that the next morning 15,000 stand of arms were collected by the Confederates, including "4500, thrown away by the fleeing enemy,"[3] secured by one Confederate division alone, the same which had successfully stormed the precipitous heights and driven the Federals from their stronghold and final position. This division's request to continue pursuit was met with refusal, though one third of it had not participated in the assault.

The halt to Confederate pursuit from a military standpoint was the most stupendous blunder of the war. For not only this Confederate division but others were ready to pursue, including brigades that participated but little in the action that day and many that had not moved since noontime. Yet according to the diary of a distinguished Federal general, who participated in the action and recorded his observations at the time, the "great Army of the Cumberland could have been blotted out" by only a single "division of the enemy pouncing down upon it before the morning" of the 21st.[4]

The tribunal to whose decision the truth of this and all other statements is referred, after exhaustive and impartial study, is the Official Records, which constitute the Court of Last Resort, cited in the text herewith, and supplemented by references to other authoritative sources in "Notes" following thereafter, which will be found of special interest.

How can such things be and never have been discovered until this late date? We need not seek far for the answer.

[1] Pages 40, 50, 385. [2] Page 96. [3] Page 99. [4] Page 102.

These pages will show how the history of Chickamauga has ever since the day it was fought been made a conspiracy for the silencing and suppression of the truth. The universally accepted history of the battle, stamped with Federal and State governmental authority, is the one written on the battle-field itself by the National Chickamauga and Chattanooga Battle-field Park Commission.

At first blush it may appear presumptuous and invidious in me to question and impeach this highest recognized constituted authority, but I appeal to the decision of the readers of this volume whether or not I am justified in going behind governmental returns, after years of delving deep into the Official Records and discovering the truths as set forth in these pages and now exposed to view for the first time.

Realizing that mere assertions unaccompanied by the proofs are as sounding brass or tinkling cymbal, I have been to great pains to present the testimony with explicit citation of the Official Records and of other authorities in proof of every statement. The text of my work will show in no uncertain way on whom the responsibility rests for foisting this fictitious battle-field panorama upon the credulity of the nation, which in the course of twenty years has spent many millions of dollars, entrusted to its servants, for a specific purpose by unanimous Congressional legislation. What that purpose was is defined in the statement of its chief promoter and founder issued as a sort of prospectus at the time of the great national event, the Dedication of the Chickamauga Battle-field Park. He claimed that it was then made

> possible for a visitor to trace the movements of every organization down to the units of regiments and batteries from the opening to the close of the engagement. . . . Union and Con-

federate lines marked with equal care. The same exhaustive study given to the positions and movements of the one as to those of the other. . . . Union and Confederate movements and fighting set forth with absolute impartiality. The controlling idea upon which it (the National Park) was founded and which has shaped every feature of the project has been to restore and preserve the accurate history of these famous fields and by the means employed, to illustrate the prowess of the American soldier in battle.[1]

Such was the basis on which this great national work was founded. From an historical standpoint the structure is an incoherent, misshapen mass of misrepresentation, mystery, and ignorance intended for the glorification of particular individuals and organizations of the Army of the Cumberland, and with respect to Horseshoe Ridge, at the expense of others that performed greater service and who were entitled to honors appropriated by the organizations which had not earned them.

The difficulties of the task to the truthful historian are therefore twofold: first he must pull down the temple at whose shrine the nation has worshiped nigh half a century, and then in the building of his own structure, in order to have it accepted, must by a presentation of all evidence contend at every step against those whose unrecorded, unofficial and non-contemporaneous claims are antagonized.

The author does not assert that his own structure is without a flaw, but if such exist, he appeals for the right to have the truthfulness of his work criticized or judgment passed upon it only after a full citation of the evidence from the same authoritative source of Official Record adopted as his standard.

This my first volume, while intended to preserve the truth and record of great deeds, is also devoted to doing

[1] H. V. Boynton, p. 705, *Century Magazine*, September, 1895.

justice to the memories of those Federal soldiers whose records have suffered by most undeserved aspersions cast upon their conduct and character.

To Confederate survivors of the battle who read these pages and who have not already been in correspondence with me and sent me their personal recollections of what they saw and did, I make the earnest appeal to get into touch with me immediately and assist my efforts in connection with my second volume, which will be confined to the view they took of the battle from their position on the field, and as much as possible, described in their own words of Official Record. I also particularly request the loan of Confederate wartime papers, illustrations, and portraits relating to the battle

I take this medium of expressing here my acknowledgment for assistance rendered in the preparation of this work, to those whose names are not recorded in the text:—

1. To Honorable Theodore Roosevelt, then President of the United States, who proffered his help and sent me to his then Secretary of War, Honorable William H. Taft, who issued orders by which I was permitted to inspect original papers and obtain copies of the same.

2. To the compilers of the War of the Rebellion Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, whose accurate and systematic work I have been in position to testify to during the course of many years of study.

3. To Mr. Herbert Putnam, Librarian of Congress, and to his staff of able assistants; also to the Librarians of the War, State, and Navy Departments, by whom all known materials relating to my work were placed at my disposal.

4. To the late General E. A. Carman, Chairman of the Chickamauga National Park Commission, for various maps and other courtesies on several of my visits to the

battle-field made in his company. He was much interested in my work and on the occasion of our first trip over Horseshoe Ridge together he made the statement that he was enlightened by my study and for the first time comprehended the battle at that point. To Captain J. Polk Smart, "Assistant in Historical Work," my thanks are also due for similar courtesies.

5. To surviving comrades of the Army of the Cumberland with whom I have had an exhaustive correspondence I am under special obligations which call forth my warmest expressions of gratitude. I wish further to pay to them an exceptional tribute by recording the fact that during a period of nearly seven years, every one with whom I have been closely in touch has without exception treated my request for information with the utmost courtesy, and has written me with perfect frankness, seemingly anxious to avoid error in connection with the smallest detail. Except for this assistance, I could never have unraveled the mysteries of the battle, or accomplished what I have done. There are many whose names are not mentioned, — equally entitled to my thanks, — who have helped in corroborating information already received from other comrades. To all who have loaned me portraits for reproduction in this history, I also add my assurances of appreciation.

In conclusion, and finally laying down my pen, I have the satisfaction of knowing that in my endeavors to reach the clear truth concerning many intricate points I have pumped my well-springs of information dry, and any further effort at filtration by more research or correspondence would be a work of supererogation.

Two days they fought, and evermore those days shall stand apart,
Keynotes of epic chivalry within the nation's heart.

Come, come, and set the carven rocks to mark this glorious spot,
  Here let the deeds of heroes live, their hatreds be forgot.
Build, build, but never monument of stone shall last as long
  As one old soldier's ballad borne on breath of battle song.[1]

ARCHIBALD GRACIE.

WASHINGTON, D. C.,
1527 SIXTEENTH STREET, N. W.,
October, 1911.

[1] Maurice Thompson: "The Ballad of Chickamauga," *Century Magazine*, p. 706, vol. 28, 1905.

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From life-size portrait, November, 1863, painted by J. O. Eaton.

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8. Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander W. Raffen.
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

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
SHOTGRASS HOUSE
A.U.S. BATTY
R I D G E
HARKER'S BRIGADE
HILL 693
KERSHAWS BRIG.
15. ALA
LAW'S BRIG.
GRACIE, 1670 MEN
KELLY, 800 MEN
650
600
550

3


4-U.S. BATTY.
16-OHIO BATTY
3-KY.
HARKER'S BRIGADE
124-OHIO
HAZEN'S BRIGADE
6-KY.
5-IND
61-OHIO
64-OHIO
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SHOOGRASS HOUSE
18-OHIO BATTY
125-OHIO
E R I D G E
HILL NO. 1
893
GRACIE'S BRIGADE
63-TENN.
4-BAT.
ALA. LEGION
850
800
KERSHAW'S BRIG.
3-S.C. BAT.
3-S.C.
2-S.C.
15-S.C.
6-S.C.

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
ERS BRIG.
SNODGRASS HOUSE
STEEDMAN'S
RIDGE
GRACIE'S BRIG.
HILL NO.1
KERSHAW'S BRIG.
GRACIE'S BRIG.
4 BAT.
ALA. LEGION
GRACIE'S BRIG.
KERSHAW'S BRIG.
850
800
850

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THE TRUTH ABOUT CHICKAMAUGA

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The Truth about Chickamauga

CHAPTER I

ELIMINATION OF FALSE HISTORY

In the Washington *Post* of April 19, 1910, is an editorial on "Buckner and Son," from which I quote the following:

> General Buckner's career was a conspicuous "if," of the many "ifs" that beat the Confederacy. After he had fought his army out of Fort Donelson in two bloody days' engagements, the civilian and political generals, his superior officers, over his protest ordered his return to the fort, which he represented to them could mean nothing but inevitable surrender. Like a West Pointer he obeyed, though Forrest refused to comply, and the result was surrender.
>
> What might have happened had the Confederate forces at Shiloh, a few weeks later, been augmented by the 12,000 soldiers seasoned in bloody battle by Buckner at Donelson! What would have happened, if Buckner had been the superior officer of Floyd and Pillow! As it turned out, that magnificent division were prisoners of war, when Shiloh was fought.
>
> May he [Buckner] long be spared to teach this generation what mighty giants there were when he was young.

General Buckner's career was, indeed, a conspicuous "if"; and one of the best-known of the exemplifications of it, Fort Donelson, is above mentioned, and justice is therein accorded him. But I desire to call attention to and obtain recognition of the fact that it is now full time that justice should be given General Buckner and the men who fought under him in another battle, connected with which is a much more important "if," and one in which he was again overruled by a superior officer. In this latter in-

stance, there was no "if" in the issue of the battle, for victory was already a *fait accompli*. His corps had then won the finishing and final victory in the great Battle of Chickamauga, one of the most important successes ever achieved by Confederate arms; and IF the pursuit had not then and there been halted, there would not have been one man left of the great Federal army, to cross the Tennessee River and escape home to tell the tale. The military and financial history of the time proves that the immediate recognition of the independence of the Confederacy would have followed this destruction of Rosecrans' army. Let the laurels, therefore, due General Buckner and his men be placed where they belong.

There are many still living who know the truth of this battle; but there is not to be found, as yet, a true and complete history or account of it, published by one individual. There are partisan accounts of the battle, pretending to be true history, but in reality written only for the purpose of extolling one individual at the expense of another, and at the sacrifice of the truth. For the most part, these accounts are not based upon official authority, but upon unreliable newspaper accounts. They have served the purposes for which they were written, and have benefited some individuals and have injured others. This misrepresentation began in Chattanooga, immediately after the battle was ended. A warfare of words was then begun, the result of which is indicated in the Official Records, a result which filled the columns of the newspapers of the land at the time, and for many years thereafter; and still the controversy remains unsettled. The principal combatants concerned therein were General Rosecrans, the commander-in-chief, and some of his subordinates, General T. J. Wood in particular. The most important incidents of the battle were lost sight of, in view of personal issues between certain generals; and the newspapers have made the incidents relating to these

personal issues the accepted history of the battle, to the exclusion of the true history of it, purposely suppressed and involved in mystery. At that time, in Chattanooga (though courts of inquiry exonerated these unfortunate generals), reputations were blasted, through statements not founded upon the facts, which were not published until years after, in the *War Records* of the battle; and a scape-goat was made of one of these, on account of an action of his which undoubtedly then saved the Federal army. On the other hand, the real culprits, who deserved censure, escaped; one of them in particular, who successfully diverted attention from his own shortcomings by means of the "Stop thief!" strategy, should have been court-martialed.

A study of the points at issue in this wordy controversy was an impossibility at that time, and continued so for nearly twenty-five years thereafter, for the very good reason that during that interval the so-called *War of the Rebellion Records*, containing the Official Reports of this battle, had not been published; and time has also brought to light other official facts which the policy of the Government suppressed. Consequently, the great number of false histories or accounts of the Battle of Chickamauga, written during the period from 1863 to 1889, are not based on official facts, as the same were not then readily available; and our Government is, in consequence, mostly to blame for the great mass of misrepresentation which still exists.

In the history of revolutionary struggles, it is generally recognized, and must be taken into consideration in a careful search for the truth, that the conquered faction has to submit, among other grievous trials, to having the accepted history of the war dominated by the partisan viewpoint of the victorious party.

When the Chickamauga Park project was first conceived and organized, it was not only for the purpose of a memorial to "American valor," but it was intended to afford to

the military student an opportunity for the study of "the brilliant strategy, the unsurpassed fighting done there," which was possible only under the expressed stipulation, which brought forth the unanimous approval of Congress, "giving impartial representation to both sides in preserving the history of the field and marking the lines of battle."[1]

There could be nothing grander or more useful, as an object-lesson of patriotism and an inspiration to students of military history, than the establishment of this park on the proposed basis outlined; and as this battle was the only Confederate victory of the four battles where the Government has established a national park, the others being Gettysburg, Shiloh, and Vicksburg, here seemed possible an opportunity for a still greater object-lesson, viz., Federal magnanimity and a spirit of reconciliation in according at least justice to the Confederate soldier, in giving equal recognition as to the truth of his statements embodied in his Official Report of the battle.

What a glorious purpose was thus intended! How interesting to every visitor who could thus see it and read it and quickly understand it! How a student of war would revel in the study of this most easily read panoramic history of the battle, impressed upon his mind in a way that no written book could do except after years of difficult study!

An interesting article could be written on the subject of the problems presented to many of the general officers on both sides, comparing what different ones did under similar conditions; for this battle certainly affords unsurpassed opportunity for military study when it is thoroughly understood in the Official Records.

But its history has degenerated into a "mystery" —

[1] H. V. Boynton, *Chickamauga Nat. Mil. Park*, Preface, iv. Cincinnati: R. Clarke Co. 1895.

using Park Commissioner Boynton's word-picture[1] in his newspaper description of facts, which, if unknown to him, were easily obtainable by reference to the Official Records containing the desired truth as to the closing scenes and final Federal positions on the battle-field.

If General Boynton, as park commissioner and historian, thus wrote of it as a mystery, how is it to be expected that any student or visitor could understand anything about the final fight on Horseshoe Ridge? And yet the Park Commission has existed for twenty years, and still do not know the history of the battle, though at last accounts they were preparing to change the legends on many of the bronze tablets.

What is the reason for this? I can and will explain it in part: instead of admitting the Official Report of the Confederate soldier as entitled to equal credence and recognition with that of his Federal brother, partisan feeling is responsible for the elimination of testimony from Confederate sources.

This partisan feeling has in consequence made the task of the Federal Park Commissioners, in searching for the truth, a difficult if not an impossible one. At the outset of my work I was told by them that the mysteries of Horseshoe Ridge were impossible of solution.

It was on my first visit to the battle-field that I was confronted with the fact that the Confederate soldier's testimony was thus thrown out and no attempt made to reconcile his statements with the truth, and (*hinc illæ lachrymæ*) it was due thereto that my work was undertaken, and an effort made to find the truth, first, from the Federal reports themselves, then from the Confederate, and reconcile the two. The reader of the ensuing pages must judge for himself with what success this has been accomplished.

[1] Chattanooga *Times*, September 18, 1890, from Cincinnati *Commercial Gazette*, May 23, 1889.

The true history of the battle cannot be lost to any student who wishes to find it. The task, however, is a tremendous one:[1] for the complete and truthful history will be found in the *War of the Rebellion Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, vol. XXX, parts I, II, III, and IV, more conveniently designated as Serial Nos. 50, 51, 52, and 53. As these Records were written at the time of the battle, when the incidents were fresh in the minds of the writers, they constitute the fullest and best collection of data which we can take as our standard of the truth. Even with these Records in one's hands, however, it is possible to quote with seeming authority what would be misrepresentations of fact. If the impartial student wants, however, the real truth, he must study and analyze every statement that is made by different witnesses of the same incident; he must compare these with each other, and sift and weigh the evidence. He will find the true metallic ring of the truth after the hot fire of search for it has been applied so that the dross will drop away, and only the refined metal, the golden truth, will be left. The writer has himself applied the test which he here recommends, devoting thereto six years of the hardest sort of work, and paying many visits to the battle-field.

The Records contain in all[2] four hundred and fourteen reports written at the time by officers who participated in the battle. Of these, two hundred and fifteen are Federal and one hundred and ninety-nine Confederate reports. There are seventy-eight infantry reports missing, of which forty-six are Confederate and thirty-two Federal. Also sixteen missing of Confederate Battery, and five of Federal. These reports and records fill the major part of four volumes averaging nearly one thousand pages each. Many of these reports are compositions of literary merit, graphi-

[1] See Notes to chapter I, Note A, at end of book.

[2] Including those in vol. LII, part I, omitted in vol. XXX.

cally describing vivid battle-scenes, and comprehensively and simply stating what concerns the positions and movements of each officer's command. All of them were written under stress of circumstances, during a period when active operations in the field were still in progress; but the question which concerns us most is the one as to what extent we are to believe in these reports as the embodiment of the truth. This can only be answered after the student has carefully considered all of the records and reports, and knows whether or not, as a result of his study, he has so reconciled many conflicting statements that the knowledge acquired presents a connected whole without any part of it involved in mystery. Having devoted much time to this study, I am myself satisfied that, taken as a whole, the great mass of testimony contains the embodiment of the truth, and that most of the official statements are intended to be truthful. We must remember that each officer, loyal to his own command, is likely to describe at most length that part of the engagement in which it acquitted itself with the greatest glory. On the other hand, he is likely to omit, or not devote much space to, another occasion when his troops, though fighting bravely, were worsted in the encounter. In fact, the years of study of each officer's report makes us better acquainted with him, and although our knowledge of his character is confined to a single day, one that tried men's souls, we cannot help feeling that we have an intimate acquaintance with him, and I have been surprised in how many instances this acquaintanceship and knowledge of character, though confined to one day's operation, has proven correct, on the evidence obtained by my conversations with various veterans who were personally acquainted with the authors of the reports which I have studied.

There are at the same time tremendous difficulties to be encountered, many mysteries which seem impossible of

solution, and many discrepancies of statements. There are some few Official Reports which I never did expect to comprehend, but after several years of study enlightenment was shed upon them with such force as to make the truth as well understood as that contained in any other reports. But there are some glaring exceptions, which will be noted in these pages, where statements are made that are obvious fabrications; again, there are other officers who, by similar untruths, have endeavored to hide their own shortcomings; and finally, there are a few who, for ulterior motives, have cast reflections upon their brother officers which they were unable to substantiate in their testimony before courts of inquiry.

All officers should be trained in the knowledge of what constitutes an official report, written on the honor of a gentleman and a soldier. What it should be is best exemplified in the words of that celebrated writer, soldier, and statesman, Hon. Carl Schurz, on the occasion of a reflection cast upon himself by a superior officer. As this is to be found in the Official Record[1] I deem it pertinent to insert it here: —

> The most formidable weapon in the hands of the latter [superior officer] is his official report of campaigns and actions. It is universally received as documentary history, as the purest fountain from which the future historian can take his most reliable information. Praise and censure conveyed in such a report is generally looked upon as based upon irrefutable evidence. And it ought to be. Every conscientious commander will therefore consider it a sacred duty before making an official statement affecting the honor and reputation of a subordinate, to scrutinize with scrupulous care the least incident connected with the case, and when at last, after weighing every circumstance, he has arrived at the conclusion that his duty commands him to pronounce a censure, he will again well weigh every word he says, so as to be perfectly sure that he does not say too much. For it must be

[1] Vol. xxxi, part i, p. 198.

considered that public opinion is generally swayed by first impressions, and an injury once done can but rarely be repaired by a subsequent modification of language.

The student who has formed his opinions from sources other than these Official Reports will, in his work, be much handicapped if he accepts absolutely what he has read in so-called histories, which have no foundation based upon such official sources as are contained in these text-books to which I refer. While he should know the lay of the land of the battle-field and points of the compass thereon, — and a day's visit, I think, would shorten by a year's time the work of study, which must otherwise be by means of maps alone, — about the most unfortunate step he can take in his progress of reaching the truth, especially as to Horseshoe Ridge, would be his acceptance of the alleged history of what happened there, as indicated by the Government's tablets, markers, monuments, and statue thereon. He would be led still further astray if he adopted any other standard of truth than the Official Records, submitted to the refining process indicated. This particularly applies to the literature and maps printed at Government expense, for more than two decades, speciously conceived by those who are responsible therefor, viz., the majority of two in the Board of Commissioners, in which the minority of one[1] has never had a voice, and where, if one of this majority had the courage of his convictions, and expressed them, he would not dare take action and apply impartially the regulations adopted for marking the battle-field, — an action which would disclose the enormities perpetrated under the pretense of justice and in the name of history; for the enmity sure to be incurred by him would be such that "good were it for that man if he had never been born."

[1] On information of unquestionable authority. See also Notes to chapter VIII, Note B.

No federal government of our day would permit such an efficient and conscientious commissioner to study the Records, — to apply the regulations for the marking of the field, and to print the literature and maps taken from this, their pretended standard of truth. Such a storm of protest would break over the Northern section of our country, that no government could recover from the obloquy of it. And why should a present-day administration stir up a personal strife, of no material advantage to any one, — for which it was not primarily responsible, and which began more than twoscore years ago, causing the most bitter feelings of any engendered in the great fratricidal struggle? Can any present-day administration afford to give out the facts, even though it is the plain truth: that great generals received especial honors, to which they were not entitled, for any conspicuous service rendered in this battle, more than were others whose conduct was submitted to courts of inquiry?

There are other skeletons in the closet of official record, the exposure of which would serve no good purpose.

As long as there are living many thousands of comrades of the Army of the Cumberland, who justly revere the memory of their great generals, the Government may well ask, What good would it do now to expose these guarded secrets of Chickamauga? While ignorance is bliss, let them enjoy reading the "complimentary orders" issued to them on October 2, 1863, by their commander-in-chief,[1] containing the following passage, which is to them sufficient authority for their belief in their Army's success at Chickamauga: —

> When the day closed [we read] you held the field, from which you withdrew in the face of overpowering numbers, to occupy the point for which you set out, — Chattanooga.

[1] Serial No. 60, p. 78, l. 16.

Here are three statements of alleged fact recorded and not a single one of them is supported by the evidence of the Official Records.

(1) He says, "When the day closed, you held the field." On the contrary, the Official Reports and Records show, including Rosecrans' own statement hereinafter referred to, that at sunset the field was abandoned. It is incomprehensible how any of his soldiers could have believed this statement at the time it was made. Surely there is no one who believes it now.

(2) He says, "You withdrew in the face of overpowering numbers." Yet it is inconceivable how General Rosecrans could have believed that Bragg's army exceeded his own. The Records show that on September 7, he considered 50,000 the most reliable estimate of the enemy's strength. He had obtained this estimate through one of his division commanders of Crittenden's corps, then in the vicinity of Chattanooga, and he considered this estimate accurate enough for him to dispatch what he had learned to the two other corps commanders, McCook and Thomas. As noted in the Records,[1] these are the words and figures containing this information: "General Wood reports 50,000 of the enemy in and about Chattanooga." Of all the varying reports which Rosecrans received as to Bragg's strength, — some as high as 100,000, — it is evident from a study of the dispatches of record that these figures, 50,000, were the ones on which he based his belief and imparted it to his corps commanders. The same Records also show that he knew these figures applied to the whole of Bragg's army, nine divisions under Generals Polk, Buckner, Hill, and Walker, and included Forrest's and Wheeler's cavalry.[2] This estimate probably included all of the support sent

[1] No. 52, p. 412, l. 41, and p. 408, l. 7.

[2] See Appendix, p. 363, Organization of the Army of Tennessee. Also Notes to chapter x, Note B.

from Johnston's Mississippi army to General Bragg,[1] though the two brigades of Gregg and McNair, numbering 2500 men, did not join Bragg until a few days before the battle.[2] It will therefore be observed that Rosecrans' knowledge of the Confederate strength was only a few thousands overestimated, as appears from the tabulated statement of the relative strength of the two armies, which will be found in Appendix to volume II. The same tabulated statement shows that Longstreet brought with him from Virginia, at maximum estimate, only 5000 men who participated in the battle. The individual reports and records of the two armies — contained in volume XXX, parts I, II, III, and IV, from which the above-mentioned tabulated statement was drawn — show that the Federals had about 63,000 men of all arms, and the Confederates about 11,000 less. Hence it appears that General Rosecrans must have grossly exaggerated the support which Bragg received after his estimate of September 7, for it is evident that, had he trebled the number of men that Longstreet brought with him into the battle, the Confederate army's strength would only have about equaled the numbers of the Federal army. It appears that General Rosecrans never did know Longstreet's strength in the battle, for in an interview with him, which we quote elsewhere,[3] it appears that he believed that 10,000 was the loss sustained by the Virginia troops in the Battle of Chickamauga; yet Bragg's Official Report[4] and the statements of Longstreet and others, show these "five small brigades" engaged in the battle numbered "less than 5000 men."

(3) The final statement which General Rosecrans makes is in effect that Chattanooga was the objective point of the

[1] No. 53, p. 561.
[2] See Notes to chapter I, Note C.
[3] No. 53, p. 643.
[4] No. 53, p. 33, l. 7.

battle.[1] His inference was that the Battle of Chickamauga was necessary for the possession of Chattanooga, and in this statement of his he was able to impose upon the credulity of the greater portion of his army by keeping them in ignorance of the facts of record. He was supported in this contention of his by the press of the country, and in particular by its then war correspondent and famous newspaper man, the Honorable Whitelaw Reid,[2] the present Ambassador to the Court of St. James. Even to this day this original invention of General Rosecrans has its sincere advocates, some of whom claim that the Battle of Chickamauga was a Federal victory in consequence. There was, however, at this time by no means a unanimity of belief in this statement of General Rosecrans. These "complimentary orders" were recognized as a mere device on his part to restore the confidence of his army in himself. He not only succeeded beyond his utmost expectations, unable though he was to retrieve his fallen fortunes with his Government, but he persuaded himself and many of his partisans in the belief, in after years, that the Battle of Chickamauga was a glorious Federal victory. Evidence is at hand that there were numbers of Federal soldiers who knew the truth.

I select out of many the statements of three competent witnesses, who were present at the time.

(1) General John Beatty, who commanded a brigade in Negley's Division, kept a record of events in his diary, published in book[3] form, and in referring to the above-mentioned article by Whitelaw Reid wrote: "Investigation will show that the army could have gotten into Chattanooga without a battle on the Chickamauga. There would

[1] See Notes to chapter I, Note C.

[2] See New York *Tribune*, November 7, 1863. Also see Notes to chapter I, Note C.

[3] John Beatty, *The Citizen Soldier*, p. 355. Cincinnati: Wilstach, Baldwin & Co. 1879.

have been a battle here, doubtless, and defeat would have resulted probably in our destruction; yet it seems reasonable to suppose that if able to hold Chattanooga after defeat, we would have been able to do so before."

(2) Next we quote the words[1] of a well-known author, Judge Albion W. Tourgée, contained in the history of his regiment (105th Ohio, E. A. King's Brigade, Reynolds' Division), as follows: —

> On the third day [i.e. September 23], General Rosecrans rode through the camp making addresses to the soldiers at various points where they trooped to hear him. It was not a formal military progress; just the general, a few of his corps and division commanders and members of his staff. His words and demeanor were confident, one may almost say boastful, strangely at variance with actual conditions. His army was enthusiastically devoted to him. They had not yet had time to study the movements of the past month. The history of the Union Army since the 9th of September, when the enemy surrendered Chattanooga, had not then been written. We supposed the Battle of Chickamauga to have been a necessity; that it could only have been avoided by surrendering Chattanooga, the objective point of the campaign.[2]

We did not know that Thomas had protested[3] against the movement into McLemore's Cove, and that we might have been in Chattanooga on the 15th without firing a gun, waiting to be attacked on the very ground we now occupied after a loss of 17,000 men. Because of this we still believed in our commander, whose confidence, as usual, soon rose to the point of boastful exhortation. He rode from camp to camp, the shouts and cheers

[1] Albion W. Tourgée, LL.D., *The Story of a Thousand*, p. 247. Buffalo: S. McGerald & Son. 1896.

[2] The following indicates that within a fortnight after the battle, some of Rosecrans' men were not deceived by his representations. Judge Tourgée (p. 264) has this quotation from the diary of Captain A. G. Wilcox, Company F, 105th Ohio (Whitelaw Reid's) Regiment: "Nov. 4, 1863, Colonel George, commanding brigade, says Rosecrans should never have fought Bragg at Chickamauga, but should have concentrated his forces at Chattanooga as soon as it was abandoned by Bragg, and made it a secure basis of supplies."

[3] See Notes to chapter I, Note D. See also page 18, *infra*.

of his soldiers constituting a vote of confidence which seems incredible when we reflect that he had left his army only a few days before in the midst of one of the most terrific battles and come to the city we were now exhorted to defend, in order to see that the means of escape across the river were prepared. . . . The army did not even know the history of those two sulphurous days under the trees of Chickamauga. They thought their leader had simply been forced to fight at a disadvantage and that the army had escaped destruction through his skill.

(3) General William B. Hazen, who commanded a brigade in Palmer's Division, in a book which he has published containing a description [1] of the battle, says: —

Those who claim strategic foresight for the movements leading to the battle, and that Bragg was made to give up Chattanooga by reason of our going south of it, which enabled us to seize and hold that place, failed to take account of the fact *that the city was gained without the movement*.[2] The theory that Bragg fell back for any but strategic purposes of his own is all a mistake. We actually put ourselves in a position so false that for four days we were entirely at the mercy of the enemy; that we were not totally destroyed by detachments was due to an equally great mistake on his part.

But we did not have to go outside of the Official Records for proof of the foregoing statements. The witnesses whom we have quoted present the facts in an interesting as well as an authoritative manner. It only remains to quote the Official Records corroborating the accuracy of their testimony. This we will do in chronological order. By his masterful strategy under most disadvantageous circumstances, General Rosecrans completed his campaign for the possession of Chattanooga on September 9, 1863, but that he outmanœuvred Bragg in gaining possession of Chattanooga, defeating the latter's purpose of making a

[1] General W. B. Hazen, *A Narrative of Military Service*, p. 147. Boston: Ticknor & Co. 1885.

[2] Italics are mine. — Author.

stand there and defending it, is not borne out by the Records by any manner of means. On the contrary, the fact is established beyond peradventure that General Bragg had no hope of his ability to make such a defense and had no such intention; for we find that on August 23, six days before General Rosecrans crossed the Tennessee River, General Bragg in Chattanooga sent a dispatch to President Jefferson Davis in which he makes the statement,[1] "We cannot save this town." The Confederate Government was fully reconciled to the abandonment of Chattanooga, and no efforts are indicated in the Records that any strenuous effort was made to hold it,[2] nor was Bragg at all disconcerted by the crossing of the Tennessee River by the Federal army. All correspondence on the subject indicates that it was a part of Bragg's strategy which courted this event.

On September 5, 1863,[3] we find his telegram to his Government indicating that his chief concern had been to frustrate the enemy's plan of cutting off Buckner's corps from making a junction with his army. The same telegram further shows that he had in his possession what he calls the whole "Yankee programme," as outlined in the Chicago *Times* and the New York *Times* in correspondence that came from Rosecrans' headquarters. Bragg had no apologies to make. On the contrary, he was satisfied with the consideration that he had already partially frustrated Rosecrans' plan.

Crittenden's, Thomas', and McCook's corps had at this time crossed the Tennessee River, and Bragg declares his intention of turning the situation to his own advantage. Buckner having joined him, General Bragg forthwith, on

[1] No. 52, p. 517.

[2] The sending of a contingent of the Virginia army to support Bragg had been determined upon before Rosecrans' crossing of the Tennessee River and had no direct bearing upon any effort to hold Chattanooga.

[3] Vol. xxx, part iv, p. 599.

the next day, promulgates his order[1] for his whole army to move towards Rome, Georgia. On September 8 at 10 P.M.,[2] General Rosecrans had received news of the enemy's evacuation of Chattanooga on the day before, and orders Crittenden to occupy the city "in the morning early, and push forward in vigorous pursuit," Crittenden to occupy Chattanooga[3] and pursue the line of General Bragg's retreat; McCook to move at once on Alpine and Summerville; Thomas, as rapidly as possible, to Lafayette, and make every exertion to strike the enemy in flank, and, if possible, cut off his escape.

General Bragg's Report reads as follows:[4]—

> Thrown off his guard by our rapid movement, apparently in retreat, when in reality we had concentrated opposite his centre, and deceived by the information from deserters and others sent into his lines, the enemy pressed on his column to intercept us and thus exposed himself in detail.

The information from one of Bragg's emissaries, which General Rosecrans accepted and on which he based his movements in pursuit, was recorded at his Department Headquarters on September 9, as follows, referring to the three corps of the Confederate army:[5]—

> The army has retreated to Rome, where it is said it will make a stand. . . . If we pursue vigorously they will not stop short of Atlanta; troops badly demoralized; all feel that they are whipped; one seventh of the troops mostly naked; the rations for three days would make one good meal.

At 3.30 A.M. of the same day he dispatches to General Thomas the news of the evacuation, and orders Thomas to

[1] No. 53, p. 610.
[2] No. 52, p. 459, l. 34.
[3] Under orders from General Wood, Colonel Smith D. Atkins of the 92d Illinois Mounted Infantry of Wilder's Brigade, Reynolds' Division, Thomas' Corps, entered the town and was first to float his colors over it at 11 A.M. No. 52, p. 496, and p. 487, l. 19. See also conclusion of Note G, to chapter I.
[4] No. 51, p. 27, l. 55.
[5] No. 52, p. 481, l. 26.

call on him at once to consult in regard to arrangements for the pursuit, and after this consultation [1] announced at 10 A.M.[2] that he has "ordered a general pursuit of the enemy by the whole army."

On the next day, September 10, rumors regarding the true state of affairs in Bragg's army reached Rosecrans, but are dismissed as[3] "hardly worthy of a moment's consideration. They should be treated with total indifference if General Thomas' Corps had reached Lafayette this morning as it was expected to." Even Rosecrans' Division commanders are thoroughly deceived,[4] "confident in the belief that all the enemy's forces are moving toward Rome for concentration."[5]

Meantime, Rosecrans has established his headquarters in Chattanooga,[6] and the grand culmination of the Chattanooga campaign is proudly announced to General Burnside in the following:[7]—

HEADQUARTERS, TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS,
CHATTANOOGA, Sept. 10, 1863 — 2 A.M.

Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside,

Commanding Department of the Ohio, Tennessee River.

SIR: — I am directed by the general commanding the Department of the Cumberland to inform you that I am in full possession of this place, having entered it yesterday at 12 M. without resistance. The enemy has retreated in the direction of Rome, Ga., the last of his force (cavalry) having left a few hours before my arrival. At daylight I make a rapid pursuit with my corps, and hope that he will be intercepted by the centre and right, the latter of which was at Rome. . . .

T. L. CRITTENDEN,
Major-General, Commanding.

[1] For Thomas' protest during this consultation see p. 14 and footnote. Also Notes to chapter I, Note D.

[2] No. 52, p. 482, l. 8, and p. 483, l. 38.

[3] No. 52, p. 506, l. 10.

[4] No. 52, p. 519, l. 5.

[5] See Notes to chapter I, Note E.

[6] No. 52, p. 517, l. 9.

[7] No. 52, p. 525, l. 14.

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
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THE PURSUIT OF BRAGG: ROSECRANS' OBJECTIVE AFTER SEPTEMBER 9TH

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General Burnside on the next day gets still further news through the medium of Washington, as appears from the following:[1]—

> General Rosecrans will occupy Dalton, or some point on the railroad to close all access from Atlanta, and also the mountain passes on the west. This being done it will be determined whether the movable forces shall advance into Georgia and Alabama, or into the Valley of Virginia and North Carolina.
>
> H. W. Halleck,
> General-in-Chief.

Thus it appears that on September 8, there was nothing whatever to prevent Rosecrans' occupation of his objective point, Chattanooga, with his whole army and without the loss of a man. Instead of concentrating, he divided his army in pursuit of Bragg, and presented the opportunities which Bragg's strategy had planned.[2] Is it not plain, therefore, that a new campaign was instituted which had for its objective the possession of Rome, Dalton, and Atlanta, and the acquirement of still more territory belonging to the Confederacy? There can be no question that Bragg's purpose was eminently successful and that he accomplished what he hoped for in his plans as indicated in his dispatch to Jefferson Davis.[3]

On September 10, we find three corps of Rosecrans' army widely separated, — Crittenden at Chattanooga, McCook at Summerville, forty miles[4] down the valley, and Thomas in McLemore's Cove, about twenty miles from Chattanooga, while Bragg's whole army on that day is

[1] No. 52, p. 555, l. 14.

[2] No. 51, p. 21, l. 21; p. 27, l. 55.

[3] For recognition of Bragg's strategy and a description of Rosecrans' boasts of delivering finishing blows of the war at Rome and Atlanta, see *Memoirs of Henry Villard*, vol. II, pp. 89, 90 (then correspondent of New York *Tribune*). Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1904.

[4] The distances are measured on the *Maps of the Chickamauga Campaign of 1863*, S. C. Kellogg, 5th Cavalry, U.S.A., 1891. See map opposite.

concentrated at Lafayette, opposite to Thomas and midway between Crittenden and McCook.

A good opportunity was here afforded the Confederate commander to assault and dispose of in detail one corps of the Federal army before the other two could come to its assistance. General Bragg issued his orders for the accomplishment of this purpose, but the reasons for the defeat of his plans at this juncture, and again on September 12, do not belong to our consideration in this volume. Thus Confederate opportunity was lost, and thereafter, up to the day of the battle, General Rosecrans could still have concentrated his army in Chattanooga without a battle.[1]

I doubt if there can be found recorded anywhere in the history of any great battle, an instance where any army was more completely deceived than was the Federal army by the stratagems employed by General Bragg during these four days, ending September 12.

A study of the dispatches which passed between Rosecrans and his subordinates during this period might be offered in evidence, forming an interesting and amusing proof of the above statement.

If there was any corps commander or general officer who was not fooled by Bragg's strategy as completely as was the commanding general in the belief that the Confederate army was running away, there is nothing of official record to sustain any such contention. All kinds of divergent rumors were brought into camp during these days, but the ones selected for belief and action were the very ones that were baited by Bragg to catch the Federals in the trap he had set for them.

[1] General Hazen, in his *Narrative of Military Service* (p. 120), says: "To the question, Was the Battle of Chickamauga necessary for the holding of Chattanooga? no answer satisfactory to all has yet been given. It is perhaps the most serious question of all those raised by the war, and will in the future claim careful study of the military critic." See Notes to chapter I, Note F.

It is customary to blame Rosecrans as alone responsible for this false move, undertaken in spite of the protest of at least one of his generals, viz., Thomas. It may be true that General Thomas, in the consultation which took place on the morning of September 9, 1863, at Chattanooga, opposed the pursuit of the enemy by the entire army, as ordered by Rosecrans.[1] We have the word of Thomas' historian, Chaplain Van Horne, for an account of the subject discussed at this consultation, wherein Thomas is said to have registered his emphatic protest against the pursuit, already ordered, and advocated the whole army's immediate occupation of Chattanooga, the objective point of the campaign, now ended.

On the other hand, there is no evidence, official or otherwise, showing Thomas' or any other Federal officer's disbelief in the rumors which Bragg scattered broadcast, that his army was running away and would not make a stand until it reached Rome, Georgia.[2] Every corps commander, and other officers as well, dispatched information to headquarters fortifying General Rosecrans in this belief. As it is unfair that his record should be made to bear all the criticism, without qualification, it is proper to set forth in his behalf some of the dispatches and information which he received from subordinates, to whom no blame whatever has ever been attached. Nay, more, some have gained honor at the expense of Rosecrans' errors, which at the time met with their approval, while others later were vociferous in criticism against him, when they themselves were in part to blame.

[1] Colonel Bond writes: "I have no recollection of the consultation. If there had been any marked difference in their views, I think I should have known of it, but perhaps not."

[2] Colonel Smith D. Atkins of the 92d Illinois is the only officer I know of making such claim. His interesting statement to this effect, made in 1907, some comrades of his regiment may confirm. See conclusion of Note F, Notes to chapter I.

The following are excerpts from some of the dispatches referred to: —

On September 11, from Department Headquarters in Chattanooga, the commanding general sent this to Crittenden:[1] —

Dispatches have also been received through Captain Oldershaw, from Colonel Wilder and Colonel Grose, and one from General Thomas since you left here, which confirm the general commanding in the belief that the enemy has retreated on Rome, Georgia. General Thomas' advance held Dug Gap of the Pigeon Mountain last night with a strong picket force of the enemy in his front. All doubt as to the general direction of the retreat is now resolved.

On the same date, Crittenden reports to Rosecrans:[2] —

All reports so far agree that the enemy have all gone to Rome.

On the next day, at 1 A.M., from same to same, the following was sent:[3] —

In my opinion, the enemy have already fled beyond my reach. My only hope, or rather my great hope is that General Thomas or General McCook may be able to hit them a side lick.

And again on the same day, at 4.45 P.M.:[4] —

I still believe that the enemy is running, and that he will make no stand short of Rome.

And finally, at 9.45 of this day, last of all to cling to the delusion, he dispatches:[5] —

I do not yet believe that there is a strong force of infantry in the vicinity of Lafayette.

His credulity, however, is finally shattered by the following from the commander-in-chief, under date of 9.30 P.M., September 12:[6] —

[1] No. 52, p. 544, l. 45.
[2] No. 52, p. 545, l. 42.
[3] No. 52, p. 574, l. 47.
[4] No. 52, p. 576, l. 45.
[5] No. 52, p. 578, l. 17.
[6] No. 52, p. 577, l. 30.

Your dispatch of 4.45 P. M. is just received. There is no longer doubt that the enemy is in heavy force in the neighborhood of Lafayette, and there is far more probability of his attacking you than that he is running.

His division commander, Wood, as early as 7.30 P.M. on September 10, picked up important information, which he transmitted, but qualified after the following fashion:[1]—

I do not give this narrative because I think it of great importance, nor because I credit it (for this I do not), but because, if true, it should be known.

On the same day the commanding general replied, agreeing with General Wood that "the story of the contraband is in the highest degree improbable," but ordering him to make a reconnaissance of investigation on the next day.[2]

Palmer, of the same corps, also on September 10, stands for the following information:[3]—

I am also confident in the belief that all the forces are moving toward Rome for concentration.

A brigade commander of the latter's division, General Hazen, as late as September 12, 1 P.M., contributes the following:[4] "They are without doubt retreating on Rome"; and Colonel J. T. Wilder, commanding the mounted brigade of Thomas' Corps, but now serving under Crittenden, dispatched, at 8 P.M. on September 10, the following:[5]—

Please forward this to Chattanooga yet to-night. I am satisfied, from all I can learn from the mail, citizens, deserters, and negroes, that Bragg has gone with his main army to Rome.[6]

Indicating how thoroughly Crittenden's Corps was deceived, from the commanding general down to the colonel of a regiment, we quote Colonel Opdycke's dispatch, on

[1] No. 52, p. 513, l. 45. [2] No. 52, p. 514, l. 21.
[3] No. 52, p. 519, l. 5. [4] No. 52, p. 585, l. 30. [5] No. 52, p. 513, l. 17.
[6] Yet Colonel Atkins of his brigade says he knew better at that time.

September 11, to the commanding general [1] and the latter's reply thereto: —

A bright mulatto has just come to me. Says that he has waited on Bragg since last March. Deserted him last night; says Bragg was going to Rome and Atlanta with 25,000 men.

(Signed) E. Opdycke,
Colonel Commanding.

To which he received reply: —

The general commanding directs that you keep the bright mulatto and keep a bright lookout for Bragg.

This last dispatch would indicate that a momentary light into Bragg's movements had begun to dawn on Rosecrans, notwithstanding the refreshing bit of humor displayed at so serious a time.

General McCook, on September 9, 6.35 P.M., transmitted to Headquarters [2] the following information: —

He [a man from Bragg's army] reports the army moving by cars and marching, and says their destination is Rome, Georgia, where they intend concentrating and give us battle.

General McCook, at 7.30 A.M. on September 12, first had his eyes opened to the fact [3] "that the rebel army is [was] concentrated at or near Lafayette"; yet the influence the ubiquitous deserter had over him was such that at 4.45 P.M. of the same day he dispatched the following to Headquarters: [4] —

I think Crook will find Lafayette abandoned by their infantry; in my judgment, Resaca is their point.

Finally, we refer to the dispatches of record which concern General Thomas. After the severe censure which he received from Rosecrans [5] for two days' delay in his movements and his failure to threaten Lafayette, General

[1] No. 52, p. 549, l. 35.
[2] No. 52, p. 489, l. 19.
[3] No. 52, p. 570, l. 7.
[4] No. 52, p. 571, l. 46.
[5] No. 52, p. 511, l. 21.

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COMMANDERS OF THE 20TH AND 21ST ARMY CORPS

GEN. A. McD. McCOOK

GEN. THOS. L. CRITTENDEN

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Thomas on the next day, September 11,[1] accepting rebuke without a word incloses a note to the commanding general, received from General Negley,[2] representing the latter's difficulties, encountered in meeting a superior force and finding a blockaded road. It will be noticed from General Thomas' reply that he had no more appreciation than General Rosecrans of the dangerous situation in which his corps then was, opposite to Bragg's whole army concentrated near Lafayette. He further pleads[3] in extenuation of his failure to capture Lafayette: —

> If I had had Wilder's Brigade I am satisfied Lafayette would have been in our possession now, as with it I could have prevented the enemy from blockading this road.

A comparison of the Confederate orders, dispatches, and reports of this time shows that repeated orders had been issued by Bragg, on September 9 and 10, for the immediate movement of three of his divisions on Negley's position,[4] and that the blockaded road, referred to by Thomas, was the chief excuse made by the Confederate officer commanding for his failure to obey orders. Thus, this blockaded road was Thomas' salvation. The text of one of these orders is as follows: —

> Headquarters, Army Tennessee,
> Gordon's Mill, Sept. 10, 1863 — 7.30 P.M.
>
> Major-General Hindman, Commanding, &c.
>
> General: — The enemy is now divided. Our force at or near Lafayette is superior to the enemy. It is important now to move vigorously and crush him.
>
> I am, General, very respectfully your obedient servant,
> Kinloch Falconer,
> Assistant Adjutant-General.

Evidently Thomas' delay was not due to caution, but to the fact that his whole corps was not with him. There-

[1] No. 52, p. 534, l. 14.
[2] No. 52, p. 534, l. 37.
[3] No. 52, pp. 509–10.
[4] No. 51, pp. 296, 299, 301, 28 and 29.

fore, a battle at Pigeon Mountain was only averted by the chance absence of Wilder's Brigade and the blockaded road. Even on the morning of September 12, after Negley had been compelled to fall back to Stevens' Gap, General Thomas had not yet appreciated the necessity for the concentration of the Federal army. On the contrary, it appears in his dispatch to General Rosecrans,[1] that he advocated that Crittenden's Corps should immediately assault the enemy.

Not until noontime of September 12 did the overwhelming evidence as to actual conditions have effect upon General Rosecrans, and the truth dawn upon him that the enemy was not running away but was ready to fight him. This is indicated by his dispatch to General Granger at 11.45 A.M.:[2] —

> The enemy has concentrated in vicinity of Lafayette and attacked one of General Thomas' columns yesterday between Dug and Stevens' Gaps with superior force. We are concentrating the army to support General Thomas and fight a general battle.[3]
>
> If all reports are true [he says], we have not a moment to lose.

And he orders Granger's Reserve Corps moved forward at once.

Was the possession of Chattanooga the purpose of this "concentrating the army to support Thomas" and "Chickamauga an incident thereto — an item of cost in obtaining Chattanooga"?[4] This dispatch and others of record expose the falsity of this afterthought claim of General Rosecrans. At this hour on September 12 his objective was a hasty concentration for attack on a supposed demoralized enemy. He wanted the ground reconnoitred, and on September 13, 7 P.M., General Thomas reported[5]

[1] No. 52, p. 564, l. 19.
[2] See Notes to chapter I, Note G.
[3] No. 52, p. 600.
[4] No. 52, p. 596, l. 35.
[5] See Notes to chapter I, Note I.

upon the passes of Pigeon Mountain through which this "forward movement" was contemplated — Dug, Catlett's, and Blue Bird Gaps. But Bragg's movements on the offensive now interfered to reverse conditions and the Federal army for the first time during the campaign is placed on the defensive.

On the 13th of September, General Rosecrans had fully awakened "from his delusion that Bragg was making a disorderly retreat." [1]

On the early morn of that day, McCook's Corps, near Alpine at 8.15,[2] "had received orders to march to Thomas' assistance," in furtherance of Rosecrans' dispatch to concentrate his army as speedily as possible at its centre, Thomas' Corps at Stevens' Gap, opposite the gaps in Pigeon Mountain, where the Confederate army was concentrated, near Lafayette. Here he expressed his intention of giving battle, and for this purpose personally abandoned his headquarters at Chattanooga, where they had been established since the 9th inst. His personal headquarters on the night of the 13th, up to the 16th, were with Thomas at Stevens' and Cooper's Gaps, while Department Headquarters, as indicated by the dispatches, were still retained at Chattanooga until September 16.

I believe enough evidence has now been presented controverting this greatest of fallacies, as promulgated by General Rosecrans and exploited contrary to the facts of record, that the battle on the Chickamauga was necessary for the possession of Chattanooga.

The account of the joining of the battle on the 19th, and the successive movements of the two armies leading up to it, belong to another volume.

Bragg's purpose was the defeat of the Federal army and the prevention of its further invasion of Confederate territory. I believe it is thus demonstrated that the occupation

[1] D. H. Hill in *Century Magazine*, April, 1887. [2] No. 52, p. 596, l. 37.

of Chattanooga by him was only incidental to the defeat of the Federal army. If Chickamauga was not a Confederate victory, it might just as well be claimed that neither was Bull Run, nor any other battle of the war, and the Federal commander at Bull Run might also have said that the Confederate objective point was the occupation of Washington, and the failure to accomplish it was a Federal victory.

Thus, Rosecrans' "complimentary orders," while they may have served their purpose, cannot be regarded as truthful history in any particular; nor will the soldiers who wish to know the truth discover it in the literature of the Park Commission, nor in the marking of the battle-field park. A still worse conception of the truth of the battle is to be found in literature disseminated by the various states through the medium of their Chickamauga Park Commissions, who for the most part have accepted the National Commission's statements as truth.[1] As an example, we have selected the *History of the Michigan Organizations at Chickamauga, Chattanooga, etc., 1863* (Lansing, Mich.: Published by the State of Michigan. Robert Smith Printing Co. 1897), wherein, describing the end of the battle (p. 57), the following statements are claimed to be made on the authority of the "Official Reports and other authentic sources": —

> At half-past five o'clock it was quiet again along the Union left. Longstreet, however, kept up the fight for another hour, though at every point unsuccessful.
>
> General Thomas' lines were solid at every point; the Confederate lines were at bay, their right too much shattered to again be of any service. The whole Union line could have been held from that time on, but daylight was needed to set the army in motion. Chattanooga, and not the woods and hills of Chickamauga, was

[1] The one exception is the conscientious, painstaking *Report of Indiana Commissioners Chickamauga National Military Park*, which is a credit to the state whose sons bore a conspicuous part and exceeded in numbers those of any other.

the objective of the campaign, and General Thomas, having full discretion, decided to occupy the passes in his rear that controlled the roads to Chattanooga. It was in no sense a retreat. If Thomas did not occupy these passes in the night coming on, Bragg would have done so, and the object he had in view would have been accomplished. Had Thomas allowed it, Bragg would have been only too glad to have withdrawn from the field and retreated on Rossville. Thomas did not permit it but went there first, and Chattanooga was won.

And (p. 59): —

At nightfall (of the 21st) the army advanced to Chattanooga; advanced is the word. The term "retreated," so persistently used in regard to this movement, has no place in the truthful history of this campaign. Every foot of the campaign was a march in advance and not retreat.[1]

Of the number of such books there is no end. The undertaking would be a weariness to the flesh even to begin the Augean task of clearing up similar misrepresentations and perversions of the truth. Yet it is my purpose to offer to the lovers of the truth the opportunity to investigate all such statements, which so radically differ from what is contained in these pages by the specification of the page and line in the Official Reports, where my basis of authority for the truth is found.

In reading some of these books and magazine articles,

[1] "Since the world began it was not heard" of before that a so-called victorious army was one which threw away its arms and accoutrements in flight and abandoned the battle-field and the wounded to the tender mercy of the foe.

Bragg reports (No. 51, p. 23, l. 23) the number of Federal small arms collected on the field after the battle as over 15,000, while in front of one division alone, Preston's on Horseshoe Ridge, his report (No. 51, p. 417, l. 40) is as follows: "The next morning about 4500 stand of arms, which had been thrown away by the fleeing enemy, were secured by my command."

Just as at Bull Run, the Federal army at Chickamauga abandoned their wounded and dead on the field and threw away everything that would impede their progress in what Generals Rosecrans, Boynton, and others claim as their glorious advance to Chattanooga, and when this army reached its goal of victory it intrenched itself therein in safety against their defeated foes and seriously considered the alternative of starvation or surrender.

so-called histories of the battle, and noting at the same time how the evidence contained in the Official Reports is perverted, and even misquoted, I am forcibly reminded of a passage in a book of poems [1] which I took down from my library shelf to-day: —

"Some books are lies frae end to end,
And some great lies were never penn'd:
Ev'n Ministers they hae been kenn'd,
In holy rapture,
Great lies and nonsense baith to vend,
And nail't wi' Scripture."

But the heart of this hydra-headed monster of untruth, whence the stream of most of these misrepresentations and perversions is diffused, particularly the literature of State Commissions, comes from the newspaper writings and similar publications of Colonel Henry V. Boynton, — for example, the above quotation from the State of Michigan Chickamauga National Park Commission's propaganda is taken, almost word for word, without giving the credit or discredit of it to him, from General Boynton's article in the Cincinnati *Commercial Gazette*, under date of Washington, August 17, in a series of articles which appeared in 1888 in that paper, but which are copied in a more permanent form in Donn Piatt's *Life of General George H. Thomas*, on pages 417 and 419 of which we find the above-quoted passages from the pen of the Chairman of the Michigan Park Commission. These articles [2] are very cleverly and interestingly written, but when the student of history studies them in the light of the Official Reports and Records of the battle, he will find that from beginning to end they are a conglomeration of misstatements and perversions, and that General Boynton has juggled with the

[1] *Poems, chiefly in the Scottish Dialect.* By Robert Burns. Philadelphia: Peter Stewart and George Hyde. 1788.

[2] Donn Piatt, *Life of General George H. Thomas*, pp. 367–426. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co. 1895.

official data with a reckless disregard of truth as to time, place, and circumstance.

Seven years later he published *The National Military Park, Chickamauga-Chattanooga, An Historical Guide,*[1] wherein he does not repeat the most glaring of his misrepresentations contained in his earlier newspaper articles, which had, in the mean time, been adopted by many of the State Commissions as their standard of truth.

In consequence of the dissemination of all this literature, which is not history, the public have been grossly deceived. Northern historians have honestly believed Boynton's statements and have incorporated them in their work as if taken from authentic and authoritative sources.

There are also Confederate writers who have fallen into error by the adoption of the streams of misinformation emanating from the same fountainhead.

I may state personally that when I started this work of mine, I was free from all prejudice, the *dramatis personæ* of my picture scene of the battle being merely names to me and none of them even acquaintances, except, of course, my father, who was killed in battle at Petersburg when the writer was of too tender an age to obtain any knowledge from him about Chickamauga. I must, however, confess having read Northern as well as Southern literature almost universally in condemnation of General Bragg's ability as a soldier.[2] In the course of my study, however, I have awakened to the fact that, whatever may have been his faults before or immediately after the Battle of Chickamauga, there is no evidence contained in the Official Reports of any action or order of his, particularly on September 20, which I can find deserving of anything but the

[1] Cincinnati: The Robert Clarke Co. 1895.

[2] For noteworthy exception thereto read the *Memoirs* of Henry Villard, who writes after a laborious study of the Records and from personal knowledge as well. See Notes to chapter I, Note H.

greatest of praise. The worst that can be said against him is that he was unfortunate, — therefore unsuccessful as a leader.

I further desire to disclaim any personal animus towards General Boynton, while at the same time making him, in my opinion, more responsible than any other one party for the mystery with which the history of the battle has been surrounded. In extenuation of his conduct in giving to the world so many untruths about the positions and movements of the various organizations of both armies in the battle, it may be said that his training as a newspaper man did not fit him for an historian, but the rôle which he filled was that of

> "A flattering painter who made it his care,
> To paint things as they ought to be, not as they are."

Again, it is to be noticed that General Boynton, in giving his original contributions to the newspapers, was acting as a special advocate in behalf of General Rosecrans, and elaborated upon the latter's explanations of his errors in a way that outheroded Herod himself. In our Notes to chapter I, Note C, we shall find a newspaper interview which General Rosecrans gave out in the same year, 1888, that Boynton's articles were appearing in the newspapers, from which it would appear that, after all, General Boynton was acting as the mouthpiece[1] of General Rosecrans. When a few years later, General Boynton was called upon to fill the office of Historian of the Park Commission, his position was an embarrassing one. He was not willing to stultify himself by carefully studying the Official Records and adopting truths which would have disproved the statements he had made as a newspaper correspondent; but the most difficult position of all that he had to fill was in connection with the history of the fight on Horseshoe Ridge, in which he had participated as the commanding

[1] See Notes to chapter I, Note I.

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
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

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officer of the 35th Ohio, which formed a part of Van Derveer's Brigade of Brannan's Division.

In his efforts to do justice to his command and his commander, and at the same time fill the rôle of historian, he has made an awful mess of it in marshaling the Federal forces on Horseshoe Ridge in accordance with his desire of making his regiment and the command to which he belonged the most prominent Federal organization in the stubborn defense which was made in this, the Federal army's, last stronghold. He also found it impossible to make his statements as a newspaper man square with those of the historian, and consequently had to mutilate the picture previously painted by himself, but still continuing to represent his personal fancy at the expense of historical truth.

In the future pages of this work, it is my purpose to expose most of these errors.

A final caution, most essential to the impartial student who visits this great panoramic, historic battle-field park, is to bid him beware of the pitfalls of nomenclature, when he reaches that point of the battle-field where the final issue was decided, — the Federal stronghold at the end of the battle, where in the woods and mountains the Federal centre and part of their right wing took refuge at midday, and were followed by the Confederate left wing. Let him not be misled by any such general terms as "Snodgrass Hill," or the "Snodgrass Hill Line." Let him use the term "*Horseshoe Ridge*," by which term it is repeatedly designated in the Official Records; let him know the three distinct hills composing that ridge, which is not a "hill," and let him know where the "Main" or "Missionary Ridge" connects; let him know where the Snodgrass house is, at the edge of the woods, over two hundred yards north of the summit of the east hill of Horseshoe Ridge, and fifty feet lower in elevation; and, finally, let him notice also the Snod-

grass cornfield or bare plateau about the old farmhouse, with a considerable northerly slope[1] extending nearly one mile to the Ridge road and Mullis' house. Let him observe also the ravine south of the Horseshoe and the fifty feet lower ridge beyond; also, the ravine north of the Horseshoe, and the deep hollow southwest of the Snodgrass house. Let him not be imposed upon, in his difficult research, by calling all the points referred to as included in the "Snodgrass Hill Line."[2]

So long as the memory of Chickamauga lives, so long, coincident with it, the term "Snodgrass Hill" will be used, notwithstanding the fact that the Official Records and Reports contain no such designation. On the other hand, Horseshoe Ridge is the term frequently applied, in the Official Reports of General Granger and others (as fully set forth later[3]), to the ridge above described.

For sentimental purposes, therefore, in the retention of this historic term "Snodgrass Hill," let us give the above-described bare hill, on the summit of which is Snodgrass house, surrounded by his garden and farm, "a local habitation and a name." This, then, is what we shall call Snodgrass Hill, if we must use this term, but let us limit it to the boundaries set forth, and make no mistake in confounding this hill with the Horseshoe Ridge, south of it, fifty feet higher, distinctly separate, and which is described in the Official Reports as the last Federal stronghold, abandoned by them at sunset, as fully demonstrated in future pages. The Confederates, as will be shown, gained their first permanent foothold[4] on the east extremity of the Horseshoe about 5 P.M. The Federal forces which had occupied it were then driven back beyond the Snodgrass house. Here, being reinforced by a brigade from their left

[1] See illustration opposite.
[2] See reproduction of Government Map, p. 242, chapter XII.
[3] See chapter XII, p. 275.
[4] See chapter VII, p. 167.

SNODGRASS HOUSE, REAR VIEW

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wing, they renewed the battle and fired a few volleys against the Confederates occupying the east hill of the Horseshoe, and who were by this time short of ammunition. When Confederate support arrived on Horseshoe Ridge, this last Federal line of battle at Snodgrass house, or Snodgrass Hill, withdrew north from the battle-field.

There can be but one complete picture of the battle-scene, with the correct relative alignment of the different organizations in each army, together with their actual positions and movements on each side, and the respective points where the opposing forces encountered each other. Any error made in connection with the actual or relative position of one organization must find its counterpart in error somewhere else, and the picture is, in consequence, blurred, and we know that the truth is not in it. Like the jig-saw picture-puzzles, now so popular, we must, in order to obtain the correct picture, place every one of the thousand blocks in its proper place.

I have found another check upon the accuracy of my work. I have followed out the movements of each corps; then the movements of each division of each and every corps; and finally, the movements of every regiment, battalion, and battery of each brigade in every division; and, where the units of organization have dovetailed perfectly, I have obtained, I think, a mathematical demonstration in many instances of the accuracy of the work. After one has accomplished the chimerical task which I have suggested, he may claim to know something about the truth of this most wonderful battle.

In consequence of this work of mine, I claim respect for the accuracy of the premises on which my conclusions are based, for the truth of which the Official Reports are responsible, and with which these conclusions square.

In Serial No. 50 are to be found the Federal Official Reports, to which alone I at first directed my work. In

Serial No. 51 are contained the Confederate Reports, and when I had mastered these also, I set about the work of reconciling the statements of the two. Having, as best I could, accomplished this, I turned my attention to all authoritative printed works, available manuscripts, and to a correspondence with every known survivor, Federal and Confederate, whose address I could obtain. I then submitted their statements to the same refining process, making the Official Records the standard as to their accuracy.

If this history is read by any Comrade who is able to pick a flaw in the picture which I shall present, I hope that he will point it out to me; and when the flaw has been tested by the light of the Official Records and the refining process which I have described, I will gladly make the correction, and will appreciate his patriotism in this cause of truth.

I cannot present the whole picture within a small compass, and I shall therefore describe only a limited part of the complete picture of the battle, for the purpose of a demonstration of the great "if," which the writer maintains to have been the greatest in General Buckner's career, and as great as any other "if" which beat the Confederacy.

I have before me, under date of September 20, 1905 (which, by a coincidence, was the forty-second anniversary of the Battle of Chickamauga), a letter written to me by General Simon Bolivar Buckner, inclosing a copy of his map of the battle-field, drawn at the time of the battle by his engineer officer, Captain Foster,[1] a map the publication of which is omitted in the Official Records, though a copy of it, General Buckner says, was forwarded to the compilers. This map defines the various positions of Stewart's and Preston's Divisions of Buckner's Corps and of the brigades which composed them. A duplicate of the

[1] See volume II for this map.

original map by Foster, accompanying an original draft of the Official Report of Colonel Trigg, who commanded a brigade in Preston's Division, Buckner's Corps, has also been presented to me by the Colonel's widow. The latter map, besides corroborating General Buckner's, defines still further the position and movement made by Colonel Trigg at the end of the battle.

On his map, General Buckner has marked for me the various positions which he in person occupied, giving me the descriptions thereof in his letter. "At the end of the battle," he says, "at the hour of sunset the enemy were retreating hastily from every part of the field." He defines a position west of the Lafayette road, near the base of the east extremity of Horseshoe Ridge, at a point where (now, as then) is a clump of trees with a spring near by. "Here," he says, "I was joined very soon by General Longstreet"; and "it was here that I received the report of General Preston, brought by his aide, Captain Blackburn,[1] — now U. S. Senator from Kentucky, — giving the result of his successful charge, sending in quite a number of prisoners, and *requesting permission to pursue the enemy by moonlight. My commander, General Longstreet, being present, I had no authority to act on his suggestion.*"[2] I have submitted this statement of General Buckner to the refining process already described. His Official Report at the time of the battle, and General Longstreet's Report, as well as all other Confederate Official Reports, are in accord. A study of the Federal Official Reports shows the same fact, namely, that, at the time mentioned, "sunset," the battle had ended. If a definition as to what constitutes the end of this battle is requested, I would say that it was when both wings of the Federal army abandoned the positions which they had defended, and were followed, in pursuit or in the capturing of prisoners, by the Confederates. In other

[1] See Notes to chapter I, Note K.

[2] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.

words, that the end of the battle was when General Longstreet, being left in command of the Confederate army, halted the pursuit. At this time, a few seconds after six o'clock, the sun went down, and the moon rose; and it was a bright moonlight night. The Chattanooga Nautical Almanac Office has furnished me with a statement showing that, on September 20, 1863, local mean time at Chickamauga, sunset was at ten seconds after six o'clock, and that the end of twilight was at 7.25 P.M., the duration of twilight being one hour and twenty-four minutes.[1]

Efforts were made at the time of the battle, and have been continued since then, to suppress and misrepresent the truth of the facts as to the closing scenes. The reader may judge for himself as to some of these misrepresentations, by reference to the same Records where I have found them; and he can make allowances and excuses for these Federal official misrepresentations and shortcomings as may suit himself, while I can only promise impartiality, and to "nothing extenuate nor set down aught in malice."

[1] Notes to chapter I, Note L.

CHAPTER II

SEPARATING TRUTH FROM FICTION IN HALLECK'S AND ROSECRANS' TESTIMONY

General Halleck, in Washington, a thousand miles away from the battle-field, exercises his imagination in describing the closing scenes from his viewpoint, which was absolutely different from that of every participant in the battle, including those who sent their Official Reports to him, — which Reports we have before us. On November 15 he says:[1] "At nightfall the enemy fell back beyond the range of our artillery, *leaving Thomas victorious on his hard-fought field.*"[2] No comment even is necessary in refutation of this palpable falsehood,[3] for we have the evidence that he knew better, which is contained in his telegram[4] from Washington on September 21, to General Burnside at Knoxville, and which reads as follows: —

> General Rosecrans telegraphs at 9 o'clock this morning that if your troops *do not join him immediately, they will be compelled to move down the north side of the Tennessee River.* As the enemy has driven General Rosecrans back to near Chattanooga, Bragg may throw his force immediately into East Tennessee between

[1] Serial No. 50, p. 30, l. 21.

[2] Italics are mine. — Author.

[3] "Falsehood" is here used advisedly in preference to "mistake." In the multiplicity of business cares, forgetfulness ofttimes is a cause for unintentional deviation from the truth; but the Official Records reject any such plea for General Halleck. There might be some allowance for his embodiment in his Report of quotations from General Rosecrans' statements completely at variance with the latter's personal communications with himself and the War Department; but no extenuating circumstances can be urged to justify what a reference to Thomas' own Report, and all other Official Reports, proves to have been a fabrication. Moreover, Halleck's own statement is of record that he had "never read or seen" Thomas' Report. (Halleck's letter to Thomas, January 12, 1864: No. 50, p. 257, l. 45.)

[4] No. 52, p. 709.

you and General Rosecrans. The extent of our defeat and loss is not known here. General Rosecrans will require all the assistance you can give him to hold Chattanooga.

The telegram which Halleck refers to is the one sent by General Rosecrans to President Lincoln. This is evident from the context, which I give in full:[1]—

CHATTANOOGA, TENN., September 21, 1863 — 9 A.M.
(Received War Department 12.45 P.M.)

HIS EXCELLENCY ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
President of the United States.

After two days of the severest fighting I ever witnessed our right and centre were beaten. The left held its position *until sunset*.[2] Our loss is heavy and our troops worn down. The enemy received heavy reinforcements Saturday night. Every man of ours was in action Sunday and all but one brigade on Saturday. Our wounded large compared with the killed. We took prisoners from two divisions of Longstreet. We have no certainty of holding our position here. If Burnside could come immediately it would be well; otherwise he may not be able to join us unless he comes on west side of river.

W. S. ROSECRANS,
Major-General, Commanding.

General Rosecrans thus telegraphed to President Lincoln on the morning after the battle what he knew to be the truth, that the right, centre, and left of his army were beaten and the battle-field abandoned *at sunset*.

When General Rosecrans sent the above telegram at 9 o'clock Monday morning, he was fully informed of his army's complete defeat and that the final issue had been settled, as he says, at sunset on the day before, when the last of his troops abandoned their position on the battle-field. Still further information, on this morning after the battle, has disclosed to him the fact that his defeated army cannot hold its present position, even at Rossville, and he

[1] No. 50, p. 149, l. 43. [2] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.

GEN HENRY W. HALLECK

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now expresses to the President doubt of his ability to hold Chattanooga, and indicates his preparations for withdrawal to the west side of the Tennessee River, where Burnside's belated support may be able to join him.

This telegram of his is directly in line with the evidence deduced from the Official Reports, and embodies the full truth of the situation as he knew it. It was no hasty telegram, sent under doubtful knowledge of the issue; it was only a complete confirmation, with more details added, of the disaster that had befallen his army, and of his peremptory orders, sent in two dispatches before 5 o'clock P.M. (and which were promptly obeyed), for its withdrawal or abandonment of the battle-field. General Halleck was more or less advised of the truth as above set forth, and had in his possession or had access to General Rosecrans' dispatches to himself, the President, and the War Department.

Let us array the above record of facts in their chronological order.

The first news from the battle-field received in Washington was sent from Chattanooga by Mr. Dana at 4 o'clock P.M. to the Secretary of War. Mr. Dana was evidently the first to get to the telegraph office, and I cull from what he sent the interesting matter pertaining to this part of our discussion:[1] —

CHATTANOOGA, Sept. 20 — 4 P.M.

My report to-day is of deplorable importance. Chickamauga is as fatal a name in our history as Bull Run. . . . Rosecrans escaped by the Rossville Road. Enemy not yet arrived before Chattanooga. Preparations making to resist his entrance for the time.

C. A. D.

HON. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

[1] No. 50, p. 92, l. 22.

The context of this telegram indicates that Dana preceded Rosecrans. The Records show that General Rosecrans was the next to arrive in town, as he says at 3.40 P.M.,[1] and as the Records also indicate, he took possession of the telegraph office located at General Wagner's headquarters,[2] whence he sent his first dispatch, as he says, at "4.15 P.M.,"[3] to General Thomas on the battle-field, to withdraw to Rossville, the text of which will be found in chapter IV, page 75; and the context indicates that Crittenden and McCook had not yet joined Rosecrans in Chattanooga. It will be noticed that the order is imperative and that Rosecrans was making preparations for the defense of Chattanooga.

The first news which General Rosecrans received from the battle-field was the dispatch from Garfield, sent from Thomas' headquarters at 3.45 P.M.[4] We have corroborative evidence that this telegram was received direct from the battle-field before 5 P.M.: —

(1) This is indicated by the context of a telegram sent at 5 P.M. to General Halleck:[5] —

CHATTANOOGA, TENN.,
Sept. 20, 1863 — 5 P. M.

MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

We have met with a serious disaster; extent not yet ascertained. Enemy overwhelmed us, drove our right, pierced our centre, and scattered troops there. Thomas, who had seven divisions, remained intact at last news. Granger, with two brigades, had gone to support Thomas on the left. Every available reserve was used when the men stampeded. Burnside will be notified of the state of things at once, and you will be informed.

W. S. ROSECRANS,
Major-General, Commanding.

[1] No. 50, p. 256, l. 47.
[2] No. 50, p. 256, l. 40.
[3] No. 50, p. 941, l. 8.
[4] See chapter IV, p. 67.
[5] No. 50, p. 142, l. 41.

(2) General Rosecrans' sworn testimony, on February 4, 1864, at the McCook Court of Inquiry, is to the effect that he had received "General Garfield's report from the extreme front" before McCook's arrival at Chattanooga, and that this arrival was "about 4.30 or 5 P.M."

We have, therefore, fully established the fact that Garfield's 3.45 P.M. dispatch was received within forty-five minutes after Rosecrans sent his dispatch to Thomas at 4.15 P.M.[1] A consideration of Garfield's statement[2] that it was "difficult to get communication to the rear," as well as other evidence from the Records, leads me more definitely to locate the time as between 4.30 and 5 P.M., when Rosecrans was first advised as to Thomas' position and the condition of his troops.

It is further in evidence that, immediately after the receipt of Garfield's message, General Rosecrans sent a reply to it. The evidence of this fact as to the time is contained in the context of the telegram, "See General McCook and other general officers," showing that its sending-time was before General McCook reported to Rosecrans "about 4.30 or 5 P.M."[3] From this telegram it will be observed that Rosecrans made no question of the withdrawal of the remnant of his army, under General Thomas and General Granger, from their positions on the battle-field, thereby assuming that his previous order, at 4.15 P.M., had been obeyed, the only doubt in his mind being as to their ability to retire *in order* to Rossville, as previously stated.

After Rosecrans had sent this second withdrawal order, fugitives from the battle-field arrived at his headquarters, or Wagner's headquarters, including, besides General McCook and other general officers, Captain J. C. Hill,

[1] Rosecrans' *Century Magazine* article of May, 1887, gives evidence confirming this. See also Notes to chapter IV, Note A.

[2] No. 50, p. 144, l. 47.

[3] No. 50, p. 941, l. 9; full text on p. 155, chapter VI.

acting aide to General Rosecrans.[1] The latter officer had, at 4 P.M., or later, met, as appears in his own sworn testimony on February 9, 1864, in the Negley Court of Inquiry,[2] Colonel Thruston of General McCook's staff, who, as we shall presently notice, had accompanied General Garfield to Thomas' headquarters at the Snodgrass house, and after leaving there, joined General Davis at McFarland's Gap, about 4 P.M. This news, via Hill and Thruston, was therefore no more recent than the information earlier obtained through Garfield's dispatch direct from the front. But the important information which General Rosecrans did receive from Hill was a message from General Sheridan signifying his intention of supporting Thomas by moving to his left via the Rossville and Lafayette road. The full context of this telegram follows:[3] —

CHATTANOOGA, Sept. 20, 1863 — 5 o'clock.

GENERAL SHERIDAN,
Rossville.

Verbal message by Captain Hill received. Support General Thomas by all means. If he is obliged to fall back, he must secure the Dug [Dry] Valley. Right falling back slowly and contesting the ground inch by inch.

By order of Major-General Rosecrans,

C. GODDARD,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

In the above, the statement, "If he [Thomas] is obliged to fall back," indicates a doubt in General Rosecrans' mind as to whether his orders to withdraw had been obeyed. This was due to the news communicated by him through Thruston and Hill, yet he had no information as to whether Garfield's 3.45 P.M. dispatch, or this last communication to him was the latest from the battle front. What follows this clause in the telegram is equivocal, if we

[1] No. 50, p. 948, l. 33.
[2] No. 50, p. 142, l. 31
[3] No. 50, p. 1022, ll. 44 *et seq.*

accept the way it is punctuated, but a revision of the sentence as follows makes it perfectly clear: "If he is obliged to fall back, he must secure the Dry Valley, right falling back slowly and contesting the ground inch by inch." I understand General Rosecrans' meaning to be, "If Thomas is obliged to fall back before or after Sheridan's support arrives, he [Thomas] must secure the Dry Valley with the aid of the right wing of the army, who must fall back slowly and contest the ground inch by inch." Any other interpretation, based upon the punctuation as recorded, would be absurd or equivocal. Thomas' troops were not in the Dry Valley, but the right wing of the army was there, with Sheridan's Division in advance of the withdrawing forces arriving in Rossville via the Dry Valley road. General Rosecrans, as the context shows, did not refer to Thomas' troops as falling back slowly and contesting the ground inch by inch, nor was he giving information to General Sheridan that such was the state of affairs existing on the right of the army, from which quarter news had just come through Sheridan himself. It is plain, therefore, that General Rosecrans intended this as an order (not gratuitous information) for the troops on the right, except Sheridan's Division, to fall back slowly and contest the ground inch by inch.[1]

From the Records it appears that within less than half an hour, General Rosecrans, with the aid of his staff officers, Goddard and McMichael, composed and dispatched five vital telegrams, four of them dated 5 P.M. The other two, which are not hitherto mentioned, follow; the one:[2] —

[1] Even if the original of this telegram in Colonel Goddard's handwriting were accessible and shown to have been properly recorded, this would not prove that it was correctly written according to General Rosecrans' dictation.

Mr. Joseph W. Kirkley, in charge of the Official Records Office of the War Department, says that "one hundred chances to one this telegram on the Records is not copied from the original, and the context is the best proof of what the correct punctuation should be."

[2] No. 50, p. 142, l. 23.

CHATTANOOGA,
Sept. 20, 1863 — 5 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL BURNSIDE: —

We have met with a severe disaster. The extent of it is not yet known. If you are near enough to join us, do so at once. If you are still too far away to form a junction, let me know your exact position, and I will advise you what you had better do.

W. S. ROSECRANS,
Major-General.

The other:[1] —

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
CHATTANOOGA, Sept. 20, 1863 — 5 P.M.

Officer Commanding Advance,
General Burnside's Army,
Cleveland [Tenn.].

SIR: — Hasten forward with your command to this place as rapidly as possible. We need you as soon as you can get here. The route by Tyner's will probably be the best. I send you dispatch for General Burnside, which please forward to him with all possible speed.

By order of Major-General Rosecrans.

C. GODDARD,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

General Rosecrans received other messages from Rossville that night corroborating what he knew and expected of his army's defeat and withdrawal to Rossville "utterly exhausted and without rations."[2] After Garfield's 3.45 P.M. dispatch "from the extreme front," Rosecrans did not hear from his chief of staff until the latter's dispatch from the extreme rear of Thomas' troops[3] at Rossville at 8.40 P.M. Garfield's telegram of this hour must have given him some momentary degree of comfort, for Granger's buffoonery, hiding his own shortcomings (as will be shown presently), imposed upon Garfield's credulity. But that night

[1] No. 50, p. 142, l. 12. [2] No. 50, p. 143, l. 32.

[3] To have said extreme rear of the army would not be applicable. A part of the army had fled to Chattanooga, and some had not stopped until the Tennessee River had intervened between them and the Confederate pursuit.

after all the troops had "moved back" to Rossville, and Garfield had the opportunity to see and know from his own personal knowledge the whole situation, both as to the position and condition of the troops, he summed up his findings as to the army's defeat and its inability to hold Rossville if the battle were renewed, in the following telegram to his chief: —

Rossville, Sept. 21, 1863 — 7.45 A.M.

General Rosecrans: —

I do not feel sure that this line is a good one for a general battle, and I do not know how much reliance can be placed on the stampeded troops.[1] I understand from General Crittenden that you expect me in town this morning, and I will start in a few minutes, after seeing General Thomas. On the whole, I do not feel sure but that you ought to remain at Chattanooga until we see the developments and organize the rear.

Very truly, yours,
J. A. Garfield,
Brigadier-General.[2]

Is there any wonder, then, when General Rosecrans received this telegram, embodying the truth (as is proven also by the Records), that he telegraphed the news of his complete defeat in his 9 A.M. telegram to President Lincoln? This telegram is unquestionably the one which Secretary Stanton is said to have shown to Governor Morton of Indiana and to General Steedman, and which, in a heated interview,[3] was pronounced by General Rosecrans many years after as a "base and an infamous forgery," due to Secretary Stanton's hatred of him. The suggestion that the Secretary of War could have perpetrated such an infamy to injure the commanding general is an obvious

[1] "The troops at Rossville were simply a mob, without organization or discipline, in inextricable confusion, and a division of the enemy at this time could have blotted out the Army of the Cumberland," is the statement of General John Beatty. See chapter IV, p. 102.

[2] See Notes to chapter II, Note A.

[3] See Notes to chapter I, Note C.

absurdity. For how could Secretary Stanton, without detection and without possessing powers of divination, have forged this telegram to President Lincoln, sent from Chattanooga at the critical moment, and on the basis of which action was taken by the Government, through its Commander-in-Chief, General Halleck, in immediately telegraphing General Burnside at Knoxville orders to go to Rosecrans' support? It will be presently noticed also that a telegram to the same purport had been sent by General Rosecrans on the evening of September 20 to General Morgan, that a "serious disaster" had befallen his army.

General Rosecrans, his supporters and apologists, Colonels H. V. Boynton and Donn Piatt in particular, from that day to this have contended that the battle fought on September 19 and 20, 1863, was a "glorious Federal victory." It is evident that General Rosecrans knew that such contention was an absurdity if it were proven that he had telegraphed on September 20 and 21, announcing the rout and disastrous defeat of his army. Hence his only refuge, when confronted with the truth, was to pronounce his own telegrams forgeries.

In my efforts to ferret out the real truth of this great battle, I have no desire nor intention of accusing these generals of deliberate falsification. The Confederate Official Reports unanimously claim a great victory for their side, and they are corroborated by the statements of Federal officers as well, including Generals Rosecrans (in his dispatches), Sheridan, John Beatty, and others, to the effect that the Federal Army was routed and suffered a disastrous defeat on the afternoon and evening of September 20, statements which are completely at variance with the theory which classifies Chickamauga among the Federal victories in this great Confederate War.[1] It is the

[1] To the general claim of Federal victory there is another brilliant exception, — Henry Villard, who, about October 1, arrived at Chattanooga in the capacity of correspondent to the New York *Tribune*. See Notes to chapter II, Note B.

province of the historian to determine between these conflicting statements as to which is true and which is false. The Official Reports and Records answer the question in no Delphian way, but settle it conclusively to the satisfaction of every impartial military student who cares to consult them.

General Rosecrans, who, according to his statement,[1] had arrived in Chattanooga about 3.40 P.M., also describes the closing scenes from his viewpoint, twelve miles away:[2] "Longstreet's men, about sunset, made their last charge, when our men, being out of ammunition, rushed on them with bayonet, and they gave way to return no more." This statement also is without the support of any participant in the conflict which he describes. And further on,[3] the close of the battle is defined by him as the time when Reynolds' Division, of which we shall hear more later, was faced to the rear and moved with the bayonet at a double-quick. "At nightfall," he says, "the enemy had been repulsed along the whole line." If such were the truth, may we not well ask why his subordinates abandoned the battle-field, when along the whole line, from left to right, they repulsed the Confederates? With the Official Reports of these subordinates before him, reports which were in his hands when he made this statement on October 15, it is difficult to understand how he could have sent such a report to his Government.

Rosecrans' statements of the use of the bayonet by his men about sunset (except by those captured) and that thereupon the enemy "gave way to return no more," also that "at nightfall this enemy was repulsed along the whole line," are plain fabrications. The evidence that he knew these statements to be false is contained in his own telegram above quoted, sent to President Lincoln on the morn-

[1] No. 50, p. 256, l. 47.
[2] No. 50, p. 61, l. 21.
[3] No. 50, p. 61, l. 10.

ing after the battle. There are two important statements made in this truthful telegram to President Lincoln which should be emphasized, corroborating as they do the evidence of the Official Reports, which we discuss later. He says: "The left held its position until sunset," meaning by this that the army which remained on the battle-field under Thomas withdrew at sunset. The other statement is that, "Every man of ours was in action Sunday, and all but one brigade on Saturday." When we come to a calculation of the strength of his army this latter statement should be taken into consideration.[1]

There is still another telegram [2] which is an acknowledgment by Rosecrans of the defeat of his army, the truth of which he has endeavored to suppress in his Official Report. This telegram reads as follows: —

CHATTANOOGA, Sept. 20, 1863 — 7 P.M.

GENERAL MORGAN: —

You must secure the bridges at Bridgeport and Battlecreek at all hazards. Let me know your force. Your effort must be equal to the emergency. We have suffered a serious disaster though I trust by no means irretrievable.

ROSECRANS, Major-General.

Here we have a plain statement of General Rosecrans' knowledge that his army had been driven from the battle-field, and had suffered a serious disaster; and fearing pursuit he desires his line of retreat made secure. Had the enemy been repulsed along the whole line, would he not *per contra* have ordered forward all his spare troops from the rear?

The duration of Rosecrans' acknowledgment of defeat extended to the night of September 22, coincident with his realization that his adversary, General Bragg, had no intention of immediate pursuit and storming the defenses

[1] See Appendix, volume II. [2] No. 52, p. 449.

GEN. W. S. ROSECRANS

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of Chattanooga. Our authority for this statement is contained in the Record, as follows:[1] —

CHATTANOOGA, Sept. 22 — 6 P.M.

Rosecrans is considering question of retreat from here. I judge that he thinks that unless he can have assurances of ample reinforcements within one week, the attempt to hold this place will be much more disastrous than retreat. That part of the army which was routed on Sunday is much demoralized.

If you have any advice to give, it should come to-night.

C. A. DANA.

HON. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

When the night came, and no assault of the enemy, Dana sent another dispatch to his chief at 9.30 P.M. containing the following: "Rosecrans has determined to fight it out here at all hazards."

The last of the equivocal statements contained in General Rosecrans' Report to which we shall call attention is the following:[2] "General Thomas, having orders from the general commanding to use his discretion, determined to retire on Rossville."

A reference to General Thomas' Report, which we shall study presently, makes no mention whatever of General Garfield's bringing any orders from the commander-in-chief. On the contrary, it was only information which he received. By virtue of his position as the highest officer in rank on the battle-field, General Thomas was vested with discretionary powers, but these ceased when he received, soon after 4.30 P.M., the peremptory orders sent by General Rosecrans at 4.15 P.M. from Chattanooga, the same which we have recently discussed. These dispatches contain no mention or intimation for General Thomas to use his discretion.

Far from admitting that General Thomas held his posi-

[1] No. 50, p. 197, l. 1. [2] No. 59, p. 61, l. 25.

tion in the exercise of this alleged discretionary power, General Rosecrans' statement distinctly asserts[1] that "Thomas determined to retire on Rossville," which was exactly what his orders required. It is also noteworthy that in all the voluminous matter contained in General Rosecrans' reports, telegrams, and interviews, he nowhere makes the statement that Thomas did not immediately obey orders to withdraw.

His equivocal statement in his magazine article in the May, 1887, *Century* serves as additional evidence to our belief that no such word as "discretion" was sent by Rosecrans to Thomas orally, through Garfield, and certainly was not sent in either first or second dispatches ordering withdrawal.[2]

[1] No. 50, p. 61, l. 27.

[2] See Notes to chapter IV, Note A.

CHAPTER III

THE TRUE RECORD OF GENERAL THOMAS IN THE BATTLE

THIS chapter sets forth a true account of the part taken by General Thomas in the battle, the proof of which is contained in the Official Reports and Records.

The facts presented from this authoritative source materially differ from the generally accepted fictions which have passed for the history of the battle ever since it was fought, nearly half a century ago.

The statements contained in this chapter are therefore submitted to the reader as a proposition, the evidence in proof of which follows in the succeeding chapters, where every point of truth is demonstrated to him who wants it, giving page and line of recorded testimony, accessible to every one, and submitting a full and conscientious analytical study of the evidence, the work of many years, from which the truth has resulted.

In this battle on the afternoon of September 20, 1863, General Thomas acquired the appellation, "The Rock of Chickamauga," for a display of leonine strength and tenacity of purpose which, by a similar performance of duty, won for another great Virginia soldier the title "Stonewall" in the first great battle of the war.

Our standard of truth, the text-book from which we quote, plainly indicates that Thomas was the grandest figure of the Federal army: a monument of strength and inspiration to the courage of his soldiers, who had rallied in the woods and on the heights to which they had fled, and where they had been posted under the orders of their commanders, Generals Wood, Brannan, and John Beatty, and Colonels Harker, Stoughton, Hunter, and Walker.

Here, from one to one and a half hours, with a force of about 1500 fragments under Brannan and of at least 1200 (carefully estimated) of the Iron Brigade of Harker, including the 125th Ohio, "Opdycke's Tigers," and Smith's four guns and eighty-three men of the 4th United States Battery, whilom fugitives,[1] most of them, whose courage was restored by the very presence of Thomas, the pursuit was checked and the heights maintained against that most formidable instrument of war, Kershaw's South Carolina Brigade, fresh from storming the heights of Gettysburg, and from victories on many hard-fought fields, but none, according to their commander, more heavy than this. Kershaw's Brigade, about 1200 in action, with Colonel Oates' 15th Alabama Regiment, was the sole representative that afternoon of "Longstreet's Virginia Army," in the assaults on Chickamauga Heights; yet these men, on the strength of their reputation, inspired such terror that their numbers were more than quadrupled by the imagination of their opponents. About 2 o'clock P.M., to Kershaw's support on his left came Anderson's strong and brave Mississippi Brigade, of Hindman's Division; but still the heights were held, the 21st Ohio Regiment, the strongest in the Federal army, performing yeoman service at this juncture with its efficient use of its five-chambered Colt's revolving rifles.

Then followed the belated Bushrod Johnson, whose time and energies had been wasted for hours waiting for orders to advance his much-enduring, hard-fighting Ten-

This is the crucial moment and the die is cast. The 21st Ohio's thin line at its middle had been thrown back like a gate on its hinges, in a vain attempt to finally resist the Confederate movement on Brannan's flank. But fifteen

[1] The 21st Ohio is not referred to, and the term is doubtfully applied to the 125th Ohio.

minutes more and this rally on the heights would have been of no use, and Thomas' superb courage, famed in story, might never have been a theme of grandeur. Granger's Reserve Corps, without orders, marching *au canon, à la* Desaix at Marengo, had arrived on the field.

After reporting to General Thomas, General Steedman, of this corps, was ordered to move his division into the three-quarter-mile gap between the two wings of the army. The preparatory movement had been made, but before the final command of execution was given, the more immediate danger was seen in time. On the command "Right face," Steedman marched west in rear of Brannan's line until the latter's right was reached, when first Whitaker's Brigade and then Mitchell's were moved by the left flank. The division then charged up the heights, General Steedman performing the most conspicuous act of personal courage recorded of any general officer on the Federal side, leading his men, most of them raw recruits, then for the first time in action, and, seizing the flag of the 115th Illinois,[1] gained the crest and drove the Confederates down the southern slope of Missionary Ridge.

About the time that Steedman's Division was thus put into action, another strong brigade of well-seasoned troops, under the command of a Mexican War veteran, Colonel Van Derveer, reported to General Thomas at the Snodgrass house, and were immediately placed in the front in one line on the crest, relieving Brannan's troops (then almost exhausted), and posted next to the 21st Ohio's left, which still defended his flank on Horseshoe Ridge.

By this acquisition of 4112 fresh troops under Steedman and about 1200 under Van Derveer, who had already rendered most creditable and opportune service on the Federal left wing and rear, Thomas was now strong in numbers and his whole command well supplied with am-

[1] See S. H. C. Royse, *History of 115th Illinois*, pp. 133, 134. Terre Haute, 1900.

munition: for another great service rendered by Steedman was the bringing-up of ninety-five thousand extra rounds of ammunition, to be distributed among Brannan's and Harker's men, whose supply was nearly exhausted.

The aspect of affairs on the heights was now completely changed, and the exultant Federals, who had been a few minutes before fighting in desperation, were reinforced with strength and courage like men who had won a victory. It was now that General Thomas resolved to hold his position and the army on the field until nightfall. He made his preparations for the purpose by general distribution of ammunition among both wings of his army. The Confederate division commanders on the left wing had received forcible knowledge of the material change in conditions by the arrival of reinforcements in support of the hitherto hard-pressed Federals on the heights. They now got together for the first time. Hindman and Johnson joined the brigades of their divisions with Kershaw's Brigade for two successive assaults in desperate efforts to gain the heights; for up to this time distinctly noticeable is the lack of unity of action on the part of these Confederate generals, due to the absence of any orders whatever from their wing commander, General Longstreet, and their inability to find him on this part of the field. Nay, more: questions of rank and precedence arose between them, which only General Longstreet's presence could have settled, and from 12 o'clock until now they had pulled in opposite directions.

Nothing could exceed the intensity and desperation of the successive assaults which now followed, made by these seven Confederate brigades in line. Hindman mentions the fact that on his "extreme left the bayonet was used, and men also killed and wounded with clubbed muskets," while Kershaw on the right effected a momentary lodgment near the crest, which drove the Federals from the summit; but the latter, rallying all their available men,

GEN. JAMES B. STEEDMAN

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charged upon the South Carolinians, whose colors were only saved by their bearer, who, after receiving a mortal wound, turned and threw the staff backward over the works into the hands of his comrades.

It was up to this time that Thomas, by virtue of his rank, used his discretion and held his men on the heights, by the example which he set them and the love which they bore towards him. His antagonist, Longstreet, who for the most part of his time until now had stationed himself in the woods in the rear of his right division, Stewart's,[1] at this juncture, first emerged therefrom in time to witness from Dyer's field the last desperate assault of Kershaw. Preston's Division had at last been "pulled away from its mooring on the river-bank"[2] and had been advanced, with his leading brigade in line facing north, bisected by the Lafayette road, near the Poe house, with his other two brigades immediately in rear, also in line. Longstreet now got into the action in Dyer's field with his last division, Preston's, the strongest of all, which he had held in reserve. He still remained blind to the opportunity which had existed at noon and all afternoon, plainly evident to the Federal generals, Wood, Thomas, Hazen, and others. Why was it that he did not order the whole of Preston's Division directly forward along the Lafayette road, with Buckner's Reserve Artillery and the latter's other division, so as to fill the apparent[3] gap of one half to three quarters of a mile between the Federal wings?

There were in this same fringe of woods west of the Lafayette road, at this point, four other Confederate bri-

[1] No. 51, p. 863, l. 29.

[2] Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, p. 452. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co. 1895.

[3] "Apparent," because he had made a personal reconnaissance (No. 51, p. 858, l. 15) of the vicinity of this gap, and his staff officers, Colonel Sorrell and Captain Manning, had to suggest the movement to him before he adopted it, and without his appreciation of its significance (No. 51, p. 890, l. 41).

gades, none of which had moved since noontime. Humphreys' Mississippi Brigade, formerly Barksdale's, which, under orders of the wing commander, was anchored at the "Blacksmith Shop" and made no assault in the battle, the men begging in vain to join their comrades in the charge; then there were the Texas Brigade of General Robertson, Law's Alabama Brigade under Colonel Sheffield, and the Georgia Brigade under General Benning, all three under the command of General Law, comprising a part of Hood's famous division, then located[1] "in line perpendicular to the road, to the left and slightly in advance of Preston, and close to the burned house [Poe's]." Blind to his opportunity and ignorant of the weakest point in his adversary's line, which appears to have been a continued source of anxiety to General Thomas that afternoon, General Longstreet ordered only two brigades of Preston's to Dyer's field, leaving the other third of the division, Trigg's Brigade, at Brotherton's, for protection against a supposed enemy's cavalry, crossing the Chickamauga below Lee and Gordon's Mills, whom Trigg with two of his regiments "was sent 1½ miles back to intercept,"[2] on a perfectly useless reconnaissance, wasting valuable time and energy only to discover that the alleged enemy was "their own" Confederate General Wheeler's men. Gracie's and Kelly's brigades were then ordered forward to the relief of Kershaw and Anderson in a final and successful effort to gain the Heights of Chickamauga, and drive the enemy from his chosen stronghold, which was made the "keypoint" of the battle, first by the division commanders who followed the fugitives into the woods and mountain fastnesses and finally by the action of Longstreet himself.[3]

The assault of Gracie and Kelly had begun, preceded by

[1] No. 51, p. 368, l. 12.
[2] No. 51, p. 269, l. 25.
[3] No. 51, p. 427, l. 26.

"a deadly fire on the right and right rear of the forces in front of Stewart."[1] The movement of this artillery, principally composed of the twenty-four guns of the Reserve Corps Artillery, and commanded by Major Samuel C. Williams, was in General Buckner's special charge under General Longstreet's orders,[2] but it was not until Gracie had gained the heights that Longstreet ordered Buckner's advance northward, with a battery of twelve guns with Stewart's Division following,[3] Longstreet's object being not to drive this entering wedge between the two wings, so much as an effort to prevent the Federal left wing from reinforcing that part of their army which was posted on Horseshoe Ridge.[4] Had Longstreet's orders to accomplish his object been given more promptly and more effectually executed, the reinforcement of Hazen's Brigade would not so opportunely have arrived in support of Harker and Brannan, nor General Hazen been rewarded with a major-generalship's commission for his act, which saved both Harker and Brannan from capture or annihilation. But it was long before this that General Thomas' watchful eye and attentive ear, of the trained soldier, forewarned him of the approaching storm and the danger to what he knew to be the weakest point in his army's position. It was also at this juncture, about 4.30 P.M., not later, that he received the withdrawal order from General Rosecrans.

Heretofore, by reason of his being the ranking general on the field of battle, in the absence of any order from the commander-in-chief, Thomas had, in accordance with his resolve, used his power of discretion and maintained Harker's and Brannan's fugitive fragments at their position on the Horseshoe, assisted by the 21st Ohio, gener-

[1] General Buckner's letter, September 20, 1905.
[2] No. 51, p. 358, l. 50, and p. 289, l. 27.
[3] No. 51, p. 364, l. 40.
[4] No. 51, p. 290, l. 42; p. 359, l. 5; p. 360, l. 38.

ously loaned Brannan on his urgent request to General Negley, and had saved these men on the heights and the whole army from immediate destruction, until Steedman's and Van Derveer's arrival.

Another crisis now ensues. At the actual and relative time of Gracie's advance in magnificent array, as recognized in the Official Reports of Federal officers on the Horseshoe and described with much admiration personally to the writer by some of them (General Boynton included among the number), General Thomas now received Rosecrans' first dispatch, directed to himself, ordering withdrawal, and as proven by thirty of our witnesses against the testimony of only one to the contrary, the evidence in fact being unanimous on the subject, General Thomas did not and could not delay one moment his obedience to the order, and forthwith dispatched his aide, Captain Barker, for Reynolds to make a beginning of the movement. Orders were also dispatched to the other left wing division commanders for their withdrawal successively. This was a wise move, to begin the withdrawal at this quarter, because of the more precarious situation on his left wing, which at this juncture was within a few hundred yards of being completely enveloped by the Confederate lines.

Thomas left the Snodgrass house before Gracie took possession of the heights, leaving General Granger the only corps commander on the battle-field, and by virtue of his rank, in command of the troops under Harker and Brannan, as well as his own men under Steedman; but Granger's personal departure seems to have been timed by the very first indication of Confederate success in driving Harker from the heights. Thus General Thomas "quit when ordered and because he was ordered." Meanwhile the withdrawal of Reynolds had already begun before Barker's arrival with the order. General Reynolds is quoted as saying, in his position at the breastworks that

his only alternative was surrender. When his division reached the Lafayette road, General Thomas saw him. Putting himself at the head of Reynolds' Division, General Thomas led his army in the movement of withdrawal.

As before mentioned, the Confederates had nearly enveloped the Federal left wing; the front brigade of a division of the right wing had reached the vicinity of the Kelly house, passing in rear of the Federal divisions of Baird and Johnson. Thomas himself ordered the charge and the division cut its way out. At the same time the way was made clear for the escape of the other divisions of the Federal left wing, most of whom were retired in great disorder.

Reynolds, misunderstanding Thomas' order, moved straight along the Lafayette road toward the Rossville Gap, not halting with his section of the division until checked at Cloud Church by Forrest's cavalry, while Thomas, separating E. A. King's Brigade from the rest of the division, wheeled to the left near McDonald's house and reached a point of safety on the Ridge road at the head of McFarland's Gap. Here he halted and sent his orders for the withdrawal of the rest of the army, whom he had left on Chickamauga Heights, and who had been driven therefrom before his order arrived. He thus obeyed to the letter General Rosecrans' orders to withdraw. The most direct route of withdrawal to Rossville was by way of the Lafayette road and Rossville Gap, but, in accordance with the wording of Rosecrans' order, he moved toward McFarland's Gap to "join his army with Crittenden and McCook," whose forces were then known to him to have been in that neighborhood. Finally, the full letter of obedience to Rosecrans' order was followed when he "assumed a threatening attitude" by the formation of his line to resist pursuit and protect the withdrawal. This alignment extended from the head of McFarland's Gap to the

Lafayette road and Cloud house, nearly to the Rossville Gap. This alignment was completed about 5.30 P.M., and shortly thereafter General Rosecrans' second dispatch, sent through the medium of General Garfield, again ordered him to retire on Rossville, provided his troops were "retiring in order."

An analysis of Rosecrans' first dispatch indicates that he desired resistance made to the enemy's advance at Rossville until he could "make such dispositions for defense" of Chattanooga as would help to maintain his army after its withdrawal thereto. Again, on the receipt of the second dispatch, General Thomas obeyed orders, though that knight-errant, General Granger, having abandoned the troops at Horseshoe Ridge, reached Thomas in time, it appears, to counsel him to disobey; but Thomas would not listen to him.

On the next day thereafter, General Granger hastened to see his great and good friend, Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, and the latter telegraphed to Secretary Stanton, Granger's assumption of superior judgment in this counsel given to Thomas.

It was also in the vicinity of the Cloud house that General Sheridan, at 5.30 P.M., reported his arrival on Thomas' left. This general had just accomplished a feat which I believe to be unique in the annals of warfare, one, however, fully illustrative of his character as a soldier. He had received a terrible beating at noontime on the extreme right flank of the army, suffering a loss of over thirty per cent, yet he gathered and rallied together in the woods more than half the scattered remnant and marched them, mostly through the woods, and along the narrow roads and defiles full of obstructions, and brought them into line again at the extreme left flank of the army ready before sundown to go into action again. Sheridan's statement is that when he reported to General Thomas for action, the

latter replied that his lines were too disorganized and withdrawal was necessary.

I believe that the statements made in General Thomas' Report as to actual time, which are from one to two hours out of the way, are not made with malice prepense. We will note that his statements of relative time agree with the great mass of evidence. Some other statements of his differ from our generally accepted testimony, the only important one of which is that "every assault of the enemy from that time until nightfall was repulsed in the most gallant style by the whole line."[1] This statement should have been limited to the time of which he had personal knowledge, up to 4.30 P.M., when he left the field. If he had read the Official Reports of those officers under his command whom he had left on the field after his departure, all except Granger, he could not have failed to know the truth and could not have made this erroneous statement. There can be no doubt that he was deceived by the accounts of Granger and others concerning what had happened after his departure. A comparison of the date of his Official Report with the dates of those written by other officers shows that he could not have availed himself of the opportunity of reading them before his own Report was made out and forwarded.

[1] No. 50, p. 258, l. 10.

CHAPTER IV

ELIMINATION OF THOMAS' UNSUPPORTED TESTIMONY AT A TIME WHEN NOT PRESENT

General Thomas is the next officer in rank, whose Official Report of the battle we will now discuss.

As seen in the previous chapter, we have only words of praise for his conduct and make no criticism of any act or order of his showing how he could have handled his men any differently. He did his full duty, and as we have noted inspired his men with confidence and courage. The Record gives proof of the fact that he knew as well as any other soldier on the field the weak points of his position. He was in no way responsible for the Federal defeat and was powerless to prevent the disaster. He held his men to their duty, and took no steps to withdraw his army from the battlefield, until he received direct orders from the commander-in-chief to retire, which he did promptly without hesitation and obediently to the letter. But there is no marked specific act of leadership or unusual order of his of record on September 20, when he earned his title "Rock of Chickamauga" by his superb bearing and exhibition of personal courage, which entitled him to especial admiration.

As the leader of the Federal army in its escape from complete annihilation, he received the crown of glory to which he was entitled, but he was not the kind of soldier who would willingly wear a spurious crown studded with false jewels for acts which he never performed and to which only his false friends will lay claim.

These statements concerning General Thomas in the battle are the most popular fallacies connected with the

history of it, and in the light of the truth officially in evidence are obviously absurd.

It is with the purpose of doing justice to his memory, with no detraction to his honored name, that I shall now divest his record of the false claims attached to it.

These are specified as follows: —

(1) That the troops who remained with him on the battle-field, after the rest of the army had been driven off, were his own troops, belonging to the Fourteenth Army Corps;

(2) That he used his discretion, and did not immediately obey General Rosecrans' order to withdraw the army, after the latter had left the field, and had directed his subordinate to assume command; and

(3) That, having assumed command of the army, he held it, or at least the right wing of it, on Horseshoe Ridge until nightfall, when under cover of darkness he marched his troops from the battle-field in perfect order.

Claim number 1 is of the kind to be found in school-books; but the veriest tyro in the history of the battle knows that the troops under Thomas' command, when the rest of the army were driven from the battle-field, were composed of all the different corps of the Federal army, viz., the Fourteenth, Twentieth, Twenty-first, and Reserve Corps. Nor was the Fourteenth Army Corps a majority of the troops engaged. I cannot, however, trace this generally accepted error to any authoritative source: it is not of official record, and I have read it in no history by any general officer who participated in the battle. That such a claim has been made, and that it has been generally accepted by the ignorant, is evidenced by the fact that Van Horne, the historian of the Army of the Cumberland (whose work was "written at the request of George H. Thomas"), has seen fit especially to discounte-

nance the statement that the Fourteenth Army Corps was more in number or deserved more credit in any particular, than any other corps.[1] I will therefore merely state that of the four divisions of the Federal left wing, mentioned in order, from left to right, Baird's, Johnson's, Palmer's, and Reynolds', the first and last belonged to Thomas' Corps, while the second and third belonged to the Twentieth and Twenty-first Army Corps. The beginning of the withdrawal was made by this left wing, with Reynolds' Division first, and it was continued by each, in succession from right to left. Of the troops composing the Federal right wing, which withdrew last, there was no full division, excepting that of Steedman of the Reserve Corps, which equaled, if it did not exceed, in number the troops of the Fourteenth Army Corps.[2] The Twenty-first Corps also equaled or exceeded the Fourteenth Corps in numbers, for the former included Harker's and Hazen's brigades and fragments of regiments of the same corps: all the rest belonged to the Fourteenth Corps, composed of a good part of Brannan's Division and fragments of Negley's. Brannan's Division was the last to leave Horseshoe Ridge, and Hazen's Brigade the last at the bare ridge north of Snodgrass house. Further consideration of this point appears unnecessary.

Claim number 2 is now before us, and I will now proceed to demonstrate that, after Thomas received the order from Rosecrans putting him in command and ordering his withdrawal to Rossville, he did not, as is claimed, act contrary to orders and remain on the battle-field, taking the responsibility in the exercise of any power of discretion. As a matter of fact, I think the Records will show that it was an

[1] Thomas B. Van Horne, *History of the Army of the Cumberland*, vol. I, p. 361. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co. 1875.

[2] See Appendix to volume II.

impossibility for him to have hesitated a moment in the execution of the order, and that, whereas, before the receipt of the order, he had made up his mind to hold his position "if it were possible," as soon as Rosecrans' command arrived, in view of the conditions then existing, he could no longer take that responsibility.

It may be rather dry work to study these important questions of time, but if the student is anxious to convince himself of the truth, he will take the "text-book," Serial No. 50, and read in each instance the reference made.

In connection with these questions of time, I submit the following evidence: see General Garfield's dispatch[1] to his chief, General Rosecrans, then at Chattanooga. I ask, in particular, attention to the place from which it was sent, and the time specified.

GENERAL THOMAS' HEADQUARTERS,
BATTLE-FIELD, FIVE MILES SOUTH OF ROSSVILLE,
September 20, 1863 — *3.45 p.m.*[2]

GENERAL ROSECRANS: —

I arrived here ten minutes ago, via Rossville. . . . I hope General Thomas will be able to hold on here till night, and will not need to fall back farther than Rossville; perhaps not any. . . .

This dispatch shows on the face of it that when Garfield reported to Thomas the latter had not received the withdrawal order from Rosecrans. Garfield would not presume to have telegraphed to his chief the hope that Thomas would act contrary to orders by remaining on the field if he, Rosecrans, had ordered withdrawal. If this is not perfectly plain, we can examine the hour of sending the withdrawal order. If Rosecrans sent it from Chattanooga at "4.15 P.M." as he says,[3] Thomas could not have received it a half-hour before it was sent, and before Rosecrans

[1] No. 50, p. 141, l. 10.
[2] No. 50, p. 256, l. 77.
[3] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.

reached Chattanooga. Even by "wireless," this would have been impossible, and wireless telegraphy was not in use in those days. Still further proof that Garfield knew nothing about any withdrawal order, when at 8.45 he sent this dispatch, is afforded by the fact that his first knowledge of such an order "was received a little after sunset, and communicated to Generals Thomas and Granger."[1] If Garfield knew, at 8.45 P.M., that Thomas had received the withdrawal order, would he have stultified himself by again communicating it to him, "a little after sunset"? We think not. It is not to the point here to show *where* Generals Garfield, Thomas, and Granger were "a little after sunset," but we will show this later. That there were two dispatches of the same withdrawal order, we shall presently also show. Finally, while actual time is difficult to remember, relative time can be better and more accurately remembered; and we have General Thomas' own statement that he did not hear from Rosecrans until after Garfield's departure. We find this in his words[2] as follows:

> I soon after [Garfield had reported] received a dispatch from General Rosecrans, directing me to assume command of all the forces, and, with Crittenden and McCook, take a strong position and assume a threatening attitude at Rossville, etc.

This is the famous withdrawal order, in obeying which it is said that Thomas used his discretion, and which I propose to prove otherwise. Before fixing the time of the *receipt* of the withdrawal order, I wish to note what we have already established on the authority of Garfield's 8.45 P.M. dispatch, viz., that it was before the withdrawal order arrived, that Thomas was, by virtue of his rank, in actual command of all the Federal army left on the battle-field; and he had already defined his purpose, before

[1] Per his dispatch of 8.40 P.M., from Rossville. No. 50, p. 145, l. 32.
[2] No. 50, p. 253, l. 26.

the receipt of Rosecrans' order, "to hold on here till night, and fall back to Rossville," — as Garfield telegraphed this "hope" to Rosecrans at 3.45 P.M. That General Thomas conceived this hope is certain; and doubtless he expressed it to Garfield. It is almost equally certain that he abandoned this hope immediately after the receipt of Rosecrans' withdrawal order; and I make this statement, notwithstanding the unsupported statement of General Thomas in his Report:[1] —

> I determined to hold the position until nightfall, if possible, in the meantime sending Captains Barker and Kellogg to distribute the ammunition.

General Thomas' Report records this resolve as if made *after* the receipt of the withdrawal order: I think I have proved that he made this resolution (and probably the remark to Garfield) *before* the receipt of the order. I will presently show, however, that the time elapsing between the hour agreed upon by Generals Rosecrans and Thomas as that when the withdrawal order was sent and the time of its actual execution, i. e., the beginning of the movement of withdrawal, could not possibly have exceeded ten minutes. One can search the Official Reports through and through, and he will find that the only basis on which this exercise of discretion by General Thomas can be advanced, is on the foregoing words of his which I have just quoted. It is one thing to make resolutions, and it is quite another to carry them out. General Thomas intimates that these resolutions were taken after the receipt of the withdrawal order, but he does not anywhere even claim that he put his resolutions into practice and actually carried them out. We do not for a moment question that he conceived the idea of holding his position or that he made a determination to do so.

[1] No. 50, p. 253, l. 33.

I call up one more witness against General Thomas' statement, to the effect, as his Report intimates, that he exercised discretionary powers *after* the receipt of Rosecrans' order for withdrawal; and we will notice, in connection therewith, that General Thomas defines the relative time of this determination of his to have been at the time when he says "in the mean time" he sent "Captains Barker and Kellogg to distribute the ammunition," etc. Captain Barker evidently went first to the position of Reynolds' Division. (General Thomas was, as we shall notice, always solicitous about this particular division, — and well he might be. He knew that its right was always in the air, and that the first break of his left wing would be at that quarter when the Confederates advanced.)

I will ask Colonel Devol, commanding a regiment in Reynolds' Division, as to about what time it was when Captain Barker came to this division with ammunition. Was it before the withdrawal order had been received by Thomas, or was it thereafter? Was it at the time when Garfield may have heard the hope expressed by Thomas? The answer of Colonel Devol is found in the following:[1]—

> About 2 P.M., our ammunition was exhausted, almost. I sent for a supply. Captain Barker, of General Thomas' Staff, came personally with a supply. Just about 3.30 P.M. the troops on the immediate right of my regiment (I think General Brannan's) were driven back, which left the right of my regiment projected and exposed.

Thus, we see it was before 3.30 that Barker came with the ammunition, and not, as Thomas intimates, *after* the receipt of Rosecrans' order. Again, we see the impossibility of a dispatch sent at 4.15 affecting this distribution of ammunition before 3.30 P.M. Now we give Thomas credit for having entertained this hope — to hold his ground, if possible — before he heard from Rosecrans at Chatta-

[1] No. 80, p. 1070, l. 28.

nooga. This was his duty. But after Rosecrans ordered him to withdraw, his refusal to obey would have made him liable to court-martial. It was all right for him to hope to hold his ground when he was ranking officer, left in command without orders, but when he received Rosecrans' order to withdraw, if he disobeyed, it was at his own risk. He took no such risk: the Records show that he obeyed at once.

One of the most difficult historical points to establish in any battle is that of actual time; but in connection with this battle particularly the Official Reports must be studied most carefully and minutely for the purpose of establishing — first, the relative, and then, the actual, time of any movement. We cannot take any one officer's statement absolutely, if we wish to make our moving-picture appear without a flaw, and therefore accurate. In the excitement of battle the thoughts of a soldier doing his duty are in other directions than that of keeping exact account of the time of day. Again, the watches may not keep good time, or a staff officer may be detailed to attend to it. This is preliminary to the statement that the most glaring feature of inaccuracy in General Thomas' Official Report, on September 20, stands out on every occasion when he mentions the actual time of day. Instances of this variance are shown to be fully one hour. Notice that he says [1] that, at about *2 p.m.*, he left his command on the left wing and went to the right; yet there can be no question that, when he saw and joined Wood's Division, fighting in Dyer's field, before Kershaw's Brigade had routed it, the time of day was about "high noon." [2] For it is still more evident that if Thomas left his troops on the left wing at 2 P.M. to join those on the right, he would have found not only Wood and Brannan posted on the heights at that hour, but also Steed-

[1] No. 50, p. 202, l. 16.

[2] See Reports of Wood, Harker, and their subordinates.

man's Division moving into action. For it was even before 2 P.M. of this day when, at his headquarters at the Snodgrass house, Thomas had what he is said to have described as the most anxious moment of his life, when he saw troops moving towards him from the rear whom he feared to be Confederates till he found that they belonged to Steedman's Division. The next error of time in Thomas' Report[1] reads: —

> General Garfield reached this position [near the Snodgrass house] at about 4 P.M., in company with Lieutenant-Colonel Thruston, of McCook's staff, and . . . Captain Barker, of my staff, who had been sent to the rear to bring back the ammunition, if possible.

But Garfield's 3.45 P.M. dispatch to Rosecrans proved his arrival at Thomas' position before the time of his sending the said dispatch. We accept Garfield's statement that his arrival was at 3.35 P.M., though other testimony indicates his arrival as nearer 3 P.M. — a still further disagreement with Thomas. Other testimony to which I refer is as follows: (1) Colonel Thruston, who accompanied General Garfield, says, in his sworn testimony before the Court of Inquiry, February 6, 1864,[2] that the hour was no later than 3 P.M.; and again, before the same court, on February 16, he calls attention to the error in "General Thomas' Report," and General Thomas' statement that Garfield and himself had reported to Thomas "at 4 P.M."[3] and shows this could not be so, for he (Thruston) was "at *McFarland's Farm, at 4 p.m.*,"[4] with General Davis. (2) General Davis' testimony before the same court on February 15, the day preceding Thruston's testimony, is to the effect that Thruston had first gone to Thomas' position at Snodgrass house, and returning, had reported to himself (Davis) at McFarland's farm, and that the time when Thruston thus reported,

[1] No. 50, p. 253, l. 21.
[2] No. 50, p. 955, ll. 9–12.
[3] No. 50, p. 945, ll. 30 to 36.
[4] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.

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as nearly as he could remember, was "between 2 and 3 P.M."[1] Now, McFarland's farm was fully three miles from Snodgrass house, measured on the maps. Still further sworn testimony against Thomas' unsupported "4 P.M." statement, comes from Captain Williams, 19th Infantry, U.S.A., acting aide to Thomas that afternoon, until the latter left the Snodgrass house. His statement[2] shows that it was nearer 3 than 4 P.M. when Garfield and Thruston reported to Thomas.

Finally, the last witness, making all unanimous against Thomas on this point, is Granger, who says,[3] "at 3 P.M. General Garfield appeared."

As these questions of time — especially relative time — are of importance in our study of the sequence of orders and of movements, I request that careful attention be paid thereto. We observe that Garfield's arrival at Thomas' headquarters was "via Rossville." This was due to the fact, much in evidence, that McCook's and Crittenden's troops, after their disaster on the right wing, were cut off from joining Thomas on Horseshoe Ridge by Confederate interposition until Granger's Reserve Corps came upon the field. The two wings of the Confederate army before Granger appeared had nearly effected a junction with each other in rear of General Thomas. Forrest's dismounted cavalry had gained possession of the Lafayette road, the Federal hospital at Colonel Cloud's house, and on the Ridge road at the head of McFarland's Gap blocked the return to the battle-field of McCook and Crittenden fleeing from the Confederate left wing.

Captain J. C. Hill, acting aide of General Rosecrans, testifies to this in his repeated statements[4] that he "encountered the enemy not more than five hundred yards from McFarland's house." Other sworn statements to the

[1] No. 50, p. 953, l. 8.
[2] No. 50, p. 973, l. 39.
[3] No. 50, p. 856, l. 25.
[4] No. 50, p. 1022, l. 26, and p. 23, l. 19.

same effect show how nearly hemmed in Thomas' army was at this time and the impossibility of reaching him until Granger blazed the way.[1] Even after Granger's arrival, access to the rear was difficult, but Garfield, Thruston, Gaw, and Barker were nevertheless able to reach General Thomas.[2]

This will show how it was that until this juncture General Thomas had no word from General Rosecrans, for, as he says in his Report,[3] "General Garfield gave me the first reliable information that the right and centre of our army had been driven, and of its condition at that time."

Garfield's 3.45 P.M. dispatch was thus the first news of Thomas sent to Rosecrans, and the latter received it "at Wagner's headquarters about 4.30 or 5 P.M.,"[4] and answered it in his dispatch to Garfield.[5]

That Rosecrans heard from and answered Garfield about 4.30 P.M. is evidenced by the context of this answer of Rosecrans, which begins with "See General McCook." Certainly General Rosecrans would not have said "See General McCook" had the latter previously reported to him, for this arrival of McCook, as testified to by Rosecrans, was "about 4.30 or 5 P.M."

When McCook arrived, he received the information contained in this dispatch, viz., the one described by Rosecrans as "General Garfield's report from the extreme front."[6] McCook was then directed to wait for "a further report" from General Garfield and the extreme front, but he waited in vain until 9.30 P.M., when the commanding general received the dispatch sent by Garfield at 8.40 P.M. from Rossville,[7] and when Rosecrans received it, according

[1] See No. 50, p. 1022, ll. 24 and 46; p. 1024, l. 3; p. 1023, l. 52; p. 1029, ll. 10 to 16, etc.

[2] No. 50, p. 253, l. 20. [3] No. 50, p. 253, l. 24. [4] No. 50, p. 941, l. 9.

[5] No. 50, p. 140, l. 36. See Notes to chapter IV, Note A.

[6] No. 50, p. 941, l. 10. [7] No. 50, p. 144, l. 43.

to his testimony he "read it to McCook, or stated its substance and directed him to go out to Rossville," [1] etc.

Garfield's second dispatch,[2] sent from Rossville to his chief at 8.40 P.M., was received by the latter "about 9.30 P.M.," [3] and describes the difficulty of getting communication to the rear. A study of all the evidence relating to the sending and receipt of these dispatches establishes beyond peradventure this relative order in which they passed between Generals Rosecrans, Thomas, and Garfield.

General Rosecrans, on his arrival at Chattanooga, was the first to send a dispatch, and it was sent direct to General Thomas. The latter's Report says [4] that he received it "soon after" Garfield had reported; but Garfield sent his 3.45 P.M. dispatch before Thomas heard from Rosecrans, and, as will presently appear, he was not advised by Thomas either of its receipt or of its contents. This dispatch from Rosecrans to Thomas contained the famous "withdrawal order" which it is alleged Thomas did not obey while exercising his discretion. It reads as follows: [5] —

HEADQUARTERS DEPT. OF THE CUMBERLAND,
CHATTANOOGA, Sept. 20, 1863 — 12.15 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS: —

Assume command of all the forces, and with Crittenden and McCook take a strong position and assume a threatening attitude at Rossville.

W. S. ROSECRANS, Major-General.

The first point to notice is the alleged sending-time, "12.15 P.M." When General Thomas was preparing his Official Report of September 30, he called General Rosecrans' attention to the time recorded, and the latter replied

[1] No. 50, p. 941, l. 14. Cist, *Army of the Cumberland*, p. 226. 1882. This historian makes Garfield's 8.40 P.M. dispatch do duty for the 3.45 P.M. one, and weaves a pretty tale not in accord with these facts of record.

[2] No. 50, p. 144, l. 43.

[3] No. 50, p. 941, l. 18.

[4] No. 50, p. 253, l. 26.

[5] No. 50, p. 140, l. 19.

that it was an error, that he "did not leave the battle-field until after that hour, nor reach Chattanooga before 3.40 P.M."[1] Thus it appears that, as the dispatch was sent from Chattanooga, and as Rosecrans did not arrive at that place before 3.40 P.M., it could not have been sent before that time; and hence Rosecrans says that it "must have been written as late as 4.15." It is of especial importance to note that Rosecrans speaks of this as his "*first* dispatch" to withdraw,[2] indicating his sending two dispatches of the same purport. We accordingly find this "first dispatch" was received by Thomas at his headquarters near the Snodgrass house, the position where Garfield reported to him;[3] while the second dispatch[4] sent to Garfield, the latter tells us, *he* "received a little after sunset" — namely, Rosecrans' order to retire on Rossville, as he briefly describes it,[5] and which he "communicated to Generals Thomas and Granger." The place where Garfield and Granger were, with Thomas, on receipt of the *second* dispatch, was, per Thomas' Report,[6] at a point beyond the Ridge road (the road which files through Missionary Ridge at McFarland's Gap) on his way from the battle-field, whence he "proceeded to Rossville, accompanied by Generals Garfield and Gordon Granger"; or, as will be confirmed presently as to both time and place, near Cloud's hospital, about two miles from Snodgrass house.

The important point which we must now establish is the time when Thomas, at the Snodgrass house headquarters, received Rosecrans' "order to retire to Rossville." For this purpose I ask the student to read the two clauses in Thomas' Report.[7] There are three statements derived from these lines which bear upon the question at issue, and let us analyze these from Thomas' viewpoint.

[1] No. 50, p. 56, l. 49. [2] No. 50, p. 256, l. 48.
[3] No. 50, p. 256, ll. 20 and 23.
[4] For the text of this second dispatch see chapter VI, p. 155.
[5] No. 50, p. 145, l. 32. [6] No. 50, p. 254, l. 21. [7] No. 50, p. 253, ll. 20 to 45.

(1) A thought in Thomas' mind conveyed to us is that he held his right wing at its position on the heights for fully one and one half hours, — with the determination to stay there till nightfall. In this there is nothing to doubt. This uppermost thought in his mind existed, however, as we maintain by the Record, from 3 to 4.30 P.M. Remember that he had defended his position on Horseshoe Ridge, with Wood and Brannan, from 1 to 3 P.M. — not from "2 P.M." to "4 P.M.," as Thomas thought, for his every statement as to time is wrong. He had, indeed, for an hour before Steedman's Division came up, held his ground; and when just about to give way, was reinforced most opportunely. With Steedman's big division and Van Derveer's Brigade, and his own troops inspired with new courage by success, his position on the heights was the strongest it had been that day, and at once gave him hope and determination to hold it till night, at least. But this was *before* he received Rosecrans' orders.

(2) We notice Thomas' Report says that he "received the dispatch from Rosecrans *soon after*" Garfield had reported to him. Herein lies the palpable error. We have established the fact that Garfield reported at 3.35 or earlier. It must have been an hour after Garfield's departure that a dispatch, sent from Chattanooga at 4.15, could have reached Thomas' headquarters. Hence we discard the statement as erroneous.

(3) Finally, with Rosecrans' note of corrected time added to Thomas' Official Report,[1] indicating his careful consideration as to actual time, General Thomas places the *actual* time of receipt as "soon after 4 P.M." [2] His statement of relative time as to Garfield and of actual time do not agree, but we accept in this instance his actual time statement as more nearly correct, based upon his consideration of Rosecrans' appended correction, possibly thinking that

[1] No. 50, p. 256. [2] No. 50, p. 253, ll. 21 and 26.

Rosecrans' dispatch could have been sent immediately on the arrival of the latter at Chattanooga at "3.40 P.M." I think, therefore, if we put the time of Thomas' receipt of Rosecrans' order at 4.30 P.M., we cannot be out of the way more than fifteen minutes.

We will now discuss, first, the relative, and then the actual time when, according to Thomas' Report, he put the withdrawal order into execution. Now, what does he say he did in the interim between its receipt and its execution? "In the mean time," he says,[1] "sending Captains Barker, etc., to distribute the ammunition, having previously sent to notify the different commanders that ammunition would be sent them shortly." But this had been done before the arrival of Rosecrans' dispatch, for we have seen that Captain Barker reported, with Garfield, at 3.35 P.M. or earlier; and the immediate duty assigned to Captain Barker was to take ammunition to Reynolds' Division, for which it had been long waiting. We remember our witness, Colonel Devol of this division, told us:[2] "About 2 P.M., our ammunition was exhausted, almost. I sent for a supply. Captain Barker, of General Thomas' staff, came personally with a supply. Just about 3.30 P.M., the troops," etc. Thus it appears that this distribution of ammunition was made about 3.30 P.M.; for this same Colonel Devol, in his first short Report on September 23, states[3] that "we (our brigade) held that position [in the breastworks] until 4 P.M., when the enemy had us nearly surrounded"; and it was while here that he says:[4] "I heard General Reynolds remark that he thought he would have to surrender." Thomas then continues:[5] "As soon as they reported the distribution of ammunition, I directed Captain Willard to inform the division commanders to prepare to withdraw their commands as soon as they received orders."

[1] No. 50, p. 253, l. 38. [2] No. 50, p. 1070, l. 28. [3] No. 50, p. 481, l. 37.
[4] No. 50, p. 1070, l. 37. [5] No. 50, p. 253, l. 37.

All of this he undoubtedly did, and at the relative time defined by himself; but the actual time of distribution of ammunition was about 3.30 P.M., and the actual time of notification to division commanders to withdraw and to prepare to withdraw, was about 4.30 P.M.

Capping the climax of error, in point of actual time, Thomas now says[1] that, "at 5.30," he sent Captain Barker to notify General Reynolds to commence the movement of withdrawal, while he left "*the*[2] position behind General Wood's command to meet Reynolds." We can prove that General Thomas was not at this position which he describes — viz., his headquarters near the Snodgrass house — as late as 5.30 P.M., for we can show that General Granger, on Thomas' departure, was left in command of the troops there, and was with Thomas beyond the Ridge road at 5.30 P.M. We can call up a before-mentioned witness, Captain Williams, who remained behind with Smith's Battery, after Thomas, to whom he was acting aide,[3] had gone to Reynolds. Captain Williams remained with Smith's Battery until its retreat about 5 P.M.[4] We can also show that Thomas would have found his headquarters at the Snodgrass house to have been an untenable position at 4.55 P.M., when the high-water mark of the Confederates was first attained and the Snodgrass house itself was then reached by them, after Wood's command was driven from its position on Horseshoe Ridge. Again, had Thomas been in the cornfield then, until "5.30" (as his Report alleges), he would have met Hazen, when he (Hazen) came to the support of Harker's Brigade of Wood's command, "which was being hard-pressed."[5] If Thomas had been there, he certainly would have mentioned Hazen in his Report; for when he afterwards learned of the service

[1] No. 50, p. 253, l. 40.
[2] No. 50, p. 256, l. 29.
[3] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.
[4] No. 50, p. 1008, l. 15.
[5] No. 50, p. 776, l. 52.

rendered by Hazen, he recommended his promotion as major-general.[1] Again, we might show the impossibility of Thomas' passing through the gap between Harker and Reynolds; for, at any time after 5 P.M., he would have been killed or captured. The advance of Buckner's Artillery, supported by Stewart's Division, had begun about this time; and Hazen's Brigade was obliged to fight its way over.

There is overwhelming evidence against the uncorroborated statement in General Thomas' Report that the commencement of the movement of withdrawal was at 5.30 P.M. On the other hand, we have a great mass of testimony as to the actual time of the receipt and execution of this order by the subordinates to whom General Thomas sent it, and this testimony indicates beyond a shadow of doubt that the order was received by these subordinates from half to three quarters of an hour earlier than the alleged time of Thomas' sending it. The testimony on the subject from every witness who refers to it is given in full; this, too, includes those subordinates who received the order last, when all the troops on their right had already executed it.

In support of this statement I will now present the testimony of the Official Reports to which I refer, on which we may base the time that each organization of the Federal left wing received the order, and the time when the actual movement of withdrawal began. We will present this testimony as nearly as possible in the relative order from right to left which each organization occupied at the time of its withdrawal. Thomas' order was that Reynolds' Division should begin the movement of withdrawal, and was to be followed in succession by each division on his left, Palmer's, Johnson's, and Baird's. The map opposite will indicate the relative order of these organizations of the left wing, and the testimony of the officers commanding will be given in the same relative order: —

[1] See Hazen's book.

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

"THOMAS' LINES" (FEDERAL LEFT WING) FROM ABOUT 4.30 P

Concerning E. A. King's Brigade, see Regimental Histories: Floyd's 75th Indiana, p. 172; Tourgée's 1[illegible]
Comrades Boring, 79th Pennsylvania, [illegible]

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

M. TO 5 P.M., SEPTEMBER 20, 1863. (SEE OFFICIAL REPORTS)

Ohio, p. 286. Concerning Starkweather's Brigade: Letters from Major M. H. Fitch, 21st Wisconsin, ...man, 1st Wisconsin, et al.

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Reynolds' Division

Turchin's Brigade [1]

The roar of the battle on our right and left advancing more and more to our rear, the time was coming to retreat. At last the order came for us to retreat by the right flank.

As this was the beginning of the movement of withdrawal, we will go into details concerning it. The following facts are derived from General Turchin's Report. His brigade at this time was facing south in the relative order shown in the map, with King's Brigade "placed *en échelon*, on my [his] right and rear."

When this order came to retreat, which was probably brought by Captain Barker, the brigade moved by the right flank across the Lafayette road, halted and faced to the front (south); "then orders came to move to the rear. The brigade faced about." It was in this position that General Thomas met it and in person ordered the charge to the rear.

Thirty-sixth Ohio, Turchin's Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel Devol

This officer makes two reports on September 23, 1863, which are found in the Official Records: the first short one being found with corresponding reports of the organizations to which it belonged; while the second, which is more lengthy, is at the end of Serial No. 50, and has indications of being written later, forgetful of the fact that a previous report had already been made.

We held that position [says Colonel Devol (No. 50, p. 481, l. 36), referring to the breastworks [2]] until 4 P.M., when the enemy had us surrounded. We were then formed on the west side of the road [Lafayette], fronting southeast. We then faced about and charged the enemy about a mile. . . . We then

[1] No. 50, p. 475, l. 2.

[2] No. 50, p. 474, l. 38.

formed on the hill where some of the Reserve Corps [McCook's Brigade [1]] were posted.

In Colonel Devol's second Report he tells us that the enemy's assaults against their breastworks [2] were repeated until 4 P.M. Prior thereto, about 3.30 P.M., he says that the troops on his immediate right, referring to the 74th and 10th Indiana, of Croxton's Brigade, Brannan's Division, were driven back, which left the right of his regiment projected and exposed. The firing at this time was on his right and rear, and it was at this juncture that he makes the important admission: [3] "I heard General Reynolds remark that he thought he would have to surrender." This is described as prior to the time that the brigade crossed the Lafayette road, and it would indicate that a further maintenance of the position would have forced General Reynolds' surrender. This second Report contains some contradictions of the first one, which do not, however, concern us here.

Ninety-second Ohio, Turchin's Brigade,[4] Lieutenant-Colonel Putnam

The regiment was drawn back and lay in double column unengaged till about 4 P.M. About this time the regiment moved with the brigade up the Chattanooga [Lafayette] road, a short distance above Kelly's house, when line of battle was formed facing southwest [Colonel Devol says southeast]. The line was then faced by the rear rank to the northeast and ordered to charge a line of the enemy drawn up in solid column across the road. [This was the charge ordered by General Thomas in person.] The 92d regiment led the charge on the right, now become the left.

Colonel Putnam, commanding this regiment, confirms Colonel Devol in the statement that the final position of these troops was on the hill where McCook's Brigade was

[1] No. 50, p. 475, l. 19.
[2] No. 50, p. 1070, l. 25.
[3] No. 50, p. 1070, l. 37.
[4] No. 50, p. 488, l. 14.

posted. The statement is fully corroborated elsewhere, but the important fact which the evidence presents is the impossibility of the charge of Turchin's Brigade being later than 4.30 P.M. Captain Barnett, commanding Battery I, 2d Illinois Artillery, McCook's Brigade, Granger's Reserve Corps, makes the following statement:[1] —

> At this time General Turchin came with his brigade from the extreme left of our army, and I assisted him to advance by shelling the enemy from his front, so that he succeeded in gaining shelter, and re-formed in the rear of our brigade.

A study of the context shows that "at this time" refers to a period about 4.15 or 4.30 P.M.

Eighteenth Kentucky, Turchin's Brigade, Heltemes, commanding[2]

> At 4 P.M. the brigade moved to the Chattanooga [Lafayette] road and formed line of battle north [west?] of said road, facing west [south?], then faced about and charged the enemy along the road. . . . Our brigade then began to form in the rear of a portion of Major-General Gordon Granger's corps on a hill north of the woods.

King's Brigade's Itinerary[3]

> At 5 P.M., ordered to retire. Cut our way out, under heavy fire of shot, shell, and canister. Retired to Rossville.

PALMER'S DIVISION[4]

> About 5 o'clock, I received an order from Major-General Thomas, by a staff officer, to retire.

Grose's Brigade, Palmer's Division[5]

> About the same time ["4 P.M."] a heavy force of the enemy commenced an attack to our right and rear, from toward Lee and Gordon's Mills and from the direction we had come in the morning, and opened the most terrific cannonading I had heard

[1] No. 50, p. 883, l. 1.
[2] No. 50, p. 470, l. 48.
[3] No. 50, p. 479, l. 12.
[4] No. 50, p. 715, l. 17.
[5] No. 50, p. 782, l. 22.

during these battles, and in a few moments completely enfilading our entire rear.

The cannonading here referred to was that of Williams' Battalion, of Buckner's Reserve Artillery, which opened up a little after 4 P.M., and was kept up, at intervals, from half to three fourths of an hour — breaking the Federal line, when Stewart's Division closed in across the battalion's front, which consisted of nineteen guns.[1]

Continuing, General Grose's Report says (and we note his preciseness in *spelling out*, for apparent emphasis, the words "fifteen minutes"): —

At fifteen minutes before 5 o'clock,[2] Lieutenant Thomas, Major-General Palmer's aide, brought me the order to retire.

Notice that this order was received three fourths of an hour before the time alleged in General Thomas' Report as the time when the order was issued, from his headquarters near the Snodgrass house, for the commencement of the movement of withdrawal by Reynolds' Division, and Palmer's Division to follow. Measure on the map the distance from Snodgrass house to the position of Palmer's Division, in the woods beyond the Kelly field: I find the distance to be over seven eighths of a mile.

General Grose also gives good evidence of the impossibility of General Thomas' making his way through the gap between the two wings, towards Reynolds' position, later than 4.30 P.M. He says:[3] —

Which way or where to retire to was not an easy question to solve, the enemy fast approaching from right and left toward our rear, their artillery fire meeting.

Thirty-sixth Indiana, Grose's Brigade, Trusler, commanding[4].

We came off about 5 P.M.

[1] No. 51, p. 450, l. 10.
[2] No. 50, p. 782, l. 29.
[3] Italics are mine. — Author.
[4] No. 50, p. 789, l. 18.

This latter statement is made after a description of the inability of the 36th Indiana Regiment, and what was left of the 84th Illinois, "to check the surging and powerful columns" of the foe, who passed their position and turned their flank. It was at this time that Colonel Grose's order to withdraw was given, to retire across the Kelly field into the woods west of the Lafayette road. It was here, about 5 P.M., that the brigade was re-formed and marched across Snodgrass field to the hills adjoining the road through McFarland's Gap.

Twenty-fourth Ohio, Grose's Brigade, Colonel Higgins[1]

The 24th Ohio, being on the extreme left, was crushed, and with other regiments of the brigade was forced to give way, torn and bleeding at every part.

Twenty-third Kentucky, Grose's Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel Foy[2]

Soon we could see our men, line after line, give way on the right. At length the whole line to my right appeared to be falling back fast. The battery that was with us at this instant hitched up and drove off. I looked toward the left. General Cruft was slowly retiring his brigade. [Here we have evidence that Cruft's Brigade, on the left of Grose's, retired before the latter, which corroborates a deduction we make later.] . . . I could see no organized body of troops but our regiment, and General Cruft with his brigade, who were retiring in excellent order on our then right. I approached the General and asked him what was best to be done. He told me he intended to halt as soon as he reached the woods, and try and rally some of the broken regiments that were leaving the field in disorder. . . . As soon as we reached the edge of the woods we halted. The General finding this was too close to the enemy's fire to rally any of the scattered men, he moved on with his brigade to the top of a high hill about 1½ *miles from the battle-field*,[3] where he halted for the space of one or two hours collecting the remains of different regiments together.

[1] No. 50, p. 798, l. 39.
[2] No. 50, p. 794, l. 32.
[3] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.

Russell's Battery, 4th U. S. Artillery, Grose's Brigade[1]

About 5 o'clock, received orders to retreat to Rossville.

Cruft's Brigade[2]

At 5.12 P.M. orders were brought me to abandon the position in which the brigade then was, and retire across the Rossville [Lafayette] road.

The precision of this statement, as to time, indicates that this officer consulted his watch. On the other hand, his testimony is contradicted by all the four subordinates to whom he transmitted these orders *after* he had received them. Their statements are quoted below, and not one of them says that he received the order to retire later than 5 P.M. The question is thus before us, which evidence to accept, the evidence of the General with his watch (which may have been wrong, or have been consulted later than he alleges), or that of the five witnesses against his testimony including Colonel Foy of the 23d Kentucky, Grose's Brigade.

We further call attention to the evidence just given: That the troops on his immediate right (Grose's Brigade) received the order to retire at "fifteen minutes before 5 o'clock"; and that the evidence given by the general and regimental officers of Johnson's Division, including those on Cruft's immediate left (to be given presently), shows that they received their withdrawal orders at about 5 P.M., "when no troops to *their*[3] right were to be seen."

Does it not seem that, if Cruft thus remained, after the troops on both sides of him had been withdrawn from the breastworks, he would have been in a most precarious situation, with the enemy not only in front, but also turning both his flanks?

[1] No. 50, p. 801, l. 49.
[2] No. 50, p. 736, l. 8.
[3] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.

We shall presently note General Johnson's statement as to *his* division (on General Cruft's left) being "barely saved from complete destruction" by the opportune order to retire, received at 5 P.M. If Cruft's Brigade was in no such precarious situation, is it not conclusive evidence that his withdrawal took place sooner than the situation described could have occurred? We think so. General Cruft's Report furnishes evidence on this point, and further, that his brigade was the only one in the breastworks that was not assaulted by the Confederate lines at the time of withdrawal; and it was a comparatively easy matter for it, therefore, to retire in good order.[1] For General Cruft's words are: —

> It is most probable that no heavy force of the enemy lay in our immediate front. A very considerable force of sharpshooters was there. [And, continuing:[2]] *There was no intimation that the line was falling back generally,*[3] [and] the [my] regiments were marched out from behind the breastwork, formed in line, and, moving out separately, formed in columns of regiments at long intervals, and marched across the open field to our rear under a most severe artillery fire from two directions.

Accompanying General Cruft's Report[4] is an instructive map, indicating his line of retreat from the breastworks, direct to a hill, the first one south of the Ridge road, where it files through Missionary Ridge, at McFarland's Gap, a distance of one and three eighths miles from the breastworks, as measured on the Commissioners' Map of Chickamauga Park.[5]

First Ohio Battery B, Cruft's Brigade, Baldwin, commanding[6]

> . . . *till 5 p.m.*,[3] when we were ordered to fall back with our brigade.

[1] See also Thomas, No. 50, p. 254, l. 20.
[2] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.
[3] See chapter I, p. 32.
[3] No. 50, p. 733, l. 5.
[4] No. 50, p. 737.
[6] No. 50, p. 759, l. 23.

Ninetieth Ohio, Cruft's Brigade, Colonel Rippey[1]

. . . *5 p.m.*,[2] when orders were sent me to retire. [On taking position on the hill near McFarland's Gap he continues:] After resting here about one hour the regiment moved back with the division to Rossville.

Second Kentucky, Cruft's Brigade, Colonel Sedgewick[3]

About 5 p.m.,[3] it being evident that the right of our line was giving way, the order was given to retire.

Thirty-first Indiana, Cruft's Brigade, Colonel Smith[4]

Near 5 p.m.,[3] when we were ordered to retire.

JOHNSON'S DIVISION[5]

While the attack on my immediate front was progressing well, I received an order from Major-General Thomas for the withdrawal of the entire army; Reynolds first, then Palmer, and I was to follow the latter; [and[6]] Reynolds and Palmer commenced the movement, followed by a heavy force of the enemy, thus exposing my right. *I barely had time to send word to my command to save them from complete destruction.*[2] They, however, withdrew in good order. . . . Willich in reserve . . . by his prompt movements . . . saved the troops from annihilation and capture. At the time the order was received to withdraw he was engaged with the enemy immediately in my rear.

Baldwin's Brigade, Berry, commanding[7]

At 5 P.M.[8] the enemy made a final attack on my lines, and this was repulsed . . . the question was asked me, "What had become of the troops on my right?" Upon looking in that direc-

[1] No. 50, p. 758, l. 8. [2] Italics are mine.—AUTHOR. [3] No. 50, p. 758, l. 55.
[4] No. 50, p. 742, l. 1. [5] No. 50, p. 535, ll. 46 and 54.
[6] No. 50, p. 356. [7] No. 56, p. 506, l. 6.
[8] This is the attack which his division commander, General Johnson, describes (No. 50, p. 535, l. 46) as at "4 P.M."; and according to all other officers in the division, the break on the right was noticed about 5 P.M. Also note that the officer commanding the Sixth Indiana Regiment of the brigade says that he received the order to withdraw from the Brigade Acting Adjutant-General, when it was "*near 5 p.m.*" (Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.)

tion, to my utter amazement, not a soldier was to be seen . . . ordered up my second line to take the place of that [Palmer's] division. While leading it up I received an order from General Johnson to fall back. . . . There was not a particle of confusion or panic in the command.

Sixth Indiana, Baldwin's Brigade, Campbell, commanding[1]

We held the ground until near 5 P.M., when I received your order to withdraw.

Ninety-third Ohio, Baldwin's Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel Martin, commanding[2]

Nothing more of importance occurring through the day until 3.30, the enemy again attacked us. We held them at bay for one hour, when it became necessary, by movements on other parts of the field, to fall back, which ended the fight for the day.

Fifth Indiana Battery, Baldwin's Brigade, Captain Simonson[3]

Hotly engaged until 5 o'clock in the afternoon.

Willich's Brigade[4]

Describing the withdrawal of Palmer's and Reynolds' Divisions from the breastworks on the right of Johnson's Division, *Willich's Brigade being in reserve*, General Willich says: —

Then the storm broke loose; first in small squads, then in an unbroken stream, the defenders rushed *without organization*[5] over the open field [Kelly's], partly over and through my brigade. . . . At the same time the enemy's artillery in front of me and in the rear of our lines advanced within canister-range, swept my position, and entered into a canister-duel with Captain Goodspeed. The enemy's infantry did not attempt to force me.

When the fugitives had reached the cover of the woods, I ordered the battery [Goodspeed's] to retire; . . . then I slowly

[1] No. 50, p. 568, l. 7.
[2] No. 50, p. 576, l. 15.
[3] No. 50, p. 576, l. 27.
[4] No. 50, p. 541, l. 9.
[5] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.

withdrew . . . exposed to heavy artillery fire, but not pressed by the enemy's infantry.

Thirty-second Indiana, Willich's Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel Erdelmeyer[1]

Returned to a reserve position on the road and in the rear of General Reynolds' Division. There remained quiet until about 5 P.M., exposed, however, to the fire of the enemy's sharp-shooters.

At this time the enemy, being invited by the withdrawal of General Reynolds' Division, recommenced throwing shells upon us and over us in such a manner as to make our position not maintainable; we therefore changed front and fell back across the road [Lafayette]. Hardly in position, the left wing of the army commenced falling back, and after the most of the troops were gone and the enemy had taken possession of the breast-works in our front, we fell back through the woods.

Eighty-ninth Illinois, Willich's Brigade, Williams, commanding[2]

About 5 P.M. it was observed that regiments and brigades on our right and left were giving way in inextricable confusion; at the same time the enemy were shelling us furiously on our front, right, and rear, mingled with terrific musketry . . . a stream of fugitives was running through and over us.

Dodge's Brigade[3]

At about 5 o'clock . . . I received an order from General Johnson in person, to withdraw my command.

Seventy-ninth Illinois, Dodge's Brigade, Colonel Buckner[4]

This was kept up about an hour [from context 5 P.M.] when an officer came up and ordered us back. We would not retire until we heard from you. In a moment you came in person, giving the order to fall back.

Thirtieth Indiana, Dodge's Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel Hurd[5]

About 3 P.M. when the enemy again attacked, and a fight of about one hour took place, after which we were ordered to fall back.

[1] No. 50, p. 547, l. 7.
[2] No. 50, p. 544, l. 45.
[3] No. 50, p. 556, l. 16.
[4] No. 50, p. 559, l. 8.
[5] No. 50, p. 562, ll. 3 and 4.

GEN. ABSALOM BAIRD

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Twenty-ninth Indiana, Dodge's Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel Dunn[1]

Remained[2] in this position *until 4 p.m.*,[2] when the enemy came up. . . . We, however, held the enemy in check until ordered to retreat.

BAIRD'S DIVISION[3]

An officer then (at 5 o'clock) arrived, with orders for myself and General Johnson to withdraw our troops . . . in direction of . . . Rossville; [and [4]] the troops on my right, first those of General Palmer and then those of General Johnson, passing off to the rear. I saw then that no time was to be lost and transmitted the order to my brigade commanders. . . . As my men fell back the enemy pressed after them, and in crossing the open field, etc.

Starkweather's Brigade[5]

Peremptory orders were received . . . that I should fall back; [and [6]] The enemy charging my front line with the bayonet, supported by their batteries, the troops gave way and a portion only rallied at the point[7] where General Willich's command rested near sunset. Was then moved and ordered to proceed to *Chattanooga*.[8] On *arriving within a mile and a half*,[2] etc.

Twenty-first Wisconsin, Starkweather's Brigade[9]

The Twenty-first Regiment was placed on the right of the Second Brigade [Starkweather's] and on the extreme right of Baird's Division in line of battle. . . . About 3 P.M. General Baird directed his division to fall back, but the order of that distinguished officer never reached the Twenty-first Regiment. The Lieutenant-Colonel commanding, observing that the officers of the other regiments were gone, ordered his men, the last to leave the front line, to fall back. In doing so they were fired upon by the enemy from the right rear by two pieces of artillery. The order was then given to make a rapid retreat to the left rear.

[1] No. 50, p. 500, l. 35.
[2] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.
[3] No. 50, p. 279, l. 13.
[4] No. 50, p. 279, l. 24.
[5] No. 50, p. 301, l. 31.
[6] No. 50, p. 301, l. 49.
[7] This point was on the Ridge road beyond Brock's house. (See Thomas, No. 50, p. 254, l. 8.) The time, as is presently evident, was about 5.30 P.M.
[8] Vol. LII, part I, p. 84, l. 35.

In this attempt, while endeavoring to cut their way through, Lieutenant-Colonel Hobart and about fifty officers and men were captured.

Scribner's Brigade[1]

About this time [5 P.M.] I observed a column of our forces from our right passing to our left and rear. . . . About this time, . . . ordered to retire, etc.

Thirty-eighth Indiana, Scribner's Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel Griffin[2]

Near 5 P.M., an order reached me through Captain Carey, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Division Staff, that the army was ordered to retire. . . . Seeing regiment after regiment of Second Brigade (Starkweather's) and the section of artillery on my right moving rapidly to the rear, nothing was left me but to follow or suffer total capture, as the enemy pressed up the hill at once on the departure of the Second Brigade, and immediately on my flank. At this point I ordered the command to retire, and moved on the double-quick through the cornfield, and again re-forming my command on the wooded hill beyond about sundown. Here . . . I reported to Brigadier-General Cruft.

Thirty-third Ohio, Scribner's Brigade, Colonel Moore[3]

Near sundown, when the order was given to fall back. The artillery on the right of our line had been withdrawn, the infantry was also retiring somewhat in haste and disorder, a partial stampede was caused on our left, . . . to save my command I directed it to fall back. This order, however, in the din of battle was not heard by a portion of the regiment, nor was any such communicated to a portion of the Second Ohio and Tenth Wisconsin. The result was that they obstinately held their ground and continued to fire until completely surrounded and either killed, wounded or captured.

J. H. King's Brigade[4]

About 5 P.M., . . . I was ordered by the division commander to fall back to the Rossville [Lafayette] road.

[1] No. 50, p. 288, l. 16.
[2] No. 50, p. 296, l. 6.
[3] No. 50, p. 291, l. 26.
[4] No. 50, p. 310, l. 44.

DISTINGUISHED YOUNG REGULAR ARMY OFFICERS FROM NEW ENGLAND

LIEUT. FRANCIS L. D. RUSSELL

MAJOR SIDNEY COOLIDGE

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Fifteenth U. S. Infantry, First Battalion, King's Brigade, Dod, commanding,[1]

At about 4 o'clock the enemy took the breastworks we had occupied in the morning, . . . we were the last to leave the breastworks.

Eighteenth U. S. Infantry, First Battalion, King's Brigade, Smith, commanding[2]

The battalions [in the front line] were replaced by the 15th U. S. Infantry, I taking the position lately held by it in the second line. Here my command remained, after changing front slightly to the right, until after sunset, after every brigade on my right had retired, when I was ordered to do so. Over a wide cornfield, under a terrific fire of musketry, canister, and spherical case shot, my men steadily and slowly followed their color, when, gaining the woods they faced about, fired, and moved to the rear, where, as ordered, I reported to the General of the brigade.

Eighteenth U. S. Infantry, Second Battalion, King's Brigade, Haymond, commanding[3]

About 5 P.M. a heavy attack was again made upon this part of the line. I remained until ordered to fall back.

Barnes' Brigade of Van Cleve's Division fought on this day under General Baird, occupying a position in the vicinity of the northeast corner of the Kelly field. The 99th Ohio and 35th Indiana, under command of Colonel Swaine, were reserve to Scribner's Brigade, while the 8th Kentucky and 51st Ohio were to the left and rear of Starkweather's Brigade.

Fifty-first Ohio, Barnes' Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel Wood[4]

At 5 P.M. the engagement became general. The right of the line falling back, the enemy opened a terrific fire of musketry and artillery on the left, completely enfilading the 51st Ohio and

[1] No. 50, p. 316, l. 37.
[2] No. 50, p. 320, l. 1.
[3] No. 50, p. 321, l. 25.
[4] No. 50, p. 347, l. 32.

8th Kentucky. Having no support, we were compelled to fall back in some disorder. Several attempts were made to rally the men immediately, but it proved impossible to do so under such a murderous fire with no support. Falling back about ½ mile, we rallied and re-formed with the balance of the Third [Barnes'] Brigade.

Thirty-fifth Indiana, Barnes' Brigade, Dufficy, commanding[1]

The enemy in the mean time massed a heavy force in our front, and about 4 o'clock opened a heavy fire of artillery and musketry upon us, which continued until sundown, when we received orders from General Thomas to retire. This was accomplished under a most destructive fire, in which it is feared many of our men reported as missing may have been either killed or wounded. Our line was re-formed on a hill in our rear, from whence we marched towards Chattanooga, and encamped within four miles of that place.

Ninety-ninth Ohio, Barnes' Brigade, Colonel Swaine[2]

This division [Baird's] received the order to fall back, fighting, late in the afternoon, after all the support on the right had been driven from the field. On the top of the ridge to our rear, I halted my retreating force, and seeing that a general rout had taken place, etc.

In order to study the questions involved in this withdrawal of the Federal left wing, the military student should have an accurate map, showing the position of the Kelly field, bordering the Lafayette road on the east. He should then know the positions of the four divisions in the woods, all behind high breastworks; part of the lines on elevations, and from one hundred to two hundred yards beyond the open field, facing, generally, east, with their flanks refused, and confronting the Confederate right wing. He should mark on this map the relative brigade positions of the different divisions: he can then study the distance

[1] No. 50, p. 344, l. 21. [2] No. 50, p. 340, l. 21.

KELLY HOUSE AND FIELD, CHICKAMAUGA

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of the two flanks from each other, and their respective distances from the Snodgrass house, and also the distance of Johnson's Division in the centre from these headquarters of General Thomas, whence his order was sent. General Boynton's *Chickamauga National Military Park*,[1] gives a table of distances, from which I take the following, with the aid of which the distances from the Snodgrass house to the flanks and centre of Thomas' left wing can be calculated, and to which reference may be made for distances between other points mentioned in these pages, viz.: —

	Miles
Snodgrass house to Kelly's	.62
Kelly's to Cloud house	1.34
Kelly's to Rossville	4.54
Snodgrass house to Rossville [via McFarland's]	5.94
Snodgrass Hill to McFarland's Gap	2.45
Cloud house to Rossville	3.20
Chattanooga to Rossville	4.
Rossville to Widow Glenn's	6.

Proof has been given that every division commander received orders for withdrawal at 5 P.M. or earlier. Before the order reached Reynolds' Division, that officer had already withdrawn from the breastworks, i.e., before 4.30 P.M., and we find his division on the west of the Lafayette road, when Thomas' order came to it to retire.

Let us now sum up the facts which the Official Records have established in connection with General Thomas' participation in the battle, from the time he received the order of withdrawal to the time he left the battle-field. I will submit what I consider is shown absolutely, by the Official Reports.

(1) Rosecrans' withdrawal order must have been sent between 3.40 and 4.15 P.M.

[1] Page 18.

(2) General Thomas received the order about 4.30 P.M.

(3) Reynolds' Division was forced to withdraw from its position at the breastworks, and about 4.30 P.M. received Thomas' order to commence the movement of the army's withdrawal from the battle-field, meeting General Thomas when it was already retiring. Palmer's Division received the order of withdrawal about fifteen minutes to 5 o'clock; and Johnson's and Baird's Divisions about 5 P.M.; and the whole left wing of the Federal army was entirely withdrawn from the battle-field before 5.30. As Thomas gave his orders for the retirement of the right wing when he was at the position he describes, near the Ridge road, and before he rode from this point "to Rossville accompanied by Generals Garfield and Gordon Granger," it follows that, from the point mentioned, he must have sent the order for retirement of his right wing before sunset.

Having established these facts from the Official Records, it necessarily follows that we have fully exposed these popular fallacies concerning General Thomas, and proven that there is no authority for the claim that he used his discretion and delayed his obedience to Rosecrans' order of withdrawal, or that he held his army on the battle-field until nightfall. On the contrary, it has been officially recorded that he obeyed the order *at once*, and that the actual movement began under compulsion before the order arrived. We have also quoted sufficient from the Records to prove that this withdrawal of the left wing was "not in perfect order," though some few brigades are shown to have retired in good order.

We will defer our description of the closing scenes of the battle and of the withdrawal of the Federal right wing until we reach in our discussion the Official Reports of officers who participated therein. This right wing had established itself at its position on Horseshoe Ridge at about 1 P.M.; but General Thomas had nothing to do with

posting the troops there, and we will later show, in our discussion of future Official Reports, that the right wing, consisting of Wood's and Brannan's commands on the Horseshoe, and Steedman's on the Main Ridge, were driven from their positions before the order reached them, sent by General Thomas from the Ridge road. And also, that at sunset all the Federals, excepting those who were captured, "were hastily withdrawn, from every part of the battle-field."

We have eliminated the testimony as to the final issue and closing scenes of the battle, which we have found in the Reports of General Halleck in Washington, and of General Rosecrans in Chattanooga. We must now classify General Thomas' testimony as also incompetent, so far as it relates to his right wing after he left it on Horseshoe ridge at 4.30 P.M.

There is no doubt in my mind that, at this particular time, 4.30 P.M., he saw the impossibility of holding his position any longer. With the natural instinct of a great soldier, he knew where the weak point in his defense was; and as soon as he saw the Confederate advance of Buckner's Corps, toward the fatal gap in his lines, which he had not means to prevent, he knew that the hour had come for retreat.

In the discussion later of other Official Reports, we shall demonstrate where this gap was, and how the Confederates did not take advantage of their opportunity until the advance of Buckner's Corps at this time. The Official Records prove that there were two Federal generals who saw and feared it, one of the number being General Thomas, who ordered Steedman's Division to be thrown into this gap between the two wings of the Federal army when Steedman first reported. But just at this moment the right of Brannan's Division on the Horseshoe had been turned by the Confederates of Johnson's and Hindman's

Divisions; so Steedman's Division was diverted to that quarter, and immediate disaster forestalled.[1]

It now remains necessary for me to complete the record of the testimony in evidence, against the assertion (as embodied in claim number 3) of General Thomas' admirers, that his army withdrew "in perfect order." It will, no doubt, surprise many of my readers, to read this record of it, supplied by a Federal officer, Colonel Peter T. Swaine, of the 99th Ohio, of Barnes' Brigade, Van Cleve's Division, Twenty-first Corps — which brigade fought, on this day, with General Baird's Division of the Federal left wing. Colonel Swaine's Report[2] reads as follows: —

> This division [Baird's] received the order to fall back, fighting, late in the afternoon, *after all the support on the right had been driven from the field.*[3]
>
> On the top of the ridge to our rear, I halted my retreating force, and seeing that a general rout had taken place from all the forces in our vicinity, I assumed command and ordered all the bugles to blow the assembly. The color-bearers of some twenty regiments planted their colors, and at the cry, "Rally round the flag, boys!" the tide of retreat was checked, and I found myself commanding a force worthy to be led by one of much higher rank. I formed to resist cavalry, requiring the men to divide their cartridges with those out of ammunition. Knowing, however, the command was too much disorganized to resist a further attack from infantry, I directed that it should fall back to Rossville and there reorganize.
>
> At this juncture we were joined by general officers and brigade commanders, relieving me of further responsibility, but they accomplished my suggested movement.

The time and place of this "general rout," and the personnel of the twenty regiments of troops which composed it, and the names of the general officers and brigade commanders who at this juncture relieved Colonel Swaine, are

[1] Steedman's Report, No. 50, p. 60, l. 27.
[2] No. 50, p. 849, l. 21.
[3] Italics are mine. — Author.

COL. PETER T. SWAINE

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of interest. We know that the time must have been near 5.30 P.M., and that the place was on the summit of the ridge immediately in rear of where Baird's Division had fought, viz., the bare ridge of Snodgrass field, halfway between Snodgrass' house and Mullis'.

It will be noticed that Colonel Swaine says that, after all the divisions of the left wing to the right of Johnson's had been driven from the field, and his division had retreated to the top of the ridge in rear, he saw that "a general rout had taken place from all the forces in our vicinity." As he first saw the rout of the left wing, it is plain that the rout that he next saw applied especially to the right wing. Thus the rout was a general one of the whole army; and the forces in the vicinity were those that fought on Horseshoe Ridge.

Without any doubt of it, because of the time and place, General Thomas himself saw this general rout, and knew that it was composed of a good proportion of troops which he had left fighting on Horseshoe Ridge at about 4.30 P.M.

When General Thomas met General Sheridan, at 5.30 P.M., on the Lafayette road north of Mullis' house, and General Sheridan asked him for orders, his (Thomas') reply was that his lines "were disorganized," and that "it would be futile," under the circumstances, to attempt to hold Horseshoe Ridge, a part of which was already in Confederate possession. What other disorganized lines could he then have referred to than those in Snodgrass field?

If we impose a literal construction upon the statements of Colonel Swaine and General Thomas, we would say that after Colonel Swaine had seen the rout of the left wing in the Kelly field, and had retreated to the ridge in the rear, — viz., the bare ridge of Snodgrass field, — he there saw the rout of the right wing, or of those troops in his vicinity who had fought on Horseshoe Ridge — troops composed

of Harker's and Brannan's commands, about sixteen regiments in all; for it is evident that this conclusion is reached by placing a strict construction upon General Thomas' statement,[1] which describes the orderly condition of the retirement of his left wing, after his charge to the rear with Reynolds: "Johnson's and Baird's Divisions were attacked at the moment of retiring, but being prepared, retired without confusion." And of the 4th and last division, Palmer's two brigades, he says: "Grose's Brigade was thrown into some confusion, but Cruft's Brigade came off in good style."

On page 85 of this chapter we learned, in confirmation of General Thomas' statement, that one regiment of Grose's Brigade, the 23d Kentucky, retired in order with Cruft's Brigade, which was halted on a hill of Missionary Ridge adjoining the road passing through McFarland's Gap. The further inference is, that the disordered troops which Colonel Cruft in vain tried to rally at that point — being the only ones who fled — belonged to the four regiments of Grose's Brigade. Hence it would naturally follow that all the regiments rallied by Colonel Swaine in Snodgrass field belonged to Harker's and Brannan's commands, if none of the twenty belonged to the left wing. But we know from better evidence that General Thomas' statement, that Grose's Brigade was the only one which retired in confusion, is incorrect. If we are not satisfied with the Federal evidence already quoted, where each officer saw his brother-officer run, but did not see himself do so, we need but read the Confederate Official Reports of the organizations of the right wing which pursued the flying Federals, after driving them from their position.

It has already been noted that Starkweather's Brigade of Baird's Division did not halt their "withdrawal" until they reached a point one and one half miles from Chatta-

[1] No. 50, p. 254, l. 16.

nooga. King's Brigade of Regulars, according to evidence, also made a rapid retreat.

The final conclusion which I reach, therefore, is that the personnel of the disorganized troops which were rallied by Colonel Swaine was equally divided between the two wings of Thomas' army, and included a greater proportion of troops that had fought under Brannan than of those who had fought under Harker on Horseshoe Ridge.

Summing up the question at issue, as to whether General Thomas withdrew his troops in good order, from either left or right wings, from the respective positions where they had fought, we think the preponderance of evidence is to the effect that — with few exceptions — the organizations of the Federal left wing were driven in great disorder across the Kelly field; also that Harker's Brigade, of the Federal right wing, after a four hours' steady maintenance of Horseshoe Ridge, was finally forced back into Snodgrass field, where, hard-pressed, they were opportunely supported by Hazen's Brigade.

Steedman's Division, after a succession of charges and counter-charges, finally broke on the summit of the Main Ridge, and fled down the northern slope, with the Confederates in pursuit;[1] while of the troops which fought under Brannan, on Horseshoe Ridge, some were driven off,[2] and others were "stealthily withdrawn" in disorder,[3] and their retreat covered at the sacrifice of four regiments, three of which were captured. Thus the whole Federal army, composed of the organizations of the left and right wings, — mentioned in detail, — were every one of them driven, in more or less "disorganized" condition, from the points mentioned before sunset; and after General Longstreet ordered the Confederate pursuit to be halted, the Federals were "marched without molestation to Rossville."

[1] Chapter vi, p. 189.
[2] Chapter x, p. 221.
[3] Chapter x, p. 212.

In reading the protestations of officers who belonged to the Federal left wing against statements that their particular organizations were driven in disorder, while they say that their comrades, on either side, fled in great confusion, I am reminded of the days, some years ago, when I boarded in a Western city, and among the guests was an aristocratic and precise old lady, always very positive as to the accuracy of her statements. On the occasion of a slight fire, the whole household was in a great state of excitement, including the dignified old lady, who rushed to the telephone, seized the *receiver*, and screamed into *it*, instead of into the transmitter, "*Fire! Fire! Fire at the Ogden House!!!*" and, out of breath, after a pause, "*Why don't you answer?*" The next morning at breakfast, she astonished the other guests with the information that *she* had been the only cool and collected member of the household, as indicated, she said, by her sending in the alarm of fire!

In General Beatty's "Memoirs,"[1] under date of September 20, 1863, referring to the time the Federal army in its withdrawal had reached Rossville, he says: —

> At this hour of the night (eleven to twelve o'clock) the army is simply a mob. There appears to be neither organization nor discipline. The various commands are mixed up in what appears to be inextricable confusion. *Were a division of the enemy to pounce down upon us between this and morning, I fear the Army of the Cumberland would be blotted out.*[2]

Supplementing General Beatty's statement, I find further evidence in the Report of General J. G. Spears, who commanded a brigade in Granger's Corps which did not get up in time to participate in the battle, but was posted on the night of the 20th, under General Rosecrans' orders, so that its various regiments might "halt all officers and

[1] John Beatty, *The Citizen Soldier*, p. 345. Cincinnati: Wilstach, Baldwin & Co. 1879.

[2] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.

soldiers coming into Chattanooga below the rank of major-general." I quote the following statement indicating the number of fugitives:[1] —

> The whole night was spent in executing said orders, and by the next morning I had halted and encamped, of different corps and divisions, between 8000 and 12,000 officers and soldiers.

That Rosecrans' army had not recovered from its demoralization even on the following day is also an established fact. While General Longstreet was responsible for halting the pursuit of the defeated army on the 20th, General Bragg certainly blundered in not following up his victory on the morning of September 21.[2] We quote the following testimony in evidence: —

(1) *Statement of General D. H. Hill*[3]

> But whatever blunders each of us in authority committed before the battles of the 19th and 20th, and during their progress, the great blunder of all was that of not pursuing the enemy on the 21st. The day was spent in burying the dead and gathering up captured stores. Forrest, with his usual promptness, was early in the saddle, and saw that the retreat was a rout. Disorganized masses of men were hurrying to the rear; batteries of artillery were inextricably mixed with trains and wagons; disorder and confusion pervaded the broken ranks struggling to get on. Forrest sent back word to Bragg that "every hour was worth a thousand men."[4]

(2) *Forrest's dispatch*[5]

> On the Road, September 21, 1863.
>
> Lieutenant-General L. Polk.
>
> General: — We are within a mile of Rossville. Have been on the point of Missionary Ridge. Can see Chattanooga and every-

[1] No. 50, p. 884, l. 45.

[2] See Notes to chapter IV, Note B.

[3] D. H. Hill, "Chickamauga, the Great Battle of the West," *Century Magazine*, April, 1887, p. 962.

[4] "If Forrest ever used the above expression," says Doctor John A. Wyeth (author of the *Life of Forrest*), "I have been unable to find it. It does not sound like him."

[5] No. 55, p. 881.

thing around. The enemy's trains are leaving, going around the point of Lookout Mountain.

The prisoners captured report two pontoon bridges thrown across for the purpose of retreating. I think they are evacuating as hard as they can go. They are cutting timber down to obstruct our passing. I think we ought to press forward as rapidly as possible.

Respectfully, &c.,

N. B. Forrest,

Brigadier-General.

Please forward to General Bragg.

CHAPTER V

THOMAS' WITHDRAWAL AND PREPARATION TO RESIST PURSUIT — FORMS McFARLAND GAP–CLOUD HOUSE LINE — DEFENSE OF SHERIDAN'S RECORD

LET us now follow General Thomas from the battle-field. We recall the fact that coincident with sending Captain Barker to Reynolds' Division with the withdrawal order, he himself followed after. "In passing through an open woods"[1] in that direction, the same that fringed the Lafayette road on the west, he "was cautioned by a couple of soldiers who had been to hunt water that there was a large force of Rebels in these woods, drawn up in line and advancing" toward him. This force belonged to the Confederate right wing, the adventurous Govan's Brigade, of Liddell's Division, which had passed completely around the Federal left, and formed a solid column[2] across the Lafayette road, advancing well-nigh to Kelly's house, and "had outflanked the left of our [Federal] lines and was in the rear of Palmer's, Johnson's, and Baird's Divisions."[3] The Federal left wing was thereby "nearly surrounded."[4] "Just at this time," General Thomas says, "I [he] saw the head of Reynolds' column approaching, and, calling to the General himself, directed him to form a line perpendicular to the State [Lafayette] road, changing the head of his column to the left, with his right resting on that road, and to charge the enemy who were then in his immediate front." The direct result of this charge was to drive the Confederates completely from the Federal rear, clearing

[1] No. 50, p. 258, l. 46.
[2] No. 50, p. 483, l. 19.
[3] No. 50, Turchin, p. 475, l. 7.
[4] No. 50, p. 481, l. 37.

the way for the withdrawal of their left wing across Kelly's field.

General Thomas continued in the charge with Reynolds' Division until it had passed beyond Baird's left flank, and when near the McDonald orchard, with Turchin in front, the latter closely followed by E. A. King's[1] Brigade, now commanded by Colonel Robinson, he turned abruptly to the left with King's Brigade from off the battle-field. Turchin's Brigade in the mean time, while on the march, faced to the right and drove the Confederates in confusion, capturing more than two hundred prisoners. As "the charge was made by the rear rank, the line became much broken."[2] General Reynolds also did not understand[3] General Thomas' purpose. Turchin's Brigade, after crossing McDonald's field, under its brigade commander's orders[4] obliqued toward the left and "succeeded in gaining shelter,[5] on the left of Dan McCook's Brigade," as Turchin tells us.[6]

This "shelter" was gained by the assistance of Captain Barnett's Battery, which shelled Forrest's dismounted cavalry from Turchin's front as he advanced. McCook's Brigade at this time occupied the summit of a high ridge in an "open field"[7] south of Colonel Cloud's house, and facing the Lafayette road.

In the mean time, General Reynolds' Report describes how he was on the right flank of Turchin's Brigade,[8] and "pressed right on in the charge, expecting the whole division to do the same until the Rebel lines and batteries were cleared and the road opened, and found myself [himself] with only about 150 of the Third Brigade [Turchin's] under Colonel Lane,[9] formed of fragments of the

[1] No. 50, p. 254, l. 5.
[2] No. 50, p. 480, l. 36.
[3] No. 50, p. 442, l. 21.
[4] No. 50, p. 475, l. 18.
[5] No. 50, p. 883, l. 3.
[6] Turchin's *Chickamauga*, p. 153.
[7] No. 50, p. 882, l. 41.
[8] No. 50, p. 442, l. 23.
[9] Eleventh Ohio.

GEN. JOSEPH J REYNOLDS

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Eleventh, Thirty-sixth, and Ninety-second Ohio Regiments near the field hospital of the Fourteenth Corps."

From the map and our table of distances[1] we note that the distance from the Kelly house to the Cloud church hospital[2] — being the field hospital referred to — was nearly one and one half miles. Here General Reynolds and Colonel Lane "found the enemy in force on the Rossville [Lafayette] road."[3] "We halted here," says Colonel Lane, "and formed the fragments of the 11th, 36th, and 92d Ohio Regiments, and marched by the left flank to join General Granger's command, where we found our brigade." In other words, they rejoined General Turchin, then on the left of McCook's Brigade. Thence Reynolds[4] and Turchin[5] rejoined the remainder of the division, which, under General Thomas and Colonel Robinson, had proceeded to the high ground at the head of McFarland's Gap, and was posted by the latter on the left of King's Brigade.[6]

It is worth while to notice for future reference that the length of time which Turchin's Brigade, as well as the rest of Reynolds' Division, remained in this locality, is indicated by the statement of Acting Major Heltemes, of the 18th Kentucky. "Here," he says, "a rest of about one and a half hours was given."[7] General Turchin in his book[8] casts a sidelight on General Reynolds during this movement of his division to the rear which is both interesting and at the same time assists our understanding of the movements as to time and locality. He says: —

> Reynolds at this time did not know what became of Turchin or his brigade. Looking neither to the sides nor to the rear, General Reynolds passed a clump of timber, skirting the left

[1] Chapter IV, p. 95.
[2] No. 50, p. 480, l. 45.
[3] No. 50, p. 479, l. 19.
[4] No. 50, p. 442, l. 33.
[5] No. 50, p. 354, l. 13.
[6] No. 50, p. 479, l. 21.
[7] No. 50, p. 876, l. 41.
[8] *Chickamauga*, p. 152.

side of the Chattanooga [Lafayette] road, and there saw a body of Rebels in front and a larger one on the flank. It was Forrest's dismounted cavalry. Reynolds now found that he was in a tight place and that the balance of the brigade had disappeared. He even imagined that the troops on the ridge were not ours, but Rebel. The command halted, and the division commander was discussing the chances of escape and the possibility of a surrender while our troops on the ridge were in view. Finally, the coming of some of our soldiers from McCook's Brigade, loaded with canteens to find water, broke the spell and showed the way for the detachment to reach the balance of the brigade on the ridge.

Criticizing General Reynolds' statement that he understood this movement "was intended to open the way to Rossville for the army and did not then know of any other road to that point," General Turchin says: —

A major-general declaring that he did not know that there were any other roads leading from our position to Rossville except the Lafayette and Chattanooga road, while fighting two days in a position which covered those *other roads* to Rossville and Chattanooga, shows one of two things: Either that he was grossly ignorant of military matters, or that he was inexcusably indifferent to what surely interested not only the major-generals, but also every intelligent private, viz., how our army could reach Chattanooga. Was it possible for our army to retreat by the main Chattanooga road when it was on its flank and in possession of the enemy as Reynolds himself at last found out?

General Thomas, as we have seen, was with that part of Reynolds' Division, King's Brigade, which broke off first and turned to the left. It continued in this direction, passing the right flank of McCook's Brigade and Barnett's Battery, until it reached a point on the Ridge road at the head of McFarland's Gap where this road debouches through a succession of high hills, the highest one thousand feet, on either side where the road passes through the Main or Missionary Ridge. But at the head of McFarland's Gap will be noticed two commanding elevations of

over nine hundred feet on both sides of the road. Here on the north elevation General Thomas posted Colonel Robinson with his brigade,[1] with orders to "hold the ground while the troops on our [Federal] right and left passed by," his reference being, as we notice, to the right wing first, composed of the commands under Wood, Brannan, and Granger.

After making this preparation, "in a few moments,"[2] General Thomas says, Willich's Brigade was reported to him as posted on the other "commanding piece of ground on the right [south] of the Ridge road." General Willich was then directed to report to Major-General Reynolds, to whom General Thomas intrusted the duty of "covering the retirement of the troops." After his long détour it appears that General Reynolds received his orders in person from General Thomas,[3] at the position of King's Brigade on the elevation on the north side of the Ridge road.

Regimental histories of King's Brigade confirm Thomas' Report. Comrade Floyd[4] shows that this line of battle was formed "near the juncture of the roads at Brock's house, facing the battle-field, with D. McCook's Brigade on our left and Willich's Brigade, of Johnson's Division, on our right." He then describes how Turchin's Brigade later "took position in the rear of D. McCook's Brigade on our left. Our army, which had not been previously driven from the field, then withdrew via McFarland's Gap to Rossville."

Comrade High's book[5] gives us the relative positions of the regiments of King's Brigade on the left of Willich, facing east; next to Willich, in respective order from the

[1] No. 50, p. 254, l. 5.
[2] No. 50, p. 254, l. 7.
[3] See Notes to chapter VIII, Note D. Also chapter VIII, p. 167.
[4] Rev. D. B. Floyd (Sergeant Co. I), *History of the 75th Indiana*, p. 178. Philadelphia: Lutheran Publication Society. 1893.
[5] *History of the 68th Indiana*, p. 119.

right, being the 75th Indiana and 105th Ohio south of the Ridge road, with the 19th Indiana Battery and the 68th and 101st Indiana Regiments north of the road. It is from General Davis' Official Report,[1] and further confirmed by my correspondence with Colonel G. P. Thruston, of McCook's staff, that I place the other two brigades, Dodge's and Baldwin's, of Johnson's Division, on the right of Willich. General Davis' Report further shows that he was "in the act of forming my [his] lines near Thomas' right" at this point when "I [he] received information from General Garfield that Thomas was falling back, and orders to repair to Rossville." "This," says General Davis in his sworn testimony in the McCook Court of Inquiry,[2] "was between sunset and dark."

Before this, Sheridan had successfully formed a junction with Thomas' left flank "about 5.30 P.M."[3] As his troops were too "disorganized" to withstand the enemy at this point, General Thomas directed that Sheridan's Division, or the "1500 gathered," instead of advancing further, should be re-formed[4] on the Lafayette road at Cloud church and "aid in covering the withdrawal to Rossville."[5]

After these dispositions had been made, by which General Thomas protected his route of withdrawal, Sheridan on his left flank covering the Lafayette road, and Reynolds with Johnson on the right covering McFarland's Gap, he (Thomas) "sent orders to Generals Wood, Brannan, and Granger to withdraw from their positions,"[6] and he "then proceeded to Rossville, accompanied by Generals Garfield and Gordon Granger, and immediately prepared to place the troops in position at that point."[7] After all these orders were given and preparations made in

[1] No. 50, p. 501, l. 19.
[2] No. 50, p. 581, l. 12.
[3] No. 50, p. 955, l. 40.
[4] No. 50, p. 584, l. 11.
[5] See chapter vi, p. 156.
[6] No. 50, p. 254, l. 15.
[7] No. 50, p. 254, l. 32.

furtherance of Rosecrans' first dispatch at 4.15 P.M., General Thomas now received the second "communication" to the same effect, dispatched by Rosecrans before 5 P.M. Garfield says[1] that he received this order to retire on Rossville "a little after sunset and communicated [it] to Generals Thomas and Granger." As this dispatch to Garfield was sent by Rosecrans from Chattanooga before his 5 P.M. dispatch to Sheridan was sent, we should expect that Garfield would have received his dispatch as soon as Sheridan made his junction with Thomas' left, a well-established point of time, namely, 5.30 P.M.;[2] but it is probable that this "second dispatch" was sent to Rossville and via McFarland's Gap, and its delivery took longer.

As appears elsewhere, General Granger seems to have made some suggestion to General Thomas at this time to make a stand at this point, but Thomas evidently thought so little of it that he makes no mention thereof in his Official Report, nor even of Sheridan's junction with him as a cause for hesitation on his part in continuing his preparations for withdrawal to Rossville in accordance with Rosecrans' repeated order.

It is from General Sheridan's Official Report that we obtain the time of this "junction with Thomas via Lafayette road." He says,[3] "This was successfully accomplished about 5.30 P.M."

This chapter has furnished the testimony as to the position where General Thomas, at sunset, had collected a part of his army for the purpose of its withdrawal to Rossville and for its protection against expected Confederate pursuit. This line, which has just been described and which extended from the head of McFarland's Gap to Cloud house and the Lafayette road, was so located as to contest the two routes leading to Rossville. But General

[1] No. 50, p. 145, l. 32.
[2] No. 50, p. 581, l. 12.
[3] See p. 119, *infra*.

Thomas considered that it would be futile, with his troops "disorganized" as they were, even to attempt to make a stand at this point, and lost no time in continuing his obedience to Rosecrans' dispatches in immediately withdrawing his whole force all the way to Rossville, Sheridan being promptly sent back to cover the Ringgold road and bar the expected Confederate pursuit via that quarter.

Thus we have seen how General Thomas, after the withdrawal of his left and right wings from the battle-field, halted at the head of McFarland's Gap and formed a line composed of Willich's Brigade of Johnson's Division, Reynolds' Division, Dan McCook's Brigade, and Sheridan's forces on advantageous ground extending from the Ridge road to the Lafayette road, defending all ways and all roads to Rossville, covering his army's withdrawal thereto. Here we have the last Federal line organized to resist the expected Confederate pursuit which was halted by Longstreet's orders.[1]

The last of the Federal army, the retirement of which was intrusted to General Reynolds, withdrew from this point via McFarland's Gap about 7.30 P.M., a conclusion which is reached from direct official evidence, presently set forth, and also later in our account, for this evidence as to time is found in General Granger's Official Report, as well as in the Brigade and Regimental Reports of General D. McCook's Brigade, which was undoubtedly selected because of its size, position, and condition to be the last to leave after Reynolds' Division on its right had filed through McFarland's Gap, though General Hazen's graphic and circumstantial account claims that his brigade was the rear guard of the army following Reynolds through this Gap to Rossville.[2]

But to D. McCook's Brigade, one regiment of which,

[1] For the relative and actual positions of this line, see map opposite.

[2] See Note to chapter v, Note A.



LINE FROM McFARLAND'S GAP TO CLOUD HOUSE ABOUT 5.30 P.M. TO 7.30 P.M., SEPTEMBER 20, 1863

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viz., the 69th Ohio, was the first to open the engagement on the early morning of September 19,[1] also belongs the honor of being the last organization to cover the final Federal retirement, its withdrawal, however, being via Lafayette road and Rossville Gap after Sheridan had cleared the way. The testimony of the officers of McCook's Brigade to which we refer is as follows: —

Barnett's Battery I, 2d Illinois[2]

About 7.30 p.m.,[3] we commenced falling back towards Rossville, Ga.

Major Holmes' 52d Ohio[4]

I received an order *immediately after dark*[5] to move quietly out by the left flank, as soon as I could recall the pickets that had been posted 300 yards in front of the command. It was done, and after a brisk march of about five miles the regiment bivouacked at Rossville.

Colonel Harmon's 105th Illinois[6]

At 8 p.m.[5] I marched by the left flank in rear of the 52d Ohio Volunteer Infantry to Rossville.

Colonel Dilworth's 85th Illinois[8]

A short time after dark[5] we were ordered back to Rossville.

Lieutenant-Colonel Magee's 86th Illinois[7]

Soon after dark[5] I received an order to call in my skirmishers and form in the rear of the brigade, which had been ordered to return to Rossville . . . where we arrived about ten o'clock in the evening.

Finally, from the Report of the brigade commander, Colonel Daniel McCook,[8] appears his corroboration of Colonel Magee's statement of arrival at ten o'clock at

[1] No. 50, p. 871, l. 16; p. 884, l. 12; No. 52, p. 749.
[2] No. 50, p. 883, l. 6.
[3] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.
[4] No. 50, p. 881, l. 32.
[5] No. 50, p. 879, l. 4.
[6] No. 50, p. 874, l. 34.
[7] No. 50, p. 877, l. 17.
[8] No. 50, p. 871, l. 48.

Rossville and the further statement that his brigade "was *the last brigade to leave the field.*" [1]

It was through General Thomas' orders, after General Garfield had communicated to him at sunset Rosecrans' second dispatch to withdraw, that Dan McCook's Brigade was selected as the rear guard of the army in the final withdrawal to Rossville, after the breaking-up of the line of defense between the McFarland and Rossville Gaps. General Thomas, as we have seen, was accompanied by General Granger from the head of McFarland's Gap to Rossville. When the vicinity of the Cloud house was reached and Garfield received Rosecrans' dispatch, it appears that it was at this time and place that Thomas gave this order to Granger pertaining to McCook's Brigade. I quote the following, in support of this statement, from General Granger's Report: [2]—

> I received instructions from Major-General Thomas to march back to Rossville and to cover the rear of the forces falling back upon that place with McCook's Brigade. These instructions were promptly carried out.

It cannot be doubted that this position occupied by McCook's Brigade and Barnett's Battery was developed into one of the most important keys to the safety of the whole Federal army, holding in check cavalry, infantry, and artillery forces of the Confederate right. For on the Confederate right, Forrest's Cavalry and troops of Breckinridge's and Liddell's Divisions overlapped the Federal left, under Baird. Steedman's opportune arrival had pushed aside Forrest's dismounted cavalry, then preventing the junction via McFarland's Gap of the two Confederate wings; and nothing but McCook's Brigade and Barnett's Battery remained behind after Steedman to guard against this threatened catastrophe — the surround-

[1] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.

[2] No. 50, p. 856, l. 35.

COL. DANIEL McCOOK AND HIS OFFICERS

COL. CALEB J. DILWORTH
MAJ. JAMES T. HOLMES

COL. OSCAR F. HARMON
COL. DANIEL McCOOK
LIEUT.-COL. JAMES W. LANGLEY

LIEUT.-COL. DAVID W. MAGER
CAPT. CHARLES M. BARNETT

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ing of the Federal army and blocking its withdrawal through the passes to Rossville.

As a further illustration of the truth thus set forth in detail as to the important position occupied and the service thereby rendered, we need but quote the words of commendation which Colonel McCook received from each of his superior officers: From General Granger:[1] "Although his brigade was not engaged in the battle, it had a very important position protecting the rear of those who were fighting." From General Thomas:[2] "He kept a large force of the enemy's cavalry at bay, and with his battery materially aided Turchin's handsome charge on the enemy, who had closed in on our left."

Finally from General Rosecrans, he received recommendation for promotion to Brigadier-General "for distinguished and valuable services" in the battle.[3]

This chapter was about to go to press, when the mail brought me the following statement of Captain Edward L. Anderson, Adjutant of McCook's Brigade, which forms an important link in connection with the history of the battle. "Just as we were about to pass the McDonald house Colonel McCook ordered me to go forward to inform General Granger that we were advancing. I was driven off the road by artillery fire and made for the rear of our fighting line. On my way I overtook Major Joe Fullerton of Granger's staff, and we saw the brigade streaming up the hill. Fullerton waited to see where McCook would halt and form, and I rode forward and found General Thomas. While I was reporting to him, Granger came up weeping for the death of his adjutant-general, Russell,[4] and Fullerton joined us. Thomas then said 'it was a happy chance, for McCook was just where he was wanted to protect our left

[1] No. 50, p. 257, l. 11. [2] No. 50, p. 255, l. 44. [3] No. 50, p. 90, l. 56.
[4] See Notes to chapter XI, Note E, first paragraph of *History of Eighty-ninth Ohio*.

flank and rear,' and I carried that word back to Colonel McCook." [1]

Defense of General Sheridan's Record

Connected with our study in this chapter of the formation of this McFarland Gap and Cloud house line, there has existed a controversy since the battle, in which a great injustice has been done to General Sheridan. It is therefore proper that under this head we should demonstrate the truth as to the points involved.

A junction with Thomas under orders was Sheridan's objective during many hours of hard marching, and his statement, in his Report of September 30, 1863, as to when it was finally accomplished, is more corroborative than the testimony of any other officer. The time — 5.30 P.M. — is in harmony with our moving-picture scene of the battle derived from numerous sources, but we have also direct official and contemporaneous corroboration of Sheridan's Report, which seems to establish this important point of time — "5.30 P.M." — as not a minute later than this junction with Thomas occurred.

The time, place, and circumstance of this junction of Sheridan with Thomas' left is one of the most important points of historical truth in connection with this much misrepresented battle. We are fortunately in possession of evidence of official record in connection with it that is most authoritative, convincing, and unanimous.

It has been already set forth that General Rosecrans sent his first dispatch from Chattanooga to General Thomas' headquarters, near Snodgrass house, at 4.15 P.M., or earlier, ordering the withdrawal of the army to Rossville. We have also seen that the movement of withdrawal

[1] Extract from letter to Henry J. Aten, of the 85th Illinois, author of an excellent history of his regiment, and to whom I am indebted for the above information and portraits.

GEN. PHILIP SHERIDAN

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began with Reynolds' Division at a time when Buckner's advance made it compulsory. As to the actual time of this movement, 4.30 P.M. is shown to be as nearly correct as much testimony on the subject enables us to establish. We called up as witnesses in connection with the time of this withdrawal movement, and the receipt of the order which caused it, all those of record, and we found that there were nearly thirty who bore testimony that this movement in response to the said order was about 5 P.M., or earlier. There was only one witness to the contrary, viz., General Thomas himself, all of whose testimony as to time we have shown to be erroneous. He alone testifies that 5.30 P.M. was the time of his order to Reynolds to begin the withdrawal.

On the other hand, in connection with the second dispatch which General Rosecrans sent after 4.30 P.M. and before 5 P.M., again ordering the withdrawal to Rossville, and his 5 P.M. order to Sheridan to help Thomas' withdrawal, we have not even one scintilla of testimony of record to gainsay the important statement in Sheridan's Report regarding his junction with Thomas' left flank.

I do not consider myself called upon to expose the errors and misrepresentations found in all the newspapers, magazine articles, and books which describe this great battle. Such a task would be a useless one, and the doing of it would consume more than one man's lifetime. Wherever there is some basis for this misrepresentation, founded on the testimony of the Official Records, I have considered it necessary to present all the evidence for the purpose of refutation. This, for example, I have done in connection with the 5.30 P.M. error in General Thomas' Report, which has been the moving "cause of woes unnumbered" in the difficulties encountered by many writers who have touched upon the history of this battle without a careful study of it.

For many years past I have sought for what General Hazen[1] calls an "official paper," containing a statement of Colonel Gates P. Thruston, chief of staff of McCook's Corps, being the same paper found in Chaplain Van Horne's *History of the Army of the Cumberland.*[2] As Van Horne includes this one unofficial paper among thirty others, all official papers, it was quite natural for General Hazen to make this mistake. That the paper in question is not of official record, and was written years after the battle, is attested to by Colonel Thruston in a recent letter received by the writer, in which he says: "Chaplain Van Horne wrote me asking me to write a statement of my observations at Chickamauga, as he was publishing his history under General Thomas' supervision, and wanted all the facts available. This was about 1874. His book was published in 1875. I wrote, not expecting its publication, and rather hastily."

This unfortunate statement is the sole cause of much misrepresentation of historical facts of official record. At the same time it is the basis of all the unwarrantable attacks made upon General Sheridan and his record in the battle. See in particular the virulent statements in the book entitled *General George H. Thomas. A Critical Biography* (by Donn Piatt. With concluding chapters by Henry V. Boynton)—under the page-heading "Sheridan Deserts the Field."[3]

I have called the statement an unfortunate one in consequence of my belief in what General Thruston has written me, telling of his friendship for General Sheridan: "I admired him. He had a splendid record, save for Chickamauga." It is also unfortunate that his paper was written hastily and without consultation of the Official Records, especially his own sworn testimony before the McCook

[1] *A Narrative of Military Service*, p. 140.
[2] Vol. I, p. 373.
[3] Page 431.

Court of Inquiry.[1] I cannot believe that, had he read this testimony and made himself conversant with the facts of record, presently set forth, he would have written any articles in detraction of his friend, General Sheridan, nor without protest stood for the statements made in Donn Piatt's and Boynton's book. This historical fact, testimony in regard to which we will now present, is that *at sunset, or earlier, Sheridan's troops effected a junction with Thomas' left on the Lafayette road in the vicinity of the Cloud church and Colonel Cloud's house.*

(1) General Sheridan's official statement:[2] "I then determined to move quickly on Rossville and form a junction with him [General Thomas] on his left flank via Lafayette road. This was successfully accomplished about 5.30 P.M."

(2) Colonel Silas Miller, who succeeded to the command of Lytle's Brigade, Sheridan's Division, when the former general was killed, in his Official Report,[3] says that Sheridan's force marched "to a point on the Chattanooga and Lafayette road three miles from Rossville, when it was reformed and took up position. By your order [Sheridan's] it soon removed, this brigade in advance, passing via Rossville on the Ringgold road, three miles to [McAfee's] church, arriving about dusk." Here we have one of those indefinite statements as to time, viz., "at dusk," which admits of considerable latitude. The dictionary gives "twilight" as a synonym. If he arrived then at McAfee's church about twilight, we know that the period of twilight began at a few seconds after six o'clock and lasted one hour and twenty-four minutes.

I take Colonel Miller's words to mean that he arrived at a time nearer sunset, otherwise he would have said "near dark." He must, of course, have needs arrived and de-

[1] No. 50, pp. 944-946 and 954-956.
[2] No. 50, p. 584, l. 10.
[3] No. 50, p. 581, l. 9.

parted from Cloud house earlier than 5.30 P.M. to have made a six-mile march in so short an interval before the beginning of twilight. A half-hour's leeway in our calculation would then be fair, and hence we reach our conclusion that his statement corroborates General Sheridan's, and his "advance" brigade may have made the six miles' march between 5.30 and 6.30 P.M.

(3) We have in the Records[1] the 5 o'clock telegraphic order of Rosecrans to Sheridan at Rossville, already quoted in full on page 44, chapter II. The context of this order — "Verbal message by Captain Hill received. Support General Thomas by all means" — shows that General Sheridan sent a message via this Captain Hill, notifying the commander-in-chief that he was going to Thomas' support on his left flank on the Lafayette road. There can be no doubt that Sheridan was at Rossville at this time, well on his way on the Lafayette road. This is indicated by another telegram specifying the time, as follows:[2] —

HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE, 2D CAVALRY DIV. ON RINGGOLD ROAD, Sept. 20, 1863 — *3.50 p.m.*[3]

General Garfield.

SIR: — Forrest[4] (said to be about 1500 strong) is immediately in my front skirmishing. I will endeavor to drive him.

Respectfully, etc.,

R. G. H. MINTY.

This was the dispatch which this same Captain Hill,[5] in his sworn testimony before the Negley Court of Inquiry, says that he "intercepted from Colonel Minty to General Rosecrans, stating that Forrest was in force on General Thomas' front and rear on the road from Rossville to Ringgold." Captain Hill was then at Rossville on his way,

[1] No. 50, p. 142, l. 51.
[2] No. 50, p. 141, l. 41.
[3] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.
[4] In his next telegram, 7.35 P.M., he says this was "Scott not Forrest." No. 50, p. 144, l. 19.
[5] No. 50, p. 1023, l. 7.

under orders[1] from Colonel Ducat, inspector-general on Rosecrans' staff, to go to Chattanooga via Rossville and report "the state of affairs" to the commanding general. This, Colonel Ducat describes, was in pursuance of an agreement, after a consultation,[2] that "General Sheridan should push out on the Lafayette road to support General Thomas, General Davis should remain where he was and cover the retreat of the trains, etc., and General Negley should march to Rossville as a support to either one." This indicates that the troops of General Sheridan were in the advance.

The same testimony is in evidence in General Negley's statement before his Court of Inquiry[3] that "General Davis should remain and hold the gap, General Sheridan to pass through Rossville toward General Thomas, while I should proceed to Rossville with the débris of the army . . . and be prepared to support either column."

A careful review of the evidence on the subject and of Captain Hill's testimony[4] shows that he must have started in quest of General Rosecrans, at Chattanooga via Rossville, at 3.45 or 4 P.M. We note his testimony[5] that he was also the bearer of information, received through Colonel Thruston, from General Thomas at Snodgrass house.

The breakneck speed with which the horses of these two staff officers, Thruston and Hill, must have been urged, is indicated by the evidence of the telegrams that Thruston left Snodgrass house at 3.35 P.M., and Hill arrived at Wagner's headquarters by 5 P.M., when Rosecrans sent his reply to Sheridan to the message communicated to him by Captain Hill; yet Hill had stopped long enough at the Rossville telegraph office to intercept Minty's telegraphic dispatch and had forwarded its contents to General Negley.

[1] No. 50, p. 1022, l. 51.
[2] No. 50, p. 1048, l. 47.
[3] Vol. LII, part I, p. 81, l. 11.
[4] No. 50, p. 1022, l. 45.
[5] No. 50, p. 1022, l. 54.

On the receipt thereof, General Negley says:[1] "In view of this new danger, I marched expeditiously to Rossville"; and according to the statement of Lieutenant W. H. H. Moody, aide-de-camp to General Negley, arrival of the troops "at Rossville was about 5 P.M."[2] As Sheridan's Division was in the vanguard, it is to be assumed that he arrived there somewhat earlier than 5 P.M. The starting-point of Sheridan's movement and the goal he was to reach are well defined within a few feet; also the time, within a few minutes, in which he accomplished this march between the two points. Colonel Ducat[3] in his Report indicates the starting-point "as marked on the map □ × G. McFarland's house," where the start was made.

From the testimony of Captain Hill, already quoted, and from the fact that he intercepted the 3.50 P.M. telegram of Minty, as well as the time of his arrival in Chattanooga, we reach the conclusion that it was about 4 P.M. that Sheridan started on this movement of his to reach Thomas' left flank.

Measured on the map, the distance from McFarland's house to Rossville is very little over two miles, and from the latter place to Cloud house is 3.2 miles, — say a total distance of five and one quarter miles which Sheridan covered in one and a half hours. On this calculation he covered an average of a mile in seventeen minutes, while Hill, on the other hand, made the distance of six miles from McFarland's house to Chattanooga within one hour. It appears from the testimony, however, that the first stage of the journey of Sheridan to Rossville must have been delayed by uncertainty, while the last stage was most expeditious. In view of the urgency, the distance from Rossville must surely have been covered in less than an hour by the head of the column.

[1] No. 50, p. 1048, l. 53.
[2] No. 50, p. 362, l. 10.
[3] Vol. LII, part I, p. 80, l. 40.

(4) Garfield's dispatch from Rossville that night, dated 8.40 P.M.,[1] contains the following: "Sheridan gathered fifteen hundred of his division, and reached a point three miles south of here at sunset."

Here again occurs the indefiniteness as to time which only the sender of the dispatch could explain. Evidence is not lacking in the Official Reports where officers used the expression "sunset" and a period a half-hour or more prior thereto, as interchangeable. Whether General Garfield meant 6 P.M. or earlier is not determinable by the context, but he certainly did not mean a period later than actual sunset at 6 o'clock. General Thomas says that Garfield accompanied him to Rossville, and our knowledge of Garfield's movements on the battle-field as they are defined in our account renders it probable that he speaks of Sheridan from personal knowledge.

(5) The Official Records contain still further evidence of the point on the Lafayette road reached by Sheridan's troops,[2] and one of General Negley's dispatches[3] tells us that "Forrest's cavalry harassed Sheridan all the way." On page 106, *supra*, giving a description of the charge of Reynolds' Division at the time of its withdrawal north on the Lafayette road, it has been observed that General Reynolds, with about one hundred and fifty men on the right of Turchin's Brigade, became separated from it in the charge, and while the rest of the brigade turned to the left, this detachment with General Reynolds continued right on until it arrived "near the field hospital of the 14th Corps,"[4] whence it rejoined its brigade which first formed on the left of Dan McCook's Brigade. This brigade was located on the high ground to the left of the Lafayette road, where General Reynolds saw it. Cloud church and Cloud house were used during the battle as field hospitals.

[1] No. 50, p. 145, l. 9.
[2] No. 50, p. 451, l. 50; p. 340, l. 1; p. 144, l. 32.
[3] No. 50, p. 144, l. 35.
[4] No. 50, p. 442, l. 26.

That Sheridan arrived in Rossville at 5 P.M., and received telegraphic orders at that hour from General Rosecrans approving his purpose to "move quickly via Lafayette road and form a junction with Thomas,"[1] is a point of agreement in Sheridan's recollections in 1888 with the Records of 1863; for in his *Memoirs*[2] he says: "I reached Rossville about 5 o'clock in the afternoon." General Rosecrans' telegram, already quoted,[3] fixes this time — "5 o'clock" — beyond dispute, though further official evidence to the same effect is on record. But some unknown influence was at work in 1888 to make General Sheridan change his "5.30 o'clock" statement of 1863 to "about 6 P.M.," which his *Memoirs* give as the hour of his junction with Thomas. We note, however, that he does not change 5 o'clock as the time of his arrival at Rossville. He could not very well have done this with the telegram staring him in the face. He must have found it difficult to reconcile the natural sequence that it took him one hour to travel the 3.2 miles. Undoubtedly one of the popular fallacies in connection with the battle, viz., that Thomas ordered the commencement of the withdrawal at 5.30, made it impossible for General Sheridan to understand how, in that event, he could have reported on Thomas' left flank at that same point of time. It is quite possible also that he was affected by the published statements resting upon the hastily written letter of his friend, General Thruston, and modified his statements accordingly.

Yet, as General Sheridan paid no attention to the reflections cast upon his record, it must have been due to the fact that he was unacquainted with the Official Records, which were not published until many years later, and which afford convincing testimony in his favor.

Though somewhat of a digression, I yield to my desire

[1] No. 50, p. 581, l. 10. [2] Page 284. [3] No. 50, p. 142, l. 31.

of doing full justice to General Sheridan's record in this battle; and though I am not called upon to take cognizance of all the errors, which are not a point of discussion, in the Official Records themselves, I will in this instance depart from the established rule.

This 1874 unofficial statement of General Thruston, beside being used by himself in published articles as a basis of attack against General Sheridan, has also been used by others than those whom we have mentioned. It must have met with the approval of General Thomas, as Chaplain Van Horne's work was under General Thomas' supervision. It has also received the stamp of approval from General Boynton [1] and Captain Kellogg, as indicated in the Park Commission's maps as well as elsewhere. The whole charge against General Sheridan is based on the fact that he did not heed the advice of Colonel Thruston bearing an order from General Thomas, not in evidence anywhere on the record. Instead, General Sheridan, as he had the right to do, waited for the order from the commander-in-chief and his approval of the plan adopted unanimously in a consultation at the McFarland house between Generals Negley, Davis, and Sheridan, and Colonel Ducat. As a matter of fact, it made no practical difference whether Sheridan went one way or the other. General Davis, as the evidence fully indicates, marched back and passed through McFarland's Gap to the head of it; but General Thomas was already withdrawing his troops before Davis began to form on the right of Johnson's Division.

General Thruston has sent me a pamphlet, "Chickamauga; A Reprint of an Article originally published in

[1] An illustration of Boynton's jugglery is presented in this connection. On page 52 of his book on the Chickamauga Park, he says Sheridan "reached Cloud's *at dusk*"; in his map (same book, p. 51) he puts it at "*7 p.m.*"; while as chairman and historian (see Plate VIII, Map of Park Commission, 1901), he finally concluded to put it at "dark."

The Southern Bivouac, December, 1886, and republished in the *Century War Book*, 'Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,' volume III." It is an interesting and cleverly written account, adopting most of the popular fallacies which have absolutely no evidence of official record in their support. His personal recollections as to what he saw and did, like all others of the kind, afford useful points in history. Describing his return to the "identical spot on the Dry Valley road where we [he] had left Sheridan and Davis," he continues later: —

> Unfortunately Sheridan's and Davis' force had drifted down the road toward Rossville. Hastening after them, we found they had already entered the narrow road or defile at McFarland's Gap. I tried to halt the rear of the column, but without success. The miseries of a mounted officer trying to pass marching infantry on a narrow roadway can be well imagined. Time was precious. I rode furiously through the thicket, alongside, and appealed to officers. "See Jeff, Colonel?" they said; "See Phil?" Some old trudger in the ranks called out: "We'll talk to you, my son, when we get to the Ohio River."
>
> A long half-hour was lost in scrambling along this wretched defile before I reached the head of the column. There I found Generals Sheridan, Davis, and Negley. We were about halfway between the field and Rossville.

Let us consider this statement with our eyes resting on the map, which indicates the distance from G. McFarland's house to Rossville, at a little over two miles. When he arrived at the McFarland house, the column had already started, Sheridan leading the van. It took Thruston a long half-hour, according to his account, to reach the head of the column. From his statement it would appear that, though the column had marched a half-hour, the head of it had not yet reached Rossville, a distance of two miles, and he asserts that the point where he caught up with the generals at the head of the column was about halfway between

A GROUP OF STAFF OFFICERS

CAPT. E. A. OTIS MAJ. F. S. BOND MAJ. M. H. FITCH
CAPT. S. C. KELLOGG LIEUT.-COL. G. P. THRUSTON LIEUT.-COL. A. VON SCHRADER
CAPT. M. V. SHERIDAN COL. ARTHUR C. DUCAT

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the battle-field and Rossville. There can be no doubt of his meaning, that this point was halfway to the position where he left General Thomas, near the Snodgrass house. What an evident absurdity is such a statement is realized when we consider that the distance from Snodgrass house via McFarland's to Rossville is 5.94 miles.[1] Thus the whole flimsy structure of the statement falls to the ground. All statements agree, both official and unofficial, that Thruston reported to Thomas in company with Garfield. The time is indicated by Garfield's dispatch, "3.35 P.M.," and statement.[2] It was so important an order that Thruston must have departed immediately. He testifies[3] that he returned to the place where he met General Davis at McFarland's farm about 4 P.M. A long half-hour taken in reaching the head of the column would make the time he reached it 4.30 P.M., which was coincident with the time that Thomas ordered the commencement of the withdrawal of the army with Reynolds' Division. Retracing his steps with Davis, Thruston arrived at the head of McFarland's Gap in time for the beginning of the withdrawal through this point.

One of General Sheridan's detractors[4] leads me to investigate whether General Sheridan would have been able to pass through McFarlands' Gap when he first reached that point. General Negley was the first to make this suggestion, that they should together "move to the support of General Thomas."[5] General Sheridan's answer is found in the statement of his Official Report![6] "On reaching the Dry Creek Valley road, I found that the enemy had moved parallel to me and had also arrived at the road, thus preventing my joining General Thomas by that route."

[1] See table of distances, chapter IV, p. 95.
[2] No. 50, p. 145, l. 8. [3] No. 50, p. 955, l. 9.
[4] Donn Piatt, *General George H. Thomas*, p. 429.
[5] No. 50, p. 851, l. 32. [6] No. 50, p. 561, l. 7.

There is a plethora of testimony establishing the truth of this fact, that the Federal forces under Davis, Negley, and Sheridan, which were halted at this point at the west entrance of McFarland's Gap, and where they were reorganized, were prevented by the enemy's presence from joining General Thomas by that route. Colonel Parkhurst, of the 9th Michigan Infantry, the provost guard, had halted all fugitives at this point, where he was joined by General Davis. Here also General Negley brought the artillery saved from capture, being nearly cut off by the enemy, who, before his departure from the heights of the Horseshoe and Main Ridges, at that time nearly surrounded him on all sides. He learned "from a cavalryman that General Thomas was holding the enemy in check."[1] Numerous attempts were made by General Negley and staff officers of his own and other commands to reach General Thomas' position, but the enemy were in the rear of Thomas, and the Confederate cavalry blocked the passage of the Ridge road at the head of McFarland's Gap.

The testimony of General Negley[2] and Staff Officers Barker, Hough, Lowrie, Moody, Hill, Johnson, Thruston, McElfatrick, Lodor, and others might be quoted, giving evidence that the enemy was at this time in Thomas' rear as described, and recording repeated and unsuccessful attempts during several hours, before General Thomas could be communicated with.[3] The testimony of Captain Johnson,[4] showing his unsuccessful efforts, and those of General Beatty in following General Negley's movement from the battle-field to McFarland's Gap, by reason of the enemy's intervening, is of especial interest, and so also is that of Captain Hill,[5] referring to his two unsuccessful attempts which he made on the west side of McFarland's

[1] No. 50, p. 1048, l. 35.
[2] No. 50, pp. 330, 331, 335, 1022.
[3] No. 50, pp. 1026, 349, 1034, 339, 361, 1012, 956, 991.
[4] No. 50, p. 343.
[5] No. 50, p. 1022, l. 24, and p. 1026, l. 19.

Gap to go to General Thomas. "Five hundred yards from that point," he says, the enemy fired upon him. Captain J. D. Barker,[1] who with Garfield and Thruston finally reached Thomas, says that his attempts were unsuccessful until he followed in the "route taken by General Granger's forces," while Colonel Thruston's sworn testimony before the McCook Court of Inquiry, on February 16, 1864, also is as follows: "I do not think I would have been able to reach General Thomas by the route I took, if General Granger had not opened the way."

That General Sheridan displayed good judgment is indicated by the statement of General Negley[2] that, after General Sheridan declined to adopt his suggestion, his (Negley's) "further advance in moving to support General Thomas" was prevented by the enemy, whom he met soon after he left Sheridan. Returning to McFarland's house, he held a consultation with Generals Sheridan and Davis, and officers of General Rosecrans' staff, when another plan was "unanimously" adopted, indicating that the judgment of all was of the impossibility of making connection with Thomas via McFarland's Gap. When we take into consideration the fact that the roads were choked with trains and with troops, for the most part thoroughly demoralized, there can be no question but that the final judgment of the officers concerned was the correct one.

The evidence indicates that General Sheridan owes no apology for his conduct or for any order that he delivered that day. On the other hand, when we consider the extraordinary movement made by his division, from the extreme right wing of the army to the extreme left, after receiving the terrible punishment in the morning, we cannot but consider the performance a remarkable one, which, so far as I can learn, has not its counterpart in any other great battle. General Sheridan marched his troops again into the battle,

[1] No. 50, p. 1029. [2] No. 50, p. 1048, l. 41.

as he supposed at the most important point where his men might render the most service and have the opportunity of redeeming their noontime discomfiture. Had the Confederates followed up their success, as was to have been expected, Sheridan's Division alone was ready there at Rossville Gap on the Lafayette road to block their passage and entrance to Rossville. But for the fact that Longstreet halted the Confederate pursuit, General Sheridan would have received the credit of having performed a most extraordinary achievement in having fought two actions in the battle on the same day on both flanks of the army.

In the above-mentioned *Memoirs* of General Sheridan we obtain an insight into the way General Thomas felt and the way he looked upon the result of the battle. General Sheridan says that General Thomas and himself arrived at the outskirts of Rossville together, where they dismounted, and he arranged a seat in one of the angles of a "worm fence" by the road, where they sat down. "General Thomas," he says, "appeared much exhausted, and said little or nothing of the incidents of the day. This was the second occasion on which I had met him in the midst of misfortune, the other being at Stone River."

This last line was indited and the chapter just finished when the postman brought me a letter which does justice to the head and heart of General Sheridan's soldier-comrade, General Thruston, in making the *amende honorable*, containing the following: —

> You of course realize that my statement of my personal observations at Chickamauga, and my paper or article was written and published, years before the Government Official Reports were published.
>
> The statement was published thirteen years before General Sheridan died. It may surprise you to learn that your letter is the first criticism of my statement in all these years, — so far as I know. You have had the benefit of the Official Reports, and

without referring to them (they are all in my Library), I am inclined to yield to your very elaborate and painstaking investigation on the special point of General Sheridan reaching some of General Thomas' forces at or about 6 P.M. on the evening of September 20. It may be true.

I had great faith in the investigations and opinion of my friend and staff mate Major Kellogg, Commissioner of Chickamauga Park. He was quite firm and insistent in disputing General Sheridan's claims on that point, and after visiting the ground later it was difficult for me to believe that General Sheridan's statement in his *Memoirs* was correct.

Still more gratifying to my efforts in establishing the truth and in doing justice to all soldiers whose records in the battle have been misrepresented, is the receipt of a letter to me from General Sheridan's brother, a copy of which is as follows: —

WASHINGTON, D. C.,
Feb. 21, 1911.

I have your letter of the 18th inst., enclosing copy of a letter you have written to General Gates Thruston, Nashville, Tennessee, relative to the part taken by the late General P. H. Sheridan in the Battle of Chickamauga, and some statements Thruston made to Chaplain Van Horne, who embodied them in his history of the Army of the Cumberland.

You request me to criticise this letter of yours to Thruston, and also throw any light I may know of on the movements of Sheridan in the battle mentioned.

A most careful study of the letter convinces me that it needs no criticism, — it covers the controversy most completely and accurately. You have taken in every phase of it, and although I was near General Sheridan during all the battle, I do not think I could add one jot or tittle to what you have written that would be of any more value than your own words, taken as they are from the Official Records.

Sincerely yours,
(Signed) M. V. SHERIDAN.

CHAPTER VI

ELIMINATION OF GORDON GRANGER'S UNSUPPORTED TESTIMONY

GENERAL GORDON GRANGER is the next and last of the four ranking Federal officers whose Official Reports lend some color to the allegation that, for their side, "it was a famous victory." From the part he played in this great fight, Rosecrans styled him "Granger, mighty in battle." Let the Official Records show in what respect he was mighty. His brave division under Steedman, as we have already seen, reported at about 1.30 P.M., in time to save Thomas from overwhelming disaster, at a most important crisis. Says Granger:[1]—

> In fifteen minutes from the time we appeared on the field, had it not been for our fortunate arrival, his forces [Thomas' upon the Horseshoe Ridge] would have been terribly cut up and captured.
>
> The greatest meed of praise is due to the officers and men of Steedman's Division of this reserve corps, for coming so opportunely to the support of their comrades, and charging up the heights and driving from the summit the Confederates, who had turned Brannan's right flank on the Horseshoe. Especial credit is also due to Granger, who exercised his discretion, and, without orders, marched his command, from a distance of five miles from the battle-field, to the support of the army.

Elsewhere we shall describe earlier pictures of the battle; but we are confining our present study to its final issue and closing scenes after 4 P.M., when the advance of Buckner's

[1] No. 50, p. 855, l. 22.

GEN GORDON GRANGER

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Corps was begun, and which ended the battle. The following[1] is a description (within the limits of this period) from General Granger's Report, referring to the struggle between the extreme Federal right flank and the Confederate left flank, . . . the latter composed of B. R. Johnson's and Hindman's Divisions, of Hood's and Polk's Corps, respectively: —

> It was almost dark: the enemy had been driven back, but we had not a round of ammunition left. All now seemed to be lost if he should return to the contest. Anticipating another attack, I ordered the command to be given to the men to stand firm, and to use the cold steel. After an ominous silence of a few minutes, the enemy came rushing upon us again. With fixed bayonets our troops gallantly charged them, and drove them back in confusion. Twice more were those charges repeated, and the enemy driven back before darkness brought an end to the battle. Night came, and the enemy fell back whipped and discomfited. [And][2] at 7 P.M. I received instructions from Major-General Thomas to withdraw . . . to Rossville.

It will be observed that the Federal troops to whom Granger here refers belonged to his own reserve corps, General Steedman commanding the First Division, which was composed of two brigades, Whitaker's and Mitchell's, the former consisting of six regiments and the latter of four.

Let us compare the above statement, taken from General Granger's Report, with the statements of his subordinate officers in their Official Reports, which were submitted to him during the week following the battle, and with which before him on September 30, he had the material with which to write the Report of what the troops under his command had done. We will quote, from each subordinate officer who makes a report, all that he says bearing upon the final issue of the contest. This testimony of divi-

[1] No. 50, p. 856, l. 14.

[2] No. 50, p. 856, l. 35.

sion, brigade, and regimental commanders, who participated therein, should decide whether, as Granger alleges, every Confederate assault was repulsed, including the final one, leaving his troops in possession of the first position gained by them before 3 P.M., and from which they did not, as he asserts, withdraw until nightfall — nightfall, as we have seen, being at 7.25 P.M.

It will be observed that General Granger describes three Confederate assaults, made just before the period of darkness began, in all three of which, with fixed bayonets, he alleges his troops charged and drove the Confederates back, "finally defeated."[1] After which, he says that at 7 P.M. he received Thomas' order to withdraw. The following is the testimony of General Granger's subordinate officers covering the same points: —

General J. B. Steedman, commanding First Division, Reserve Corps

My troops maintaining their position . . . until 5 o'clock, fell back under orders, slowly and in good order. After retiring to the second ridge in rear of the one on which they had fought, and resting half an hour, . . . they retired under orders to Rossville.

General W. C. Whitaker, commanding First Brigade[2]

The entire command . . . *for over three hours*[4] firmly maintaining their ground until we were directed to retire, which was done in fair order, [and][5] the Twenty-second Michigan, after fighting for near three hours, having exhausted their ammunition, boldly charged into the midst of overwhelming numbers with the bayonet, driving them until overcome.[6]

[1] See also No. 50, p. 196, l. 7, and p. 199, l. 4.

[2] No. 50, p. 860, l. 41.

[3] No. 50, p. 863, l. 17.

[4] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.

[5] No. 50, p. 863, l. 12.

[6] This is mythical, the 22d surrendered at discretion when their position was surrounded and when cut off from their brigade, that withdrew without them about a half-hour before the 22d surrendered. See Notes to chapter XI, Note A.

Colonel T. E. Champion, Ninety-sixth Illinois, Whitaker's Brigade[1]

We received an enfilading fire from the Eighty-fourth Indiana and One Hundred and Fifteenth Illinois, and were compelled to retire; [and] we *then*[2] fell back and re-formed with the remnant of the regiment, on the right of the first line of the brigade, and as the left of the line successively gave way, we fell back with it until night ended the contest.

Captain I. C. Nelson, Eighty-ninth Ohio[3]

A short time before dark they became engaged again and fought superior numbers until after dark, when their ammunition gave out and they were surrounded and captured.

Colonel J. G. Mitchell, commanding Second Brigade[4]

For five hours remained in the position first gained, . . . [and] the command, *at sundown*,[2] after the last cartridge was fired, fell back to the ridge first in our rear.

At half-past six o'clock, we were ordered to Rossville.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. Van Vleck, Seventy-eighth Illinois[5]

We maintained the admirable position on the crest of a high ridge we had gained from about 1 o'clock until after 4. . . . After maintaining this fearful contest for more than three hours an overwhelming force was thrown against our left wing, which left us no alternative but to retire or be overpowered and captured. . . . We put forth every energy in our power to drive back, or at least hold in check, the massive columns that moved steadily against us, *but in vain*.[2] Our only salvation was in retreat. The order was reluctantly given and still more reluctantly obeyed. While communicating this order I received a severe wound in my left [arm]. I nevertheless conducted the regiment to the crest of another ridge some three hundred yards to the rear. This retreat was made and the line re-formed . . . I remained with the regiment for nearly half an hour after I re-

[1] No. 50, p. 865, l. 42.
[2] No. 50, p. 866, l. 32.
[3] No. 50, p. 869, l. 12.
[4] No. 50, p. 867, l. 53.
[5] Italics are mine. — Author.

ceived the wound; [and][1] that we were not utterly destroyed is owing in a great measure to the protection afforded by our excellent position.

Lieutenant George Green, Seventy-eighth Illinois, commanding Regiment after its Colonel was wounded[2]

We maintained our position until sundown, when our ammunition became exhausted, and we were compelled to retire, and were withdrawn from the field to Rossville.

It seems as if the man behind the gun should know better than the general in the rear, as to whether, after the exhaustion of his ammunition, he had, on three occasions before dark, charged upon the enemy and driven him from the field; yet these men who were actual participants in what they described tell no such tale. In all of the Official Reports mentioned, there is not one of them which claims that they even maintained their position at the point of the bayonet. There is no question that they made a gallant defense of the heights; but there is not a single officer of them all who claims the maintenance of their position until dark *on the main ridge to the right of the Horseshoe*. The evidence of Granger's division, brigade, and regimental commanders is overwhelmingly against his statements; *per contra*, they describe their falling back from their first position on the main ridge, Brannan's right, to the crest of another ridge, some three hundred yards to the rear of the first one. The latest hour mentioned by any of them is "6 o'clock," or "at sundown," when they were driven from the first ridge, and were re-formed on the second ridge in the rear, where, after "resting half an hour," they "were ordered to Rossville at half-past 6 o'clock."

The colonel of the 96th Illinois of Whitaker's Brigade, occupying at the close of the fight a position on the right of this brigade (two lines of the brigade having been merged

[1] No. 50, p. 870, l. 4.

[2] No. 50, p. 870, l. 31.

into one, as early as 2 P.M.),[1] describes[2] how every regiment on his left, viz., the 115th Illinois, 84th Indiana, and 40th Ohio, successively gave way before his regiment did.

It will be noticed[3] that the first two regiments mentioned had, a few minutes previously, enfiladed the 96th Illinois, compelling the latter's withdrawal from its advanced position; while the other two regiments of this brigade, viz., the 22d Michigan and 89th Ohio, had become separated from Whitaker as early as 3 P.M., and, as will be described elsewhere, fought all the rest of the afternoon on Brannan's right on Horseshoe Ridge, until abandoned and captured.

In Volume LII, Part I, Serial No. 109, pages 81 to 83, is to be found the Official Report of the colonel commanding the 115th Illinois, Whitaker's Brigade. He reports that his men held their position on the hill after their ammunition had been exhausted, and until they were forced to resort to the cartridge boxes of the dead and wounded, when they received the order to retire; but no mention is made of any further firing, or the use of the bayonet, and on page 83, line 18, a statement is made that "the engagement which my [his] command participated in on Sunday, the 20th inst., commenced about 1 P.M. and continued till about 6 P.M."

As to Mitchell's Brigade, we have only the testimony of the brigade commander, and of the commanding officer of one regiment, viz., the 78th Illinois. If we carefully analyze this small but important amount of data provided, we find a practical agreement, indicating that, *at sundown*, they were on the crest of a ridge three hundred yards in rear of the first one, from which the brigade was driven; and that, at 6.30 P.M., they were ordered thence to Rossville. They agree in their statements as to time (from 1 P.M. — 5 hours — until sundown — 6 P.M.), as covering the duration of fighting; but Colonel Van Vleck, of the 78th

[1] Whitaker, No. 50, p. 363, l. 6.
[2] No. 50, p. 365, l. 47.
[3] No. 50, p. 365, l. 42.

Illinois, describes a fight of "more than three hours," "from 1 until after 4 P.M.," at the end of which time, to avoid capture, the order for retreat was given from the advanced and strong position on the first ridge, occupied at this juncture by the right wing of the brigade, consisting of the 78th Illinois and the 121st Ohio.[1] He further says that it was because of the overwhelming force thrown against the left wing of the brigade, viz., the 113th and 98th Ohio Regiments, that this alternative was forced upon the right wing.

Thus, from analyzing his statements, we obtain the information that the left wing of this brigade as well as the right was forced to retire.

A visit to this point on the battle-field and a view of the position described afford a better comprehension of Colonel Van Vleck's statement illustrating the difficulty encountered by the right wing of the brigade, with no other alternative than that of being overpowered and captured had they remained at their advanced position on this high crest, after the other two regiments composing the left wing of the brigade were driven back by an overwhelming force.

In conclusion, we confront General Granger with the testimony of the officers commanding his troops, to the effect that both Whitaker's and Mitchell's Brigades were driven from their positions on the Main Ridge, before or at sundown, according to the unanimous testimony of them all.

The standpoint from which this discussion is viewed is from the Federal side alone; and with the earnest purpose of presenting every statement fully and impartially. Later, we will take up the Confederate standpoint, with the same impartiality. For the present, in regard to Confederate testimony on these points of difference between General Granger and his subordinates, it is necessary only to state

[1] Van Vleck; No. 80, p. 368; Mitchell, p. 367, l. 32.

that, "about 5.30 o'clock," [1] Steedman's division began to give way and were pursued [2] down the north slope of the ridge by the Confederates, who, at 6 P.M., were halted in the deep hollow [3] north of the west extremity of Horseshoe Ridge,[4] with no enemy in reach.[5]

For some years past, my efforts have been directed towards obtaining, by correspondence and personal interviews, all information I could about General Granger's positions and movements on the battle-field. At some period within an hour or so after reporting the arrival of his troops at 1.30 P.M., according to the statement of General Frank G. Smith (then lieutenant of the 4th U. S. Regular Artillery), we find General Granger acting as artilleryman in Smith's Battery, filling the place of Number 1, with sponge-staff in his hand, at one of his guns. This was at a critical point, when his troops of Steedman's Division were fighting for the maintenance of the heights they had so gallantly won.

From my memoranda of an interview with General Caleb H. Carlton (who in the battle was colonel of the 89th Ohio Regiment) I quote similar information about General Granger's acting as gunner in Smith's Battery, as follows: —

> Adjutant [6] Drake of the 22d Michigan, called his attention [he says] to the fact that he had seen General Granger pointing a gun, possibly of Smith's Battery, in the direction from which Steedman's troops had come; and that he [Colonel Carlton] had replied: "For God's sake, say nothing about it, as such a statement might cause the men to think we were surrounded."

Colonel Carlton's regiment, at its position on the summit in the first assault on the heights, was on the left flank

[1] No. 51, p. 488, l. 45, and p. 496, l. 20.
[2] No. 51, p. 486, l. 45.
[3] No. 51, p. 464, l. 30.
[4] No. 51, p. 464, l. 38.
[5] No. 51, p. 486, l. 44.
[6] Drake was aide to Colonel Le Favour, Matthews was adjutant.

of Whitaker's Brigade in the second line, the 22d Michigan in the first line.

In this position on the ridge [Colonel Carlton says], from the time I came there till I was captured, I never saw General Gordon Granger on the ridge. As I was a stranger to the rest of the army located there, except to the 22d Michigan Regiment, the only faces familiar to me at that time were General Granger's and his staff officers', Majors Fullerton and Russell.

When, at 4.30 P.M., General Thomas left his headquarters at the Snodgrass house, General Granger, being the ranking officer, was left in command of the right wing of the army. There is no authority indicating that Granger was anywhere else at this period than at Thomas' headquarters near the Snodgrass house. It was here, in the first place, that he reported to Thomas; here, where he served as artilleryman in Smith's Battery; here, in the position of Generals Wood and Harker, that these officers report his presence with Garfield among *their* troops;[1] and here, where General Thomas at this juncture left him in command.

In the *Century Magazine*, issue of April, 1887, page 964, is a letter of Major J. S. Fullerton, Granger's chief of staff, who later was a Chickamauga Park Commissioner. From this letter I quote the following: —

Soon after 5 o'clock, Thomas rode to the left of his line, leaving Granger, the ranking officer, at the centre. The ammunition of both Thomas' and Granger's commands was now about exhausted. . . . When it was not yet six o'clock, . . . Brannan rushed up to Granger, saying, "The enemy are forming for another assault; we have not another round of ammunition, what shall we do?" "Fix bayonets and go for them," was the reply.

The testimony that is of use to us here is that Granger was near the Snodgrass house, from the time that Thomas left it until the time of the former's departure therefrom.

[1] No. 50, p. 638, l. 16; p. 695, l. 54.

We will notice, while passing, that General Fullerton could not have studied the Records closely as to the time of Thomas' departure; but even *he* could not adopt Thomas' statement that he rode to the left of his line at *5.30* P.M.

Next, I quote again the testimony of Colonel Carlton, in a letter written by him to General Turchin: [1] —

> We had sent Lieutenant Drake, adjutant [2] of the 22d Michigan, to Granger for ammunition. Granger said he had no ammunition and to "tell Carlton and Le Favour that they must use the bayonet, and hold their position at all hazards." This was the last order we received. Drake, on returning to us, was fired on from both sides, — that is, the Rebels had a cross-fire in our rear; that was half-past four. I mention my name first as it was mentioned first in the message.

The above is here quoted as still further testimony that, at the time described by Carlton, General Granger was not at the position of Le Favour and Carlton, with their respective regiments, on the west extremity of Horseshoe Ridge.

In a later chapter, connected with the history of Le Favour's and Carlton's captured regiments, we shall discuss the points of interest contained in Colonel Carlton's statements. Here, we will only call attention to the time reported by the latter as 4.30 P.M., when these two regiments of the Reserve Corps exhausted their ammunition, and to the time, "before 6," when Major Fullerton says that General Brannan made a similar report, and when to Le Favour and Brannan General Granger ordered a final resort to the cold steel. We also note that, as Colonel Carlton says, this was the last order received; and, it might be added, for the very good reason that their general did not wait long enough to give them another, or to know what became of them. Undoubtedly General Granger had in

[1] Turchin, *Chickamauga*, p. 155. Chicago: Fergus Printing Company. 1880.

[2] Drake was aide to Colonel Le Favour. Matthews was adjutant.

mind these two incidents when he reported to Dana, next day: "In last two assaults our troops fought with bayonet, their ammunition being quite exhausted."[1]

In a later chapter (XI), also, will be found quotations from an exhaustive correspondence with the surviving members of the 22d Michigan Regiment, from none of whom have I been able to obtain any information[2] indicating that General Granger was at any time with them on Chickamauga Heights. These two regiments were to the right of Brannan, and were the nearest troops of Granger's Corps, from his position near the Snodgrass house, and yet they never saw him on their part of the lines. On the other hand, we have found him, at intervals of a half-hour each, all the afternoon near the Snodgrass house.

The only corroboration that I find of General Granger's statement of his presence with his own troops on the heights where they fought is contained in General Steedman's Report,[3] which offers as an explanation for not presenting a more detailed account the statement that his troops "fought under the eye of the major-general commanding the corps," and which may not refer to any fighting on the heights, but to the time prior to 1.30 P.M.[4] With this single exception, it is noticeable that the division, brigade, and regimental officers of the Reserve Corps make no reference or mention whatever, in their reports, of Granger's name[5] that whole afternoon, nor reference to any order of his after their first assault on the heights; but it is from other sources that we learn that Granger was not

[1] No. 50, p. 196, l. 10.

[2] See note on p. 147, *infra*.

[3] No. 50, p. 861, l. 8.

[4] Either this, or on September 20, when writing his Report, Steedman assumed that Granger was with his men always until he learnt the contrary later. See Notes to chapter XI, Note C, and footnote.

[5] Nor Garfield's name, though Granger reports the presence of Garfield and himself with Steedman; but Garfield's presence with *Harker's* troops is fully corroborated.

with Steedman, the chief source being General Thomas himself, from whose Report it appears that General Granger left the Ridge road in his company, and proceeded to Rossville with him. We repeat the quotation from Thomas' Report as follows: "I then proceeded to Rossville, accompanied by Generals Garfield and Gordon Granger." We have also seen that, a half an hour later, these three generals and Sheridan were near the Cloud house, which, according to the Commissioners' Map, Plate XIV,[1] is about one and one half miles on a direct line from Snodgrass house. I believe that Granger left his position near the Snodgrass house at about the same period as Smith's Battery and Captain Williams, acting aide to General Thomas, — whose testimony before a Court of Inquiry we have already noted. According to Colonel Carlton's and Major Fullerton's statements, we should further take notice of his last orders to his troops whom he left behind, and whose ammunition was exhausted, namely, to "fix bayonets and go for them."

Reverting again to General Thomas' Report, we notice that, immediately on his arrival at the Ridge road, near McFarland's Gap, after making disposition for the retirement of the troops from that point, he sent orders to the commanders of the right wing, including Granger, to withdraw from their positions. In the mean time, Generals Garfield and Granger must have appeared and accompanied him from that position to Rossville. As will presently appear from the evidence, both Generals Granger and Garfield were unaware of the sending of the withdrawal order until Garfield received the second dispatch. The order then sent by Thomas for Granger's troops to withdraw was received by General Steedman and his brigade commanders, and was the order which they refer to as received on "the second ridge, in rear of the one on which they were

[1] See chapter I, p. 38.

formed," from whence, at 6.30 P.M., according to their Reports, they executed this order to withdraw to Rossville.

Let us now study General Garfield's dispatches and other statements in the Records, for corroboration of General Thomas' report that General Granger accompanied him, as well as General Garfield, when they left the Ridge road and proceeded toward Rossville, meeting Sheridan near the Cloud house. What does Garfield say of Granger's presence? In his telegram from Rossville, sent to Rosecrans,[1] he says: "Your order to retire on this place was received a little after sunset and communicated to Generals Thomas and Granger." The order referred to is the "withdrawal order," the "*first*[2] dispatch" of which (as we have previously proven from the Records) was received by General Thomas, to whom it was addressed, near the Snodgrass house about 4.30 P.M., and, as General Thomas says, after Garfield had reported to him. Therefore, what *Garfield* here refers to is the second dispatch, addreased to himself, the purport of which was to withdraw to Rossville, and which he received, as he says, "a little after sunset." It is evident that this was the first knowledge that Garfield had of the withdrawal order, for he certainly would not have communicated it a second time to Generals Thomas and Granger, had he known of a previous dispatch to the same effect received by Thomas about 4.30; whereas it was *now* "a little after sunset," and when Thomas, Sheridan, and himself were near the Cloud house. I consider that the signification of the word "communicated" is, that Garfield, in person, orally communicated the contents of the said order to Generals Thomas and Granger, the former regarding it as a repetition of the order to retire all the way to Rossville. There is one statement which is not gainsaid in the Records, and a point of unanimity testified to by all of these

[1] No. 50, p. 146, l. 2. [2] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.

generals, viz., Thomas, Garfield, and Granger himself, to the effect that Garfield and Granger were together about sunset, as well as prior[1] and subsequent thereto. It naturally follows, then, that Granger was with Thomas, as well as with Garfield, after the time they left the Ridge road; for, according to General Granger's Report,[2] General Garfield and himself were together from the time the former appeared on the battle-field "at 3 P.M." — as Granger puts it — "until dark"; but the astonishing point of difference in *Granger's statement*, contradictory to Thomas, Garfield, and Sheridan, is, that this locality, where they were all together before and after sunset, was nearly two miles back on the battle-field on the summit of the Main Ridge west of the Horseshoe, which, as we have proven, from both Federal and Confederate participants in the fighting there, was then occupied by Confederate troops, who, at 5.30 P.M., had driven Steedman's Division from the heights down the northern slope into the deep hollow where, at 6 P.M., we find Bushrod Johnson; and Steedman out of reach on a second wooded ridge, whence Steedman received orders and retired at 6.30 P.M., fifty-five minutes before dark. What, then, are we to think of the following statements of General Granger, which I quote word for word:[3] —

> At 3 P.M. Brigadier-General Garfield, chief of staff, appeared *upon that part of the field where my troops were then hotly engaged with the enemy. He remained with us until dark*,[4] animating and cheering both officers and men. . . . At 7 P.M. I received instructions from Major-General Thomas to withdraw my troops from the position they held at dark, to march back to Rossville, etc.[5]

Now, as we have already seen, the preponderance of evi-

[1] Turchin's recollections place General Garfield with General Thomas when the latter left the Snodgrass house and went to Reynolds' position. This is not impossible; but Turchin's inaccuracies are many. See his *Chickamauga*, p. 148.

[2] No. 50, p. 856, l. 25 [3] No. 50, p. 856, l. 25. [4] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.

[5] The context betrays Granger's ignorance as to time that darkness set in; he puts it *before* 7 *p.m.*, whereas "end of twilight was at 7.25."

dence in the testimony of his subordinates is against General Granger's statement that he himself was on that part of the field where his troops were hotly engaged with the enemy. There is no statement in the Official Records to the effect that any one saw General Granger on the heights with his troops. *Per contra*, the testimony as to his personal whereabouts on the battle-field is, that he was near the Snodgrass house, where he was located, at half-hour intervals during the afternoon, from 1.30 to 5 P.M. But Granger also caps the climax of error, when, according to his statements quoted, he says that Garfield remained with his troops on the heights, where they were engaged with the enemy from 3 P.M. until dark. The explanation may be here advanced that he did not intend to convey the meaning that Garfield was with his troops under General Steedman; but that is just what he did mean to say, for he particularizes that he did not have reference to the troops under Brannan and Wood, holding Horseshoe Ridge: I give his own words:[1] —

> Although they were not under my command, I cannot refrain from herein noticing the troops that held the Horseshoe Ridge. . . . Their commanders, Generals Brannan and Wood, and Colonel Harker, behaved with unqualified bravery and gallantry.

General Garfield came upon the battle-field, as he says, "via Rossville"; and it is of record that he was enabled to do this because of Steedman's Division, which had blazed the way before him. His place of meeting with General Thomas was near the latter's headquarters. And it is of further record that he appeared among the troops on Horseshoe Ridge, animating the troops under the commands of Harker and Brannan, particularly Harker's Brigade, which[2] he had commanded before he became chief of staff; but there is no statement, excepting Granger's, indi-

[1] No. 50, p. 356, l. 29.

[2] No. 50, p. 633, l. 54.

cating that Garfield appeared among the troops of Steedman's Division on the Main Ridge.

I call attention to a just-quoted statement of General Granger's that the troops on Horseshoe Ridge were not under his command. What, then, are we to think of Major Fullerton's and Colonel Carlton's statements, the one of whom says that, when Brannan rushed to Granger with the information that ammunition was exhausted, the latter gave the command to "fix bayonets and go for them"; and the other of whom says that the last order received by Colonel Le Favour of the 22d Michigan, and by himself, commanding the 89th Ohio, was that these two regiments also must "use the bayonet and hold their position at all hazards"; and the Federal Records further show that they bravely remained at their post till captured.

The last quotation from General Granger's Report shows his ignorance of the fact that, besides the troops he mentions, on Horseshoe Ridge there was also this "semi-brigade" under Colonel Le Favour's command, i.e., the 22d Michigan and the 89th Ohio, which, during the afternoon, from 3 P.M. until captured, fought on the west extremity of Horseshoe Ridge, protecting Brannan's flank until they, along with another brave regiment, were disgracefully abandoned to their enemies, surrounded, captured, and sent to Libby and Andersonville Prisons, in order that the rest of the army might make its escape. These are hard statements, but succeeding chapters will prove their truth beyond question. We here have still further evidence that General Granger was not with his own troops on the heights, where they were hotly engaged; otherwise he would have known their position better.[1]

[1] See p. 142, *supra*. Also see p. 230, chapter XI, for the illustration of the monument representing the alleged position of General Gordon Granger's Headquarters on Horseshoe Ridge, next to the 22d Michigan, though correspondents of this regiment and the 89th Ohio never saw him there.

General Granger's statement that these troops on Horseshoe Ridge were not under his command strikes us as an extraordinary assertion, as if it were a repudiation of his responsibility for leaving them as he did, at 5 P.M.; though there can be no question that by virtue of his rank the command fell upon him after Thomas' departure, as the only full-ranking major-general and corps commander left on the field.

In Mr. Dana's dispatches to the War Department, it is interesting to notice his strictures against the two corps commanders, McCook and Crittenden,[1] who "fled to Chattanooga, with the sound of artillery in their ears, from that glorious field where Thomas and Granger were saving their army and their country's honor." In the same connection,[2] Dana defines the duty of the corps commanders to be, "to remain with their troops."

Outside of General Granger's testimony, the Official Records establish the fact that Dana should have included in these strictures his friend, General Gordon Granger. It seems as if General Granger, by the way he talked and by the statements he made in his Official Report, succeeded in diverting attention from his own shortcomings and pulled the wool over everybody's eyes, including those of General Thomas; for how is it possible for the latter to make such a statement as he does in his Report, viz., that he proceeded to Rossville accompanied by General Granger, when the latter's position should have been with the right wing of the army where Thomas had left him? There are instances recorded in the Official Records where one officer calls upon another for an explanation of alleged errors of omission and commission in official statements. Does it not seem that General Granger, too, should have called General Thomas' attention to the reflection cast upon himself (Granger), in

[1] No. 50, p. 202, l. 27.

[2] No. 50, p. 202, l. 32.

Thomas' Report of September 30, stating that he was accompanied to Rossville by General Gordon Granger — flatly contradicting General Granger's Report (of the same date, September 30), which says that at the time specified, and later, he was, on the contrary, several miles back on the battle-field, at the position on the heights won by his troops before 3 P.M., a position which they maintained, he alleges, until night,[1] "when the enemy fell back, whipped and discomfited." General Granger should have further called General Thomas' attention to the statements of the latter, viz., that Garfield accompanied Thomas to Rossville; as, until dark, Garfield (Granger alleges) was with him and his troops on the heights they had won and were maintaining.

Still another point: General Thomas says in his Report,[2] after describing the arrival of Steedman's Division, and his driving the enemy from the crest of the hill on Brannan's right: "Every assault of the enemy from that time until nightfall was repulsed in the most gallant style *by the whole line.*"[3] We will deal with this statement in a future chapter, so far as it applies to assaults upon Horseshoe Ridge after 4.30 P.M., when Thomas had left that part of his army, and had withdrawn from the battle-field. But the statement that he makes, applies not only to Horseshoe Ridge, but also to the assaults of the Confederate left flank on the Main Ridge against Steedman's Division. Where, other than from Granger's statements and from his Official Report, could General Thomas have obtained information so palpably untrue as his statement that Steedman's Division repulsed every assault made upon it from the time it arrived until nightfall? If he read General Granger's Report, he could not have failed to notice the statements that Generals Granger and Garfield were with Steedman's

[1] No. 50, p. 856, l. 23. [2] No. 50, p. 253, l. 10. [3] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.

troops during the time when Thomas knew, on the contrary, that they were accompanying him from the Ridge road to Rossville. There can be no doubt that some careless statements are made in official reports; but when there is such a unanimity of evidence against General Granger's statements, we must reach the inevitable conclusion that he is the guilty one in making these misleading statements. But General Granger had a most potent friend, whom he stuffed full with statements as to his own prowess and opinions, carried to an extent which, in view of the circumstances, is truly laughable.

Then there are some amazing statements to be found in Assistant Secretary of War Dana's dispatches to his chief, Mr. Stanton, in Washington.

So far as my study of the *War of the Rebellion Records* goes, I know of no other army, Federal or Confederate, which ever had an official of the above-mentioned kind in its camp, one whose sole duty was, in this instance, that of custodian of all the gossip of the army that could be collected against the general officers, from the commander-in-chief down, to be retailed daily to the authorities in Washington, and thence to percolate through the newspapers[1] to the public, and to be actually used as the basis for the history of this battle, as generally accepted, even to this day.[2]

How any general of a great army or any man of self-respect could have tolerated, as did Rosecrans, the presence in his camp of such an official, whom he knew to be there to spy on him and to criticize his every action, is incomprehensible. One instance of a somewhat like nature is before me, indicating what General Beauregard had to say when the Confederate War Department interfered with *his* plans

[1] No. 50, p. 208.

[2] For illustrations of the influence of Dana's dispatches and letters, see Notes to chapter VI, Notes A and B.

at a critical period — for the safety of Richmond was at stake: "If my course," he promptly telegraphed the War Department, "be not approved by the War Department, I wish to be relieved at once." [1]

If we read Dana's dispatches, and then mark the effect produced by them in Washington, not only in the deposition of Rosecrans and in the appointment of his successor, but also in connection with the future careers of officers whom he vilified, we must conclude that his authority was supreme and that he was the only full-ranking general of them all. The Records prove that this doughty warrior accepted the camp gossip for truth, and used it to destroy the future sphere of usefulness in the service of their country of some general officers who deserved a better fate, including even those whom courts of inquiry but to no purpose rightly exonerated from blame; while two generals whom he specially honors in these dispatches escaped without even exposure for conduct deserving of court-martial.

Describing his own experiences on the right wing of the army that morning, Dana telegraphed [2] on September 20, 1863, at 4 and 8 P.M.: —

> Chickamauga is as fatal a name in our history as Bull Run . . . myself swept bodily off the battle-field by the panic-stricken rabble.

Apropos of this, the following quotation from the Report of Colonel Wilder (commanding mounted brigade) to General Rosecrans is not without a touch of evident humor,[3] in giving Mr. Dana his full military title and recording his assumed succession to the command of the

[1] No. 68, p. 992. [2] No. 50, p. 192, l. 23, and p. 193, l. 27.

[3] Since above was written this inference has been confirmed by letter to me from General Wilder, who inclosed a copy of an address delivered by himself, wherein he describes this Dana incident the extract from which appears in Notes to chapter VI, Note C.

army, in view of the probable death of its commander-in-chief: —

> *General*[1] Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, came up, and said that "our troops had fled in utter panic; that it was a worse rout than Bull Run; that General Rosecrans was probably killed or captured."

Instead, however, of obeying General Dana, he chose to follow the order of General Sheridan.

After passing the night in Rossville, General Granger lost no time in going to Chattanooga the next day, to see his friend Mr. Dana.[2] The latter tells us (September 21) that Garfield arrived in Chattanooga before noon.[3] Possibly Granger came with him; and the probabilities indicate that much of the information which Dana communicated to the War Department during the next few days was through this medium. As these dispatches are part of the Records, we must deal with them as part of the evidence which we are required to sift in our search for the truth. Garfield seems to have told Dana that, on the day before, i.e., September 20, he had "spent the afternoon and night with General Thomas." This, we notice, is a corroboration of General Thomas' Report and Garfield's dispatches, and a contradiction of Granger's, that Garfield and himself were with Steedman's troops from 3 P.M. till dark.

From the hour that he met General Granger, Mr. Dana began to learn that the Confederates were defeated, that, if General Thomas had hearkened to General Granger, the Federals would still have been in possession of the battle-field. For this we read:[4] —

> Granger says that in yesterday's battle rebels were finally defeated, and if Thomas had not withdrawn during night enemy would not have dared attack further. In last two assaults our

[1] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.
[2] No. 50, p. 194, l. 37.
[3] No. 50, p. 195, l. 42.
[4] No. 50, p. 196, l. 7.

troops fought with bayonet, their ammunition being quite exhausted.

This was General Granger's first step in his assumption of superior military judgment to General Thomas, criticizing the latter for retiring his troops from the battle-field when, according to Granger, he was not compelled to withdraw. Not content with this criticism, his next step was an actual attempt to snatch from Thomas some of the laurels bestowed upon the latter on account of the alleged action (chiefly worthy of praise) which earned for Thomas the agnomen "Rock of Chickamauga." For this, read this statement[1] of Dana's: —

Granger would seem to have been right, *when he pronounced the enemy defeated,*[2] and urged Thomas to disregard Rosecrans' order to retire on the ground that the latter was at Chattanooga ignorant of the facts.

The official evidence shows that General Thomas' judgment rightly differed from General Granger's; and that it was fortunate that he withdrew just when he did. But first, let us score a point on this statement, evidently emanating from General Granger.

When and where did he first hear of the commander-in-chief's order to withdraw to Rossville? His answer must transfix him upon the one horn of a dilemma or upon the other, for in his Official Report he says that at 3 P.M. Garfield appeared upon that part of the field where his troops under Steedman were hotly engaged with the enemy; and that he remained there, with Granger and his troops, until dark. Was it while in this position that Granger heard of the withdrawal order, or of the fact of Rosecrans' arrival in Chattanooga? He could not have obtained his information from General Garfield, because the latter did not know whether his chief had arrived there or not, "until a little

[1] No. 50, p. 199, l. 3.

[2] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.

after sunset," when he first heard from him.[1] We will recall the facts already established, viz., that Garfield went direct to Thomas' headquarters via Rossville. He gave General Thomas the "first reliable information that the right and centre of our [Federal] army had been driven";[2] but he conveyed no order from Rosecrans, nor could he tell Thomas that the commander-in-chief had yet arrived in Chattanooga. But the following is what Garfield told Dana on September 21, as the latter says in his dispatch of 2 P.M. to Stanton:[3]—

> Garfield, chief of staff, becoming separated from Rosecrans in the route [*sic*] of our right wing yesterday, made his way to the left, and spent the afternoon and night with General Thomas.

The Records also establish the fact that Rosecrans arrived in Chattanooga at 3.40, and sent the withdrawal order before 4.15 P.M., which order, according to the same authoritative sources, caused the commencement of withdrawal of Reynolds' Division before 4.30 P.M., followed by Palmer's Division at 4.45 P.M. Is it not, then, evident that there was not more than an interval of ten minutes' time between the receipt of this first dispatch from Rosecrans and its execution, during which time General Granger could have had the opportunity of offering his advice and of urging Thomas to disregard the orders of the commander-in-chief?

Measured on the map, the centre of Steedman's Division would be a full half-mile through the woods and over the ridge from Thomas' headquarters near the Snodgrass house. Granger's Report says that he was with Steedman at this time. If he was there, he certainly knew nothing of

[1] Rosecrans sent Garfield to Rossville, while he went to Chattanooga (No. 50, p. 60, l. 7) and knew nothing of Garfield's joining Thomas until the receipt of Garfield's 3.45 P.M. dispatch from Thomas' headquarters, which Rosecrans received shortly before 5 P.M. See chapter IV. p. 74.

[2] Thomas, No. 50, p. 253, l. 24. [3] No. 50, p. 194, l. 34.

Rosecrans' first dispatch. The evidence further indicates that though Granger was, in fact, near the Snodgrass house at the time when Thomas received the withdrawal order, the latter had no time to advise with Granger about it; and it appears, further, that General Thomas did not even acquaint General Granger with his proposed departure. Had he reported his departure to General Granger, it would have been equivalent to direct orders to the latter to take command of the right wing, i.e., the troops at that point; and it would have been impossible, without detection, for General Granger to have disobeyed, or, in his Report, to have made the statement already referred to, that the troops on Horseshoe Ridge "... were not under my command." Where, then, did General Granger obtain his first knowledge of Rosecrans' order to withdraw to Rossville? It is plain that he obtained it from the second dispatch, which General Garfield "communicated" to Granger, "a little after sunset," at or near the Cloud house, when Garfield and Granger were together, and with Thomas. Rosecrans signed and sent the "first dispatch" himself, and addressed it to "General Thomas"; but the second dispatch of the same purport, to retire to Rossville, was addressed [1] to Garfield, and we give it in full, as follows: —

CHATTANOOGA, September 20, 1863.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL GARFIELD: —

See General McCook and other general officers. Ascertain extent of disaster as nearly as you can and report. Tell General Granger to contest the enemy's advance stubbornly, making them advance with caution. Should General Thomas be retiring in order, tell him to resist the enemy's advance, retiring on Rossville to-night.

By command of MAJOR-GENERAL ROSECRANS:

WILLIAM MCMICHAEL,
Major, and Assistant Adjutant-General.

[1] No. 80, p. 140, l. 30.

It was therefore at this time and place, according to the evidence, that Garfield and Granger first knew of Rosecrans' order, and when both of them were together with Thomas; and the only opportunity which Granger had was then presented, in which to urge Thomas to disregard Rosecrans' order. We have further shown that General Sheridan was at or near the Cloud house at this time; and the statement that we have quoted from him indicates that he was also a party to a consultation as to whether a stand should be taken at this time and place, or whether Rosecrans' repeated orders to retire to Rossville should be obeyed. General Thomas, just as he had done in case of the first dispatch, decided it to be best to obey the second one. On General Sheridan's asking Thomas for orders, whether to make a stand at this time, General Sheridan says, in his *Memoirs*,[1] that Thomas " . . . replied that his lines were disorganized, and that it would be futile to attack; that all I could do was to hold on, and aid in covering the withdrawal to Rossville." Thus were Rosecrans' orders obeyed implicitly and immediately by all parties.

As to General Granger's criticism of General Thomas' withdrawal, it was mere buncombe, and could apply only to the time when the army had already withdrawn.

In a future chapter, we expect to show beyond question that the two wings of the Federal army would have been cut in two and completely destroyed but for Thomas' immediate obedience to Rosecrans' order at 4.30 P.M.

There is a humorous side to Mr. Dana's dispatches. It was through Andrew Johnson that he first knew Gordon Granger and of his capabilities.[2] Dana thus met Granger in Louisville, at the outset of the former's peculiar mission. The three went to the front together — to Rosecrans' army investing Chattanooga. Granger was thus the first officer of this army whom Dana fell in with, and whom he recom-

[1] Page 284. [2] No. 50, p. 183, l. 22.

mended in high terms to the War Department. In fact, throughout these dispatches, Granger is the one who always receives Dana's unstinted praise. Dana must, therefore, have plumed himself upon his perspicacity, when he was able to telegraph to his chief, Mr. Stanton, that in Granger he had picked out a winner, viz., the only general, excepting Thomas, who came out of the fight with flying colors. Granger must have known that he was in Dana's good graces, and he appreciated his advantage in having such a friend at court. It seems as if the principal reason for his going to Chattanooga from Rossville, the very next morning, was for the purpose of seeing this friend. Garfield, of course, went under orders to see his chief, General Rosecrans; but Granger, who had saved the army by disobeying Rosecrans, and who had recommended to Thomas that he also should disregard the orders of the commander-in-chief, was evidently a free lance. He had again left his command in the rear with Steedman, in case there should be any real fighting to be done. And it certainly was a critical time with the Federal army at Rossville, momentarily expecting, as it did, the assault which General Bragg's subordinates were frantically but vainly urging upon the Confederate commander-in-chief. After General Granger had performed his great service in saving the army under Thomas by his timely arrival, it does not appear, from our study of the Records and from our information from authoritative sources, that his subsequent services were at all creditable. His troops under Steedman, however, did their duty magnificently.

Possessing, as we do, such authoritative information about General Granger's movements on the battle-field on the afternoon of September 20, our view is shifted from the sublime to the ridiculous, by reading this[1] in General Dana's dispatch: "Granger, his hat[2] torn by bullets, raged like a

[1] No. 50, p. 195, l. 2. [2] See Addenda.

lion wherever the combat was hottest with the electrical courage of a Ney." This sounds like the bray of the steed in the lion's skin, as described in one of Æsop's fables: and there is no wonder that Mr. Stanton in Washington did not understand what kind of a warhorse General Granger was riding. To his request to have the foregoing message repeated, General Dana replied:[1] "My cipher-clerk, myself, shall be more careful." After reading this, we are reminded of the information, told us with a smile, about General Granger's playing as soldier in acting as artilleryman in Smith's Battery, while his own troops on the heights a half a mile away were hotly engaged. Later, about 5 P.M., when the fight became so hot around the Snodgrass house after Thomas had left Granger in command of the troops of the Federal right wing, as soon as the Confederates took possession of the heights south of Snodgrass house he made haste personally to withdraw, after commanding Brannan and Le Favour to hold their positions at the point of the bayonet.[2] His hasty departure from the vicinity of the Snodgrass house is indicated by the fact that he overtook General Thomas beyond the Ridge road before sunset, in time to proceed with him and General Garfield to Rossville. Thereafter, General Granger began a mighty assault upon the gullibility of the public, demonstrating the great service that he had unquestionably rendered in saving the Federal army, but diverting attention from his own shortcomings, by communicating to Thomas, Dana, Rosecrans, and others, the intelligence that the troops that were left behind by him on the battle-field at 5 P.M. had defeated the Confederates and had driven them back, to return no more. Thus General Granger furnished the cue acted upon by the other three ranking officers, in their descriptions of the issue and final scenes in which they were not participants; and they followed his example in claiming this battle to be

[1] No. 50, p. 199, l. 38.

[2] Notes to chapter VI, note D.

a Federal victory, and a Confederate defeat. This was the nucleus of the forces led by General Granger (apparently to shield his own shortcomings), in this campaign against the credulity of the public, through the press of the country. He reminds us of that famous knight, Don Quixote de la Mancha,[1] with General Dana as the counterpart of his man Sancho, in "their attack upon the windmill." Probably there has never been a more successful assault upon the truth of history, where the official reports of the participants have been disregarded, and where the newspaper correspondent has won.

In view of the number of prominent newspaper men, like Messrs. Charles A. Dana, Whitelaw Reid, and Henry V. Boynton, and others of the same political persuasion, who were present in this battle and in Chattanooga soon thereafter, it is suggested that this occasion was the first successful inauguration of the election device, frequently employed in later years, which had for its motto: "Claim everything in sight and leave it to the other party to prove the truth."

[1] See Addenda.

CHAPTER VII

TESTIMONY OF BRANNAN, RANKING OFFICER LEFT IN COMMAND

THE previous chapters might be called chapters of elimination, for besides establishing from the Records some very important facts concerning the final issue of the battle, the time of commencement and withdrawal of the left wing, and at the same time setting forth the hour and position when and where General Thomas sent back the order for the withdrawal of his right wing, their distinctive feature is the elimination of the statements made in the Official Reports of the four ranking Federal generals, as to the final issue and closing scenes. These generals' unsupported testimony would not be considered as competent evidence in any fair court of justice; for neither Generals Halleck nor Rosecrans participated in the battle on the afternoon of September 20, 1863; and Generals Thomas and Granger did not participate in the battle after they left it, — the one at 4.30, and the other at about 5 P.M.

The Official Reports which will be discussed in this chapter will be those of Federal officers who were actual participants in the final scenes of the battle.

Claim Number III, referred to in chapter IV, page 65, that the right wing of the Federal army, under General Thomas, withdrew from the Horseshoe Ridge at nightfall under cover of darkness, in good order, and not under pressure, will be disposed of in this chapter.

I would gladly give a descriptive account of these closing scenes, which would be more entertaining to the average reader than this argumentative study thereof; but my con-

GEN. JOHN M. BRANNAN

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clusions in such a descriptive account would not be generally accepted. I am therefore forced (particularly where the grossest misrepresentation has existed) to prove that the knowledge which I have obtained, through a laborious study of the Official Records, is the true history of the battle, and is diametrically opposed to the accounts of it which have been disseminated by the newspapers and by so-called histories which are not founded on the Official Reports as the standard of truth.

It therefore seems best that I should outline, beforehand, each proposition whose truth I shall undertake to demonstrate, impartially weighing all good evidence in the Official Reports, and accepting, from other authoritative sources, only such evidence as is not directly antagonistic to the standard which we have assumed as our best guide to the truth, viz., the aforesaid Official Reports. Wherever any uncertainty exists, in the settlement of any mooted point, I will present to the reader both sides of the question, from which he can thus form his own opinion.

My first proposition is to show *that the last Federal line of battle was on the bare hill near the Snodgrass house, at a time when the whole of Horseshoe Ridge was in possession of the Confederates, and the only Federal regiments remaining thereon, at this time, were surrounded and captured.*

The Federal line, thus described, was composed of Hazen's Brigade, on the left, and of troops of Harker's Brigade, on the right of Hazen's, with two guns of the 18th Ohio Battery.

Let us establish, from the Records, the time when this line was formed; the direction in which it faced and fired; the position of the opposing Confederate forces, against whom its fire was directed; and the time of withdrawal of this Federal line. That this was the last position of the Federal brigades, here named, is not a mooted point: that Harker's Brigade was joined here by Hazen's, is accepted

by every authority. But what I propose to show is, that the fire of these brigades and the battery was directed from their position against the Confederates on Horseshoe Ridge, who were in entire possession after Brannan's departure and abandonment of the three Federal regiments which were surrounded and captured there later.

At the outset I must request of the reader a careful examination of the map, in order that he may understand where the last Federal line of battle was located. It was not on Horseshoe Ridge, but over three hundred yards north of it, on the bare hill fifty feet lower, in the vicinity of the Snodgrass house. Again, I ask that notice be taken of the deep hollow southwest of the Snodgrass house, and connected with the ravine that borders the northern slope of the two west hills of Horseshoe Ridge. For brevity, let us call these hills of Horseshoe Ridge, Numbers 1, 2, and 3 — respectively denominated from east to west. Later, we may give them other than these prosaic names.[1] Hills Numbers 1 and 2 are connected by a neck of land which some Federal soldiers call "the Hog's Back." In moving from Snodgrass house to the summit of Hill Number 2, you do not pass over the summit of Hill Number 1. If a Federal soldier be stationed in the cornfield north of the Snodgrass house, the expression which he would naturally use (and did use) in describing his position would be that he was thus located "in rear of the log-house," or hospital, for which purpose this house was used. Looking south, from the same position, and having reference to the hills of Horseshoe Ridge, he would again naturally mean Hill Number 2, when referring to the hill to the right of the log-house. Finally, when he makes reference to his position as being on the "left," or on the "right of the log-house," he means the positions respectively

[1] After the truth has established the propriety and accuracy we shall adopt the final nomenclature of these hills. See Note to chapter VII, Note A.

THE SNODGRASS HOUSE ON HARKER'S HILL

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east and west of the Snodgrass house, and not the hills of Horseshoe Ridge, whose summit is three hundred yards beyond.

As Harker's Brigade was at the position where this line was formed, before Hazen's Brigade came from the left, we will study, from the reports of officers of this brigade, what each one says, by means of which we may determine the relative and actual position of each regiment in line.

In marshaling the statements of my witnesses, for evidence on this point, I find it necessary at the same time to introduce their evidence, indicating their former position in line, from which they had previously been driven. That this previous position of Harker's Brigade was on Hill Number 1, will be proved in another chapter; but to avoid needless repetition, I would request that close attention be paid to the evidence on this point — a very small part of which is presented at this juncture.

When the 65th Ohio Regiment, according to the Report of its commanding officer,[1] could no longer hold its position on Horseshoe Ridge, the regiment was "ordered by Colonel Harker to fall back to the rear of the log-house. Here the regiment was formed, having been joined by Captain Tannehill and the men under his command." Now this Captain Tannehill,[2] before the 65th Ohio was posted by its brigade commander on Horseshoe Ridge, had remained "at the left of the house" (east of Snodgrass house, in command of a number of men of the regiment who had become separated from their companies. The 65th was then "supplied with cartridges to make up forty rounds to the man"; and Captain Powell, who then resumed command of his regiment (which had been temporarily officered by Lieutenant-Colonel Bullitt, of the 3d Kentucky), says: —

[1] No. 50, p. 704, l. 46.

[2] No. 50, p. 704, l. 46.

After a rest of about thirty minutes I was ordered to take position on the left of the 64th Ohio. The engagement then being renewed, we fired by volley alternately, with the 125th Ohio, until the enemy was repulsed, when I was ordered to take position on the right of the log-house, still occupying position in the line on the left of the 64th Ohio.

Here we have defined the relative and actual positions of every regiment of the brigade, except the 3d Kentucky, which, when on Horseshoe Ridge, and at other points in line also, was on the left of the 65th Ohio. The conclusion is, therefore, that it occupied the same relative position in its last line of battle as on Horseshoe Ridge, where it alternated with the 125th Ohio in being in the front and rear line. We will therefore presently see that, when the brigade was joined by Hazen's, the 125th Ohio was in the front rank, with the 3d Kentucky in reserve. That the 18th Ohio Battery was supported at this time by Harker's Brigade is attested to by this evidence from a Federal source, viz., from Colonel Opdycke, of the 125th Ohio:[1] —

Late in the afternoon, two pieces of the 18th Ohio Battery were placed at my command. They aided much to repulse the enemy.[2]

And of the junction of Hazen's Brigade in support of Harker's, the same officer has the following[3] to say: —

The 41st Ohio and the 9th Indiana, of General Hazen's Brigade, Palmer's Division, filed two rods to my rear, and added their veteran fire in repulsing the last assault.

The right of Harker's line, as indicated by the 65th Ohio's Report, was the first part of Harker's Brigade to be driven to the rear of the Snodgrass house, while the left of the line doggedly withdrew, sometime later, from the summit of the Horseshoe (of which there is corroborative Con-

[1] No. 50, p. 706, l. 53.
[2] For account of 18th Ohio Battery see Notes to chapter VII, Note B.
[3] No. 50, p. 706, l. 55.

federate testimony). After their retirement therefrom, it was in this position, according to Major Hampson, commanding the 124th Ohio, that Hazen's Brigade ". . . came to support Colonel Harker's Brigade, *which was being hard pressed.*"[1]

Now Hazen's Brigade came over from the breastworks on the left wing, three fourths of a mile distant, per map. It stands to reason that Hazen's Brigade and the battery were not directing their fire eastward towards the point whence Hazen's Brigade came to Harker's support, nor were they directing their fire southeast, towards the point whence General Thomas had disappeared, in the gap between the two wings, on his way to meet Reynolds' Division. In this gap was the spring of water, the only one in the vicinity where, during the afternoon, the Federals went in search for it. There never were any hot encounters in this gap in the line; and the ground was not fought over. General Hazen, in his *Narrative of Military Service*,[2] refers to this interval between the two wings of the Federal army, and the extent of it, measured from the right of Reynolds' Division, after Reynolds had left the breastworks, making the right of the Federal left wing refused and at right angles to the Lafayette road. He says: —

> The break in the centre and right was never repaired, and it had left Brannan and Wood with two brigades each, in line — facing nearly due south, and about on the prolongation of Reynolds' last position, but with a gap between them of half a mile. Our forces remained in this separated condition for the rest of the day.[3]

We will now study the Official Reports of the officers of Hazen's Brigade relating to their movement from the left to the support of the right wing of the army.

[1] Italics are mine. — Author.
[2] Page 131.
[3] See also Hazen's Report, No. 50, p. 764, l. 2.

General Hazen's Report[1] describes how this move came to be made. The general officers of the left wing, as well as his own regimental officers, heard the battle raging on the right wing, where the fearful onslaughts were made upon Horseshoe Ridge, at a time when the Federal left wing was comparatively quiet. He, with other general officers, saw the necessity for sending support to the right wing; his brigade, having more ammunition than the others, — forty rounds per man, — was selected and[2] General Palmer authorized General Hazen "to go over and aid them," i.e., the right wing. Hazen says: —

My brigade was replaced in the line by Grose's Brigade, of our own division.

This movement caused a partial advance of the enemy, and I was halted in the middle of the field,[3] just behind our line, to await the result, but soon had orders to go on. I found the forest on the west side of the Lafayette and Chattanooga road, through which we had to pass, filled with the enemy's stragglers and pickets, requiring a sharp skirmish all the way. This explained why none of our messengers had returned, for the past five hours.

The regimental commander of the 124th Ohio[4] and Major Whitaker, commanding his 6th Kentucky,[5] corroborate the statement as to the skirmishing on the way over; and General Hazen, in copying the document into his book,[6] has seen fit to add to his Official Report[7] the clause noted in italics in the following: —

I moved my men over at double-quick with a front of two regiments, *skirmishing all the way*.[8]

I am thus particular, in the foregoing details, because of the difficulty in reconciling the statements made as to the time of departure of this brigade from its breastworks, —

[1] No. 50, p. 764, l. 3.
[2] Hazen, *A Narrative of Military Service*, p. 132.
[3] The Kelly field. See map.
[4] No. 50, p. 776, l. 52.
[5] No. 50, p. 772, l. 12.
[6] Page 125.
[7] No. 50, p. 764, l. 8.
[8] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.

GEN. WILLIAM B. HAZEN

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two regimental officers placing the time much earlier than does General Hazen, who puts it at about 4 P.M., and is corroborated therein by his Colonel Suman, of the 9th Indiana.

The relative time of Hazen's arrival on Harker's left must, we know, have been after the time when the latter was driven from Horseshoe Ridge, and was where Hazen found him in the cornfield position, in rear of the Snodgrass house, and after the time of the respective departures of Thomas and Granger and of Smith's Battery. It seems, also, that he must have crossed the Lafayette road just prior to the charge of Reynolds to the rear; and he was delayed not only on the east side of the road, but also in the woods on the west side, continuing his skirmishing with the enemy's stragglers. Therefore, we may approximate his actual time of arrival as about 5 P.M.

The conclusion which we have thus reached is still further corroborated in the Official Report of Colonel Foy,[1] of the 23d Kentucky, Grose's Brigade.

> We were now, about 4 P.M. [he says], ordered to change front to the right. After being in this position half an hour we were ordered back to the breastworks. The storm of battle had now ceased on our left and front, but off to the right it was renewed with increased vigor. There was now considerable changing round of troops. General Hazen, with his entire brigade, moved off in the direction of the enemy's left, etc.

Major Whitaker, of the 6th Kentucky,[2] helps to establish the relative alignment of the brigade: —

> Having crossed the woods, we fell in with the brigade, in reserve to the 41st Ohio Volunteers. . . . Our front line 41st Ohio Volunteers, and 9th Indiana. . . .

This, then, leaves the 124th Ohio in reserve to the 9th Indiana, which is corroborated[3] by Colonel Suman, who says:

[1] No. 50, p. 794, l. 12.
[2] No. 50, p. 772, l. 18.
[3] No. 50, p. 769, l. 16.

. . . Moved to the right, to support the 125th Ohio Volunteers, the 41st Ohio Volunteers, 9th [Indiana] and 125th Ohio Volunteers for a short time fired alternately.

In his *Narrative of Military Service*,[1] General Hazen still further corroborates his regimental officers in the following statement: —

My advance brought me directly on the left flank of our force there, which was Opdycke's 125th Ohio of Wood's division. I found him firing by volley with great rapidity — a species of tactics he had been taught when a captain in the 41st Ohio Regiment . . . I at once formed upon Opdycke's left, and began volley-firing also.

We have, therefore, established the alignment of this Federal line of battle of the regiments of these two brigades, in relative order, as indicated in the following diagram: —



It would appear scarcely necessary, with the evidence and information already before the thoughtful student, for me to have to show where the Confederates were located, against whom these volleys were directed. The direction could not have been either towards the west, north, or east, *or yet towards the gap between the two wings — southeasterly*. The only direction, therefore, which remains, is the south, where the Confederates were on Horseshoe Ridge, from the eastern extremity of which Harker's Brigade had just been driven. But such is the Park Commission's statement in its published literature, and such is its representation in Plate VIII[3] of their map of the battle-field, "noon to night Sep-

[1] Page 132.
[2] "S" indicates Snodgrass house.
[3] See chapter XII, p. 242.

tember 20th 1863," which represents the brigades and the battery mentioned, as well as Smith's Battery, engaging one Confederate brigade — viz., Humphreys', which made no assault on the Federal line, but reconnoitred once about noontime the vicinity of Snodgrass house and the hill of Horseshoe Ridge south of it, after which for the rest of the day it made no other move, acting in obedience to General Longstreet's orders to hold "its position without advancing," as fully established by the Official Report[1] of General Humphreys, and other unquestionable testimony. The misrepresentation on the Park Commission's map is so absurd that, were it not made on their authority, I would pay no attention to it, as there is not a spark of evidence of it in all the Records. The direction taken by Hazen's Brigade, from its position in the breastworks towards the Snodgrass house, was at right angles to the Lafayette road, due west; and we call attention to General Hazen's Report:[2]

Arriving near the scene of action, I caused a partial change of direction to the left, and was quickly pouring in volleys, my second line alternating with my first.

A "partial change of direction to the left," thus means that his line of battle faced southwest, which is all the testimony necessary to submit for the present, refuting, as it does, the unsupported statement of the Park Commission, as indicated in their map, that this line faced southeast. We have not an overabundance of evidence about this final position of Harker's and Hazen's Brigades, it being entirely ignored in the Reports of General Wood, Colonel Harker, and in the Report of the 3d Kentucky's colonel, who make no distinctions between their position on Horseshoe Ridge and their last and final one, at least two hundred and fifty yards north, on the "bare ridge" in the vicinity of the Snodgrass house. These latter officers give no credit to

[1] No. 51, p. 509, l. 45. [2] No. 50, p. 764, l. 9.

Hazen's Brigade, nor do they even mention the name of this brigade, which came to their support when they were thus "hard pressed." The Reports of the other two Harker regiments, the 65th and the 64th Ohio, make no mention of Hazen either. This gives rise, therefore, to the conclusion that the officers mentioned withdrew, while Colonel Opdycke with his 125th Ohio (supporting the two guns of the 18th Ohio Battery) were the last of the brigade to leave the vicinity of the Snodgrass house. It is therefore appropriate that we should give a full description, from official sources, of this last position. General Hazen describes it as follows:[1]—

> The position was admirable, being a little crest at the south side of the field, at Snodgrass house. [N.B. The "little crest" referred to, is recognizable to this day. We call attention to the fact that it was in the field, and not in the woods.] The men, alternating by companies, would advance up to this crest and deliver their fire, and then fall back a few yards for shelter and to reload. . . . The position was *in a cornfield, and the bullets rattled through the dry corn in a very uncanny way.*[2]

A study of the Reports of the officers of Hazen's Brigade indicates that their firing was of short duration, but very severe while it lasted. General Hazen's testimony on the subject[3] is as follows: —

> . . . The action lasting but a few minutes, the enemy retiring. There was no more fighting.

The testimony of Colonel Suman, of the 9th Indiana,[4] reads: —

> . . . For a short time fired alternately, which was very destructive to the enemy, speedily driving him from his position, and compelling him to abandon his position in front of that portion of our lines entirely.

[1] *A Narrative of Military Service*, p. 132.
[2] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR. See also chapter VIII, p. 177 and footnote.
[3] No. 50, p. 764, l. 12.
[4] No. 50, p. 769, l. 19.

And that of Major Hampson,[1] of the 124th Ohio, is: —

> But the enemy were soon driven, the regiment firing by battalions, and performing several evolutions under fire. The firing at this point was for a short time very severe.

Yet, according to Major Whitaker, of the 6th Kentucky,[2] it was only the front line, composed of the 41st Ohio and the 9th Indiana, which had driven the enemy back, when the 6th Kentucky joined the rest of the brigade; and it still further appears that all the loss suffered was sustained by the 41st Ohio and 124th Ohio only, the former of which[3] lost "about a dozen wounded in this part of the action," and the latter, "several killed and wounded."

When we get to the accounts of this same affair, in the testimony of the Confederate troops who encountered this fire from the last Federal line of battle, we shall observe that "there was no more fighting," because their ammunition was nearly exhausted. Yet they still held their own, in the possession of the east part of Horseshoe Ridge, when support arrived from a fresh Confederate brigade, which had swept the west part of the ridge of all remaining troops of Brannan's Division, and against whose advances the 18th Ohio Battery and the 125th Ohio directed their fire. But when these fresh Confederate troops reached the position of the "Hog's Back," and were halted, preparatory to charging the battery,[4] the last of the Federal line withdrew, and succeeded in saving their guns. This is the Confederate viewpoint, the evidence of which is given later: we state it here, in advance, only that the reader may better acquaint himself with the picture of the battle.

[1] No. 50, p. 776, l. 54.
[2] No. 50, p. 772, l. 15.
[3] No. 50, p. 774, l. 16.
[4] See Notes to chapter VII, Note B.

CHAPTER VIII

SOME SUPPRESSED HISTORY CONCERNING THE NINTH INDIANA

We believe that we have already, at this point, proved, from the Official Reports, that the last position of Hazen's and Harker's Brigades was in the Snodgrass cornfield, and firing upon the Confederates on Horseshoe Ridge. If Brannan's command was still occupying this ridge "on the prolongation"[1] of Harker's former line; and if still in possession of Hill Number 2, it stands to reason that Hazen and Harker would not volley upon and shell the alleged position of their own troops. But we have plenty of direct Federal testimony showing that Brannan's command, before this firing ceased, had "withdrawn" into Snodgrass field. It was after Hazen's and Harker's Brigades had ceased firing, and the Confederates on the east hill of Horseshoe Ridge, because of scarcity of ammunition, were making no immediate reply, that the following interesting battle incident occurred: The 9th Indiana Regiment, of Hazen's Brigade, was called upon, under General Brannan's directions, to go to the position on Hill Number 2, recently occupied by Brannan's troops. The evidence of the Official Reports in regard to the movement in question will be given first; the record of it is contained only in the Reports of Colonel Suman and General Brannan. The former says:[2] —

> My regiment was then ordered still farther to the right, on a high hill. It was while in this position that my attention was drawn to my right, by an unnecessary amount of talking. I went

[1] Thomas, No. 50, p. 252, l. 14. [2] No. 50, p. 769, l. 22.

over to see what it meant, and to my surprise, I found the enemy demanding our troops to surrender.

While General Brannan's statement[1] is as follows: —

I remained in this position, heavily engaged, until sunset, reinforced at intervals by the Ninth Regiment, Indiana Volunteers, sent me at my request by General Hazen. . . .

The position to which Brannan has reference is the one where his troops were "heavily engaged" during the afternoon; and he remained there, viz., on Horseshoe Ridge, "until sunset." If he withdrew at this time he would pass by Hazen's and Harker's Brigades, drawn up in line, in conflict with the Confederates who had taken possession of the east extremity of the ridge. In order to meet Hazen's Brigade, Brannan would have to be in the Snodgrass cornfield; and it was from this cornfield that Colonel Suman's regiment was ordered to the "high hill" still farther to the right. On his way to the position ordered, he had reported,[2] at the edge of the woods, to one of Brannan's regimental officers, the identity of whom is later established. It further appears, from Colonel Suman's Report,[3] that he was temporarily a prisoner; and we can approximately determine the point where he was at this time, with the other captured Federals, by his statement to the officer to whom he reported:[4] —

. . . That he had but thirty steps to walk to convince himself . . . that the enemy had gained that point [where they were demanding the Federal troops to surrender and who had surrendered when Suman himself had walked into the Confederate lines and become a prisoner].

Why was the 9th Indiana sent on this perilous mission? The question is answered in the Official Reports, by the strongest inference, viz., that it was to facilitate the with-

[1] No. 50, p. 403, l. 12.
[2] No. 50, p. 769, l. 28.
[3] No. 50, p. 769, l. 40.
[4] No. 50, p. 769, l. 48.

drawal of Brannan's troops, from Snodgrass field, who, as will be shown later, had almost entirely exhausted their ammunition. And, again, as will later be shown by the same Official Reports, Brannan before this, "withdrew stealthily" from his position on Horseshoe Ridge, and had abandoned to their fate three other regiments (whose ammunition was exhausted), who all that afternoon had covered his right flank and fought under his command, though belonging to another division.

As the other three regiments mentioned were thus used as a buffer, to permit Brannan's own troops to escape capture, the inference is that a similar purpose instigated the ordering of the 9th Indiana back into the woods where the other Federal troops had been abandoned, without any notification by General Brannan of his intention to withdraw.

My first natural inference was that the 9th Indiana was sent back to help the three regiments which had been thus sacrificed; but the testimony in Colonel Suman's Report indicates that he was told nothing about there being any Federal troops still in that position, for he says:[1] "To my surprise, I found the enemy demanding our troops to surrender."

Some years ago I was fortunate in obtaining the names and addresses of several members of the 9th Indiana Regiment; and a correspondence with them followed. In particular, I have had a number of letters from General I. C. B. Suman, former colonel of the 9th Indiana, and also, letters from his adjutant, S. P. Hodsden. At first, these officers were rather reluctant in answering the blunt questions which I put to them, as indicated in Adjutant Hodsden's letter, in which he says: "I told General Suman you must have learned something of it from some source, or you

[1] No. 50, p. 769, l. 25.

COL. I. C B SUMAN

NOW

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would have had no occasion for requesting a 'candid statement.'"

Through the courtesy of these officers, I am thus also enabled to give the details, embodying the heroic record, in this battle, of the officers and men of the 9th Indiana, full credit for which has never been given them; but, on the contrary, the laurels to which they were entitled have been a subject of controversy; and they have justly complained, like other regiments, referred to later, that they have "become a mere tail" to another regiment's "kite."

In his letter to me of April 4, 1909, General Suman inclosed a joint letter, dated "March 2, 1909," written by Adjutant S. P. Hodsden, "in behalf of the 9th Indiana and Colonel Suman," from which I quote, *verbatim*, their joint statement about this incident, in connection with General Brannan's order: —

> As to your first question, perhaps it would make it more nearly clear to restate how we came to be on the hill, under command of General Brannan. Sometime before sundown, the 9th having been relieved from duty on the front, Colonel Suman marched his regiment, as ordered through an orderly, to rejoin Hazen down towards the log-house under Snodgrass Hill, seeking the brigade — Hazen's.
>
> It seems from Brannan's Reports[1] that the 9th had been loaned to Brannan while *both*[2] were in the cornfield. We knew nothing of this; so, when Van Derveer, if it was Van Derveer, ordered Suman up the hill, he turned to his field major, Carter, and staff, myself, and asked: "What do you think Hazen will say, if we follow the order of that colonel?" My opinion was, that "Old Hazen would be hotter than hell." Carter said: "He is trying to work you, Colonel." So Suman turned and replied: "I don't know that I ought to take orders from you." This made Van Derveer hotter than Hazen ever was. He turned to the bunch of officers and said (pointing to us): "That regiment is a lot of d—d cowards!" At this, the men of the 9th — every one,

[1] *Official Records*, Series I, vol. XXX, part 1. [2] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.

or nearly so — spoke to the Colonel: "We will go with you, Colonel." Then the Colonel said to Van Derveer: "We will go, and what's your orders?" To this Van Derveer said: "Go up the hill [pointing towards the heights] and hold it till the army gets out of here." Suman inquired as to his withdrawing. Van Derveer replied that if he could get out, that was Suman's business, not his, and implied relieving us sometime in the night, if fortune favored us. I heard no reference whatever to any troops we were either to relieve or reinforce, except as to strengthening our line on the summit of Snodgrass [Ridge].[1] This is the substance of what occurred, as I heard it.

We had not gone far when a person in Federal uniform overtook us, and said he was sent by General Brannan to place us. As we were entering the timber, he attempted to lead us up a depression heavily clad in underbrush, when Suman asked him if he had no better sense than to lead us into a probable ambuscade, and took a route on higher and less densely wooded ground, where it was less dark, and reached the left of the regiments that had just surrendered, as we then learned and still believe. Feeling our surroundings, quite a number of the men, seeing dimly that we were right amongst a lot of soldiers, went prospecting, to ascertain if they were Union men. . . .

In this correspondence with Colonel Suman and his adjutant, Hodsden, is testimony corroborative of the evidence deduced from the Official Reports — as to time, place, and circumstance. As the truth of history has been so much misrepresented, about this part of the battle, fought on "Harker's Hill,"[2] it is of the greatest importance to marshal all this authoritative evidence from actual participants.[3]

From Adjutant Hodsden's letter of August 12, 1907, written at the request of Colonel Suman, concerning the former's recollections, — and which the latter kindly for-

[1] By "Snodgrass" Ridge is meant "Horseshoe" Ridge here and elsewhere.

[2] "Harker's Hill"; Harker's position from 5 P.M. to 6 P.M. at Snodgrass house or "Snodgrass Hill."

[3] *Appeal to the Secretary of War, by the Indiana Chickamauga Park Commission*, p. 2, l. 16.

warded to me, — I cull the following pertinent statements: —

As you [Colonel Suman] were hastening to General Harker's assistance, we came in rear of Colonel Opdycke, of the 125th Ohio, who was waging *an unequal fight with a charging rebel column*,[1] of which we made out several lines. You promptly went to his aid[2] . . . and fought for a half-hour or more, and until the attack was repulsed.[3] . . .

At about 6 P.M., the enemy's firing having ceased, and they not appearing strongly in our front — besides, other troops were there who appeared amply able to hold the lines — you evacuated the position, and sought to report to your brigade.

As you were withdrawing, we passed a number of *field and general officers, apparently holding a council of war*,[1] when a . . . *Colonel Van Derveer*,[1] I believe, *ordered you to take your regiment to the front and right*,[1] further than we had yet been, and hold the rebels in check at all hazards, taking the position indicated, which was *in pretty dense timber. This was near 6 p. m.*,[1] the darkness of evening drew on, accentuated, maybe, by the pall of powder-smoke that, in a measure, shrouded us.

Under date of March 10, 1909, Adjutant Hodsden also wrote the following: —

I presume it is clear to you that General Brannan never tried to withdraw the regiments of other commands which had assisted him; but when an unfortunate regiment tried to help him out, to leave them in. We believed at the time, and have ever since, that we were ordered up the hill to stay there. This was the opinion of Captain D. B. McConnell, as I understood it — which, if so, he has established beyond a peradventure.[1]

[1] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.

[2] "Which was being hard pressed"; Hampson, No. 50, p. 776, l. 51.

[3] Compare this with the following on page 53, *Forty-first Ohio Veteran Volunteer Infantry*, by Robert L. Kimberly and E. S. Halloway (Cleveland, Ohio: W. R. Smellie, Printer and Publisher, 1897): "The arrival was just in time. Hazen's men marched through a cornfield to the crest of a low hill and were there massed in column of regiments. Scarcely had this been done when the Confederate storm burst. The slope in front of the brigade was open ground, with heavy masses of the enemy making for the top. Hazen's men were lying flat," etc.

Again, from the joint letter of the colonel and his adjutant, under date of March 2, 1909, I quote the following:—

> Had Suman gone, as ordered by Van Derveer, — and had it lacked the approval of Hazen, as we believed it did, — without Hazen's knowledge, then a court-martial would have been in prospect, for failing to rejoin his brigade. For remember, not one of us had any intimation, from any source, at this time that Hazen had been consulted in the matter, and never knew any better until consulting the Records in recent years.

In this connection, it is proper to call attention to a different statement, made by General Hazen in his *Narrative of Military Service:* [1] —

> General Brannan asked for a regiment to take post on his right, and I sent the 9th Indiana, then in reserve.

As between the two foregoing conflicting statements, I leave the reader to judge; but I will ask that the fact be considered that all available testimony of the officers and the men of the 9th Indiana is against that of General Hazen, who at the time he wrote his book consulted the Official Reports, and may have adopted General Brannan's statement therein as a matter of inconsequence. On the other hand, it must be remembered that it was a serious situation, never to be forgotten by the officers of the 9th Indiana; and had the "disobedience of orders" resulted in the capture of the regiment, they would have suffered certain reproof in consequence. One salient fact, already established, is corroborated by General Hazen, viz., that of his meeting with General Brannan in Snodgrass field, in rear of the log-house, to which point his command had withdrawn at this juncture.

The same letter still further refers to the "person in Federal uniform, sent by General Brannan to place us": he appears to have been Brannan's orderly, acting as their

[1] Page 132.

guide; though they were quite "distrustful of him at the time, and kept an eye on him." The "depression" here referred to is undoubtedly the deep hollow southwest of Snodgrass house. Distrusting their guide, they did not "go up" this depression, from the Snodgrass house to Hill Number 2, but passed along the edge of the little cliff by the log-house, and thence along the "Hog's Back" to the said Hill Number 2 on which the tower now stands. This edge of the little cliff by the Snodgrass house was the point to which Colonel Suman refers in his Report,[1] and where he met the officer whom he "reported to at that point." Park Commissioner General Frank Smith, in answer to my repeated questions on the subject, has said that General Boynton told him that he (Boynton) was the officer to whom Colonel Suman's Report refers. Testimony of 9th Indiana comrades is to the same effect. Adjutant Hodsden explained that it was he who helped write Colonel Suman's Report, and that the words "reported to" should not carry with them the construction that Colonel Suman reported to this particular officer for orders, but that he merely spoke to him in a "social" way, as he passed that point.[2]

After my study of the Official Reports had developed the conclusions above mentioned, and after the corroborative testimony obtained through the kindness of Colonel Suman and his adjutant had been received, I was referred by them to Captain McConnell, who sent me, in pamphlet form, an *Appeal to the Secretary of War, by the Indiana Chickamauga Park Commission, R. M. Johnson, Indiana Chickamauga Park Commissioner*. This pamphlet was written, in whole or in part, by Captain McConnell for the Commissioners, as appears by his signature, which he has himself written in my personal copy. Much valuable testi-

[1] No. 50, p. 769, l. 40.

[2] How the 9th Indiana "relieved" the 35th Ohio, see Notes to chapter VIII, Note A.

mony from the officers and men of the 9th Indiana is to be found in this document, corroborating our deductions from the Official Reports.[1]

The deliberate purpose of General Brannan to sacrifice the 9th Indiana Regiment is still further confirmed in this before-mentioned pamphlet:[2]—

> Through the ranks had passed the whisper, "The army is retreating, and we are placed out here and left, to hold the enemy back so long as we can, to enable the army to retreat unmolested. . . ."
>
> Officers and men alike were led to believe that it had become necessary to sacrifice a regiment.

And again, he says that this regiment had a " . . . full knowledge . . . of the fact . . . that they were abandoned to their fate."

We believe that we have thus demonstrated the truth of the proposition which we set out to prove at the beginning of the chapter, viz., that the last Federal line of battle was on Harker's Hill in Snodgrass field.

We have now completed our history of what happened on this hill, between about 5 and 6 o'clock P.M., September 20th, excepting a few further details and corroborative facts from both Confederate and Federal sources, which, to avoid needless repetition, are reserved for presentation in future chapters.

There are several corollaries or obvious consequences, which follow the proof of the above proposition.

[1] This controversy between the Indiana Chickamauga Commission and General Boynton brings to light, to those who want the truth, much that otherwise can only be obtained by laborious study of the Records, indicated in these pages. Yet the National Park Commission withheld the record of it on the score that it "would doubtless and almost certainly lead to confusion rather than to light," quoting from a letter to the author from the War Department under date of December 29, 1910. For an account of this controversy see Notes to chapter VIII, Note B.

[2] *Indiana's Appeal to the Secretary of War*, p. 9.

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The *first* is, that Harker's Brigade was driven from its position on Horseshoe Ridge about 5 P.M. The truth of the above will be demonstrated still further in a later chapter.

The *second* is, that all of Brannan's command, consisting principally of troops of his own division and of Stanley's Brigade, had withdrawn from Horseshoe Ridge by sunset. (In succeeding chapters, from Federal as well as Confederate evidence in the Records, it will be proved that this was somewhat earlier than 6 o'clock, and that this withdrawal was disorganized and made "stealthily.")

The *third* corollary from the evidence hitherto presented is, that the withdrawal of the Federal right wing from their position on Horseshoe Ridge and the Main Ridge was forced and was executed before the arrival of General Thomas' order from the Ridge road and McFarland's Gap, i.e., Harker's Brigade was driven from its position about 5 P.M., Steedman's Division about 5.30 P.M., and Brannan's command near 6 P.M.

In future chapters will be given accounts of the closing scenes and incidents of the battle on Horseshoe Ridge, and of Brannan's abandonment of the 21st and 89th Ohio and 22d Michigan Regiments, which were captured, and of the 9th Indiana's escape from a similar fate.

We will end this chapter with a description of the final withdrawal of the Federals under Brannan's command from Snodgrass field. We have already seen that Steedman's Division, on the flank of this right wing, withdrew at 6.30 P.M. from a second ridge, three hundred yards in rear of the one on which it had fought.

I must digress for a moment, to make a statement, in view of a feature of our discussion which our study of this 9th Indiana incident in Snodgrass field makes appropriate and necessary. I wish to reiterate that my purpose is to present fully and truthfully what the Official Reports reveal, and, in our consideration of the record made by the Federal

and Confederate soldier, to treat both alike impartially. If the conclusions reached, after a fair presentation of the evidence, appear to me overwhelming, I shall have the courage of my convictions in stating them, regardless of whom this exposition of the truth pleases or displeases. For my first thought in connection with this work is to make good application of the title given to it, "The Truth about Chickamauga." If these Official Records prove that much that has hitherto been generally accepted as the history of this battle does not square with our standard authority, I disclaim any personal responsibility for these disclosures, which may not be popular to my brothers, either of the North or of the South. I speak advisedly, for part of my family connection belong to one section of our country, and part to the other, and I would not intentionally do an injury to either.

In the course of my work, the records of officers whom I shall feel obliged to criticize unfavorably are not numerous, and are about equally divided between the two sides. On the Federal side, the records are thus included of several generals, whose names were not known to me when I began this undertaking: while on the Confederate side are the records, also, of several whom I knew by name, but never expected to criticize.

The pleasantest duty which I have to perform is that of doing justice to great soldiers on both sides, who have not received the full measure of credit due them—in particular, those whose actions have been misrepresented, and others who have received censure and abuse, where the Records give evidence that they were worthy of the highest praise.

Outside the pale of any of the foregoing are the records of two Federal generals, whose Reports contain unblushing evidence of deliberate falsification. One of these, whose name it is unnecessary to mention, has already been exposed; but it is now our disagreeable duty to question the

veracity of the statements of the other, while leaving it to a future chapter to completely fasten upon him the full measure of his guilt in this and other graver offenses.

I trust that my readers have carefully followed the incident of the 9th Indiana's meeting, in Snodgrass field, about 6 P.M., "a number of *field and general officers* apparently holding a council of war." And among the general officers, we might, by inference, include General Brannan, for his brigade commanders all ranked as colonels. It is the further testimony of Colonel Suman and his adjutant that it was General Brannan's orderly who was sent to guide them to "the high hill," and who later made his report to his general. From this it would appear that General Brannan may have known of the facts by being a witness to them, viz, that the 9th Indiana came to his support, in Snodgrass field, *after his troops withdrew from the Horseshoe.* Yet he says in his Report[1] that this service was rendered at the "position" where his command was "heavily engaged, until sunset." Think of his using such a word as "reinforce," in describing this evident abandonment of the 9th Indiana to its fate! Absolute proof, however, is lacking that General Brannan was a direct witness to the incident described, for Colonel Van Derveer was his spokesman. It was, too, the latter officer who, a short while before, on Horseshoe Ridge, had personally given the order, which, as we shall see in a future chapter, consigned the 21st Ohio Regiment to its fate.

It appears probable that, while this colloquy between the 9th Indiana's officers and Colonel Van Derveer was in progress, General Brannan was seeking other reinforcements further north, which he found, as we shall presently show, in the 68th and 101st Indiana Regiments.

In fact, because of General Brannan's statements in his Reports, and his proved ignorance (shown later) as to the

[1] No. 50, p. 403, l. 12.

actual and relative positions of the troops under his command, we have good reason to question that he was present during the real "last attacks" of the enemy against Horseshoe Ridge; for what he describes as the "last attack" was not the last attack, by any means; while the last attack, which he saw and describes,[1] was when "the enemy were gallantly driven from the ridge, where they had obtained a momentary lodgment." An attack of the kind which he describes, and which was begun at Brannan's position, on Hill Number 2, before 4 P.M., will be found later in our account of the assaults of Kershaw's Brigade. Again, at about 4.30 P.M., some of the regiments of Kelly's Brigade drove the Federals from the heights occupied by Brannan's command, and held them against successive Federal charges, which will be described in our account of Kelly's Brigade. As all Confederate assaults which were made later resulted in permanent occupancy of the heights, Brannan certainly does not refer to these.

When the "momentary lodgments" were effected (and we apologize to Kelly's Brigade for calling their long and unsupported occupancy a momentary one), there is no evidence of any lack of ammunition among Brannan's men. That regiments of his command ran out of ammunition, is a well-established fact; but this was not during the time of these "momentary lodgments."

A summary of these falsifications in General Brannan's Report describing his position on Horseshoe Ridge is included in the following paragraphs of his Report:[2]—

> I remained in this position, heavily engaged, until sunset, reinforced at intervals by the 9th Regiment, Indiana Volunteers, sent me at my request by General Hazen, and the 68th and 101st Regiments, Indiana Volunteers, sent by order of General Thomas, also the 21st Ohio Volunteer Infantry, all of whom remained in position and behaved with steadiness while their ammunition

[1] No. 50, p. 403, l. 24. [2] No. 50, p. 403, ll. 12–16.

lasted. Colonel Stoughton, with a portion of a brigade, also rallied at this point and did good service.

Finding my ammunition almost exhausted, some of the troops having none at all, and the remainder but one or two rounds, I ordered it to be reserved until the last final effort, and resort to be had to the bayonet as a means of defense. Several charges were made by the entire command during the last attack of the enemy, by which they were gallantly driven from the ridge, where they had obtained a momentary lodgment.

What he says above, is applicable to Van Derveer's and Croxton's brigades of his own division and Colonel Stoughton's portion of Stanley's Brigade, but only a small portion of it to the 21st Ohio, as hereinafter proven, — all the rest being fabrications. His description of "the last attack of the enemy" is applicable only to the last one which he may have seen when "they [the enemy] had obtained a [the] momentary lodgment" to which he refers.

His statements, however, as applied to the Indiana regiments, can be characterized after a careful review of all the evidence in the Official Reports, corroborated by officers of these regiments who were participants and are still living, only as a barefaced attempt to perpetrate a gross deception on those unacquainted with the truth, and made with the evident purpose of covering his own shortcomings and perhaps shielding one of his own subordinates. *Per contra*, we have seen: (1) that the 9th Indiana met Brannan's men in Snodgrass field, near Snodgrass house, after the latter's withdrawal from their position on the Horseshoe where they (Brannan's men) had been "heavily engaged until sunset"; (2) that the 9th Indiana was thence ordered alone and unsupported to the "high hill" of Horseshoe Ridge, where the only Federals encountered were the regiments on the right which had been surrounded by the Confederates.

But we notice that General Brannan introduces two

other regiments in his description of the scene where the severe fighting was done by the troops under his command, when he includes the 68th and 101st Indiana regiments among them as well as the 9th Indiana. The presence of these two regiments has already been accounted for elsewhere,[1] as with their brigade (E. A. King's) and division (Reynolds') participating in the commencement of the withdrawal of the left wing about 4.30 P.M., and included at this time in the charge of the division to the rear via McDonald's to a point on the Ridge road near McFarland's Gap.[2] Moreover, we find no room for them in our alignment of Brannan's troops from 1 P.M. until sunset. We have been rendered suspicious of this general's veracity on 9th Indiana counts, and — doubting the truth of his statements again — we search for testimony elsewhere, adopting our self-imposed rule to first apply the evidence of the Official Records as the standard test.

Unfortunately for history and for the memory of brave men, the Official Records contain no brigade or regimental reports whatever of E. A. King's Brigade, to which these Indiana regiments belonged. Nevertheless we find fully sufficient evidence in the Official Reports showing Brannan's sweeping statements to be as palpably untrue concerning the 68th and 101st Indiana Regiments as concerning the 9th Indiana. To have been on Horseshoe Ridge before Brannan's command withdrew therefrom, it would of necessity follow that the 68th and 101st Indiana arrived there before sunset. Could they possibly have done so? Could they, when withdrawn from the Kelly field at 4.30 P.M., participating in the charge to the rear under Thomas' direction northward with their division

[1] Chapter IV, pp. 81 (map), 88, notwithstanding Turchin's erroneous statement (*Chickamauga*, pp. 122, 140) to the contrary. See also Notes to chapter VIII, Note C.

[2] No. 50, p. 254, l. 4. In rear of McCook's Brigade, "gained shelter" behind Barnett's guns. No. 50, p. 883, l. 1; p. 871, l. 35; p. 874, l. 20; p. 876, l. 55.

(Reynolds') to McDonald's, thence turning to the left with their brigade under Colonel Robinson, and posted by General Thomas on the high ground near the Ridge road and McFarland's Gap in rear of McCook's Brigade, and thence after an interval of delay, countermarched to Horseshoe Ridge, being a distance of about one and a half miles going, and about one mile returning, have overcome the natural obstructions and the encounters with the enemy in ninety minutes? We doubt the physical possibility of it; moreover, the evidence furnished by the Federal and Confederate Reports is convincing that it was not done. The encounter with Liddell's Confederate Division on the right wing by this charge of Reynolds' Division to the rear (the details of which belong to another volume) occurred without doubt at about 5 P.M.,[1] in McDonald's orchard.

The division separated into several parts near this point, and beyond it, one part, General Reynolds' detachment, going a full half-mile further northward to near the field hospital at Cloud house,[2] while Thomas turned to the left.

But the details of covering the retirement of the troops were left to General Reynolds,[3] and as the 68th and 101st Indiana Regiments belonged to his division, it would appear that these regiments were moved under his orders after he had rejoined his command. We cannot, therefore, estimate the time of these regiments' moving from near McFarland's Gap at an earlier hour than sunset, and *before* sunset, according to our previous conclusions, General Brannan's command had withdrawn from its position on Horseshoe Ridge, except the three regiments which were surrounded and captured at sunset. Hence the conclusion that the 68th and 101st did not arrive before sunset. Nei-

[1] No. 50, p. 450, l. 15; No. 51, p. 256, l. 54; p. 257, l. 12; p. 265, l. 54; p. 270, l. 45; p. 246, l. 39; p. 247, l. 43.

[2] No. 50, p. 442, l. 23.

[3] No. 50, p. 254, l. 11.

ther at sunset could they have been "put in" with the 9th Indiana, which was ordered to Brannan's previous position on the "high hill" at 6 P.M., in time to witness the capture of the 22d Michigan, 89th and 21st Ohio Regiments, then located on the Horseshoe to their right, where Trigg's three regiments had moved up in their rear.

By 6 P.M. the Confederates had gained possession, and occupied the ridge from one extremity to the other. The 9th Indiana happened to move to a point which had just previously been swept by Colonel Finley with his 6th Florida and 54th Virginia Regiments of Trigg's Brigade, and then, he being joined by Colonel Trigg with the 7th Florida, the three regiments enveloped all that remained of the Federals on the ridge, who were to the west of the Indianians.

The 9th Indiana was a witness to a part of these proceedings. For a half-hour they stood in their position, their colonel and some of his men in the mean time being prisoners in the enemy's hands, where they had walked over on a scouting expedition. Colonel Suman escaped and joined his regiment just as it was surrendering to Colonel Hawkins with his 5th Kentucky and 63d Virginia Regiments of Kelly's Brigade, which just then advanced up the southern slope and over the summit of the "high hill," where it encountered the 9th Indiana. The details will be found in succeeding chapters. Only sufficient has been quoted to show that there was no room for the 68th and 101st Indiana Regiments on Horseshoe Ridge, during this period when no record of their presence is found in any official report whatever except in General Brannan's discredited testimony. When we come to the account of the 21st Ohio's[1] participation in these closing scenes, we shall find that *this* was the regiment which protected Van Derveer's right flank and covered the withdrawal of Brannan's

[1] See chapter IX, p. 207.

Division from "the position where the last stand was made,"[1] namely, on Horseshoe Ridge. This is the claim made by the 21st Ohio and is fully substantiated.

The careful student of the Official Reports cannot help noticing Brannan's equivocating testimony in disputing the 21st Ohio's claim.

"The position where the last stand was made," where there were charges and countercharges, when ammunition was nearly exhausted, and the last few rounds ordered reserved before a resort to the bayonet (Granger's last order and Brannan's Report), was undoubtedly the position on Horseshoe Ridge where Brannan says he remained until sunset and then withdrew.

He did not then withdraw to Rossville, as we well know, for beyond the Snodgrass house in Snodgrass field, out of sight of any enemy[2] was his last position, and it is to it that he refers when he says:[3] "Shortly after sunset I withdrew without molestation to Rossville, where I bivouacked for the night, my retreat being covered by the 68th and 101st Indiana Volunteer Infantry, the only troops who had a supply of ammunition. This duty was satisfactorily performed by these regiments under the direction of Captain C. A. Cilley, of Colonel Van Derveer's staff."

This covering of Brannan's retreat to Rossville was thus performed by the 68th and 101st Indiana Regiments, not from Horseshoe Ridge, but from some point in rear of Snodgrass house, or, as the 9th Indiana testimony has it, "under Snodgrass Hill."

The relative time of this retreat or withdrawal, when Captain Cilley performed the duty referred to, was subsequent to what is described elsewhere[4] as the 35th Ohio incident when Colonel Boynton's party, concealed in the bushes at the edge of the little cliff that overlooks the deep

[1] No. 50, p. 405, l. 18.
[2] See illustration, chapter I, p. 24.
[3] No. 50, p. 406, l. 30.
[4] See chapter XIV, p. 334.

hollow southwest of Snodgrass house, fired a volley upon a mounted Confederate soldier. For it is following after Colonel Van Derveer's graphic description of this encounter that he says,[1] "an order came from Major-General Thomas that the forces under General Brannan should move quietly to Rossville. This was carried into execution under the direction of Captain Cilley, of my staff, in excellent order."

Colonel Boynton, in his description of the same incident, says of the counter-volley which the Confederates fired into his ranks:[2] "With this fire the engagement ceased," and the results of our research given in these pages indicate that this statement is true. It is also certain that "at this juncture" Boynton's men withdrew, receiving the order Van Derveer refers to and,[3] "together with the troops on the hill" near Snodgrass house, belonging to Brannan's command, fell back to Rossville, the 68th and 101st Indiana covering his retreat.

From Colonel Boynton's statements we reach the conclusion that these Indiana regiments could not (or else he would have known it) have fired a gun subsequent to the time they joined Brannan, for we must remember his statement, after receiving the Confederate volley, "with this fire the engagement ceased."

As Horseshoe Ridge was alive with Confederates of Preston's Division on all three hills from east to west, occupied in gathering the prisoners of the three Federal regiments captured by Trigg's[4] fresh brigade which had surrounded them, it is inconceivable, after reading the evidence of the Official Reports submitted in this and later chapters, that any one can believe that Captain Cilley could have formed Brannan's command at any point on the hills and in the woods of Horseshoe Ridge "without

[1] No. 50, p. 431, l. 10.
[2] No. 50, p. 436, l. 31.
[3] No. 50, p. 436, l. 33.
[4] See chapter IX, p. 197.

molestation," with not a gun fired, and "in excellent order." That this was done in the open field north of Snodgrass house, where the nature of the ground hid them from view and where no enemy interfered, can be well understood, and where, beyond a doubt, the final movement preparatory to the march to Rossville "was carried into execution."

As it is plainly in evidence on the Records, outside of Brannan's false statements alone, that the 68th and 101st Indiana Regiments never fired a gun anywhere on this part of the battlefield, the question will be asked why we should take so much time and space to disprove so immaterial a point.

Our answer is that while not one iota's difference resulted in this movement of these regiments, still they form a connecting link in the chain of evidence as to time and place, and the strength of the chain is that of its weakest link. The consequence of there being five missing Official Reports, all of E. A. King's Brigade, is to make us thus resort to a lengthy argument, but one which I believe to be none the less conclusive.[1]

From the *History of the Seventy-fifth Indiana*, by Rev. D. B. Floyd, formerly a sergeant in Company I of that regiment, which contains a most interesting and admirable account of the battle and of the operations of King's Brigade on the Federal left wing, quoted elsewhere, I here present his statements which concern "King's detachment" of the 68th and 101st Indiana. After describing the charge of General Reynolds' Division to the rear and north, as we have seen, as far as McDonald's, his account continues:[2] "General Thomas personally directed Colonel Robinson to move our brigade on the road," etc., and,

[1] For full account of "King's detachment" by an officer of the 101st Indiana who was with it, see Notes to chapter VIII, note D..

[2] Page 178.

"while we were in position at Brock's house, General Thomas, about dusk, sent the 68th and 101st Indiana Regiments of our brigade to the assistance of the troops under Brannan at Snodgrass hill. These regiments arrived too late to do any fighting there." [1]

[1] Page 184.

CHAPTER IX

GENERAL BRANNAN'S MISTAKES

THE Official Reports of Generals Halleck, Rosecrans, Thomas, and Granger have been disposed of, so far as the statements therein contained relate to the period about which we write in this volume. Their testimony relating to the battle scenes and the incidents that occurred on Chickamauga Heights (as we denominate the Horseshoe and Main Ridges) is not given from their own personal knowledge, for they were not present during this period at this point of the battle-field. The same statement applies to their testimony concerning the vicinity of Snodgrass house on the fifty-feet lower elevation (in rear of the eastern extremity of Horseshoe Ridge), sometimes denominated "Snodgrass Hill" and sometimes "Harker's Hill."

After the departures of Generals Thomas and Granger from the battle-field, the one about 4.30 and the other about 5 P.M., the next officer in point of rank on whom the command of what was left of the Federal army devolved was Brigadier-General John M. Brannan, acting division commander.

Brannan's Official Report

It is this officer's Official Report which comes next in order for consideration. We have, however, already given this testimony of his in full in the previous chapter, but there still remain in the Official Records "supplementary reports" or "letters," whichever it pleases us to call them, to whose consideration this chapter will be devoted.

Not satisfied with the description given in his Official Report of the closing scenes of the battle, he indirectly calls our attention to its deficiencies, either of commission or omission, by his explanation on October 8, 1863, that it was "owing to the short period allowed me [him]" in which to make an official report. He here makes reference to what he had "omitted to mention" concerning the 21st Ohio Volunteer Infantry of General Negley's Division. This was the first and most important omission, as indicated by the length of his explanation. The next omission to which he refers concerns Harker's Brigade, and strangely enough the latter's name is not mentioned in his original Official Report, though he now does justice thereto in the statement[1] that it "acted with great courage and determination, pouring into the rebels an incessant roll of musketry for several hours, and causing them to recoil with immense slaughter." This tardy justice serves to mark an important point, viz., that Harker's Brigade "held a position on my [his] left, after retiring to the ridge." In passing, let us note this statement as undoubtedly applied to a position on the Horseshoe Ridge, where Brannan could see the result as described by him, which would not so likely be the case if Harker occupied a position on an elevation fifty feet lower on the bare ridge two hundred and fifty yards or more to the rear.[2] But it is with the first sin of omission that we are immediately concerned,[3] that "in the position where the last stand was made, the 21st Ohio, having fought bravely up to 5 P.M., when their ammunition entirely gave out, were surrendered at about 7 o'clock by Major McMahan (some forty strong). It was then occupying a position on my [his] right, which the rebels again attacked after nightfall with a furious dis-

[1] No. 50, p. 405, l. 28.
[2] See map of Chickamauga Park, chapter I, opposite p. 88.
[3] No. 50, p. 405, l. 18.

charge of musketry. The rebels were immediately afterward repulsed in the most gallant manner by the 35th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Boynton commanding." This statement is completely at variance with his original Official Report, and contrary to all evidence, both Federal and Confederate, previously presented. It is not so much an omission as a correction of his Official Report, though the context alleges that it was not intended as such. His Official Report, describing the position where "the last stand was made" by his command on Horseshoe Ridge, prominently sets forth that it was "until sunset" that his troops were "heavily engaged." On the strength of his Official Report and the testimony of the 9th Indiana Regiment, as well as other Federal authority, I have established, I think conclusively, that Brannan's command withdrew from its final position on Horseshoe Ridge before 6 P.M. From the same authoritative Federal source, including General Brannan's own statement, the further fact is also established as to the time of final withdrawal from Snodgrass field, viz., that it was, as he says, "shortly after sunset."[1] Yet now comes General Brannan's revised testimony, about one week later, to the effect that both these statements which we have accepted as facts are incorrect. He says now that "the rebels again attacked [him] after nightfall with a furious discharge of musketry," though originally having stated that he finally withdrew "shortly after sunset without molestation." Again, referring to the position where "the last stand was made" by his command (this on Horseshoe Ridge, of course), he says that the 21st Ohio, a component part thereof on his right, surrendered at this relative as well as actual time, 7 P.M. I think we will all admit that it would have been better for his reputation had he been contented with no

[1] No. 50, p. 406, l. 31.

additions to his original report. His "furious discharge of musketry after nightfall" undoubtedly has reference to the "35th Ohio—54th Virginia" incident, presently described,[1] which occurred at least a half-hour after the 21st Ohio with the other two regiments had surrendered, for it was when the 54th Virginia was taking its prisoners to the rear that Colonel Boynton's "squad,"[2] lying down "ten feet from the edge of a little cliff" that overlooks the bowl-shaped hollow southwest of Snodgrass house, were discovered here by Colonel Trigg's mounted orderly against whom Boynton's fire was directed, "producing some confusion"[3] in the ranks of the 54th Virginia; but the prisoners were recaptured, and the only other result was the serious wounding of this one man.

Colonel Boynton places the hour of this occurrence as 7 P.M.,[4] though I am inclined to think it was earlier. This conclusion of mine is reached by a study of the Confederate Reports, describing Colonel Trigg's movements with the 7th Florida Regiment, hereinbefore set forth, from which it appears that, with this one regiment of his brigade, while Finley swept east, he crossed the summit of the western extremity of Horseshoe Ridge and found Johnson's Division[5] in the deep hollow there before 6 P.M., when the last shot had been fired against the retreating Federals of Steedman's Division.[6] "At this time," says Colonel Finley, "the Colonel [Trigg commanding brigade], having learned upon the way the position and situation of the enemy,"[7] joined him and the other two regiments, the 6th Florida and the 54th Virginia, in the vicinity of the Snodgrass house just at the moment, described by Colonel Finley, when his charge was forestalled by the retirement

[1] Chapter XIV, p. 334.
[2] Chapter XIV, p. 338.
[3] No. 51, p. 439, l. 50.
[4] No. 50, p. 426, l. 32.
[5] No. 51, p. 464, ll. 33 and 37.
[6] No. 51, p. 493, l. 40; p. 466, l. 48.
[7] No. 51, p. 457, l. 6.

of the last of the Federal forces at that point, namely, the 125th Ohio Regiment and the 18th Ohio Battery.

It was then about 6 o'clock, and Colonel Trigg, instead of following up the retreating Federals, turning his attention to the preconceived plan,[1] wheeled his brigade "in rear of the enemy and moved rapidly up" the north slope of Horseshoe Ridge, "surprised" and captured the 22d Michigan, 89th Ohio, and part of the 21st Ohio Regiments. When this movement had been accomplished, and he looked for the enemy whom he had seen in the vicinity of the Snodgrass house, he says that they had withdrawn from their position and "no further movement was attempted." [2]

With so plain a statement of facts as is herein presented, can any one doubt, if any other troops of Brannan's command (and their ammunition was exhausted) could have been at this juncture on Horseshoe Ridge, on the immediate left of the captured prisoners, that they also would have been included among the number?

In the whole course of my study of the Official Records, this conduct of General Brannan is the only instance discreditable to the character of the American soldier that I have discovered, which I would prefer to omit in my account of the battle were it not my purpose to obey and follow out, to the best of my ability, what the old Roman correctly asserts as "the first and fundamental law of history, that it should neither dare to say anything that is false, nor fear to say anything that is true, nor give any just suspicion of favor or disaffection." My purpose is further upheld by the reflection that, while exposing the conduct of this one officer, I am, at the same time, performing an act of justice to the memory of gallant soldiers who suffered materially by the reflections thus cast upon them by General Brannan. I refer first to Major-General James

[1] No. 51, p. 492, l. 12. [2] No. 51, p. 492, l. 22.

S. Negley, whose reputation was seriously and permanently besmirched by the abuse which was heaped upon him, deprived of command and never honored as he deserved to have been for the part he performed in the battle, wherein he saved the army at a critical period by the removal to a place of safety (as per orders received by him) of artillery which barely escaped falling into the enemy's hands and being used for the annihilation of the Federal army.

I also refer to the officers and men of the 21st and 89th Ohio and the 22d Michigan Regiments, who suffered "the miseries of imprisonment in the hands of the enemy,"[1] and who were not only deliberately sacrificed, whereby the escape of Brannan's Division was encompassed, but were also dishonored by his baseless charges against them.

Finally, I refer to the officers and men of the 9th Indiana Regiment, who, as we have seen in the previous chapter, after being branded as cowards, in obedience to an order from this officer, to whose command they did not belong, allowed themselves to be used as a buffer and narrowly escaped capture.

Before I have finished my work I shall present additional testimony from the Records and other authoritative sources as well, convincing even the most skeptical that General Brannan and his lieutenants protected their own lives and gained their freedom from captivity by the deliberate sacrifice of their comrades without their knowledge or consent; also that efforts of concealment of their own shortcomings were the cause of baseless charges of cowardice, brought against the officers and men of these regiments who suffered in their place. Finally, as will be further shown, no due recognition of the services then performed by the said officers and men of the 21st and 89th Ohio, the 22d Michigan and the 9th Indiana Regiments, has ever been accorded them. On the contrary, the truth of

[1] No. 50, p. 390, l. 49.

history has been misrepresented and the honors for saving the Federal army from total annihilation have been filched from these regiments to whom they belong, and appropriated by Brannan and his lieutenants.

These are hard statements that I am compelled to make as a duty, and within the province of an historian who is in possession of all the facts concerning the many unfortunate controversies, Federal and Confederate, which figure so prominently in connection with this battle. But in this controversy between General Brannan and these regiments of other commands which stood in the breach, I want to see justice performed, and have the truth revealed, whether the name be Capulet or Montague in whose favor the decision is made.

I particularly disclaim responsibility for raising the issues involved in the controversy. Let us define these issues and establish the identity of their parentage: —

(1) The two Official Reports of the officers of the 21st Ohio, the correspondence between Generals Negley, Brannan, and McMahan, are the authorities of record which I submit as responsible for the statement that the three captured regiments were deliberately sacrificed without their knowledge and consent.

(2) The responsibility for the charge of cowardice against the same regiments is Brannan's above-quoted statement of "surrendering so quietly as to escape the notice of all but the regiment on your [McMahan's] immediate left."[1] That the purpose of this charge was for concealment of Brannan's shortcomings is the substance of General Negley's statement contained in the following: [2] —

> These reflections [on General Negley] appear to be gratuitous productions from officers my inferiors in rank (forming no portion of my command), with reference to circumstances which

[1] No. 50, p. 392, l. 50. [2] No. 50, p. 363, l. 31.

strongly indicate a desire to thus apologize for the conduct of themselves and their own troops.

This statement refers to General Brannan as well as to General Wood.

(3) For the responsibility of the third and last charge, to the effect that the above-named regiments were robbed of honors appropriated by others, we need only refer to the already quoted statements of General Brannan and point out the fact that the aforesaid regiments fought under and with his command. Nowhere in the brigade or regimental reports of officers of his whole division do we find even mention of the names nor any mention whatsoever of the great services performed by the three captured regiments and the 9th Indiana Regiment, who were deliberately thrown into the breach to save them from death or imprisonment, while Brannan's conduct toward them as manifested in the Official Records is almost unthinkable in an American soldier.

It is unnecessary to quote from my correspondence with surviving comrades, any more than I have already done in connection with the 9th Indiana, as to the injustice done to the memory of these brave men; but as the pamphlet, *In the Matter of the Appeal to the Secretary of War by the Indiana Chickamauga Park Commission* (already referred to), is an official document (and while I decline to enter into the arena of controversy concerning the proper location of monuments), I call attention to the unsuccessful controversy which that regiment had with the National Park Commissioners in general and the historian and president of it in particular, viz., General H. V. Boynton, formerly colonel of the 35th Ohio Regiment of Van Derveer's Brigade, Brannan's Division.

While the whole pamphlet is full of evidence to the point, as well as are the quotations taken from the stenographic

report of the proceedings of the Commission, which met at Indiana's state capital, which Commission was appointed by the Secretary of War, and included representative men of the 9th Indiana, for the purpose of settling this controversy,[1] I need quote but two paragraphs (from page 24) of the *Appeal*, showing how the wishes of the members of the 9th Indiana Regiment were disregarded, and how this Indiana Monument Commission objected to the decision of the National Chickamauga Park Commission, as follows: —

> This Commission [of Indianians] objects further to the inscription because whatever of credit is due to the state, in one of its regiments, on account of a proud position, gallantly maintained, [it] is, in it, refused, ignored, and belittled, and only mentioned as shining with a little reflected radiance from the glory of the mighty deeds of Van Derveer's Brigade, *which were never performed.*[2]
>
> . . . . . .
>
> The inscription makes the Ninth Indiana to be the tail of the Van Derveer animal, and it can only wag in glorification of that brigade, i.e., it can only have an inscription which shall publish the glory of that brigade, and as there is no pretense that any other regiment of Van Derveer's Brigade than the 35th Ohio took part in the movement to protect the flank, it is to the glory of the 35th Ohio. . . . Thus it will be seen that the Ninth Indiana is by this inscription made to become a mere tail to the 35th Ohio kite.

There can be nothing plainer than the fact that General Brannan expected court-martial proceedings to be brought against him on account of his conduct, and the record indicates that he was richly deserving of it.

After his release from prison[3] Major Arnold McMahan,

[1] I have for some years been expecting to obtain access to this interesting report, but, though promised it, I have not yet received it. See Note to chapter IX, Note A.

[2] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.]

[3] No. 50, p. 388, l. 18.

commanding the 21st Ohio, wrote in his Report, dated April 6, 1864, "We moved into action with 22 officers and 517 men with rifles."[1] He might further have said that these were magazine guns[2] of an improved pattern "which the regiment had learned the use of with great effectiveness."[3] This was the first recorded occasion, I believe, with the exception of a brief experience at Murfreesboro, when this kind of gun was used by the Federal infantry against the Confederates. A mounted infantry brigade, Wilder's, also had a similar gun of the Spencer make (adapted to cavalry use) in this same battle.[4]

It may be mentioned, from what I learn from authoritative sources outside of the Official Records, that this 21st Ohio Regiment made its presence so well known on Horseshoe Ridge that the assaulting columns of Confederates thought there were many other Federal regiments armed with a similar rifle, for the 21st Ohio made itself felt from one end of Horseshoe Ridge to the other, and, as is recorded, its efficiency was equal to a brigade because of these guns.

Its "Statement of Casualties" is the best indication of the severity of the service rendered by this regiment. We have three official statements to decide between, — that of the brigade commander, Colonel William Sirwell,[5] dated September 27, 1863, placing the total loss at 272 men, and the "revised statement" from the same source made out before the second week in October, when transmitted to the War Department,[6] which shows 28 killed, 84 wounded,

[1] No. 50, p. 390, l. 25.

[2] "Colt's revolving rifles," says Major McMahan (No. 50, p. 389, l. 4). "Part of the Regiment also had Enfield rifles," says General William Crozier, the present Chief of Ordnance.

[3] No. 50, p. 1042, l. 28.

[4] Company A, 21st Michigan, Lytle's Brigade, Sheridan's Division, were also armed with Colt's revolving rifles (No. 50, p. 585, l. 47). Colonel Atkins, of Wilder's Brigade, describes the Spencer as "the best arm for service in the field ever invented, better than any other arm in the world then or now," etc.

[5] No. 50, p. 385, l. 54; p. 395, l. 46. [6] No. 50, p. 172.

and 131 captured; total, 243; while the third "Report of Casualties" was made by the commanding officer of the 21st, when a paroled prisoner, under date of April 6, 1864, and being the latest is possibly the most correct. His statement[1] is as follows: —

Killed and died of wounds	48
Wounded	101
Prisoners	116
Total	265

Compare this, particularly as to the number of prisoners, with Brannan's statement[2] that the 21st Ohio "fought bravely up to 5 P.M. when their ammunition entirely gave out," and they "were surrendered later by Major McMahan (*some forty strong*)."[3] Note the evident sting in the tail of this statement.

The brigade commander, Colonel Sirwell, in his Official Report, pays the following tribute to this regiment:[4] —

> The 21st Ohio faithfully remained at its post the whole of that dreadful afternoon. The men fought as heroes; almost unsupported and without hope they fought gallantly on; their ammunition giving out, they gathered the cartridges of the dead and wounded, and then finally, without a load in their guns, charged twice upon the rebel horde which was howling furiously around them. Their loss is terrible. . . . The officers and men deserve great praise for their conduct upon this occasion. I respectfully mention in terms of praise the names of Lieutenant-Colonel Stoughton and Major McMahan, who gallantly stood by their men until wounded and not able to do anything more.

The regimental commander, Major McMahan, in his Official Report, also pays the following tribute:[5] —

> Great credit is due the gallant officers and brave men of my command for their soldierlike bearing and good discipline, who

[1] No. 50, p. 390. [2] No. 50, p. 405, l. 20. [3] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.
[4] No. 50, p. 385, l. 47. [5] No. 50, p. 389, l. 56.

stood by their colors and contested the fortunes of the day to the bitter end.

I have the honor to report that my regiment did the last firing upon and offered the latest resistance to the advance of the enemy which he received, and which checked his progress and ended the battle of Chickamauga.

I may state that the evidence obtained from the Official Reports and other authoritative sources more than justifies these tributes.

Such was the regiment which rendered most effective service to General Brannan all that afternoon, and before the arrival of Steedman's Division, protected his flank and saved him at that time from capture and annihilation according to authoritative evidence given later on.

In his Official Report,[1] as well as in his Supplementary Report,[2] we have noted the repeated statement of General Brannan (in the first of which he actually includes the 9th, 68th, and 101st Indiana Regiments) that these troops "remained in position and behaved with steadiness while their ammunition lasted." There can be no question of his inference that after their ammunition gave out (though the Indiana regiments' ammunition did not give out), they did not continue to fight bravely. The slur was plainly intended against the 21st Ohio only, as we shall now show.

While still a paroled prisoner, at Camp Chase, Ohio, Major McMahan, on April 12, 1864, addressed a letter to his division commander, General Negley, which contained the following:[3]—

I would be pleased to have my Report accompanied by a letter from you, showing why I received no orders from you before night, or in time to prevent so severe a loss of my command on the 20th of September. Be assured, General, that the unfortunate officers and men of my command, now suffering the miseries

[1] No. 50, p. 403, l. 16. [2] No. 50, p. 405, l. 20. [3] No. 50, p. 390, l. 43.

of imprisonment in the hands of the enemy as well as myself, will be slow to believe that our old commander, who defended Nashville with such signal ability and who acquitted himself with honor in the battle of Stone's River and Dug Gap, came short in the discharge of his high duty and the expectations of the army and country at the battle of Chickamauga.

It would be useless to call attention to the brave men of my command who fell in the line of their duty, though fighting against hope, but I would be pleased to communicate to the surviving officers and soldiers of my regiment who fought with me on that memorable occasion that their general appreciates their services and conduct on the field.

After a grateful acknowledgment and appreciation of the sentiments of respect and confidence expressed in Major McMahan's letter, and incidentally mentioning the severe reflections cast upon himself and his division by Generals Brannan and Wood, General Negley, on April 18, answered:[1] —

During the battle on Sunday, and after my First and Second Brigades were detached from my command, General Brannan applied earnestly for a regiment to support his position. The 21st Ohio Volunteers were sent for the purpose. . . .

The 21st Ohio Volunteers remained under the immediate command of General Brannan, and, as I have been informed, covered his retreat after dark.

On April 22, 1864, Major McMahan addressed a letter to General Brannan,[2] containing the above extract quoted from General Negley's letter, and adds: —

My object in writing to you is to learn why I was not informed of the withdrawal of the troops on Horseshoe Ridge at dark, and why I received no orders from you in regard to the retreat of my own command. Having no ammunition and the troops having been stealthily withdrawn from my flanks, I was forced to meet the enemy under serious disadvantages. The interposition of my regiment between the enemy and our retiring forces made

[1] No. 50, p. 391, l. 34.

[2] No. 50, p. 392, l. 2.

their retreat an easy matter after dark, as they were not disturbed in the even tenor of their way toward Chattanooga.

To the above, General Brannan made reply which I quote in full:[1]—

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., May 8, 1864.

Maj. A. McMahan,
Twenty-first Ohio Volunteers.

MAJOR: — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of April 22, 1864, inquiring wherefore you were not informed of the withdrawal of troops from your flanks, nor ordered to withdraw your command of Twenty-first Ohio Volunteers from the Horseshoe Ridge on Sunday night, September 20, at Chickamauga, and would state in reply that at the time of your command being captured no portion of my troops had been withdrawn from the field, nor had orders been issued to that effect.

The surrender of your command was accomplished so quietly as to escape the notice of all but the regiment on your immediate left, the colonel of which promptly reported the fact to me, whereupon I sent the Thirty-fifth Ohio Volunteers to hold the position, which it did successfully against a subsequent attack of the rebels.

The extract quoted from Major-General Negley's letter of April 18, 1864, to the effect that the Twenty-first Ohio Volunteers covered my retreat after dark is incorrect, as that duty was performed by the Sixty-eighth and One Hundred and First Indiana Volunteer Regiments, being the only troops who had any ammunition whatever.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. M. BRANNAN,
Brigadier-General, Chief of Artillery,
Fourteenth Army Corps.
Late Commanding Third Division,
Fourteenth Army Corps.

P. S. The troops on your right belonged to Major-General Granger's corps and were withdrawn before you were captured

[1] No. 50, p. 302.

without my being notified of the fact. My command was not withdrawn for a considerable time after.

At this point we will merely comment upon how General Brannan has dodged the issue in his reply. McMahan asked him: —

(1) Why he was not informed of the withdrawal of Brannan's troops from Horseshoe Ridge, to which Brannan does not reply that no portion of his command was withdrawn from Horseshoe Ridge, but that no portion of it was withdrawn from the field. We know that he had not withdrawn from the battle-field, but the question that McMahan asks is, why it was that Brannan's men were stealthily withdrawn from his regiment's flank without notification, while the 21st Ohio and other captured regiments were occupying their position on Horseshoe Ridge, before they were surrounded, overwhelmed, and forced to surrender without support from any other troops, though they were under Brannan's command and acting under his orders.

(2) Again, it is evident that the interposition of his regiment at the point of capture, viz., Horseshoe Ridge, where Brannan abandoned them to their fate, checked the enemy's progress and permitted Brannan to stealthily withdraw from his former position on Horseshoe Ridge, and that it was thereafter that without molestation the 68th and 101st Indiana Regiments covered his retreat to Rossville, a well-established fact, but having nothing to do with the 21st Ohio claim of service rendered before capture and before the Indiana Regiments had arrived.

Finally, on July 14, 1864,[1] Major McMahan forwarded his Official Report to the Adjutant-General's Office, Department of the Cumberland, with copies of his correspondence with Generals Negley and Brannan, calling

[1] No. 50, p. 387.

special attention to the charges which cast a reflection of cowardice upon his command for surrendering so quietly. He might have called attention to the fact that without ammunition it was impossible for it to have made much of a noise, but he satisfies himself with commenting upon General Brannan's ignorance indicated by the postscript in this general's letter as to the relative positions of the regiments which fought on his right flank, and which were deliberately sacrificed. The comment referred to is as follows:[1]—

> He [Brannan] will be surprised to know that Colonel Carlton, of the 89th Regiment, Ohio Volunteer Infantry, and Colonel Le Favour, of the 22d Michigan, were the colonels commanding regiments on my left, both of whom were captured a short time before I was captured myself.
>
> General Brannan may have been misinformed in regard to the position of his troops.

This very mild protest, with the correspondence containing serious charges and countercharges, was evidently pigeon-holed in the War Department, and nothing heard thereof afterward.

[1] No. 50, p. 868, l. 8.

CHAPTER X

JUSTICE DONE TO THE SPLENDID RECORD OF THE TWENTY-FIRST OHIO[1]

It impresses me that enough testimony has already been introduced in this case of the 9th Indiana, 21st and 89th Ohio, and 22d Michigan Regiments *versus* General Brannan on the charges specified and of official record. But some of my fair-minded readers may still remain unconvinced, and may still consider Brannan's testimony just as worthy of belief as that of his accusers. They may not accept my intended spirit of fairness in my endeavors in the cause of truth, or may be of opinion that I have reached my conclusions too hastily on an insufficiency of evidence, or have exaggerated its importance. Prolixity of evidence may be a weariness of the flesh to one class of my readers while the weight of evidence may be a desideratum to another class. My efforts are directed in favor of

[1] The writing of this chapter had been completed when I discovered in the Library of Congress the *History of the Twenty-first Ohio Volunteer Infantry*, by Captain S. S. Canfield. (Toledo, Ohio: Vrooman, Anderson & Bateman, Printers. 1893.) On pages 135 to 149 are contained letters from officers of this regiment addressed to Major McMahan and to the author, Captain Canfield, viz., from Isaac Cusac, captain of Company G, June 7, 1890; John S. Mahony, second lieutenant of Company K, April 1, 1892; John H. Bolton, sergeant of Company F; Abel Comstock, Company C, April 16, 1892.

In Notes to chapter x will be found frequent references to these letters. Major Cusac and Judge Abel Comstock are among the survivors with whom I have had extensive correspondence, and in connection therewith it is my desire to herein express my indebtedness to them for their material assistance. It, however, makes the Twenty-first Ohio's case against their detractors all the more strong that the justice due them had been made apparent by the Official Record before their overwhelming reinforcements arrived to my support. See Introduction to Notes to chapter x.

the latter at the expense of the former class, in order that the true history of this battle shall prevail, and that all partisan, fictitious, and mysterious misrepresentations may be relegated to the region where they belong, — utter darkness. For this reason I ask that attention be given to further testimony, and that we suspend our final judgment or conclusions, so that we may decide as between Brannan and his accusers in favor of that party or those parties in whose behalf the Official Reports present the more weighty and authoritative evidence.

Preliminary to this discussion, I call attention to the fact that the only direct charges made by General Brannan in his Reports and in other testimony of his, found in the Official Records, are made against a ranking officer, Major-General Negley, belonging to another division in the same corps, and also against the officers and men of the 21st Ohio Regiment, which belonged to General Negley's Division.

Specification I. General Brannan charges the 21st Ohio Regiment with behaving bravely enough while their ammunition lasted, viz., until 5 P.M., and that thereafter, until dark (7.25 P.M., — though he means until 7 P.M.), they did not do their duty, and draws an unfavorable comparison between them and the 35th Ohio Regiment of his own division.

In his Official Report, and its supplement of October 8, he makes these statements on his own authority. We find no evidence supporting them elsewhere in the Records. In fact, neither the commanding officer of the 35th Ohio nor the officers commanding the brigade and other regiments in the same brigade with the 35th Ohio, make any mention whatever of the 21st Ohio in their Official Reports. On the other hand, we have already quoted the testimony of the division, brigade, and regimental commanders of the 21st Ohio, viz., that of General Negley,

MAJ. ARNOLD McMAHAN

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Colonel Sirwell, and Major McMahan, paying exceptional tribute to the bravery of this gallant regiment after its ammunition had been exhausted, from 5 P.M. until the time it was captured.

Another witness is on record in the Official Reports, viz., Charles H. Vantine, captain commanding Company I, 21st Ohio, being the ranking officer of a portion of the regiment which escaped capture and the fate of the rest of the regiment. His Report,[1] written at Chattanooga a week after the battle, supplements in point of time and other incidents almost every statement of record in Major McMahan's Report which the latter made out in prison. In future pages this will be demonstrated, and at the same time a description given of the different positions and movements of the 21st Ohio on Horseshoe Ridge, from noon until the time it was captured. It will therein be found that at 5 P.M. it was posted on Hill Number 3, where it had been first supported on the right,[2] by the 22d Michigan[3] and 89th Ohio Regiments of Granger's Reserve Corps,[4] and where at about 5 P.M.[5] it was "relieved by some of Brannan's Division,"[6] belonging to regiments of Van Derveer's Brigade on its left,[7] the officers of the 21st Ohio specifically mentioning the "9th Ohio[8] and the 2d Minnesota Volunteers in Reserve.[9] The other two regiments of this brigade, viz., the 35th Ohio and 87th Indiana, are not specifically mentioned in the 21st Ohio Reports; but evidence is not lacking, so far as concerns the 35th Ohio, that it is also included with the two other regiments which relieved the 21st Ohio at this position. This appears from the

[1] The real author of this Report was Acting Adjutant Wilson J. Vance, second lieutenant Company D, who wrote and signed it on Vantine's authority. See Notes to chapter x, Note A.

[2] No. 50, p. 388, l. 44.
[3] See Notes to chapter x, Note B.
[4] No. 50, p. 394, l. 53.
[5] No. 50, p. 395, l. 2, and p. 389, l. 58.
[6] No. 50, p. 395, l. 2.
[7] No. 50, p. 388, l. 48.
[8] See Notes to chapter x, Note C.
[9] No. 50, p. 388, l. 48, and p. 389, l. 54.

Report of Colonel Boynton of the 35th Ohio,[1] who says that his regiment was on the right of Van Derveer's Brigade when it first took position on Horseshoe Ridge, and adds: "In a short time the 35th advanced to a line of logs, hastily thrown together and just sufficient to cover the heads of the men when lying on the ground," — which corresponds to "the slight breastwork of logs and stone,"[2] described by Captain Vantine as thrown up by the 21st Ohio about 4 P.M.

We have noticed the 21st Ohio's statements that the 2d Minnesota was there with them in reserve, and it appears that at the time specified the 2d Minnesota supplied the 35th Ohio with several rounds of ammunition,[3] and the presence of the 35th Ohio is to be inferred therefrom. However, I regard the following statement as conclusive, taken from the bronze tablet to Sirwell's Brigade located near the Snodgrass house, which the Park Commission tells me was composed by General Boynton. After stating that the 21st Ohio was sent from the vicinity of this tablet to General Brannan's assistance on the right of his line, the legend thereon recites that it was here on Brannan's right that the 21st "was relieved by the 35th Ohio and the 2d Minnesota,[4] of Van Derveer's Brigade."

Is it not strange that at this most serious period of the battle, with all the evidence of Van Derveer's contact with the 21st Ohio, neither he nor his regimental commanders mention that regiment anywhere in their reports?

Now, let us follow what Captain Vantine says happened to these regiments of General Brannan's Division:[5] "At about half-past five P.M. the enemy . . . fired a volley and charged up the hill, gaining possession of it entirely."[6] The Confederate account of the capture of this hill and the

[1] No. 50, p. 434, l. 58.
[2] No. 50, p. 436, l. 16.
[3] No. 50, p. 395, l. 1.
[4] See Notes on chapter x, Note D.
[5] No. 50, p. 395, l. 4.
[6] See Notes to chapter x, Note E.

circumstances attending it are not necessary to give at this point, but will be found in Volume II, where the 5th Kentucky Regiment of Kelly's Brigade is indicated as the regiment which at this time took possession of the hill in question, and where later it was supported by Colonel Finley with his two regiments of Trigg's Brigade. Continuing his Report, Captain Vantine says:[1]—

> The commanding officer[2] of Brannan's troops asked that the 21st should charge up and retake the hill. After some delay, one round of ammunition was procured per man from the dead and wounded. With this one round in our guns, we charged up the hill. We delivered our volley, but the enemy was in too large force and we were forced back.

Before we go any further, let us establish the identity of this "commanding officer" of Brannan's troops who gave this order. It appears from the context of the Reports of both officers of the 21st Ohio at this time that it had withdrawn from the summit before Brannan's troops were driven from it. This is the direct statement of Major McMahan, who discloses the identity of this "commanding officer" of Brannan's troops in the following:[3] —

> At this time Colonel Van Derveer (who assumed command),[4] ordered me to occupy a position on the extreme right, from which a part of our line had just been driven by the enemy.

Resuming Captain Vantine's account we read:[4] "Twice again, with no ammunition, we charged, with the vain hope of retaking the hill, but we were repulsed."[5] At this point occurs the only difference between the Reports of the two officers, one of whom was captured and the other escaped, which accounts to some extent for their different points of view; Major McMahan claiming that the posi-

[1] No. 50, p. 395, l. 9.
[2] See Notes to chapter x, Note F. Also see p. 220, *infra*.
[3] No. 50, p. 389, l. 38.
[4] No. 50, p. 395, l. 14.
[5] See Notes to chapter x, Note G.

tion on the hill was finally regained by his command after being repulsed. The Confederate movement indicates how this might well have happened, for Trigg's Brigade thereupon separating into two parts (one part sweeping the heights to the right),[1] flanked the right and left of the Federal position, wheeled about and marched up the north slope of Horseshoe Ridge in the rear of the Federals remaining there and captured them. This was a skillfully executed movement by the three regiments of the abovenamed brigade, viz., the 54th Virginia and the 6th and 7th Florida. They were in action for the first time that day, and, as hereinafter shown, their casualties were practically nil. Both officers of the 21st Ohio relate how they were left alone and unsupported in making these assaults with the bayonet. It appears that they vainly expected Van Derveer's support.

The following is Vantine's graphic account confirming the Confederate description of the movement:[2]—

> While we were waiting,[3] a column was observed filing in a small ravine on our right flank. Supposing they were our own men (they being dressed in blue jeans) we took no notice of them until they formed in line of battle facing towards us. They formed and commenced advancing on us; when asked who they were, said they were "Jeff Davis' men"; supposed they were some of J. C. Davis' division. When they were within a few rods of us they called upon us to "surrender," "lay down," etc. A portion of the men jumped up to retreat toward General Brannan's Division, when they poured in a heavy volley, wounding and killing a great many. A few of the men of the Twenty-first who escaped formed, and were led to Rossville by Colonel Walker, of the Thirty-first Ohio Volunteer Infantry.

Major McMahan also describes how he was overwhelmed by Colonel Trigg's regiments,[4] and that the enemy, besides

[1] No. 51, p. 436, l. 47.
[2] See Notes to chapter x, Note H.
[3] No. 50, p. 395, l. 19.
[4] No. 50, p. 389, l. 44.

being on his right flank and rear, was also upon his left, and states that a part of his men escaped under cover of the night.

We rest the 21st Ohio's case on this point with the following conclusion of Captain Vantine's Report:[1]—

> Of the officers and men of this command I have only to say that they have done their duty. We ask no higher praise than that. Every man fought as if the fate of the nation rested on his individual efforts.

Specification II. This, like the previous one, is a specification of a charge of cowardice and an imputation of neglect of duty embodied in the following statement of General Brannan to Major McMahan:[2]—

> The surrender of your command was accomplished so quietly as to escape the notice of all but the regiment on your immediate left.

Again we find nothing in the Records to support Brannan's charge. As the 9th Indiana is "the regiment" herein referred to, let us quote the Report of its colonel in regard thereto:[3]—

> My regiment was then ordered still further to the right, on a high hill. It was while in this position that my attention was drawn to my right by an unnecessary amount of talking. I went over to see what it meant, and, to my surprise, I found the enemy demanding our troops to surrender.

Then follows the account, given elsewhere, of his capture and escape. Thus it appears that Colonel Suman was not Brannan's informant, for, being a prisoner himself, he could not have "promptly reported" anything. Brannan's orders when he sent Colonel Suman to the high hill evidently did not specify whether he was to protect Federals remaining there. As the 21st Ohio had exhausted its

[1] No. 50, p. 595, l. 40.
[2] No. 50, p. 592, l. 50.
[3] No. 50, p. 769, l. 23.

ammunition and all it could gather from the dead and wounded after Van Derveer had ordered it to retake the hill with one round of ammunition, it is evident that this unnecessary talking is about the only kind of noise that could be expected from the captured regiments, and Brannan therefore shows his ignorance or stultifies himself in making this statement. From my 9th Indiana correspondents it will be noticed in future pages[1] that the source of Brannan's information was from the commanding officer of the 9th Indiana (in the temporary absence of his colonel), viz., Major Carter, and that it was promptly reported through the medium of Brannan's orderly, who had been sent back into the woods of Horseshoe Ridge to guide the 9th Indiana to its position on the high hill, a position formerly occupied by Brannan's men.

Thus we account for Brannan's statement as to the surrender of the 21st Ohio being "promptly reported."[2] Major Carter, being without information (any more than his colonel), may also have been surprised to find Federal troops on his right, and did not know that they had only surrendered to overwhelming forces after their bayonet charges following the depletion of their ammunition. The fact is further established by General Brannan himself, as well as by the statements of Colonels Suman and Boynton, that as a result of this information coming from the 9th Indiana's position on Horseshoe Ridge he "sent the 35th Ohio Volunteers,"[3] and "the 35th was ordered to protect the right flank and was wheeled accordingly." This, says Colonel Boynton, "was near dark," and when the troops on the right of Brannan's line had been moved,[4] at which time the 35th Ohio had but three rounds per man, which had been previously supplied by the 2d Minnesota.

After Colonel Boynton had wheeled his regiment and

[1] See chapter XIV, p. 325.
[2] No. 50, p. 396, l. 1.
[3] No. 50, p. 392, l. 52.
[4] No. 50, p. 436, l. 90.

halted waiting "the approach of the enemy," Colonel Suman, who had in the mean time escaped after being a prisoner in the enemy's hands, met Colonel Boynton at the point where his men were halted,[1] and from the latter's Report and from the conversation which he held with Colonel Suman, we conclude that he did not know that the troops on the right of his line, viz., the 22d Michigan and the 89th and 21st Ohio Regiments had *not* "been removed," nor did he know that the enemy had gained a position where he could have seen them within thirty steps from the point of his conversation with Colonel Suman.[2]

These statements all point to the following conclusions:—

(1) That the captured regiments, with the 9th Indiana on their left on Hill Number 2 of Horseshoe Ridge, were the only Federals in position thereon at this time, and all of Brannan's men were out of hailing distance, where they could not have rendered assistance to their comrades.

(2) And it is further evident that the 35th Ohio must have been so far away from Horseshoe Ridge and in rear of Snodgrass house that its colonel, Boynton, did not hear the 9th Indiana's fire, which followed Colonel Suman's escape out of the enemy's hands, which he describes,[3] nor did he hear the counter-volley of the 5th Kentucky and 63d Virginia.[4]

No one disputes the fact that the "high hill," Hill Number 2, and that part of Horseshoe Ridge to the right thereof was the scene of all the incidents described, to wit: This was where the 9th Indiana was posted and where it met the 5th Kentucky and 63d Virginia, and to the right of the 9th Indiana was where the 22d Michigan and the 89th and 21st Ohio Regiments were located, and where they were surrounded and captured by Colonel Trigg. It was on this same hill that the 54th Virginia and the 6th Florida Regi-

[1] No. 50, p. 769, l. 45.
[2] No. 50, p. 769, l. 47.
[3] No. 50, p. 769, l. 51.
[4] See chapter XIV, p. 327.

ments were engaged in distributing their prisoners, and the 54th Virginia was fired upon when moving off with a part of them.

It is ridiculous, I think, to claim that the 35th Ohio or any other of Brannan's troops could have been on the high hill, or at any other point of Horseshoe Ridge at this time.[1] If they had been, their ammunition being depleted, they also would have been surrounded and captured or annihilated. This conclusion that the 35th Ohio could not have been on Horseshoe Ridge is further confirmed by direct evidence that its actual position was in the bushes near the edge of a little cliff southwest of Snodgrass house, the truth of which will be found in a succeeding chapter.[2]

It is further noteworthy that subordinates of General Brannan do not support his testimony as to the purpose of this movement of the 35th Ohio. Brannan says it was sent "to hold the position."[3] Boynton, who received and executed the order, says, on the contrary, that it was "to protect the right flank,"[4] and Colonel Van Derveer, through whom the order was transmitted, practically agrees with Colonel Boynton in the statement that it was "to prevent a surprise,"[5] and an analysis of General Brannan's statements of the purpose and result of this order discloses a lack of regard for the truth, or extraordinary misapprehension of the facts, when he says the 35th Ohio was sent "to hold a position," though the information imparted to him from the 9th Indiana was that the Confederates were in possession and had already captured the Federals occupying the position. His statement is that the 35th Ohio retook the position and held it "successfully against a subsequent attack of the rebels"[6] who "were immediately afterward repulsed in a most gallant manner."[7]

[1] See Notes to chapter x, Note I.
[2] Chapter xiv, p. 334.
[3] No. 50, p. 393, l. 1.
[4] No. 50, p. 496, l. 21.
[5] No. 50, p. 481, l. 1.
[6] No. 50, p. 393, l. 2.
[7] No. 50, p. 495, l. 25.

Colonel Van Derveer, who transmitted the order, says that in the encounter referred to, the 35th "put the force to flight,"[1] and yet the officer who executed the movement makes a statement which differs from them both, for Colonel Boynton says that "the three remaining companies [of the 54th Virginia] poured a volley into our [his] front and left,"[2] and that these three companies maintained their position on the hill. He did not return their fire at this juncture, — viz., "7 P.M.," — but fell back to Rossville. From this it would appear that the 35th Ohio did not occupy the hill, — viz., Hill Number 2, — where, according to Boynton's account, at least three companies of the 54th Virginia maintained their ground.

If we have followed the testimony of Colonel Suman and his adjutant, Hodsden, in their letters to me, and also the testimony in the Reports of Major McMahan and Captain Vantine of the 21st Ohio, we shall have observed that Colonel Van Derveer appears to have been the officer who transmitted the order direct to the 9th Indiana which sent it on its perilous mission, and it was this same Colonel Van Derveer who had prior to this, while still on Horseshoe Ridge, given the order to the 21st Ohio, with one round of ammunition, to retake the hill from which his men had been driven. Consequently we conclude that he was the officer on the firing-line, while Brannan was not, but when we turn to Van Derveer's Official Report, where some mention of the 9th Indiana and the 21st Ohio's participation ought to be of record, we do not find even mention made of these organizations. Perhaps the fact that this testimony of the 9th Indiana and 21st Ohio is not creditable to him, is an explanation of Van Derveer's reticence.

It is from the above evidence that we must come to the

[1] No. 50, p. 451, l. 8.

[2] "The three remaining companies" appear to have really been the 6th Florida Regiment. See chapter XIV, p. 341.

conclusion that Brannan's charges and imputation of cowardice against the 21st Ohio are entirely false.

The Twenty-first Ohio's Charge that General Brannan Deliberately abandoned them to their Fate, Interposing them between his Division and the Enemy, and Immediately Withdrawing without Notification, thereby Effecting his own Escape

We now come to an investigation of the charges made against General Brannan and his lieutenant, Van Derveer, though in connection with the latter we are unable to state whether he was simply the mouthpiece in the execution of the former's orders.

In his Official Report, describing a period about 5.30 P.M., Major McMahan says,[1] "At this time, Van Derveer (who assumed command[2]) ordered me to occupy a position on the extreme right, from which a part of our line had just been driven by the enemy"; and again,[3] "Colonel Van Derveer having withdrawn the troops under his command, my command was unsupported and both flanks were exposed."

Referring to the same order, which was given by Van Derveer, Captain Vantine in his Official Report, written independently of McMahan's a week after the battle, confirms the latter's statement, and still more specifically mentions "Brannan's men," which includes regiments of Van Derveer's Brigade, viz., the 9th Ohio, 2d Minnesota, and the 35th Ohio as the ones identified with being driven from Hill Number 3 by the Confederates who "charged up the hill, gaining possession of it entirely."[4] Thereupon the 21st Ohio, which had procured after some delay one round of ammunition per man from the dead and wounded, was ordered by Van Derveer to retake the hill. With this one round of ammunition it charged up the hill, delivered the

[1] No. 50, p. 389, l. 38.
[2] See p. 213, *supra*, and Notes to chapter x, Note F.
[3] No. 50, p. 389, l. 40.
[4] No. 50, p. 395, l. 7.

volley, and was forced back. Twice again without any ammunition this regiment charged and was repulsed. "In the mean time Brannan's men were re-forming" and the 21st "lay down to wait until they reorganized." They waited, however, in vain,[1] for, as Major McMahan says, Brannan's troops were "stealthily withdrawn" without any information being given to him.[2] Thus Major McMahan makes his charges, and his own Official Report and that of the other officer of the 21st present their testimony as personal witnesses.

What answer does General Brannan make to these charges? Only the false statements which have already been disproved. His command had indeed been withdrawn from Horseshoe Ridge, and the Federal official testimony shows that it not only was withdrawn stealthily, but also without organization, and from previous testimony we conclude that Van Derveer's Brigade was finally re-formed and reorganized in Snodgrass field to the rear of Snodgrass house, where Hazen's Brigade had opportunely arrived in time to save Harker's Brigade, as well as Brannan's command through the 9th Indiana's support; but Van Derveer's regiments did not re-form in time nor attempt going to the assistance of their comrades, particularly those of the 21st Ohio, whom Van Derveer had interposed between himself and the enemy by his order to charge with one round of ammunition, while his disorganized troops were being withdrawn.

Confederate testimony is also available, supporting McMahan's statement as to the troops having been stealthily withdrawn.

We have seen how those regiments who had relieved the 21st Ohio were driven from their position, but the Federals who then occupied Hill Number 2 were opposite to regiments of Kelly's Confederate Brigade, who, in conse-

[1] No. 50, p. 395, l. 19. [2] No. 50, p. 392, l. 24.

quence of the temporary absence of their brigade commander, did not advance according to the preconceived plan, but simply halted on the southern slope. Colonel Palmer, commanding the 58th North Carolina Regiment, in his Official Report[1] referring to this period of time, about 5.30 P.M., says: —

> Fancying soon after that the enemy had discontinued firing, I ordered my men to cease firing in order that I might ascertain definitely. Not a shot was being fired by the foe. I sent a messenger to Colonel Kelly, commanding the brigade, to acquaint him with the facts and to suggest that, if the other regiments reformed and advanced to the line occupied by me, we could probably carry the enemy's position without further opposition. The messenger could not find him. I then went myself, etc., etc.

Major French, also, testifies that it was about sundown when the enemy ceased firing.[2]

Major McMahan claims that it was the interposition of his regiment between the enemy and Brannan's forces which made their retreat an easy matter after dark,[3] and also[4] that his "regiment did the last firing upon and offered the latest resistance to the advance of the enemy, which he received, and which checked his progress and ended the Battle of Chickamauga." This statement, taken in connection with the similar service rendered at the same time by the other captured regiments and by the 9th Indiana, which was sacrificed in a similar way but fortunately escaped, is undoubtedly true. Here, then, we submit the case of the 21st Ohio against General Brannan.

We believe that the charges made by Major McMahan are fully substantiated. We have shown the flimsy character of General Brannan's denial, unsupported by any evidence. Major McMahan made the statement that both his flanks were exposed by the withdrawal of the Federal

[1] No. 51, p. 445, l. 55.
[2] No. 51, p. 448, l. 4.
[3] No. 50, p. 392, l. 27.
[4] No. 50, p. 390, l. 4.

troops. The troops on his right (and Le Favour's right) belonged to Steedman's Division, and had been driven from the summit of the Main Ridge, about 5.30 P.M., by Bushrod Johnson's Division, which, about 6 P.M., was in the deep hollow northwest of Horseshoe Ridge where Colonel Trigg joined them after crossing over Hill Number 3. Thus, the Federal troops remaining on the Horseshoe were cut off from Steedman's Division, and this was just before the 21st Ohio was ordered by Van Derveer to make its charge. Hence, Brannan's plea that his withdrawal without notification to McMahan was justified by the fact that Steedman's Division had withdrawn in a similar manner without notification to him (Brannan), is not well taken.

Further, it seems evident that Brannan did not know of the presence or position of the 22d Michigan and the 89th Ohio, which fought with his command and had not withdrawn, but were abandoned only to be captured in the same way as was the 21st Ohio. These two regiments belonged to Whitaker's Brigade of Steedman's Division. In the final capture the 21st Ohio was on the right of these regiments, a fact which is supported by testimony which will be given presently, the regiment which was nearest to the 21st being the 89th Ohio, on whose left and front was the 22d Michigan, and the latter the nearest regiment to the 9th Indiana. Brannan's charge of "surrendering quietly" was applicable only to the 22d Michigan and not to the 21st Ohio; for all available evidence goes to show that the 21st did not surrender at all, and that when part were captured and part escaped, it was not to the accompaniment of "loud talking" but to the tune of an enemy's guns. This appears from Vantine's Report:[1]—

> When they [the enemy] were within a few rods of us, they called upon us to "surrender," "lay down," etc. A portion of the men jumped up to retreat toward General Brannan's Divi-

[1] No. 50, p. 395, l. 24.

sion, when they poured in a heavy volley, wounding and killing a great many. A few of the men of the Twenty-first who escaped formed and were led to Rossville by Colonel Walker of the Thirty-first Ohio Volunteer Infantry.

Further confirmation of this is given in the accounts of various officers belonging to the regiments concerned.

The relative positions of the three regiments and relative time of capture of their commanding officers, as given by McMahan and corroborated by others,[1] is contained in the latter's statement as follows:[2]—

> He [Brannan] will be surprised to know that Colonel Carlton, of the 89th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, and Colonel Le Favour, of the 22d Michigan, were the colonels commanding regiments on my left, both of whom were captured a short time before I was captured myself. General Brannan [concludes Major McMahan] may have been misinformed in regard to the position of his troops.

He certainly was, for it seems incredible how he otherwise could have made so many misstatements. Undoubtedly Colonel Van Derveer could have given him some of the desired information if Brannan was not in position to report on the fact from his own personal presence and knowledge.

My ink is scarcely dry since writing the last sentence, when I am favored by the receipt of supplementary authoritative testimony indicating the accuracy of my conclusion that General Brannan was not on Horseshoe Ridge in the immediate presence of his troops after 4 P.M., but was "off the hill" in Snodgrass field near Snodgrass house.

Adjutant Alfred G. Hunter, of the 82d Indiana Regiment, Connell's Brigade, Brannan's Division, sends me the history of his regiment,[3] which includes its history in the Battle of Chickamauga, written by his brother, the

[1] See Notes to chapter XI, Note H. [2] No. 50, p. 388, l. 8.

[3] *History of the Eighty-second Indiana.* Indianapolis, Indiana: W. B. Burford, printer. 1893.

colonel of the 82d, Morton C. Hunter, whose Official Report, though written and duly forwarded to General Brannan, inclosed in the brigade commander's Report at the same time with Colonel Lister's, of the 31st Ohio, is "not found"[1] in the Records, but whether purposely "suppressed" by the division commander, as charged by Colonel Hunter, is not sufficiently well authenticated; for unfortunately, not only Colonel Hunter's but all regimental reports of this brigade are lacking.

The corroborative testimony referred to is found in Colonel Hunter's statement as follows:[2]—

> I never saw my division commander from the morning of the 20th until after night, when we moved off the hill. I do not know where he kept himself; *but am sure he was not around where I was during the 20th,* for I believe, under the circumstances, he should have been in the rear of my brigade, for it was the place of danger.

It is a source of gratification, and a compensation to me for many years of toil, to discover that my study of the Official Records has enabled me to do justice to the memory and services of brave men, who were shamefully mistreated and whose record was grossly misrepresented. I am at the same time glad to know that I have made no mistake in exposing those whom my researches indicate as responsible for this wrongdoing.

This is the reward and encouragement which I have received recently from a member of the 21st Ohio, Judge Abel Comstock of Bowling Green, Ohio, who, under date of February 10, 1911, writes me as follows: —

> Your favor of the 7th inst. came to me, a very great and agreeable surprise, this morning. In reply, permit me to say that I am very glad indeed if some one will take up the cudgel for the rights of the old 21st Ohio Volunteer Infantry, who has the data at command, or the will to assemble the proofs of the glorious work

[1] No. 50, p. 412, l. 9. [2] *History of the Eighty-second Indiana*, p. 77.

done by it on that never-to-be-forgotten Sabbath Day, September 20, 1863. General Brannan intended the sacrifice of the regiment, evidently to serve his own purposes. Generals Van Derveer and H. V. Boynton deliberately misappropriated what we did that day, to Van Derveer's Brigade.

. . . The records of Colonel McMahan and the men of the 21st are sufficient to refute the charges of "cowardice" made by General Brannan.

. . . We have always known that Brannan sneaked away from us and left us to our fate. Had we chosen to have done so, the most of us could have gotten clear as well as his troops.

. . . I will gladly aid you in any way I possibly can, and shall esteem it a great privilege if I can assist ever so little in finally placing, in a fair and unbiased light before the American people, that part of the history of the Battle of Chickamauga, Georgia, that concerns the old 21st Ohio Regiment.

. . . You must remember that when you stir up one of the regiment in regard to that battle, you set something a-going. I was largely instrumental in having the history by Captain Canfield[1] written, and did so for the reason that Brannan, Van Derveer, and Boynton had persistently and unjustly claimed the credit for themselves for the work that we did.

[1] It appears in the preface of this history (p. 4) that "Colonel McMahan first conceived the idea of writing its [the 21st's] history in the Battle of Chickamauga. . . . Before much had been accomplished by way of preparation, death claimed him."

CHAPTER XI

UNRECORDED HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-SECOND MICHIGAN AND EIGHTY-NINTH OHIO REGIMENTS

The Twenty-second Michigan and Eighty-ninth Ohio Regiments were also Abandoned to their Fate by General Brannan, and Interposed between the Enemy and his Retiring Division, without Notification of his Withdrawal from Horseshoe Ridge at Sunset

THESE two regiments, already referred to, composed a semi-brigade under the command of Colonel Heber Le Favour, temporarily "attached for the day" to Whitaker's Brigade, Steedman's Division, of Granger's Corps.[1] There are no Official Reports in the Records from Colonel Le Favour, or the regimental commanders of the 22d Michigan and 89th Ohio,[2] describing the action of September 20, except that of a captain of the latter regiment, containing a brief paragraph of information, confirmed elsewhere. In the Official Records, however, are found sufficient data, principally from 21st Ohio sources, indicating the positions, movements, and circumstances of their final capture.

Like the 21st Ohio, these regiments belonged to another division, but fought with and under Brannan's command on Horseshoe Ridge, after being sent to his relief when the latter was about to be annihilated; and they protected his flank all that afternoon until abandoned by him, when, without ammunition, they were surrounded and captured.

Their case against General Brannan is simply a repetition of the testimony presented by the 21st Ohio, except

[1] No. 50, p. 862, l. 34; p. 859, l. 31; No. 52, p. 536. But assigned to Steedman and with him since September 11.

[2] Concerning Colonel Carlton, of the 89th Ohio Regiment, see Notes to chapter xi, Note A.

that Brannan's false imputations of cowardice "in surrendering so quietly" had direct application to the 22d Michigan,[1] which was the regiment whose conduct was referred to, but, through ignorance of the position of his troops, was mistaken for the 21st Ohio. The only other point of difference is the lack of sufficient evidence against General Brannan and his lieutenant, Van Derveer, to definitely fix upon them, as we have already done in the case of the 21st Ohio and the 9th Indiana, the deliberate purpose and issuance of the order which, at the time Brannan was in command after Granger's departure, interposed Le Favour against the enemy and which accomplished Brannan's escape.

But the charge made by the 22d Michigan and the 89th Ohio, that they "*were deliberately left there*"[2] and abandoned to their fate, has been proven by evidence already presented in the 21st Ohio's case. In view of this failure of the Official Records to furnish any adequate account of the 22d Michigan and 89th Ohio's movements on September 20, I have done what I could to supply the deficiency, — to preserve the memory of the heroic services rendered by these regiments, — in the compilation of the information which I have collected, taken principally from my extensive correspondence with members of these regiments who participated in the battle. This will be found in my notes to this chapter.

Evidence has already been submitted which shows that their corps commander, General Granger, had previously abandoned them,[3] as well as the rest of the army, when he left Snodgrass house, and Brannan in command, with orders to the latter "to fix bayonets and go for them," and after

[1] The 22d Michigan surrendered when they had no ammunition and were surrounded; the 21st Ohio did not surrender, but were overwhelmed and most of them captured under fire. See chapter x, p. 223.

[2] See Notes to chapter xi, Note B. [3] See Addenda.

the delivery of a similar order to "Carlton and Le Favour," which, according to Steedman's claims and Granger's admission, was the last order received and "*the only order Granger gave to the division after it went in,*[1] and which caused Carlton and Le Favour to be captured."[2]

Testimony of officers and men of the 22d Michigan and the 89th Ohio confirms these points, and still further shows that before sunset Le Favour and Carlton were cut off from rejoining Steedman's Division.[3] The whole Confederate Division of Bushrod Johnson[4] was then in their rear, interposed between Steedman and themselves. In fact, after the 22d Michigan and the 89th Ohio first went in, they became, after 3 P.M., entirely separated from the brigade and division to which they were assigned, and, as appears from the testimony of members of these regiments, they never saw their own brigade and division thereafter.[5] The conformation of the heavily timbered hills permits us to understand this more readily. On the other hand, the position which they did occupy after 3 P.M. (as described in Note D to this chapter) was on Hill Number 3 of Horseshoe Ridge, on the extreme right flank of Brannan's command.

General Brannan [6] and Colonel Van Derveer,[7] in explaining their own shortcomings as to their withdrawing without notification to the troops on their right, — viz., the 21st Ohio and Le Favour's regiments, — endeavor to transfer part of the onus from their own shoulders by their statements against General Steedman's Division, "which early in the evening had been withdrawn without our knowledge, thus leaving our flank exposed." Brannan and Van Derveer thus criticize Steedman, but offer no excuse

[1] Italics are mine. — Author.
[2] See Notes to chapter xi, Note C.
[3] See Notes to chapter xi, Note D.
[4] See chapter vi, pp. 134–139.
[5] See Notes to chapter xi, Note E.
[6] No. 50, p. 398, l. 12.
[7] No. 50, p. 430, l. 12.

whatever for their own neglect of McMahan, Le Favour, and Carlton. In this connection appears an important bit of testimony in a letter to me under date of August 6, 1908, from Captain E. G. Spalding of the 22d Michigan Regiment, as follows: —

> I wish also to state that several years after the war, General Steedman informed me that when he withdrew his division he sent an aide to withdraw the 89th Ohio and the 22d Michigan, but that the aide was cut off by the enemy and never reached us.

There was nothing whatever preventing Brannan and Van Derveer from notifying McMahan, Le Favour, and Carlton of Brannan's intent to withdraw, but they deliberately refrained from doing so to suit their purpose, according to the charge made by officers and men of the 21st[1] and 89th Ohio and the 22d Michigan Regiments.

We believe we have presented testimony which fully exonerates Generals Steedman and Whitaker from all complicity in connection with this sacrifice of Le Favour's and Carlton's regiments as well as McMahan's. This defense was considered necessary in view of Turchin's scathing statements[2] against "commanders to whom had been assigned the temporary command of these three regiments," and who "did not take proper means to inform them in time to withdraw." The "damnable facts" of this "inexcusable neglect," he says, "should not be passed over in silence," and he stigmatizes as "an unworthy wretch rather than a dignified member of a great army, an officer to whom temporarily is intrusted troops of another command, and who wantonly sacrifices them while saving his own." This episode he characterizes as "the most shameful that happened during the Battle of Chickamauga, and only merits record that future genera-

[1] For this charge of deliberate intent, see chapter X as to the 21st Ohio. The same charge was made by the 9th Indiana. See chapter VIII.

[2] *Chickamauga*, p. 155.

LE FAVOUR'S HILL OF HORSESHOE RIDGE

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tions may read the disgraceful occurrence and hold in abhorrence such acts of criminal neglect."

Because the 22d Michigan and the 89th Ohio had, anterior to this battle, composed a part of his brigade, General Turchin singles out the division commander, General Steedman, to whom they were assigned, and vents indignation against Steedman alone, and brands him as the "guilty wretch." After admitting his appreciation of the fact that such serious charges should not be made unsupported by substantial evidence, he presents[1] as evidence extracts from letters written to him by members of the 89th Ohio Regiment, from which we have quoted those of Colonel Carlton and Lieutenant Scott. He ignores the fact that Colonel Carlton's testimony acquits General Steedman from all blame and places upon Granger the cause of Carlton's and Le Favour's capture. Though with the Official Reports in his possession, General Turchin also ignores the evidence available therefrom proving that, after 5.30 P.M., Le Favour and Carlton, by the interposition of Johnson's Division, were cut off from Steedman, and a half hour later, or at about sunset, were captured. Though these regiments were assigned to Whitaker's Brigade of Steedman's command on this day, it does not appear that after 5.30 P.M. anything could have been done by Steedman, more than was done, to withdraw them at the same time with Whitaker and Mitchell. They were fighting directly under Brannan at this time and thereafter, and it was Brannan only who could order their withdrawal, or support them. Hence there seems to be no doubt on whom the responsibility for their abandonment rests.

After three P.M., as our authorities show, Le Favour was not connected with Whitaker, but dressed his semi-brigade with the 21st Ohio on Van Derveer, the right brigade of Brannan's Division; and the nature of the ground

[1] *Chickamauga*, p. 206.

prevented Whitaker and Mitchell on Le Favour's right from keeping well dressed on the 22d Michigan and 89th Ohio.

About 5.30 Whitaker was driven back, and at 6 P.M. Le Favour was cut off from receiving any orders whatsoever from his brigade and division commanders. Furthermore, as Le Favour had all along been supporting Brannan's right, it would not appear proper for Whitaker or Steedman to have ordered Le Favour's withdrawal so long as Brannan also maintained his line. It would appear from all authoritative evidence on the subject that about 5.30 P.M., or soon after, Le Favour still remained on Horseshoe Ridge, with ammunition long since exhausted and both flanks exposed, his 22d Michigan being the only regiment on the crest, when the 21st Ohio from the hollow made its heroic sacrificial charge up the hill in a desperate attempt to retake the position from which the 35th Ohio and 2d Minnesota had just been driven.[1]

It appears to have been at this juncture, when Whitaker too was driven back, that Le Favour decided, as 22d Michigan comrades all testify, to march his command down the northern slope, where he found himself cut off from rejoining Whitaker; but in the mean time a mounted aide[2] rode up with orders to retake the position on the hill, which the 22d Michigan did, resuming the position it had left without contact with the enemy during the interval of its departure and return.[3] If Steedman's orders had reached Le Favour, they would have been for his withdrawal. Granger's orders to Le Favour and Carlton were delivered, the latter says, "about 4.30 P.M.," and were "to hold their position."[4] Though as yet we are unable to

[1] For diagrams showing relative positions of regiments referred to, at this juncture, see Notes to chapter XI, Note F, and Note I for positions when captured.

[2] For efforts to identify him, see Notes to chapter XI, Note G.

[3] See Notes to chapter XI, Note H.

[4] See Notes to chapter XI, Note C. This was "the only order Granger gave *to the division* after it went in."

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identify the mounted aide, the natural conclusion is that he belonged to Brannan's command; possibly he was the one who had given a similar order to the 21st Ohio at the same point.

Our exposé of General Brannan's shortcomings would not be complete without some mention of his baseless reflections upon the conduct of General Negley, though the incidents which called them forth occurred at an earlier period, and therefore belong to another volume. These reflections are found in General Brannan's Official Report,[1] summed up in his statement: —

> General Negley retired with extraordinary deliberation, to Rossville, at an early period of the day, taking with him a portion of my division, and . . . leaving me open to attack from the right as well as from the left and front.

The records of the "Negley Court of Inquiry" are given in full in our Serial No. 50, pages 1004 to 1051, and after a thorough examination of General Negley's conduct (as indicated in the Official Reports), and an examination of witnesses who were in position to testify, including Generals Rosecrans, Brannan, Wood, etc., etc., the Court delivered its findings and opinion in the case, from which we quote the following:[2] —

> General Negley, moving to a position *on Missionary Ridge*,[3] to which he had been ordered by General Thomas, gave up to General Brannan, on his urgent appeal for support, the largest regiment of his last brigade, retaining for himself only two small, weak regiments, and four companies of another regiment. The point to which he was directed was in rear of the centre of the line. Here he found some artillery; other batteries and parts of batteries joined him, and it appears in evidence that he had at last fifty guns under his care, with only the small infantry support above referred to, namely, two small regiments and four

[1] No. 50, p. 402, ll. 55 and 56; p. 463, l. 1; and p. 464, l. 18.
[2] No. 50, p. 1045, l. 20. [3] Italics are mine. — Author.

companies of another regiment, in all about 600 or 700 men. . . . [Being] subjected to such hazard of losing this large park of artillery, made it expedient, in his [General Negley's] judgment to withdraw. . . . It appears in evidence that this movement was executed in good order and all the artillery saved. . . . General Negley exhibited throughout the day . . . great activity and zeal in the discharge of his duties, and the Court do not find in the evidence before them any ground of censure.

The impression which seems to have been entertained by General Brannan, that General Negley had ordered one of his brigades to the rear, is not sustained by the testimony.

A careful study of the evidence before the Court, and a comparison with other evidence, found in the Official Reports, cannot fail to convince any one that Brannan's reflections upon his superior officer, General Negley, were absolutely uncalled for as well as false, according to the opinion of the Court. He and General Wood were General Negley's only accusers. The statements of both of these officers were actuated by the desire of covering their own shortcomings. In the case of General Wood, it is evident that he had good reasons for expecting trouble, if not court-martial, for himself in connection with the movement of his division in the early morning, and particularly "the very great delay[1] for which he was responsible in going to relieve General Negley at that time."

In their findings, the Court severely rebuked General Wood as follows:[2] —

When placed upon the stand before the Court, he failed entirely to substantiate any charge as ground of accusation against him [General Negley]. The Court deem it their duty to express their marked condemnation of such conduct, leading to vexatious and unprofitable investigations prejudicial to the service.

This rebuke was called forth by the evidence submitted before the Court as to General Wood's conduct in apply-

[1] No. 50, p. 1038, l. 44. [2] No. 50, p. 1044, l. 4.



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ing[1] coarse and offensive epithets on various occasions at Army Headquarters against General Negley.[2]

General Brannan's testimony also failed to substantiate any charge, and there was not enough evidence brought against General Negley on which to try a dog; yet these slanders of Brannan and Wood had their effect upon Rosecrans, who, in turn, repeated them to the army gossip, "General" Dana, who, of course, transmitted them to Secretary of War Stanton on October 4:[3] "These facts," as he calls these slanders, "were stated to me by Rosecrans, who, when I said Negley ought to be shot, answered, 'That is my opinion.' He added that he should have him punished, yet now he has determined to do nothing more than to apply to have him relieved and ordered elsewhere." However this may be, a communication of General Rosecrans, of October 14, 1863, to the Adjutant-General of the Army, respecting Major-General Negley, and which was read before the Court, contained the following:[4]—

> The general has always been an active, energetic, and efficient commander, and displayed very good judgment in the affair at Widow Davis' house in front of Stevens' Gap, where he was attacked by a superior force of the enemy and successfully extricated his train and command from a perilous position.

Again in Rosecrans' testimony before the Court on February 5, 1864, he said:[5]—

> On 20th A.M. I found him as vigilant as any other division commander, and thought his behavior very good.

There were nine other witnesses called to testify as to General Negley's deportment during the time they were with him on September 20, and a fair sample of the testimony on this point, of every one of them is that of Captain

[1] No. 50, p. 1044, l. 8.
[2] See also No. 50, p. 1018, l. 37.
[3] No. 50, p. 206, l. 51.
[4] No. 50, p. 1006, l. 1.
[5] No. 50, p. 1014, l. 24.

Joseph C. Hill, 5th Kentucky Cavalry, acting aide to General Rosecrans, who says:[1]—

> He [General Negley] was perfectly cool and comprehended the extent of the disaster, and did all in his power to meet it and counteract it. . . . Treated the matter of personal danger in the most indifferent manner, and I saw nothing in all my intercourse with him during the day which would lead any one to doubt his coolness or courage.

Finally, we have in the Record the statement of an officer in General Negley's command, — one who knew no fear himself, — Major McMahan of the 21st Ohio Regiment, whose statement has already been quoted, who says of General Negley,[2] that "he defended Knoxville with signal ability, and acquitted himself with honor in the battle of Stone's River and Dug Gap." Thus our record of General Negley, so far as it appears in our study of him on September 20, is that of a capable officer who demonstrated his courage and coolness in action, and in another volume we will show further that the fifty pieces[3] of artillery above mentioned would surely have been captured had he remained with them on the field any longer than he did, the enemy "almost seizing the guns in action."[4] Also, that if this artillery had been captured, the guns would have been turned against Steedman's Division, and the end of the battle would have been recorded at 3 P.M. Thus, General Negley saved the Federal army by his action at this crisis. He withdrew from the position, on the Main Ridge to the right of Brannan, for this reason. There was no quarter from which he could seek succor.[5] "None could be expected from General Brannan, as he had just recently applied for and received assistance from me" (General Negley).

[1] No. 50, p. 1023, l. 31.
[2] No. 50, p. 1049, l. 90.
[3] No. 50, p. 901, l. 1.
[4] No. 50, p. 1048, l. 5.
[5] No. 50, p. 1048, l. 8.

Thereafter, considering that his military reputation had "been fully vindicated,"[1] General Negley made repeated application to the War Department for orders, but his usefulness as a soldier was ended and he received no command.

General Brannan's conduct is the more shameful in comparison with the generosity of General Negley, who sacrificed himself to save Brannan. I refer to his loan of the 21st Ohio to General Brannan on the latter's urgent request.[2] This regiment was said to have been the largest, except one, in the Army of the Cumberland, and, as already noted, seven of its ten companies were armed with five-chamber Colt's revolving rifles, the intention being to make mounted infantry of it. Testimony has also been quoted[3] showing the regiment's proficiency in the use of these guns. What execution they did and the increased effectiveness of their guns is further shown in the account by Lieutenant Vance,[4] as follows: —

> The result was that first the charging enemy, reaching the proper distance and receiving a volley from the regiment, returned the same and then started on the keen jump, satisfied they could reach the blue-coats before they could reload; before, however, they had advanced ten paces they would get another volley, and while they were pondering on this circumstance, still a third; then they would scarcely get their backs turned before the fourth would catch them; and when, on a dead run for home base, the fifth came singing among them, they began to think that certainly old Satan was in it.

General Brannan's Report is therefore conspicuously neglectful of adequately mentioning the 21st Ohio's great service, not only during the first crisis, when it was lent

[1] No. 50, p. 365, l. 20.
[2] No. 50, p. 1049, l. 27.
[3] No. 50, p. 1042, l. 26.
[4] Wilson J. Vance, *God's War*, p. 278. F. Tennyson Neely, Publisher. London, New York.

by General Negley, but also during that whole afternoon and evening.

Nor does Brannan's Report show adequately his indebtedness to General Steedman. The latter tells us of the sacrifice he made in Brannan's behalf, when after his own troops fell back, having exhausted their ammunition, he says:[1] —

> The extra ammunition which I had with my command, *95,000 rounds*,[2] having been taken to supply General Brannan's troops, who were out.

But all the acknowledgment given by General Brannan[3] of this great service was: —

> I am indebted to General Steedman for a *small supply of ammunition*[3] when I was depending solely on the bayonet for repulsing the next assault.

Another extraordinary point neglected is the failure of Brannan's Report to even mention Wood's Division, particularly Harker's Brigade, with whom Brannan coöperated in the defense of Horseshoe Ridge. The plea which he makes on October 8,[4] that it was "owing to the short period allowed" in which to make his Official Report, is not sufficient explanation for these errors of commission and omission. The Records show that most of the Official Reports, including some of the longest and most accurate, had been sent in during these nine days, during the same nine days which were allowed Brannan. His Supplementary Report speaks fair of Colonel Harker and his brigade, but on this day, as indicated, he belittled the services of the 21st Ohio, which "surrendered, some forty strong," as he alleges. The Record shows, however,[5] the number surrendered to have been 116; the killed and wounded,

[1] No. 50, p. 360, l. 43.
[2] No. 50, p. 404, l. 22.
[3] Italics are mine. — Author.
[4] No. 50, p. 405, l. 12.
[5] No. 50, p. 390, l. 22.

149; and 274 to have escaped, out of a total of 539 in action.

The only suggestions which I have to offer for all, or most, of these discrepancies is that General Brannan expected to throw the blame on others for his discomfiture and trimmed his sails accordingly.

CHAPTER XII

HARKER'S BRIGADE ON HORSESHOE RIDGE

THE purpose of this chapter is to expose the most barefaced misrepresentation and one of the most palpable falsifications in the history of this great battle which confronts the visitor to the battle-field and the student of its history.

The scene thereof, which we will now describe, is the east extremity of Horseshoe Ridge, whose topography has already been described most carefully in previous chapters, viz., the crescent-shaped horseshoe ridge athwart the valley of the Chickamauga west of the Lafayette road, and with its three connecting hills jutting out eastward from the Main, or Missionary Ridge. The tangent of this curved ridge is at right angles to the Lafayette road and the aforesaid Main Ridge. The concavity of this curve opens directly towards the south.

Plate XIV, Map of Chickamauga Park, prepared under the direction of the Honorable Daniel S. Lamont, Secretary of War, by the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park Commission, surveyed and drawn by Edward E. Betts, C.E., Park Engineer, 1896–1901, a part of which is reproduced opposite page 33, chapter I, is the authoritative map to which I direct the careful attention of the reader.

So far as Horseshoe Ridge is concerned, we have thus far confined our attention to only the western end of it, and principally to the happenings on Hill Number 3 during the period when occupied by a portion of the Federal general Brannan's command. We will now revert to the

other end of the ridge, more especially to Hill Number 1, and disclose the true history of it, showing what Federal organization of troops occupied it and the relative positions of the regiments of that organization during the period of its occupancy.

The witnesses whose testimony we will consult, as we find it in their Official Reports, comprise all those of official record who give any evidence whatsoever on the point in question; mentioned in order of rank, I refer to the Federal generals Thomas, Granger, Wood, Hazen, Brannan, and the officers commanding Harker's Brigade and the regiments composing it. I shall also include one other witness, viz., the topographical engineer of General Wood's Division, who furnished the map which accompanied the latter's Official Report. We have thus summoned ten witnesses, whose unanimous testimony contains the evidence that the organization which occupied this east extremity of Horseshoe Ridge was none other than Harker's Brigade. The Official Records have been searched these many years in vain for testimony showing that any other Federal organization than Harker's and a small fragment[1] of a regiment of another division of the same corps ever fought at this position on the afternoon of September 20, 1863. And yet, General Henry V. Boynton, in his capacity as historian and chairman of the National Park Commission, while professing that the standard authority for the truth, and the court of last resort in connection with all controversies, is the evidence contained in the *War of the Rebellion Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, has disregarded this unanimous testimony of official record and made himself responsible for this glaring error, the result of which has been to put in the background that magnificent brigade of Harker's which for four long hours

[1] Forty men under Colonel Aldrich, of the 44th Indiana, Van Cleve's Division, Crittenden's Corps (No. 50, p. 695).

made the heroic defense of what they call the "keypoint" of Horseshoe Ridge.[1]

General Boynton's *ipse dixit*, on the other hand, locates Harker, not at the point where the most efficient service was rendered of any other brigade on Horseshoe Ridge, but relegates him to the rear that whole afternoon on what he calls "the bare ridge north of the Snodgrass house,"[2] shown on the Government Map, Plate VIII,[3] part of which is reproduced on the opposite page, the position being in a cornfield from fifty to seventy feet less in elevation than the summit of Horseshoe Ridge, as indicated more clearly by the contour lines of Plate XIV, chapter I, p. 33.

Harker's Brigade at no time faced in the direction represented on this Plate VIII, and when Hazen arrived in the cornfield, about 5 P.M., as established in our chapter VIII, his volleys, as well as Harker's, were directed southwest, where, emerging from the woods a "charging rebel column"[4] had driven the "hard-pressed"[5] Harker from his position on the east extremity of Horseshoe Ridge. This most misleading map, Plate VIII, has only a single Confederate brigade, that of "Humphreys, 1 to 6 P.M.," represented as opposed to and facing Harker and Hazen in line with two batteries, the 4th United States Artillery and the 18th Ohio.

[1] Colonel Dunlap's (3d Kentucky, Harker's Brigade) Report, No. 50, p. 701, l. 4.

[2] H. V. Boynton, Assistant in Historical Work, Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park Commission, *Battle of Chickamauga, Georgia, September 19–20, 1863; Organization of the Army of the Cumberland, etc., and of the Army of the Tennessee, etc.*, p. 12. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1895.

[3] Map of the battle-field of Chickamauga, prepared under the direction of the Honorable Daniel S. Lamont, Secretary of War, republished by order of Congress with additional position maps under the direction of the Honorable Elihu Root, Secretary of War, from Official Reports and maps of both contending armies, compiled and drawn by Edward E. Betts, C.E., Park Engineer. 1901.

[4] See chapter VIII, p. 177, Adjutant Hodsden to Colonel Suman, 9th Indiana, Hazen's Brigade. See Notes to chapter XII, note A.

[5] Hampson's (124th Ohio, Hazen's Brigade) Report, No. 50, p. 776, l. 51.


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Kershaw's Brigade and the three brigades of Preston's Division are designated by the arrow sign as assaulting Horseshoe Ridge only at points occupied by troops under Brannan's command, and according to this most ridiculous misrepresentation, none of the four Confederate brigades referred to ever faced Harker or Hazen "from noon to night." Moreover, those acquainted with the lay of the land will observe that Kershaw and Preston, from their positions south of the summit of Horseshoe Ridge, could never have been in sight of Harker that whole afternoon; yet it was Kershaw's Brigade which drove Harker from Dyer's field and the dominant hill of the "Lower Ridge," and pursued him into the woods and hills beyond. According to this map it would appear that Humphreys' Brigade was the only one which followed up the pursuit of Harker to his next alleged position in line, and, as misrepresented by the map, from "1 to 6 P.M." confronted him here at long range. Does this map, by the sign of the arrow, indicate that Humphreys made any charge against the Federal line at Snodgrass house or Horseshoe Ridge? No, it does not. Yet the juggling Boynton, in his *Historical Guide*[1] (the book to which we have already referred) says: —

> Humphreys' Brigade, of Kershaw's Division, formed the right of the assaulting lines and faced the open crest beyond the house where Harker had taken a final stand on the left of Brannan.

Between the divergent misrepresentations of the map and Boynton's statements, the map is correct so far as it relates to the fact that Humphreys' Brigade made no assault or charge upon the heights, either of Horseshoe Ridge or in rear thereof, "the open crest beyond the house" (as called by Boynton), with its gradual slope toward the southeast.

[1] H. V. Boynton, *Chickamauga National Military Park and Historical Guide*, p. 83. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke Co. 1895.

General Boynton's fertile imagination was his only authority for including Humphreys' Brigade in the "assaulting lines." Per contra, we have official authority, of record and elsewhere, that Humphreys' Brigade made only one reconnaissance of the position and this was before 1 P.M., and, acting under Longstreet's orders, did not assault the Federals on the heights, but held its position for the rest of the day at a point indicated on the map as the "Blacksmith Shop," six hundred and fifty yards southeast from Snodgrass house, — in proof whereof we submit the following from General Humphreys' Official Report:[1] —

> I immediately moved to General Kershaw's right and met the enemy in force, drove in his skirmishers, and found him intrenched on a hill with artillery. After engaging him and reconnoitring his position, I found it impossible to drive him from it. I immediately informed General Longstreet of the enemy's position and strength and received orders from him to hold my position without advancing.

This I take to mean that while marching north in Dyer's field, the brigade found the Federals intrenched on the heights to the left. This position was reconnoitred, and because of its strength, on General Humphreys' representations, General Longstreet ordered that no assault should be made. This is undoubtedly the correct interpretation, as appears from General Humphreys' own construction of it, contained in his manuscript description of the Battle of Chickamauga, for a copy of which I am much indebted to his son, Congressman Benjamin G. Humphreys. I quote, therefore, from General Humphreys what concerns the point in question: —

> Kershaw had encountered the line to my left and his success had produced a panic in my front. I found they were "skedaddling" instead of bristling their bayonets, and had only to hurry

[1] No. 51, p. 509, l. 39.

up their movement by firing into their rear . . . for about six hundred yards when I was suddenly brought to a halt by a terrific fire of artillery and musketry from a strongly intrenched line on a hill to the west of the Lafayette road. Many of the brave boys fell dead and wounded. . . . My brave boys wanted to charge the hill — begged and importuned. A very slight reconnaissance satisfied me that to attempt to attack would be the loss of one half of my brigade. . . . I sent Captain J. H. Hobart to Longstreet to inform him that I was too weak to carry the hill without artillery. He soon sent me orders not to attempt it. . . . I held the position with sharpshooters and skirmishers constantly engaged, and concealing the brigade as best I could behind trees, logs, etc.

It is also my good fortune to have as a correspondent Captain J. S. McNeily, of Company E, 21st Mississippi Regiment, Humphreys' Brigade, who corroborates the statements given above, timing the reconnaissance "about 1 o'clock," and adds: —

The two right regiments were very little exposed. The left regiment was the most exposed and returned the fire. The left centre, to which I belonged, had not, I think, fired a volley, for we were all expecting the order to charge at double-quick, — but it never came. Ordering a halt, General Humphreys rode through our ranks and out into the open in the face of the enemy. Here, after a moment of close scrutiny, he turned and shouted the order "'Bout face," and we marched from under fire back to our position at the "Blacksmith Shop." In the conversation with General Humphreys alluded to, I expressed the disappointment of the whole command at his order to retire, telling him the men were keyed up to the highest tension, and would have gone over the enemy's lines as we did at Gettysburg.

In 1894 I went to Chickamauga to locate the position of my brigade. While there I met the Park Commissioners.[1] I remember distinctly that General Humphreys said that Longstreet designated the blacksmith shop as the landmark of the position

[1] He specifically names General Boynton among them, and in this connection we should note that the latter's *Historical Guide* was published in 1895.

he was to occupy. . . . In locating the brigade markers for the Park Commission, I rested the left, I am sure, correctly on, or very near, the road descending the hill on which the Snodgrass house stood, but I did this at the point of our furthest advance and not at the blacksmith shop. At this point, our line ran parallel with the Snodgrass Ridge,[1] fronting the cornfield and about three hundred yards from the Snodgrass house, I judge. I think we faced northwest.

In previous chapters in our study of the movements of General Hazen's Brigade, and of the 9th Indiana Regiment in particular, evidence has been set forth which shows that Hazen supported Harker in Snodgrass cornfield about 5 P.M., as the latter had been driven from his previous position on the east extremity of Horseshoe Ridge. There is no question of doubt advanced by any one of the fact that the Confederates drove certain Federal troops from this part of Horseshoe Ridge, and took possession of it at the time stated. These troops thus driven from the ridge did not form part of Brannan's command, the only other occupants of Horseshoe Ridge, consequently the troops must have been those of Harker's Brigade.

Harker's encounter with Kershaw's troops when Harker and Buell, of Wood's Division, occupied the "dominating hill" of the fifty feet lower ridge, separated by a ravine south of Horseshoe Ridge, resulted in Harker's being driven from *that* position; but this occurred at noontime, and no one will maintain that it was at this period that Hazen's Brigade came to the support of Harker at the Snodgrass house. One has only to look at the map, Plate VIII, to recognize the absurdity of representing Harker's brigade two hundred and fifty yards in rear of Brannan on Horseshoe Ridge, his line refused and almost at right angles to Brannan's, and facing in a direction where its

[1] The "bare ridge" near the Snodgrass house and cornfield, or the "open crest," as variously called in Boynton's literature, from the context, is evidently referred to.

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volley-firing could not at any time prior to 5 P.M. have found a Confederate foe. Instead of which, with the artillery fire supporting Harker, also firing in the same direction, it would, as thus misrepresented, have caused havoc in the ranks of the Federal left wing about three fourths of a mile distant, particularly Reynolds' Division, in whose rear the shells would have taken effect.

The same map represents Stanley's Brigade as firing east from Horseshoe Ridge during this period, which is still more absurd. The convex broken line thus represented in the map, and formed by the combined lines of Brannan and Harker, is contrary to all descriptions in the Official Reports.

It was not in Snodgrass cornfield that, with some of its regiments on one side of Snodgrass house and some on the other, Harker's Brigade repulsed the fierce Confederate assaults, which, like billows of the sea, constantly advanced and withdrew from noon till 5 P.M. on that memorable Sunday afternoon. This defense by Harker's Brigade was at the position which it occupied on Horseshoe Ridge, with the steep declivities on the south and east sides of its position on the crest.

The graphic reports of Harker's Brigade describe a succession of fierce assaults made by fresh lines of Confederate troops against their "keypoint" position for four hours during that afternoon. Yet on the map it is not indicated that even the one opposing Confederate brigade made a single assault or suffered a repulse.

Nor did any other Confederate brigade make any assault at this point or in this direction. Had it done so, it would have met no opposition, and the battle should have ended then and there. Here was the three-quarter mile gap between the two wings of the army to which General Hazen refers,[1] and which is well authenticated in the Official Reports of both armies.

[1] Chapter VII, p. 165.

Finally, look at the casualties of Humphreys' Brigade:[1] "20 killed and 132 wounded; total, 152." Members of Harker's Brigade will certainly not admit that with all their volley-firing, from noon to 6 P.M., and when supported too by Hazen's Brigade, Frank Smith's[2] and Aleshire's Batteries, this was all the damage they were able to inflict upon the enemy, while Brannan's command, in defense of Horseshoe Ridge, inflicted more than thirteen times as much damage in killed and wounded, viz.: —

Gracie's Brigade	705[3]
Anderson's Brigade	534[4]
Kershaw's Brigade	503[5]
Kelly's Brigade	300[6]
Total	2042[7]

At this time, about 1 P.M., Brannan's Division consisted of fragments of only two of his brigades, Connell's and Croxton's, the former represented by "only about one hundred men"[8] of the 82d Indiana under Colonel Hunter,

[1] No. 51, p. 291, l. 18.

[2] This officer, now General Frank Smith, U.S.A., retired, was formerly a member of the Park Commission and furnished some points of information to the author, who here desires to record his thanks; but there is one statement made by General Smith, of special significance, which has been useful in the consideration of the testimony presented by comrades of both sides who participated in the battle and visited the field in later years, in company with others, namely, that he finds it difficult to differentiate between what he saw at the time of the battle and what he has learned since about it. See Notes to chapter XII, Note B.

[3] No. 51, p. 421, l. 37.

[4] No. 51, p. 319, l. 46; part of this loss was sustained against Davis and Sheridan.

[5] No. 51, p. 506, l. 45.

[6] No. 51, p. 420, l. 10.

[7] No. 51, p. 442, l. 33. Robertson's Brigade at about 11.30 A.M. was in contact with the 21st Ohio on south slope of Hill Number 3. Trigg's Brigade sustained some little loss on Horseshoe Ridge. The 15th Alabama, of Law's Brigade, was also in Kershaw's line. These losses may offset in Anderson's total what he incurred before assault of Horseshoe Ridge.

[8] According to Colonel M. C. Hunter's statement. Alfred G. Hunter, *History of the Eighty-Second Indiana*, pp. 66 and 78. Indianapolis: W. B. Burford, printer. 1893.

and the latter by three small regiments, forty-five men[1] of the 4th Kentucky, a detachment of the 14th Ohio, and 10th Kentucky, totaling only "a few hundred men." Add to the above a few stragglers from the 17th and 31st Ohio, of Connell's Brigade, and according to the Records, *nem. con.*, four hundred would be an overestimate of Brannan's *Division* on Horseshoe Ridge prior to the arrival of Van Derveer with the Third Brigade and Major Kelly with another small detachment of the 4th Kentucky.[2] Other fragments of regiments which rallied there and fought under Brannan's command before support arrived, were: Colonel Stoughton, with a portion of Stanley's Brigade, consisting of detachments of but two of its regiments, the 11th Michigan and 19th Illinois, less than two hundred; Colonel Buell with all that was left of his brigade, about one hundred and fifty of the 58th Indiana Regiment;[3] and two hundred 17th Kentucky and 13th Ohio men of the first and second brigades of Van Cleve's Division. The 21st Ohio was already there, and at Brannan's urgent request for support, General Negley had lent to him this strong and efficient regiment, which had "moved into action with 22 officers and 517 men with rifles."[4]

If we add another one hundred men for stragglers from regiments not mentioned, fifteen hundred would be a fair estimate of the troops under Brannan at this juncture, when the first assaults of Kershaw and Anderson were repelled.

It is not to be supposed for a moment, however, that Harker's Brigade did not take advantage of the strongest possible position in sight and support Brannan's command at the time of this and later assaults. On such an occasion, Harker would not remain in the rear out of range.

[1] According to Major R. M. Kelly's (4th Kentucky) Report, No. 50, p. 1062, ll. 25–27.
[2] No. 50, p. 1062, ll. 13 and 19.
[3] No. 50, p. 657, ll. 9–14; p. 665, l. 18.
[4] No. 50, p. 390, l. 25.

The statement of General Thomas is in itself conclusive: there could be but one straight line — viz., the trend of Horseshoe Ridge on which Brannan was located — that he refers to in his order to General Wood to place Harker's Brigade on the prolongation of that line. He did not order that Harker should be refused, or at right angles to Brannan's command.

The accompanying diagram will represent the relative positions of the few hundred men in Brannan's command which, with Harker's Brigade, defended Horseshoe Ridge against the first Confederate assault.

If it were not for the Official Report of General Hazen and those of his regimental commanders, and his book account in his *Narrative*, we should have known scarcely anything of the fact that Hazen's Brigade rendered any support or assistance whatever to Harker. The only reference thereto in the way of recognition, even by mention of name or of the fact that Hazen's and Harker's Brigades were ever in juxtaposition, is found in a single sentence of Colonel Opdycke's (125th Ohio) Report:[1]—

> The 41st Ohio and 9th Indiana of General Hazen's Brigade, Palmer's Division, filed two rods to my rear, and added their veteran fire in repulsing the last assault.

Perhaps this would not have been recorded were it not for the fact that Colonel Opdycke himself was formerly a captain in this 41st Ohio Regiment, Hazen's Brigade.

No one can read these chapters, however, without knowing that Hazen and his brigade merited material appreciation for the services rendered to both Harker and Brannan. The consciousness of duty well performed is, itself, the highest reward of a true soldier, who does not boast of it. Such an one was General Hazen, as a study of the record shows. It is most gratifying, however, to know that

[1] No. 50, p. 708, l. 58.

his splendid performance of duty and his modesty about it received their reward. We learn this from the following statement: —

> For carrying my brigade across to help the right on the 20th, *General Thomas, who at the time was not aware of it,*[1] afterward recommended me for promotion to a major-generalship, — a fact unknown to me until after the close of the war.[2]

Here we have an explanation why General Thomas does not mention Hazen's name anywhere in his Report, and this was for the very good reason that Thomas was not at his headquarters in Snodgrass cornfield north of the log-house at the time of Hazen's arrival in that vicinity, for our carefully established time-table indicates Thomas' departure therefrom at about 4.30 P.M., and Hazen's arrival about half an hour later. We have here still another check on the accuracy of our conclusions concerning General Gordon Granger's early departure from the vicinity of the Snodgrass house, where he made his headquarters and succeeded to the command of the troops at that point where Thomas left him.

Does not the fact that he too does not even mention the name of Hazen and his brigade in his Official Report indicate that he did not witness the service Hazen rendered at that time? Does it not appear almost certain that General Granger would have remembered it had he been present when this efficient brigade arrived, supplied with forty rounds of ammunition per man at a time subsequent to Brannan's and Le Favour's urgent appeals for ammunition, and when Granger ordered them to use the cold steel, while he hastened to join Thomas on the Ridge road and accompanied him to Rossville?

How also shall we account for General Wood's neglect

[1] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.

[2] W. B. Hazen, *A Narrative of Military Service*, p. 136. Boston: Ticknor & Co. 1885.

to mention Hazen's name and the service rendered to him? Is it possible that he too was not with his troops under Harker in Snodgrass cornfield at the time of Hazen's opportune arrival, when the "charging rebel column" was emerging from the woods of the Horseshoe near the Snodgrass house? Was it a matter of no consequence, and therefore not worthy of note, when Hazen's 1015 men[1] joined the "hard-pressed" Harker's Brigade and checked the enemy's pursuit? Surely it would not appear so, for General Wood does not neglect to mention all the support he seems to have knowledge of. He appropriately returns his "thanks to Major-General Granger for a timely supply of ammunition,"[2] makes mention of how the small fragments of the 17th Kentucky and 44th Indiana "most nobly and gallantly aided my [his] command,"[3] devotes two paragraphs of fifteen lines thereto, mostly in praise of the forty men[4] of the 44th Indiana,[5] to whom Colonel Harker also pays a handsome tribute. Why should both of them neglect their thanks or mention of Hazen's service in their greatest hour of peril?

General Wood's Official Report is one of the best in the Records, giving a clear and accurate description of the battle and of the battle-field, until we arrive at his description of the closing scenes, where explanation is necessary for his omissions, and the impossibility of reconciling some of his statements with other official evidence of record, overwhelmingly convincing of the truth. We do not question his veracity for a moment, and we have positive evidence from his own Official Report and other equally authoritative testimony that he was not with his troops some considerable portion of the time during the period referred to. At noon and early afternoon he is hotly en-

[1] No. 50, p. 767, l. 15; p. 763, ll. 5 and 26.
[2] No. 50, p. 639, l. 14.
[3] No. 50, p. 639, l. 27.
[4] No. 50, p. 695, l. 48.
[5] See Notes to chapter xii, Note C.

gaged at the points of danger among his troops, but in the afternoon we find him scurrying around evidently for reinforcements north of their position on Horseshoe Ridge. As this is undoubtedly the case, it follows that some of the statements as to the closing scenes do not represent his personal knowledge in regard thereto. His Report[1] reads:—

> Near sundown of the 20th, I met General John Beatty not far from where I had fought the enemy. . . . At the moment I met him I was engaged halting some troops that were crossing the valley north and west of my position. . . . I then rode back to my command.

While this interval of absence cannot be definitely determined, we do know the period when the fugitive organizations of the left wing began crossing towards McFarland's Gap, over the bare ridge north of Snodgrass' and south of Mullis', where General Wood was engaged in trying to halt some of them, and without doubt we can draw the conclusion that his presence where he describes it, indicates that he was not with his command during an interval before 5 P.M. and some three quarters of an hour or more thereafter. During this period, therefore, he would not be a witness to the arrival of Hazen, and when he rode back to his command would find it moved north from Snodgrass' before sunset, and not on Horseshoe Ridge, the place answering to his description[2] "the position it had taken about 1 o'clock" and alleged to have maintained until "nightfall," or[3] about "7 P.M.," when he "received an order from General Thomas to withdraw my [his] command from the field." His command, as has been established elsewhere, was the first one, acting under Thomas' orders, to withdraw, and Brannan's next. This statement is admitted by all authorities, and if the retirement of Bran-

[1] No. 50, p. 642, l. 34.
[2] No. 50, p. 639, l. 22.
[3] No. 50, p. 638, l. 25.

nan was at 6.30 or 7 P.M., Harker's retirement, preceding him, must have been at an earlier period. If General Wood got back to his command before 6 o'clock, he would have seen Hazen in line of battle with Harker, but he evidently did not see Hazen, and must have retired before him.

We have the findings and opinion of the Negley Court of Inquiry, and the testimony in the case is our authority for undoubted proof that General Wood was capable of reprehensible conduct in making statements which had no foundation in fact and were not made from his own personal knowledge.

We should be derelict in our duty if we omitted mention of this evidence of record. After an inquiry as to the identity of the staff officer who informed General Wood that "some troops on one of the spurs of Mission Ridge,"[1] this spur being the Horseshoe, were General Negley's, the question is put to him by the Court:[2] "Was that point at any time occupied by the enemy?" Answer: "No."

In exposing this palpable misstatement, Captain J. D. Barker, the same staff officer of General Thomas', hitherto mentioned, was called in rebuttal, and after giving his testimony contradicting General Wood's, presented the following evidence explaining the latter's ignorance of the truth to be due to the fact that he was a mile or more north of the Snodgrass house vicinity, according to the admission of General Wood himself as just quoted from his Official Report.

Captain Barker's testimony[3] is that he saw "General T. J. Wood at a comfortable distance in the rear of the line without any of his command near him on the afternoon of the 20th," and that the distance "was not less than one mile nor more than one and a half miles" from the Snodgrass house.

[1] No. 50, p. 1020, l. 1. [2] No. 50, p. 1020, l. 41. [3] No. 50, p. 1029, l. 21.

By an *ex parte* consideration it is possible to make a good case and prove almost anything from testimony of record in support thereof. "The Devil can cite Scripture for his purpose."

The testimony which is offered in the Reports is sometimes conflicting and hard to understand. There can, however, be but one truthful account, and that is the one, in the progress of our study, to which every bit of new truthful testimony adheres as to a magnet. Where the testimony of two witnesses is completely at variance, there is, of course, some reason for it, and we must decide between them as to which is the more credible and competent. I shall not shirk my duty of responsibility in making my decision, but I wish it understood that I have no intention of casting invidious reflections on any of our witnesses while sifting their testimony to the bottom.

It is often remarked that no two soldiers in battle, even in the same company, ever view it alike. There is bound to be some point of difference at some time of the day's happenings which is irreconcilable between them. One's personal observations in ordinary affairs in the walks of life show how prone we are to make mistakes.

At the expense of some repetition I propose to review the testimony of the officers of Harker's Brigade, making a comparison of their statements with each other and other authorities. It is noticeable that the clergyman-captain, Powell, of the 65th Ohio, is the only one who records the three successive positions occupied by his regiment and brigade. The only point of information which he omits concerns the support of Hazen, and this may be explained by the fact that his regiment was never in contact with Hazen's Brigade, as per our conclusions elsewhere.[1] This officer describes the position of the 65th on the east slope of the dominating hill, with the rest of the brigade on his

[1] Chapter VII, p. 170.

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left, the 3d Kentucky, 125th Ohio, and 64th Ohio Regiments in succession.[1] On his right, occupying the summit of the hill, was the 58th Indiana, of Buell's Brigade. He describes the "severe" encounter at this position with the Confederates marching north in Dyer's field. These, we know, were Kershaw on their left and Humphreys' Brigade on their right. The regiments on Powell's right and left "broke in confusion,"[2] and the 65th was not rallied until it reached the rear of the Snodgrass house in the cornfield.[3] It then advanced and took its next position in line on Horseshoe Ridge on the Tower hill.[4] After hours of hard fighting, this regiment was forced to withdraw under direct orders from Harker,[5] and Powell describes, as hitherto recounted, a final position of his regiment and brigade in Snodgrass cornfield, where the engagement was renewed and ended.

The ambiguous Dunlap in his Report tells us of the severe encounter in Dyer's field, and that when "the enemy were driven from this field," he took his flag and ran with it into the woods, where his men were rallied and posted, under Harker's orders, on the hilltop.[6] The position thus first occupied by his 3d Kentucky, on Horseshoe Ridge, for a brief period was also on the middle hill, but the "avalanche of retreating hordes" forced his occupancy of a point on the east extremity of the ridge, viz., Hill Number 1, which he calls the "keypoint." This position, as we shall presently note, his regiment occupied with the 125th Ohio, the two regiments alternating with each other in the front rank, firing by volley, and, in the execution of this movement, "marching to the crest of the hill," as he describes, and of course, marching back again. How many yards were involved in this withdrawal to the rear

[1] No. 50, p. 704, l. 35; p. 696, l. 53.
[2] No. 50, p. 704, l. 38; p. 706, l. 31.
[3] No. 50, p. 704, l. 43.
[4] No. 50, p. 704, l. 45.
[5] No. 50, p. 704, l. 53.
[6] No. 50, p. 700, l. 51.

of the front line is not stated, but it is quite possible, in fact very probable, that there were occasions when the fighting was "at short range," that the rear line was forced back to the vicinity of the Snodgrass house, two hundred and fifty yards from the summit and on the fifty feet lower and separate "open crest" beyond.

From the mass of our testimony elsewhere we have established the fact that the period of Harker's occupancy of this position was from about 1 to 5 P.M., and we find Colonel Dunlap's corroboration of this in his statement, "at this point for four hours in the afternoon . . . more than fifty deadly volleys were directed at short range upon the enemy."[1] This was at the rate of about five minutes to each volley. If the alternating regiment, the 125th Ohio, performed the same service, this exhibition of volley-firing was indeed terrific.

Analyzing Colonel Dunlap's statements, we note that nothing could be more explicit than his assertion as to the "keypoint" being the position occupied, and that the afternoon was the time of this occupancy, and not night-time. It follows, therefore, that when he says, "at about 8 P.M. . . . [we] were ordered to file to the rear," he here has reference to another position than the "keypoint," and may mean the Snodgrass cornfield, or some position still further in the rear. In view of this marching and counter-marching of these alternating regiments, and the fact that, in the execution of the movement, several hundred yards to the rear may have been necessary, as just described, it is quite possible that the position of the Horseshoe and the position of the "open crest" on the summit of which is the Snodgrass house, may have been considered as one and the same relative position. If this be the interpretation of the testimony of some of these witnesses, their statements are reconciled in regard thereto and omissions

[1] No. 50, p. 701, l. 9.

explained. On this basis alone can we account for the gallant Harker's Report:[1]—

> As night closed upon us, the firing ceased, and my men were in the same position they had taken near midday, and which they had held with such heroic tenacity. About dark we received orders to fall back to Rossville.

It is entirely unnecessary to present the overwhelming mass of testimony, Federal and Confederate, to disprove any construction of Colonel Dunlap's statement which makes him testify that it was 8 P.M. when he was ordered to withdraw from the "keypoint." The same discussions on points of time obtain as well here as elsewhere, and I do not desire any further prolixity in pointing out errors of time in connection with each witness. But at this point, we must note that if Colonel Dunlap's statement is thus misconstrued, his four-hour occupancy must begin somewhat before 4 P.M. in order to end at 8 P.M.; yet we notice Colonel Harker's statement that about midday was the time when his brigade was posted on the ridge. It would take a volume by itself to attempt to discuss each and every point of testimony which concerns the time of events in this battle.[2]

In this connection it is interesting to study the discrepancies of statements as to time of arrival of Wood and Harker at Rossville, and the varying testimony as to the interval of time taken in the march. If Dunlap left the battlefield at 8 P.M., his march to Rossville took but two hours, if General Wood's statement[3] is correct: "My command reached Rossville about 10 P.M." Colonel Buell, with his fragment of the 58th Indiana, says that soon after dark he was "ordered to follow Colonel Harker's command and

[1] No. 50, p. 695, l. 47.

[2] Gettysburg presents the same difficult problems as to time. For their solution on that great open field of battle, see Notes to chapter XII, Note D.

[3] No. 50, p. 689, l. 33.

reached Rossville about 11 P.M."[1] Colonel Harker[2] gives the time of his arrival there as "about 11 P.M."

On the other hand, General Hazen, in his *Narrative*, claims that his brigade was the rear guard of the army, arriving at Rossville "precisely at 11 P.M.," while Daniel McCook's brigade, under orders from Thomas and Granger, was the last to leave the *head* of McFarland's Gap "at 7.30 P.M.," but withdrew via Rossville Gap.[3]

Thus Colonel Dunlap's and Colonel Stoughton's "8 P.M." statements would substantiate claims to their having been the last of Thomas' force to leave Snodgrass house and the first to arrive at Rossville. It would be interesting, under any such hypothesis, to explain how they passed by the other troops who preceded their march through the narrow defiles and obstructed roads.

Next in consideration comes the report of one of the bravest of the brave, the efficient commander of the "Opdycke Tigers," the 125th Ohio, whose fortune it was, if we except the 21st Ohio, to render the greatest service of any Federal regiment which fought that day in Dyer's field or on Horseshoe Ridge, according to the evidence of record.[4] Its first great service was its gallant charge under their colonel's leadership (and General Wood's order in person[5]) against Law's and Benning's Brigades of Hood's Division, the other regiments being but partly engaged, if at all, in this charge. The 125th and the 64th Ohio (though we have no record from the latter's Report) par-

[1] No. 50, p. 657, l. 36. [2] No. 50, p. 695, l. 53. [3] Chapter v, p. 113.

[4] Quoting from Colonel Harker's Report (No. 50, p. 697, l. 20): "They moved on the field of battle with a precision and apparent indifference to danger which challenged the admiration of veterans. Their good conduct as a regiment may be inferred when it is stated that after passing through this terrible battle of two days' duration, but one man was missing, not accounted for as killed or wounded. The good conduct of this regiment must be attributed entirely to the untiring energy and superior military characteristics of their gallant Colonel Opdycke."

[5] No. 50, p. 708, l. 17; p. 686, l. 46.

ticipated in the repulse of the enemy, who "fled in confusion,"[1] and who took no part in the engagement, for the rest of the day remaining south of the Poe house in the fringe of woods west of the Lafayette road.

Though this belongs to an earlier part of the day than the closing scenes, to which this volume is limited, I will insert here General Wood's claim as to the importance of the service rendered by his command at this juncture:[2]—

> When I discovered the enemy in force in the valley south of my command, I at once divined his intention, and appreciated the terrible hazard to our army and the necessity for prompt action. His object was clear.
>
> Having turned our right and separated a portion of our forces from the main body, he was seeking the rear of our solid line of battle to attack it in reverse, hoping thus to cut our communication with Chattanooga and capture and destroy the bulk of our army.

Colonel Opdycke's Report continues the description of the next encounter after the repulse of Law's and Benning's Brigades:[3]—

> Another line of the enemy, more formidable than the first, appeared in the distance, moving upon us. The terrible splendor of its advance is beyond the reach of my pen. The whole line seemed perfect and as if moved by a single mind. The musketry soon became severe and my losses heavy.

This was Kershaw's Brigade, that magnificent instrument of war.

> Seeing no relief [he says], I retired the regiment to the ridge in rear. In doing so, some troops passed obliquely through my right wing, which caused a little confusion there, but the ranks were closed immediately and the crest occupied where ordered by General Wood.

[1] No. 50, p. 708, l. 20. [2] No. 50, p. 696, l. 10. [3] No. 50, p. 706, l. 25.

COL. EMERSON OPDYCKE

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By this we note that General Wood was at the left of the line, while the brigade commander had returned to the right, for we have seen by the testimony of the 65th Ohio and 3d Kentucky Regiments on that flank that they obtained their orders direct from Colonel Harker. From all the regimental commanders we obtain the information that this was a bloody encounter in Dyer's field; yet it is significant to note, in connection with their future testimony pertaining to later positions as well, that both the division and brigade commanders give such scant account of this affair that were it not for the regimental officers themselves, we should not know from the Federal Reports that there was any such encounter with Kershaw in Dyer's field and on the dominating hill. In General Wood's description it would appear from his account as if his men did not fire a single volley or make any effort whatever to defend this position, which, with the "hill dominating the field,"[1] was one of the strongest. This, too, despite his statement that defeat at this juncture and at this position still exposed the rear of the Federal solid line of battle, which could be attacked in reverse and communication with Chattanooga cut off, while the only remaining organized force, "Thomas' lines,"[2] would be captured and destroyed.

It would appear as if Wood had forgotten for the second his appreciation of this "terrible hazard," and retired before Kershaw without a fight at this point, and that he did so solely for strategic reasons in order to occupy a stronger position, viz., the ridge in rear of the fifty feet lower ridge on which is the dominant hill. The east extremities of both ridges ascend, the former into "quite a timbered hill," and the other into a "wooded" one, as

[1] No. 50, p. 637, l. 8.

[2] This term for Baird's, Johnson's, Palmer's, and Reynolds' Divisions is used by Rosecrans when interviewed, and is adopted for its brevity.

Colonel Opdycke describes them.[1] Thus the 125th's position was on the east hill of Horseshoe Ridge, directly in rear of the dominating hill and not at this time at the "open crest" near Snodgrass house. Colonel Harker depreciates even more than General Wood the severity of the encounter with Kershaw in Dyer's field. His brigade, with all of his regiments in the same line,[2] was countermarched south, and he left his command in charge of General Wood to investigate whether friend or foe were advancing north. "Assured that they were the enemy,"[3] before he had returned to his position "they had advanced and fired upon my [his] brigade, which was promptly returned."[4] Like General Wood, there is no admission of any disorder whatever, and, according to his statement, he simply retired by battalion to the crest of the hill so that the enemy would not flank his brigade both on the right and on the left.

Colonel Opdycke, too, is loath to admit that his retirement was in confusion. While "a regiment to my [his] left gave way and then that upon my [his] right" (the enemy coming on and themselves prolonging his line to his right, occupying the wooded hill there and enfilading his line with a destructive fire), still, he says, it was not so with his regiment, except some little confusion to his right wing caused by some troops passing obliquely through it, when the ranks closed immediately.[5] Thus, while all the other regiments of the brigade, according to fully corroborated testimony, were driven in confusion, we have no Federal Report of confusion in the 125th Ohio's ranks, other than Colonel Opdycke's doubtful reference thereto. Yet this and the 64th Ohio would be the regiments athwart the path of Humphreys' Brigade which the latter represents

[1] No. 50, p. 706, ll. 14 and 23.
[2] No. 50, p. 694, l. 43.
[3] No. 50, p. 695, l. 5.
[4] No. 50, p. 695, l. 7.
[5] No. 50, p. 706, ll. 32 and 47.

as "skedaddling" before him; and this General Kershaw in his Official Report[1] describes as follows: —

When within one hundred yards of the enemy they broke and I opened fire upon them along the whole line, but pressed them rapidly over the first line of hills to the foot of a second,[2] when I halted under a heavy fire of artillery on the heights, sheltering the men as much as possible, and there waited the coming of Humphreys on my right.

In a history of his regiment, by Captain Charles T. Clark, of Company F,[3] he says: —

In the retreat from Dyer's field the 125th was the last regiment to ascend the hill, and was posted on the left of the brigade and was therefore on the left flank of the line defending the heights.

And again:[4] —

The retreat of the 125th Ohio from Dyer's field to Snodgrass Heights before Kershaw's advance was a severe test of discipline. It was not a disorderly rout.

As to the maintenance of his position on Horseshoe Ridge, Colonel Opdycke says:[5] —

This position was repeatedly assaulted during the day in a most terrific manner by heavy forces of Longstreet's corps, but it was triumphantly maintained until the battle was ended and until after dark, when we were ordered to retire, which we did without molestation.

The most striking error here, which is the first to be disposed of, is his statement that the assaults at this time on the "keypoint" were made by "heavy forces of Longstreet's Corps." This, of course, is a mistake. The only force of Longstreet's Corps included in the assaulting Confederate lines was Kershaw's Brigade, and when the

[1] No. 51, p. 505, l. 4.

[2] "The first line of hills" is the "Lower Ridge," the second is "the Horseshoe."

[3] Charles T. Clark, *Opdycke's Tigers, 125th Ohio Volunteer Infantry*, p. 117. Columbus, O.: Spahr & Glenn. 1895.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 117–25.

[5] No. 80, p. 708, l. 48.

assaults of the latter ended, at 4 P.M., Preston's two brigades of Buckner's Corps made their final and successful assaults on the Horseshoe. It was completely in their possession when Preston's Third Brigade, Trigg's, appeared at last,—a part, under Trigg, crossing its west extremity and a part, under Finley, sweeping the summit of the ridge, and before 6 P.M. confronting the last of the Federal line on the "open crest," which then immediately withdrew.

Opdycke also, as per our discussion of Colonel Dunlap's Report, may have arbitrarily considered the crest of Horseshoe Ridge and the "open crest," two hundred and fifty yards or more in rear, north of Snodgrass house, as one and the same position, and only on this basis can his above-quoted statements be reconciled. Nevertheless, our clergyman-captain, Powell, places Opdycke and his 125th Ohio in the third and last position in the cornfield east and north of the Snodgrass house, where General Hazen and his colonels testify that they found him, and where they took position on the 125th Ohio's left or left and rear, when they came to Opdycke's support, "waging an unequal fight with a charging Rebel column."[1] Evidence of the truth in his own testimony is also found in the last sentence of Opdycke's Report of the events of this day when he says:—

> The 41st Ohio and the 9th Indiana of General Hazen's Brigade, Palmer's Division, filed two rods to my rear and added their veteran fire in repulsing the last assault.[2]

There is no claim that Hazen's Brigade ever fought on Horseshoe Ridge. On the contrary, we have read the interesting statement of General Hazen which, for a lifetime, fixed the memory of his position: "The position was in a cornfield and the bullets rattled through the dry corn in a

[1] 9th Indiana testimony, chapter VIII, p. 177.
[2] No. 50, p. 708, l. 55.

very uncanny way."[1] His advance brought him "directly on the left" of Opdycke's 125th Ohio there. When this Colonel of the 125th says his regiment was but "two rods" (thirty-three feet) from Hazen's regiments in rear, at this time, it follows that the 125th was not then near the summit of the Horseshoe, two hundred and fifty yards distant from Snodgrass house.

We have already shown[2] how this 125th Ohio was in the last Federal line of battle near the Snodgrass house, and how it, with two pieces of the 18th Ohio Battery, which Colonel Opdycke says "were placed at my [his] command,"[3] were the last of this line to retire before 6 P.M., and just preceding the completion of Colonel Finley's (Trigg's Brigade) preparation for the charge of his 6th Florida and 54th Virginia, at a time when the whole of Horseshoe Ridge was in possession of the Confederates, and the only remaining Federals on the heights were of those three regiments, who were presently captured.

We shall now briefly examine and summarize the reports of many officers giving testimony as to the position of Harker's Brigade on Horseshoe Ridge.

General Thomas was with General Wood's and Colonel Harker's command during that afternoon, from 1 until half-past 4 P.M., occupying a position in rear of Harker's line. He did not post any of the Federal troops on Horseshoe Ridge, as is evidenced in General Wood's and Colonel Harker's Reports. This office was performed by the division and brigade commanders themselves, on General Wood's initiative order; for General Thomas[4] "rode to the crest of the hill" which is the east extremity of Horseshoe Ridge, and saw the position already taken up there by

[1] W. B. Hazen, *A Narrative of Military Service*, p. 132. Boston: Ticknor & Co. 1885.
[2] Chapter VII, p. 164; and elsewhere.
[3] No. 50, p. 708, l. 58.
[4] No. 50, p. 252, l. 39.

Harker's Brigade, and on the latter's right on Hill Number 2, by portions of Stanley's under Colonel Stoughton, which had retired to that point from the position of the left wing. Here also General Thomas[1] "ascertained from Wood" where General Brannan's division was, viz., moving along the heights of the Main Ridge to a position on the western portion of the Horseshoe to the right of Harker. The following order, given by Thomas to Wood, indicates the position of Harker's Brigade:[2] "I then directed him to place his division on the prolongation of Brannan's," — being simply instructions for the maintenance of the formation existing before General Thomas' arrival at Wood's position, as appears from the Reports of both these generals.

General Thomas says:[3] "General Wood barely had time to dispose his troops on the left of Brannan before" this assault "was made on him and Brannan combined, and kept up by the enemy throwing in fresh troops as fast as those in their front were driven back." General Thomas here speaks of what he saw in this position before his departure about 4.30 P.M. This means that every assault that was made on Brannan was made on Harker's Brigade at the same time. How could Thomas have seen this unless Brannan and Harker were on the same line, facing south in the same direction? Why should the Confederates, each time that they assaulted Brannan's position facing south, take such pains to assault Harker's alleged position near the Snodgrass house two hundred and fifty yards in rear of Brannan, whenever they made an assault on their combined lines? The supposition is simply preposterous, and so, therefore, is any statement which claims that Harker's Brigade was not on the prolongation of the same line with Brannan, and on the eastern portion of Horseshoe Ridge.

[1] No. 50, p. 252, l. 44.
[2] No. 50, p. 252, l. 42.
[3] No. 50, p. 252, l. 48.

General Wood's Report, giving a description of the conformation of the ridge on which Harker's Brigade was reformed and the relative position which it occupied with respect to Brannan's command, is still more convincing of the fact that Harker was on Horseshoe Ridge, and the east extremity of it.

This movement of the enemy [he says] made it necessary I should gain a position in which I could form a shorter and more compact line, in which my right would be more protected by natural obstacles.[1]

This surely does not mean that he considered Harker's Hill as better protected by natural obstacles than Horseshoe Ridge, which was the nearest point to his then position.

I accordingly retired my command [he continues] to a narrow and short ridge which juts out nearly at right angles as a spur from the general ridge, which is parallel to the Rossville and Lafayette road. The short and narrow ridge extends athwart the valley in a nearly east-and-west course. The abruptness of the declivity on either side of it almost gives to this ridge the quality of a natural parapet.

Will any one pretend to assert that the gentle slopes on the various sides of Harker's Hill in Snodgrass field answer to this description?

Troops holding it [he continues] could load and fire behind it out of reach of the enemy's fire, and then advance to the crest of it to deliver a plunging fire on the advancing foe. In addition, there was a moral effect in its command over the ground south of it which inspired the courage of the troops holding it.

The plunging fire which was delivered from Horseshoe Ridge, and the moral effect inspired by being upon the highest ground in the vicinity and commanding the fields and lower ridge beneath, are well understood, but such an

[1] No. 50, p. 657, l. 24.

application to the conformation of Harker's Hill is absurd, as it does not command the higher ridge, "the Horseshoe," south of it.

"Here," he says, "I determined to make an obstinate and stubborn stand," and he did. He then goes on to describe the route taken by General Brannan in moving to the same ridge on his right, and forming his command upon it as well as upon the Main or Missionary Ridge, higher up. Of General Brannan he says: —

> He had been compelled to fall back to the general ridge [i.e. Missionary Ridge] inclosing, on the west, the valley in which the great battle was fought, which ridge, as already remarked, runs nearly parallel to the Rossville and Lafayette road. When I took position with Harker's brigade on the narrow ridge extending partially across the valley, General Brannan formed his command on my right and higher up on the main ridge, thus giving to our united lines something of the shape of an irregular crescent, with the concavity toward the enemy. This disposition gave us a converging fire on the attacking column.

This seems so plain that argument is superfluous. I will merely call attention to the fact that an attacking column making an assault on the combined lines of Brannan on Horseshoe Ridge, and on Harker at his alleged position on Harker's Hill, would not be exposed to a converging fire from both Brannan and Harker, and would be facing two concavities at the same time which open in entirely different directions.

General Wood goes on: —

> Colonel Buell formed his command with General Brannan's. When my arrangements in this position were concluded, it was probably 1 P.M. or a little later.
>
> The enemy did not leave us long in the quiet possession of our new position. Soon a most obstinate and determined attack was made, which was handsomely repulsed. Similar attacks were continued at intervals throughout the entire afternoon. To

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describe each one in detail would be unnecessary and only add useless prolixity to my report. But I deem it proper to signalize one of these attacks specially. It occurred about 4 o'clock, and lasted about thirty minutes. It was unquestionably the most terrific musketry duel I have ever witnessed. Harker's brigade was formed in two lines.

The attack which he here describes can be none other than the first made by Gracie's Brigade, which occurred at about this time and place. The whole assault of Gracie's Brigade occupied, by the watch of one who timed it, exactly fifty-five minutes, leaving the brigade in full possession at about 5 P.M.; but all of this will be described in the volume to which it belongs.

At the end of General Wood's Report is a sketch of the battle-field showing positions of his command during the battle, made by his topographical engineer, Captain McLoughlin.[1] A study of this sketch, while the points of the compass are not indicated or satisfactory, shows the various positions (represented in two sets of lines) occupied by Harker's and Buell's Brigades. Horseshoe Ridge is here delineated, with Harker's Brigade on the eastern portion and Buell's on the western, and the Hospital or Snodgrass house north of Harker on Horseshoe Ridge. Snodgrass cornfield is designated as a "burnt" stubble-field. We therefore take note that it was neither "quite a timbered hill" nor "wooded."[2]

Colonel Harker's Report furnishes testimony to the same effect as the preceding one, describing[3] the formation of his brigade in two lines "to the left of Brannan, fronting to the south and nearly perpendicular to Reynolds' Division, then on my [his] left." This is a repetition of what we have already learned from General Hazen, but the

[1] See Notes to chapter XII, Note E.

[2] Opdycke's description of the Lower and Horseshoe Ridges; see p. 271, *infra*.

[3] No. 50, p. 696, l. 11.

latter describes the gap between Harker and Reynolds as nearly three quarters of a mile.

Colonel Harker defines the ridge, on which he and General Brannan were located, as "running nearly perpendicular to the general line of battle." This could not be said of the alleged line on Harker's Hill in Snodgrass field. He then likens the position occupied by the Federal army to "the form of a crotchet," which in brief indicates that the two wings were at right angles to each other. He speaks of his command "occupying a part of the 'key of the position,'" which is a term used several times in the Official Reports, and his putting it in quotation marks would indicate that the Federal soldiers were accustomed to refer to Horseshoe Ridge in this way.

Among others, Colonel Dunlap, of the 3d Kentucky, describes the east extremity of Horseshoe Ridge[1] as the "keypoint." It is doubtful if any such location could be thus described on Harker's Hill, unless this keypoint was in the door of Snodgrass' farmhouse. The only additional information, as to the conformation of the ridge on which they were located, is supplied by Colonels Opdycke and Dunlap. The former describes the crest of the hill which he occupied[2] as "quite a timbered hill," and the latter also[3] speaks of forming his regiment in the woods and moving it to the hilltop. Harker's Hill, on the other hand, was in a cornfield and was not wooded.

Captain Powell, of the 65th Ohio, in his Official Report, tells us[4] that the regiment on his right, which was the 58th Indiana, of Buell's Brigade, broke in confusion, thus enabling the enemy to take possession of the hill;[5] and that *his* regiment was "forced to fall back."

It is from *Colonel Opdycke*[6] that we learn that the regi-

[1] No. 50, p. 701, l. 4.
[2] No. 50, p. 700, l. 54.
[3] No. 50, p. 708, l. 14.
[4] No. 50, p. 704, l. 36.
[5] This was General Wood's "dominant hill."
[6] No. 50, p. 708, l. 38.

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ments on his left and right, which were respectively the 64th Ohio and 3d Kentucky, both gave way, and that "the enemy came on and themselves prolonged my [his] line to the right, occupied the wooded hill there, and enfiladed my [his] line with a destructive fire." Thus, Colonel Opdycke, and not Colonel Dunlap, tells us that the latter's 3d Kentucky gave way, though we had inferred as much from the latter's Report, which reads:[1] "Being overrun by hundreds of stragglers and the confusion increasing, so soon as the enemy were driven from this field, I took my flag and formed my regiment in the woods immediately adjacent." "The enemy driven from this field"! — this appears contrary to sense as well as fact, and though the original Report was signed by Colonel Dunlap, I believe that the clerk or staff officer to whom it was dictated, or who copied it, must have made some mistake, and that the passage should read, "so soon as *my men* were driven from this field," for it certainly is unintelligible that the colonel should take his flag and run to the adjacent woods when the *enemy* was driven from the field. By the same token we should further expect order restored and confusion diminished had the enemy departed and not pursued him as they did.

We have no evidence in the Official Reports that the 125th Ohio was driven in disorder. On the contrary, according to the Report of its commanding officer, Colonel Opdycke, — while it seems that his regiment was compelled, seeing no relief, to retire to the ridge in the rear, and though the right wing of the regiment was thrown into some confusion by troops of other commands passing through it, — the ranks of the regiment[2] "were closed immediately, and the crest occupied where ordered by General Wood."

The 3d Kentucky regiment's first location on Horseshoe

[1] No. 50, p. 700, l. 51. [2] No. 50, p. 708, l. 47.

Ridge was evidently on Hill Number 2 on the Hog's Back, which was overrun with stragglers passing along the line of easiest convenience to the rear. These stragglers were so numerous as to compel the 3d Kentucky to move one hundred yards to the left, which would locate it at the "keypoint," or the summit of the east hill of Horseshoe Ridge. I make this deduction from the following statements in *Colonel Dunlap's Report:*[1] —

> I moved, under Colonel Harker's orders, to the right upon the hilltop, and found a heavy force advancing, upon which we fired and ceased firing alternately by order, doubtful whether they were the enemy.[2] This doubt encouraged their advance, and just here an avalanche of retreating hordes overran us, and compelled us to rally at the "keypoint," one hundred yards to the left.

The 65th Ohio fell back all the way to Snodgrass field in rear of the log-house. It rallied here, and Colonel Harker posted it also on Hill Number 2. He would naturally do this, as the 65th Ohio and the 3d Kentucky in their previous positions were on the right of the line, and being also nearest the Horseshoe Ridge, would close up on Brannan and leave space for Harker's other two regiments to be put in on the left of the line. But the 3d Kentucky did not remain on Hill Number 2, but as we have seen moved one hundred yards to the left.

General Wood, as Colonel Opdycke tells us, posted the 125th Ohio on the crest, and the point referred to is undoubtedly the same "keypoint" on which the 3d Ken-

[1] No. 50, p. 700, l. 54.

[2] An analysis of some statements in this Report provokes a grim vein of humor. We notice that on three occasions "pell-mell mobs" and "avalanches of retreating hordes" of Federal troops were the cause of withdrawal from these various positions, and in no case does Colonel Dunlap admit that the enemy was the immediate cause. After Colonel Dunlap reached the hilltop he found Kershaw still following in pursuit, and the 3d Kentucky fired alternate volleys with some other regiment, though doubtful, he says, that they were firing upon the enemy.

65TH OHIO COMMISSIONED AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS (GROUP I)

CAPT. CHAS. O. TANNEHILL MAJ. SAMUEL C. BROWN SERGT.-MAJ. STANLEY G. POPE

LIEUT.-COL. HORATIO N. WHITBECK

1ST SERGT. EDWARD E. SCRANTON 2D LIEUT. BENJ. TRESCOTT

SERGT. G. W. McFADDEN 1ST LIEUT. WILBUR F. HINMAN

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tucky was located. Here the two regiments occupied the front line alternately. The 64th Ohio, being the only remaining regiment, is thus left to occupy the right of the line, alternating in the front rank with the 65th Ohio.

The following interesting details of the part taken by the 65th Ohio on Horseshoe Ridge are also given by Captain Powell:[1] "The regiment, though having lost many of its best officers, and its ranks having been thinned by the loss of over one third of its men, still held its position, and did so for an hour and a half, when we were joined by Lieutenant-Colonel Bullitt with two companies of the 3d Kentucky, who, at my request, took command." Thus it was about 2.30 that these two companies of the 3d Kentucky were put in, and it seems probable that Colonel Harker sent them to the position on Hill Number 2 where he had previously posted the 3d Kentucky regiment, supposing it to be there still, though it had before this moved to the "keypoint."

From Colonel Dunlap's Report[2] describing an earlier encounter, we learn that the two companies referred to were "the dissevered parts of Companies A and C," joined by stragglers from other commands who were rallied by Lieutenant-Colonel Bullitt, assisted by Adjutant Hunt. As appears from Colonel Dunlap's statement, "These officers behaved gallantly in gathering from the retreating mass some four hundred stragglers, which they rallied upon the hill, which developed itself as part of the important key to the safety of the army." This, then, was a substantial reinforcement, and from half-past two until 5 P.M. Colonel Bullitt, in command of the 65th Ohio and this detachment of his, maintained his position on Hill Number 2. This fact is obtained from Captain Powell's statement,[3] that they "held the enemy in check till or-

[1] No. 50, p. 704, l. 48.
[2] No. 50, p. 700, l. 27.
[3] No. 50, p. 704, l. 58.

dered by Colonel Harker to fall back to the rear of the log-house."

The position to which he fell back, in rear of the log-house, was in Snodgrass field north of Snodgrass house.

Before the regiment was put in on Horseshoe Ridge, one of the captains of the regiment, Captain Tannehill, "took command of a number of men who had become separated from their companies, and took position at the left of the house." Thus it appears that this part of the regiment remained at the Snodgrass house, and did not fight with the rest of the regiment on Horseshoe Ridge. This is made still more evident by the fact that when the 65th Ohio fell back to the rear of the log-house, Captain Tannehill and his men were still there, as appears from Captain Powell's statement:[1] "Here the regiment was formed, having been joined by Captain Tannehill and the men under his command."

The inference to be drawn from the quoted statements of Captain Powell is to the effect that when the regiment was no longer able to hold the enemy in check, it was ordered by Colonel Harker to fall back, and it must have been in disorder, because it had to be re-formed. It also appears that its ammunition was short, and that an additional supply was obtained from some supporting force in Snodgrass field, for Captain Powell says:[2] "We were at this time supplied with cartridges to make up forty rounds to the man." It was at this juncture that Hazen's Brigade opportunely arrived in Snodgrass cornfield, — viz., at about 5 P.M., — when the whole of Harker's Brigade had been driven back, and it is from Captain Powell's Report that we obtain the relative positions of the regiments of the brigade when re-formed on Harker's Hill,[3] "the engagement then being renewed;" and as the 125th Ohio appears

[1] No. 50, p. 704, l. 54.
[2] No. 50, p. 704, l. 56.
[3] No. 50, p. 705, l. 3.

65TH OHIO COMMISSIONED AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS (GROUP II)

1ST LIEUT. JOSEPH F. BONNANSTINE

2D LIEUT. C. M BUSH — 2D LIEUT. PHILIP P. McCUNE

CAPT. ORLOW SMITH

1ST SERGT. EZEKIEL MOORES — Q. M. JOHN C. ZOLLINGER

1ST SERGT. W. A. BELL — HOSPITAL STEWARD W. H. MOZIER

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on the left of the brigade at this time, our belief is still further confirmed as to its position on the left previously when on Horseshoe Ridge, and we are similarly assured of the position we have given to the 64th Ohio.

Captain Powell's Report also indicates that Colonel Bullitt rejoined his regiment, the 3d Kentucky, thus leaving Captain Powell again in command of the 65th Ohio when it fell back into Snodgrass field in rear of the log-house. These statements are taken from Captain Powell's Report,[1] and have been quoted already in our account of the position of this brigade on Harker's Hill.

General Granger's testimony is as follows:[2] "I cannot refrain from herein noticing the troops that held the Horseshoe Ridge and from testifying to their heroic behavior and unflinching steadiness under the heaviest fire. Their commanders, Generals Brannan and Wood and Colonel Harker, behaved with unqualified bravery and gallantry."

General Granger, as we have seen, was at the Snodgrass house in rear of the troops fighting on Horseshoe Ridge. Undoubtedly this "heaviest fire" was directed in front of the concavity of Horseshoe Ridge and not in rear of it, on what General Boynton calls "the bare ridge" and "the open crest near Snodgrass house."

Now, let us refer to another part of General Granger's Report for his description of the ridge on which, according to his testimony, Colonel Harker fought.[3] "At about 1 P.M. I reported to General Thomas. His forces were at that time stationed upon the brow of and holding a 'horseshoe ridge.'" The gradual slope from the Snodgrass house down towards the "Blacksmith Shop" does not answer to this definition, nor is any brow discernible.

General Brannan's testimony on the subject at issue is found (1) in his belated statement in regard to Harker's

[1] No. 50, p. 705, l. 1.
[2] No. 50, p. 655, l. 14.
[3] No. 50, p. 656, l. 29.

Brigade, on October 8, 1863,[1] that it "held a position on my [his] left after retiring to the ridge, and acted with great courage and determination, pouring into the rebels an incessant roll of musketry for several hours, causing them to recoil with immense slaughter."

We need only remark that Harker's retirement to Horseshoe Ridge was at 1 P.M., and that at this time, as Brannan says, Harker's position was on his left, not in his rear or left rear. Again, (2) in his sworn testimony before the Negley Court of Inquiry,[2] we find his statements to the same effect, and, after describing the position of his division which he re-formed on the ridge in a line nearly perpendicular to the original line of battle in the morning, he testifies: "I found Colonel Stoughton, who commanded a brigade of General Negley's Division, on my left, connected with Colonel Harker, of General Wood's Division." The position of Harker at this time was on his left on the same perpendicular line to the original line of battle in the morning.[3] We could have, it would appear, no more conclusive statement.

Nevertheless, as we have noticed, General Boynton, as historian and Park Commissioner, in his literature and maps has crowded Harker's Brigade off of Horseshoe Ridge entirely, and substituted in their place the few hundred men composed of the before-mentioned fragments of Stanley's, Croxton's, and Connell's Brigades, with Van Derveer's alone defending the Tower Hill on their right. The visitor to the battle-field will also notice the array of handsome monuments memorializing Harker's Brigade crowded off of Horseshoe Ridge, where this brigade made its magnificent defense, and located in the rear in the cornfield.

Yet General Boynton at one time did know the truth, when, on August 7, 1888, he wrote his newspaper account

[1] No. 50, p. 405, l. 28.
[2] No. 50, p. 1041, l. 48.
[3] No. 50, p. 1041, ll. 2, 31, and 48.

to the Cincinnati *Commercial Gazette*, and which he republished with corresponding maps in the before-mentioned book[1] on the life of General Thomas. Here he gives repeated proof that he knew the position of Harker's Brigade, of Wood's Division, behind the breastworks on the east extremity of Horseshoe Ridge, for the following is his statement (on page 416): "While Gracie's Brigade, of Preston, *was assaulting Hazen and Wood*,[2] this attack on the Union left began." Finally, in his map (opposite page 411), he correctly locates Wood's Division, viz., Harker's Brigade of that division on the east extremity of Horseshoe Ridge, far to the south of the Snodgrass house.

In the next chapter we shall find further conclusive proof of the true position of Colonel Stoughton's fragment of Stanley's Brigade, falsely located at the position which belonged to Harker. It is sufficient to state, what has already been proven, that it was on the right of Harker on the middle hill next to Brannan's left, which was Croxton's Brigade. It may not be out of place, however, at this juncture to conclude with the fact that the Confederate Records do not even mention Brannan's name or division, and according to the Confederate General Preston's account, the only troops encountered by his division belonged to Granger's and Crittenden's Corps. It was the troops of the latter whom he mentions as occupying the Battery Hill, which is the name he gives to the east hill of Horseshoe Ridge.[3] Of course, it is Harker's Brigade, of Crittenden's Corps, to which he refers.

[1] Donn Piatt, *General George H. Thomas. A Critical Biography.* With concluding chapters by Henry V. Boynton.

[2] Italics are mine. — Author.

[3] No. 51, p. 417, l. 42.

CHAPTER XIII

CONCERNING BRANNAN'S COMMAND AT THE CENTRE OF THE LINE

ELSEWHERE, but in the previous chapter especially, we have exposed the popular fallacy of assigning to Brannan's command the entire defense of Horseshoe Ridge. We have shown that Harker's Brigade occupied the eastern portion of it, where the slopes are most precipitous. Another popular conceit, fostered by officers of Van Derveer's Brigade, is the assertion, unsupported by the evidence of the Official Records and other authoritative sources, that their brigade, as shown on Plate VIII,[1] occupied the whole of Hill Number 2, the middle portion of Horseshoe Ridge, to the exclusion of all other Federal organizations. Not only this, but the further assertion is advertised to a credulous public that this Hill was the one position from which the Federals were not driven; and the Government lends its authority to the portrayal of this statement on the map in question by representing that Van Derveer's Brigade maintained this position at "8 P.M."

To those of my readers who have followed the previous discussions of the Official Records, which furnish the proof of the occupancy of the heights of the Horseshoe and Main Ridges by the Confederates, who were in complete possession of the Federal stronghold before 6 P.M., these assertions cannot but appear most ridiculous. From the Official Records, and from other authoritative sources as well, it has also been proven that regiments of Trigg's Brigade, at about sunset, or 6 P.M., marched up the north slope of

[1] Chapter XII, p. 242.

Horseshoe Ridge in rear of the Federals then remaining thereon and captured them. The authoritative testimony from 9th Indiana, 21st and 89th Ohio, and 22d Michigan sources has been presented, which shows that Van Derveer's Brigade was at this juncture in rear of the Snodgrass house and had abandoned the regiments in question to their fate, though the 9th Indiana, which was a witness to the proceeding, narrowly escaped.

The Official Reports of Colonels Van Derveer and Boynton and the three other regimental officers commanding regiments of Van Derveer's Brigade are entirely mum on the subject of their being in contact with any of the important proceedings which preceded, or which resulted in the scattering or in the capture of what at this juncture was a very considerable force of Federals, all of whom, however, with the exception of the 9th Indiana, had completely exhausted their ammunition. Even the very existence of these regiments is ignored by Van Derveer's men. On Colonel Van Derveer's part, considering the testimony presented, which furnishes the evidence of the charge of deliberate abandonment, it seems most extraordinary how this issue was avoided, in view of the direct charge of official record in the Reports of the 21st Ohio officers, who directly charged him with assuming command over the 21st Ohio and ordering its "interposition" between the enemy and himself, while his own troops were "stealthily withdrawn." The point is not one which Van Derveer and his officers might have regarded with indifference and have considered of too little importance to mention officially.

Not only is there no official record of any statements on the part of Van Derveer or any of his officers, but I have as yet been unable to discover any explanation made by any of them in after years.

In the case of General Boynton I know that the point at issue connected with the whole subject was a familiar

one to him. I have never seen any explanations emanating from either him or Van Derveer pertaining to the statements made by comrades since the war who belonged to the four regiments and who were treated so shamefully. "A Mystery of Horseshoe Ridge" is the only statement which I have from the pen of General Boynton in regard to it, and which is referred to elsewhere.

This hydra-headed monster of untruth, that Van Derveer retired from Horseshoe Ridge in perfect order and at his own free will, which crops out continually and tenaciously, has, I believe, already received blows which ought to prevent the rearing of its hoary head again.

In view of the circumstances, it seems unnecessary to repeat the testimony of Generals Granger and Thomas, where their official statements are not based upon personal knowledge, after their departure from the field of battle.

We need only refer to General Brannan's testimony in his Official Report, that his command remained only "until sunset" at the point where it "was actively engaged."

As to the 9th Indiana testimony, we need only refer to the official statements of its colonel, which indicate that he was ordered by Brannan's officers in Snodgrass field to take position on the "high hill" where Brannan's men had been and where his scouting expedition developed the presence of foes who had captured the Federals remaining there. We remember his testimony and the evidence furnished that, before he was thus "put in," he met Colonel Boynton, of the right regiment of Van Derveer's Brigade. On his prospecting tour did he find there any of the fragments of Stoughton, Croxton, Connell, or Buell, whose former position was on this "high hill"? He answers,[1] "Decidedly no"; the only Federals he found on the ridge were the ones who had surrendered, or who were captured.

[1] Chapter xiv, p. 228.

As has been already described in a previous chapter, and as will be in the next one also, it was through the medium of this 9th Indiana Regiment that General Brannan heard of the surrender of the troops who had been abandoned on Horseshoe Ridge; and whereupon he "sent the 35th Ohio," which was wheeled accordingly,[1] to create a diversion, but it was too late. The 9th Indiana meantime escaping, its colonel met Colonel Boynton and his 35th Ohio men at the edge of the little cliff near Snodgrass house. Here Colonel Suman suggested to Colonel Boynton that he should take "thirty steps" in order to see the point which the enemy had gained, "but he seemed not inclined to convince himself by going to see." [2]

It is also unnecessary for me to repeat the statements of officers of the 21st and 89th Ohio and 22d Michigan regiments in their letters, from which I have quoted in chapter X and XI and Notes thereto. We must recall, however, the testimony on the subject, which is fully corroborated by the record, that at 5.30 P.M., the 21st Ohio made its charge for the purpose of retaking the hill from which the 35th Ohio and the 2d Minnesota on the left had been driven pell-mell by the Confederates of the 5th Kentucky Regiment, of Kelly's Brigade, while the rest of Brannan's men, who had fought on the same hill on the left flank of the 2d Minnesota and the 35th Ohio, at the position formerly occupied by the 21st Ohio, were "stealthily withdrawn" from in front of the other two regiments of Kelly's Brigade, viz., the 58th North Carolina and the 63d Virginia.

We have seen how impossible it is, on account of sins of omission, to reconcile the statements of Van Derveer and his men with the fully corroborated testimony of the other four regiments, the 9th Indiana, the 21st and 89th Ohio, and the 22d Michigan. It is also an impossible task, for a similar reason, to reconcile satisfactorily the statements of

[1] No. 50, p. 436, l. 22. [2] No. 50, p. 709, l. 42.

the officers whose regiments fought on the left of the 2d Minnesota, with the Confederate testimony of officers of Kelly's Brigade, opposed to them after 4.30 P.M. The Federal regiments referred to are the ones who are charged by Major McMahan of the 21st Ohio, with having been "stealthily withdrawn," and whose statement is corroborated by Colonel Kelly.

In order to give the reader a full and fair opportunity of understanding what each and every one of these officers may have to say bearing upon the issue, and describing the period in question, I herewith present excerpts from their Official Reports, omitting only such statements as do not concern us here, and such as have already been discussed elsewhere, or will be in the next chapter.

(1) *Colonel Van Derveer*, commanding Brannan's Third Brigade, in his Report says:[1] —

> The position was the crest of a hill. From 2.30 P.M. until dark we were hotly engaged. Ammunition failing, we finally fixed bayonets, determined to hold the position.
>
> For an hour and a half before dark the attack was one of unexampled fury. At length night ended the struggle and the enemy retired from our immediate front.
>
> At 7 P.M., an order came from Major-General Thomas, that the forces under General Brannan should move quietly to Rossville.

Our ability to make the above statements square with the truth depends upon what construction we put upon the meaning of his words "until dark" and "night." Previous and future testimony shows that the woods were full of smoke, which produced a pall of darkness before 6 P.M.

The last encounter which Van Derveer's Brigade had with the enemy on the crest of Horseshoe Ridge was the one at the position west of the Tower, where his two

[1] No. 50, p. 430, ll. 37 and 50.



COL. FERDINAND VAN DERVEER

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regiments, the 35th Ohio and 2d Minnesota, relieved the 21st Ohio, and were driven entirely from the hill. This was before 5.30 P.M., when Van Derveer ordered the 21st Ohio, of Negley's Division, with one round, to retake the hill. His brigade was undoubtedly "hotly engaged for an hour and a half" before this period, but certainly not thereafter. Brannan, too, claims only "until sunset" to have been "heavily engaged."

It was at the same juncture, due to the Confederate Colonel Kelly's being "summoned suddenly from the field by General Preston,"[1] that the regiments of his brigade remained on the south slope, and that during the interval Brannan's men were "stealthily withdrawn."

When the order came for retirement, Brannan received it in Snodgrass field and withdrew, he says, "shortly after-sunset"; *we* say at 6.30 P.M., but Van Derveer, Boynton, and others put it at 7 P.M.

But it is not so much what Van Derveer mentions as what he neglects to mention that is of the greatest import-ance in our search for the truth. Neither he nor any of his regimental commanders tell us of their contact with any of the captured regiments; nothing about the 21st Ohio, who protected their flank and with whom they were in close contact all that afternoon, until they left it behind on Horseshoe Ridge trying in vain to retake the position from which Van Derveer's men were driven. At this juncture, in Snodgrass field, before 6 P.M., he met the 9th Indiana, Hazen's Brigade, and ordered it also interposed between his retiring forces and the enemy. He and his regimental commanders do not mention the 9th Indiana, either as to time, place, or circumstance.

[1] And when Colonel Kelly returned to his brigade "the enemy [on the ridge] had surrendered to Colonel Trigg," escaping prisoners had been recaptured, and the action was over. See No. 51, p. 461, l. 54; p. 462, ll. 1–6; p. 446, ll. 1–18, 26, 36–43; p. 444, l. 4, etc.

(2) *Colonel James George*, commanding the 2d Minnesota, Van Derveer's Brigade, in his Report[1] says in substance that his regiment was on the hill heavily engaged from 2.30 P.M. until "4.45 P.M., when there was an intermission in the firing and the enemy temporarily withdrew from the contest. Two other attacks were afterwards made upon us here, but both were repulsed, and darkness ended the fight about 6.30 P.M."

We take no issue in any statement that he makes. He makes no claim that his position was on the Horseshoe after 6 P.M. We, however, do take issue with him for omitting to state that his regiment was driven from its position at about 5.30 P.M., according to the testimony furnished by other Federal and Confederate Reports.

(3) *Colonel Boynton*, commanding the 35th Ohio, Van Derveer's Brigade, in his Report [2] tells us nothing that has not been fully discussed elsewhere.

He tells us how his own brigade came upon the hill unbroken and how it took position in one line on the crest, the 35th on the right.[3] In a short time it advanced to a line of logs, etc., all of which has been described before. We have seen that when his regiment moved farther to the right, it fell into position in rear of the 21st Ohio, with the 2d Minnesota on the left.

As we have already shown, the principal issue which we take with this Report depends (1) upon its interpretation. We find, however, no direct statement therein claiming occupation of Horseshoe Ridge after 6 P.M. (2) The other principal point at issue is his omission of the fact, testified to elsewhere, that his regiment was driven from Horseshoe Ridge.

[1] No. 50, p. 433, l. 46.

[2] No. 50, p. 436.

[3] With the exception of the 87th Indiana, whose colonel's (Gleason's) Report (p. 286, *infra*) shows that he joined the other three regiments of the brigade later.



COL. HENRY V. N. BOYNTON

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(4) *Colonel Kammerling*, commanding the 9th Ohio, Van Derveer's Brigade, in his Report[1] says: —

I was ordered by Colonel Van Derveer to march off by the flank with skirmishers ahead, and on a parallel line with the Second Minnesota Regiment, in a direction from east to west. After having marched about one mile through the woods we reached an open cornfield, passed across the same, and again entered the woods, which we found filled with our troops. Here we were ordered to take position along the crest of a hillside, on the right of the Eighty-second Regiment Indiana Volunteers. The whole Third Division was concentrated on this point. The enemy were in force in our front, trying to take the hill occupied by our troops, and so to cut off our communication with Chattanooga. A terrible fire was incessantly kept up by both sides. Desperate efforts were made by the rebels to gain our hill and storm our little fence breastworks, which, although hastily erected in a few moments of pause, gave a good cover to our soldiers, and as such were of an immense advantage and saved many a soldier's life. In vain the rebels made charge after charge. Each was bravely repulsed, and finally just before dark the enemy abstained from their attempts and let us alone. An hour after dark our troops were quietly and unmolested marching back toward Rossville.

This description helps us in our alignment, and corroborates various points of information found elsewhere as to locality and circumstance.

We note his statement that he found the woods of Horseshoe Ridge "filled with our troops." He presents the principal testimony locating the position of the fragment of the 82d Indiana, Connell's Brigade. Here again the question at issue is omitted. From Confederate testimony, elsewhere seen, the opposing regiments of Kelly's Brigade were, just before dark, lying on the south slope of the middle hill of Horseshoe Ridge, waiting the order of the brigade commander to advance; but Colonel Kelly had

[1] No. 50, p. 1069, l. 13.

been summoned from his brigade by General Preston. It was during this interval that these troops of Van Derveer's on the left were "stealthily withdrawn," according to the statement of the officers of the 21st Ohio, and confirmed by Reports of Colonel Kelly and his regimental commanders.

(5) *Colonel Gleason*, commanding the 87th Indiana, Van Derveer's Brigade, in his Official Report disposes of the period in question in a single sentence, as follows: [1] —

> My command retired to the top of a hill occupied by the balance of the division, where we soon joined the brigade[2] and formed upon the left of the 2d Minnesota, maintaining our position fighting the enemy with vigor and determination until the darkness of night brought the engagement to a close.

Here again the issue as to the point involved is omitted. No direct testimony is furnished against evidence presented elsewhere that Brannan's men on the left of the 2d Minnesota and 35th Ohio were "stealthily withdrawn" from their position shortly before 6 P.M., to a position three hundred yards or more in the rear, where they were "unmolested."

The accompanying diagram represents the alignment and relative positions of the regiments of Van Derveer's Brigade just before the period between 4 and 4.30 P.M., when the first assaults were made by the brigades of Preston's Division.



A study of the previous positions in line of the various Federal organizations which fell back from the first line of battle and took refuge on the heights providentially found in the rear, and where they were supported by Steedman's Division coming most opportunely to their rescue, is helpful to our understanding of the actual and relative positions

[1] No. 50, p. 1059, l. 20.

[2] See p. 284, *supra*.

occupied by Harker's Brigade, and by the organizations which fought under General Brannan's command.

We have already described somewhat at length Harker's successive movements to his position on the east extremity of Horseshoe Ridge.

On the other hand, according to General Brannan's Report[1] and his sworn testimony before the Negley Court of Inquiry,[2] we arrive at the conclusion that when his division, in the vicinity of the Poe house in the original line of battle in the morning, "was thrown back a half a mile to the rear," not only did Connell's Brigade fall back to the Main Ridge, but his other brigade, Croxton's, also did the same thing, reaching Horseshoe Ridge at its western extremity. We have the testimony of General Wood to this effect, and no statement of General Brannan to the contrary as to the route his division took before arriving on the "commanding ridge."

General Wood's testimony referred to is as follows:[3] —

> He [General Brannan] had been compelled to fall back to the general ridge, inclosing, on the west, the valley in which the great battle was fought, which ridge, as already remarked, runs north parallel to the Rossville and Lafayette road. When I took position with Harker's Brigade on the narrow ridge, extending partially across the valley, General Brannan formed his command on my right and higher up on the Main Ridge, etc.

According to this statement, the movements of the two organizations were coincident in their formation on Horseshoe Ridge, Harker on the eastern and Brannan on the western extremity; and, according to General Brannan's sworn testimony, quoted in the last chapter,[4] he found Colonel Stoughton already there on his left, "connecting with Colonel Harker. General John Beatty was also there."

[1] No. 50, p. 402, l. 38.
[2] No. 50, p. 1041, ll. 51 and 55.
[3] No. 50, p. 657, l. 50.
[4] No. 50, p. 1041, l. 31.

From General Brannan's Report it is evident that General Thomas had nothing to do with the selection of Horseshoe Ridge as a rallying-point for his command. But in the case of General Wood, it was his own appreciation of this advantageous position which led him to withdraw to the east extremity of the ridge in question.[1] "The short and narrow ridge," as he describes it, "which extends athwart the valley in a nearly east-and-west course. The abruptness of the declivity on either side of it, almost gives to this ridge the quality of a natural parapet," etc. "Here I determined," he says, "to make an obstinate and stubborn stand."

Thus it appears that it was not on General Thomas' orders that Wood took position on Horseshoe Ridge, and, according to his Report,[2] referring to his able and distinguished commander, Major-General Thomas, he says: "I think it must have been near to 2 o'clock when he came to where my command was so hotly engaged. His presence was most welcome. The men saw him, felt they were battling under the eye of a great chieftain, and their courage and resolution received fresh inspiration from the consciousness."

If we now revert to General Thomas' Official Report, we find that he first met Colonel Harker in Dyer's field, and ordered him to return the fire and resist the farther advance of the Confederate troops who were mistaken for friends; but when Harker later retired to Horseshoe Ridge, it was on the brigade or division commander's orders and where Harker[3] "placed his right in connection with Brannan's Division, and portions of Beatty's and Stanley's Brigades of Negley's Division." Thomas "then rode to the crest of the hill referred to," and on his way met General Wood, and delivered what seems to have been—from

[1] No. 50, p. 457, l. 40.
[2] No. 50, p. 638, l. 32.
[3] No. 50, p. 268, l. 55.

his own account as well as General Wood's—the *ex post facto* order "to place his division on the prolongation of Brannan's, who, I [he] ascertained from Wood, was on the top of the hill above referred to." Thus it appears from the Reports of both Generals Thomas and Wood that the former rode to the crest of the east hill of Horseshoe Ridge, where Harker was so hotly engaged; and from this position General Wood pointed out to General Thomas, Brannan's position on Wood's "right and higher up on the main Ridge, thus giving to our [their] united lines something of the shape of an irregular crescent with the concavity toward the enemy." This concavity, as General Wood describes it,[1] was towards the south and not towards the east and the Lafayette road.

On the strength of a statement in his Official Report[2] as to the relative time of General Granger's appearance with Steedman's Division, marching up in rear of the position on the Horseshoe, we are able to establish the actual time as about 1.30 o'clock P.M. when Thomas joined Wood on the crest of the hill. The troops of his own division, whom General Brannan formed on the ridge at this juncture, besides the fragment of the 82d Indiana, of Connell's Brigade, consisted only of fragments of his other brigade, Croxton's, belonging to the 4th and 10th Kentucky and the 14th Ohio. Before the arrival of Harker and Brannan, the only Federal troops in the vicinity of Snodgrass house, cornfield, and Horseshoe Ridge were those of General Negley's Division, viz., Sirwell's Brigade, supporting some batteries of artillery. This scattered artillery was posted under General Negley, acting under General Thomas' orders and the guidance of an officer of his staff, Captain Gaw.[3] When it was exposed to capture by the Confederate advance in rear of the Horseshoe, as well as in front

[1] No. 50, p. 657, l. 46.
[2] No. 50, p. 252, l. 46.
[3] No. 50, p. 1026, l. 36.

of it, he removed six batteries into the woods and on higher ground. Meantime, the 21st Ohio had also been moved into the woods on the southern slope of Horseshoe Ridge, where it had rendered the important service of repulsing Robertson's Brigade, of Hood's Division,[1] whose advance was checked after its occupation of the "lower ridge" in front of the Horseshoe, with its "dominant hill," which was later occupied by Harker's Brigade and part of Buell's; but when Brannan met Negley, and urgently requested support, the 21st was left behind to protect Brannan's flank, while Negley preserved the fifty guns from imminent capture by their removal from the field with the seven hundred infantry support, which were all that remained to him of his division, of the command of which he had been stripped because of the urgent needs of other division commanders.

We shall now call for the testimony in the Official Records of the officers commanding these fragmentary parts of Brannan's command.

(1) *Colonel George P. Buell*, commanding Brigade in Wood's Division, reports as follows:[2] —

I continued to retreat with the remnant of my brigade until we came up to the right flank of General Brannan's Division, which was in position on the top of a high hill. Here I reported to General Brannan, and we remained in this position until the sun went down. . . .

Colonel Harker's Brigade was on his [Brannan's] left. About 4.30 o'clock our ammunition entirely failed; we had already taken all from the dead and wounded. Just at this time Colonel Stout, of the 17th Kentucky, came up with about one hundred men, having sixty rounds each. He gladly relieved my men, while they remained in his rear with fixed bayonets to help hold the hill; this as a last resort. Soon after 4 p. m., as the enemy was again coming around our right flank, General Steedman's

[1] See Notes to chapter x, Introduction, "Second Position" of 21st Ohio.
[2] No. 50, p. 657, l. 10.

Division, of General Granger's Corps, came up on the right. Happy were we to see them. They held the right till night. As night closed the scene, the whole rebel army, then almost surrounding us, gave one long and exultant cheer. Our few thousand exhausted men, who, without ammunition, had so long struggled to hold the trying position, being by no means disheartened, answered them with bold and defiant shouts. Soon after dark I was ordered to follow Colonel Harker's command with mine. We marched to the rear and reached Rossville about 11 P.M.

Here we have corroboration of General Brannan's Report as to maintenance of the Horseshoe Ridge position "till the sun went down." Colonel Buell's description helps to establish the relative position of this fragment of his brigade on the right flank of General Brannan's Division.

This fragment, according to the context of Colonel Buell's statement and the Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Embree,[1] was composed of only "about one hundred and fifty men" of the 58th Indiana under its major, Moore, who gave the latter "the facts connected with the" action at this point. This was all that was left of Buell's Brigade and the 58th Indiana Regiment, after being driven by Kershaw from their previous position on the lower ridge on the right of Harker. This remnant which was rallied moved up the south slope and halted on the right of Croxton's Brigade, which was then Brannan's flank. Here this remnant of the regiment fought until 4.30 P.M., when their ammunition was exhausted.[2]

Analyzing his statement that one hundred men of the 17th Kentucky came up at this time to his relief, we can reconcile it only on the theory that these one hundred men came up from the rear, where they had replenished their ammunition, which had become exhausted when occupy-

[1] No. 50, p. 665, l. 18.

[2] See Notes to chapter XIII, Note A.

ing a previous position on the summit of the hill; for it is in evidence, from a statement contained in Colonel Stout's Report,[1] that this fragment of his regiment also made its way from Dyer's field up the south slope of the Horseshoe, where it also "found fragments of various commands, including a small portion of General Brannan's Division."[2]

From the context of the various Reports here referred to, it is evidenced that these various fragments were posted on the heights with General Brannan, not only before the arrival of General Steedman and Colonel Van Derveer, but also before Brannan's flank on the Horseshoe was about to be turned, and before the first assaults of Kershaw's Brigade and of Anderson's, of Hindman's Division. These statements are of assistance to us in connection with the diagram which we shall presently show, indicating the alignment of these various fragments. We note that Colonel Buell's statements as to actual time are irreconcilable with our previous study and conclusions, and we shall presently discuss this time-table question collectively with the testimony of other witnesses.

It suffices here to call attention to the fact that, according to Buell's statement, the limit in point of relative time of occupancy of the position on the summit of the Horseshoe and Main Ridges, or in the rear thereof, by Steedman and by Brannan's "various fragments" before marching orders to Rossville arrived, was marked by and coincident with the "one long and exultant cheer of the whole rebel army."[3] This incident occurred at a well-defined point of time established by the meeting of the two wings of the Confederate army, and a realization of the fact that their heroic efforts were at last rewarded with success, the Federals fleeing before them from every quarter of the field. This, as we have seen beyond peradven-

[1] No. 50, p. 816, l. 52.
[2] See Notes to chapter XIII, Note B.
[3] No. 50, p. 817, l. 1.

ture, was about 6 P.M. The point of relative time designated by Colonel Buell as "at night" was therefore about 6 P.M.[1]

(2) *Colonel Stout*, commanding the 17th Kentucky, of Samuel Beatty's Brigade, of Van Cleve's Division, reports:[2] —

> With the major, adjutant, and colors, and about one hundred men I moved to the left and rear, several times halting and firing a volley at the enemy, but in every instance outflanked until we reached the crest of a high ridge running from north to south and then turning at right angles and running westward.[3] There we found fragments of various commands, including a small portion of General Brannan's division. These were hastily formed along the crest and preparations made to hold the position. . . . Our little force, increased to some fifteen hundred, Colonel Cram and Lieutenant-Colonel Bailey, of the Ninth Kentucky, with a small portion of that regiment, took a position and held it until dark. A few men of the Nineteenth Ohio and Seventy-ninth Indiana were also with my small command. By hard, determined fighting, the enemy was held back until late in the evening, when a part of General Granger's command arrived and took position on our right and engaged the enemy just as he was about to turn our right. A desperate fight ensued and lasted until nearly dark. Our little fight on the crest I must consider as the most brilliant of the two days' battle.

We interpret his statement "some fifteen hundred" to apply to the members of the various fragments under Brannan's command, including Croxton's Brigade of his division. This accords with our previous estimate, made irrespective of this Report. His indefinite statements as to points of time relative to Granger's arrival and the duration of the contest will be considered later collectively with the testimony of other witnesses.

The peculiar feature of the testimony quoted from the Reports of the witnesses whose statements we have just

[1] See next to last paragraph, Notes to chapter VIII, Note A, locating Colonel Buell.

[2] No. 50, p. 816, l. 52.

[3] He means eastward.

considered is the lateness of the hour of their reported arrival of Steedman's Division on their right flank. Colonel Buell puts it at "soon after 4 P.M."; Colonel Embree, through Major Moore, at "about 4 P.M."; and Colonel Stout at "late in the evening." These are the extreme limits of time developed by our research in the Official Reports and elsewhere, the next latest limit being Brannan's testimony:[1] "Reinforced about 3.30 P.M." But we have as many score of witnesses to an earlier hour as we have one to the contrary as late or later than Brannan's testimony. To summon all of these witnesses would be a work of supererogation. Elsewhere the testimony has been presented showing the unanimity in the Official Reports and elsewhere of Granger's men, including corps, brigade, division, regimental, company, and battery commanders, showing that the latest hour at which any one of them places the time of leaving McAfee's church is 11.30 A.M., and of Steedman's reporting to Thomas is 1.30 P.M., and of the time when put into action is 2.30 P.M.

It has also been shown elsewhere, from General Steedman's Report and other authoritative sources, that on Steedman's arrival, his division was formed preparatory for a movement into the gap between the lines of the two wings on Harker's left and Reynolds' right; but the order was countermanded, and Steedman was thereupon put in on Brannan's right flank just as Bushrod Johnson's Division was on the point of turning it.

The Confederate testimony shows that Bushrod Johnson's Division was posted on a "bald hill,"[2] overlooking the "cove" lying south of the Vidito house, "where it remained from a few minutes before 12 M.[3] until a few minutes before 2 P.M.,"[4] waiting for orders to advance, and not coming in contact with the enemy in force for half an hour

[1] No. 50, p. 402, l. 53.
[2] No. 51, p. 459, l. 22.
[3] No. 51, p. 475, l. 1, and p. 458, l. 52.
[4] No. 51, p. 461, l. 46.

thereafter. This admission on General Johnson's part is bad enough as it is, representing as it does an inertness of two hours and a half, waiting for Longstreet's orders, which never came. To extend this limit of inertia an hour or an hour and a half longer would meet with a storm of protest from every soldier who fought in that brave and self-sacrificing Tennessee division.

When General Garfield arrived at General Thomas' headquarters it appears from General Thomas' Report[1] that the relative time of Steedman's arrival was two hours previous, and Garfield's actual time of arrival is established by our *lex scripta*, his often-mentioned telegram from Thomas' headquarters,[2] sent at "3.45 P.M.," and which says: "I arrived here ten minutes ago. Granger is here closed up with Thomas. He is fighting terribly on the right."

These conclusions as to time have been reached after many years' study of all conflicting statements. It must be remembered that while 2.30 P.M. is the latest time we can assign to Steedman's getting into action, it was not until near 3 P.M., after charging down the south slope of the heights, that Le Favour's semi-brigade, of Steedman's Division, returned to the summit after a twenty minutes' contest during this interval. This is the time which the 21st Ohio reports, "when some of the Reserve Corps came up and relieved us"[3] [them].

We therefore have no hesitancy in our assertion that Colonels Buell and Stout are absolutely wrong in their statement on the point of time. To account for their error we might take into consideration (1) the suspense in waiting for expected support must have made the hours seem longer; (2) the woods on fire and full of smoke caused darkness and made the hour appear later; (3) an exag-

[1] No. 50, p. 258, l. 20, and p. 262, l. 58. [2] No. 50, p. 141, l. 12.
[3] No. 50, p. 394, l. 58.

gerated sense of loyalty towards their own command in rivalry with others for the glory of efficiency and endurance. This proof of the unreliability of the testimony as to the time of Granger's arrival is certainly a point of evidence against their testimony, if we regard the indefinite expressions "at night" and "at dark" as having any other meaning than 6 P.M.

(3) *Captain Cosgrove*, commanding the 13th Ohio, Dick's Brigade, Van Cleve's Division, reports as follows:[1] —

> Our line fell back, and nearly one hundred of the regiment, with the colors, took position on the crest of a hill to the right of the general hospital, where we had many killed and wounded. At dark we were ordered to vacate the hill and fall back in company with part of General Brannan's Division to a point four miles to the rear.

In his description of the hill to the right of the general hospital, he refers, as we have so frequently seen in these Reports, to Hill Number 2. The Official Reports and our research have rendered no assistance to our efforts to more definitely locate the relative position of this fragment of men.[2] The previous discussion as to the indefiniteness of the statement "at dark" need not be repeated, and that he refers to a period near sunset.

(4) *Colonel Cram*, commanding the 9th Kentucky, Samuel Beatty's Brigade, Van Cleve's Division, makes his Report[3] of the "small portion of that [his] regiment," hitherto mentioned by Colonel Stout as one of the fragments who "were also with my [his] small command":—

> I ordered the regiment to fall back, which it did, pursued by the enemy. We moved to the left and rear nearly half a mile,

[1] No. 50, p. 830, l. 50.

[2] Lieutenant Daniel W. Rutan, of Company D, describes, in correspondence with me, the color-bearer incident, which he saw, and as related by comrades of Stanley's Brigade and General Beatty, thus fixing the 13th Ohio in Stanley's vicinity on Hill Number 2.

[3] No. 50, p. 814, l. 25.

and took position on the crest of a hill overlooking the road and a flat valley, and with the fragments of several other regiments made a most desperate and successful resistance against all attempts to take the hill. From about 1 until 4 o'clock the enemy kept up an almost constant fire of musketry. Taking advantage of a short lull in the firing, I ordered barricades of such material as was most convenient to be built on the crest of the hill, and logs, stumps, and rails were scarcely piled up to the height of two feet before the enemy again made a most desperate attempt to take the hill. For half an hour the firing was the most terrific I had ever heard, my men firing during that time sixty rounds of cartridges, and it was only when the last cartridge was expended that I ordered my men to fall back. The enemy did not occupy the hill until the next morning.

As long as he remained on the hill a successful resistance was maintained. The first assaults prior to 4 o'clock were those of Kershaw's and Anderson's Brigades. At 4 P.M. Preston's Division came up with Kelly's Brigade in his (9th Kentucky's) front. At the end of half an hour his ammunition was exhausted, and Cram ordered his men to withdraw. Every statement is in accord with the preponderance of the most authoritative testimony, but when he says, "The enemy did not occupy the hill until the next morning," his statement, which is not of his personal knowledge, is absolutely worthless. The only competent testimony as to whether the Confederates continued their occupancy of the hill in question after the Federal withdrawal is that of the Confederates who bivouacked there, as shown by Confederate reports and maps with Preston's Division represented thereon, from one extremity of the ridge to the other.

It would appear that when such a statement is made in an Official Report, we should be justified in throwing out all his testimony on the basis of the principle, *falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus*. It was at or near this position that the three Federal regiments captured were marched from the

field, the 54th Virginia, of Trigg's Brigade, taking them to the rear. Immediately thereafter the 58th North Carolina, of Kelly's Brigade, covered the ground which had been the scene of the conflict and bivouacked on Hill Number 2 with the rest of its brigade. From the Report of its colonel, Palmer,[1] this is fully confirmed: —

> I, accompanied by Lieutenant Terrett, of Colonel Kelly's staff, moved my regiment so as to sweep over the scene of our conflict, and, gathering a portion of our dead and all of our wounded, caused details from my regiment, assisted by the infirmary corps, to convey the latter to the foot of the ridge, and the former to the division hospital established nearby. Colonel Kelly afterward returning, the brigade was collected together and we all slept upon the battle-field.

The testimony of officers of Croxton's Brigade comes next in order of consideration.

We have already shown (on page 249 of the previous chapter) that this brigade on Horseshoe Ridge was a fragment of only "a few hundred men" belonging to the 4th and 10th Kentucky and the 14th Ohio Regiments.

(5) *Lieutenant-Colonel Kingsbury*, commanding the 14th Ohio, Croxton's Brigade, Brannan's Division, says in his Report:[2] —

> We fell back across the field [Dyer's] and there rallied what men I could and formed them upon the hill. During the confusion, my command became separated and were kept so during the day. . . .
>
> The major and several other of the officers, with what men they could rally, remained upon the hill to the right of the hospital (on the right) and fought until the enemy fell back and gave up the contest. It was 6.30 P.M. when they were withdrawn and moved to the rear.
>
> The confusion which we were at times thrown into renders a more explicit report impracticable.

[1] No. 51, p. 446, l. 31.

[2] No. 50, p. 425, l. 24.

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REPRESENTATIVES OF CROXTON'S BRIGADE

MAJ. ROBERT M. KELLY

COL. JOHN T. CROXTON

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From the context we reach the conclusion that Colonel Kingsbury did not remain on Horseshoe Ridge with the major and other officers of his regiment, and it is from them that he obtains his information as to what happened there. The position occupied was on the hill to the right of the hospital, viz., Hill Number 2, the location of which was "on the right" wing of the army under Thomas. The enemy referred to in front of the 14th Ohio's position who fell back on the south slope of the Horseshoe, were regiments of Kelly's Brigade which, in the absence of their brigade commander, as fully explained elsewhere, did not advance until after Trigg's Brigade had swept the whole ridge and captured the Federals remaining there.[1] It was during this lull in the fighting that, about 5.30 P.M., the Federals occupying this position on the ridge were "stealthily withdrawn," according to 21st Ohio Reports. The time of withdrawal from Snodgrass cornfield is given as "6.30 P.M.," being somewhat later than Brannan's statement, "shortly after sunset."

(6) *Major R. M. Kelly*,[2] commanding the 4th Kentucky, Croxton's Brigade, Brannan's Division, in his Report[3] describes his early movement "with about twenty-five of my [his] own men and a small number from other regiments," with whom he reported to Colonel Van Derveer, who placed him on the right of the 35th Ohio, and when the latter moved to Horseshoe Ridge, Major Kelly moved with him, and here we quote directly from his Report:[4]—

I there found Colonel Hays, commanding Second Brigade, with a few hundred men, and was joined by forty or fifty of my men under their officers. After an hour or two of rest moved up the hill and engaged the enemy, who were endeavoring to carry the ridge. Here the regiment suffered severely. After being in action about an hour and a half the enemy was repulsed. I re-

[1] See p. 285 of this chapter and footnote.
[2] No. 50, p. 1062, l. 13.
[3] See Notes to chapter XIII, Note C.
[4] No. 50, p. 1062, l. 25.

formed the regiment in line, and shortly afterward was requested by Colonel Stoughton, commanding brigade in (Negley's) division, to move about one hundred yards to the left and fill a gap in his line, which I did. Not seeing Colonel Hays at the moment, I reported the fact to General Brannan. There was no further firing, and a little after dark I received orders to move quietly in rear of the brigade off the hill.

Let us analyze this Report, comparing its statements with others.

At 2.30 P.M. Major Kelly was joined by about forty-five of his men, making some seventy of his regiment, who rested in the cornfield for an hour or two. This interval would bring the time to the first assault of Kelly's Brigade, of Preston's Division. The duration of this interval, he says, was about an hour and a half, being the period from 4 to 5.30 P.M., when the assaults of Kelly's Brigade were made against this position, and when they ceased, as described elsewhere. The movement of the regiment after 5.30 P.M., when at Colonel Stoughton's request it was moved one hundred yards to the left, appears to have been made in Snodgrass cornfield. This conclusion is reached after careful consideration, for several reasons: (1) At this juncture, Major Kelly reported to General Brannan, and the latter we know was in the cornfield at this time. (2) In my correspondence with Major Kelly, he tells me he has no recollection of the movement. None of my correspondents who belonged to Stoughton's command recall any such change of position on Horseshoe Ridge.

When the brigade "received orders," it appears from the testimony of our next witness, that General Brannan delivered the same in person. This brigade, Croxton's, led the division in its withdrawal from the hill on which is Snodgrass cornfield and Snodgrass house. Van Derveer's Brigade, of the same division, followed Croxton's.

(7) *Lieutenant-Colonel Wharton*, commanding the 10th



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4TH KENTUCKY OFFICERS (GROUP I)

CAPT. SYLVESTER S. ROCKWELL

ASSIST.-SURGEON HARRISON PHILLIPS

CAPT. ALFRED S. STEWART, CO. K.

MAJ. J. WESLEY JACOBS

CAPT. WILLIAM F. HOCH, CO. F.

1ST LIEUT. SAMUEL H. HILLIS

1ST LIEUT. JAMES McDERMOTT, CO. I.

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Kentucky, Croxton's Brigade, Brannan's Division, succeeded to the command of the regiment when Colonel Hays assumed command of the brigade after the wounding of its commander, Colonel Croxton. Colonel Wharton's Report is as follows:[1]—

> The regiment, together with the 4th Kentucky and the 14th Ohio, were posted on the crest of a high hill on the west side of the Chattanooga and Lafayette road, which they were ordered to hold, which we succeeded in doing with slight loss until 3 o'clock, when we were relieved by the division of General James B. Steedman. I then withdrew my regiment about two hundred yards and replenished our exhausted ammunition and rested the troops for about half an hour, when the Third Brigade, which was posted on this same hill to the left of position from which we had been relieved by General Steedman, was furiously assaulted by a large column of the enemy, and we were ordered forward to their support. The troops went forward with great determination and at a double-quick and took position behind a temporary fortification of rails immediately on the left of the Third Brigade, Third Division, Fourteenth Army Corps, and poured a most destructive fire into the advancing columns of the enemy, which staggered them for a moment, but they rallied and advanced again and again. It seemed two or three times it would be impossible to hold our position, so overwhelming was the force of the enemy, but our troops, being partially screened by the rails, poured volley after volley into their masses, and so well aimed that, after three hours of most desperate fighting, the enemy withdrew just as our ammunition was exhausted, and General Brannan had ordered the men to fix bayonets and receive the enemy on their points if they again advanced. . . . After night had well set in, we, in obedience to orders received from General Brannan in person, withdrew the regiment from its position on the hill and marched to Rossville.

The above statements conform in time, place, and circumstance with all our calculations. The "Third Brigade," on whose left Croxton's rallied, was Van Derveer's Bri-

[1] No. 50, p. 423, l. 46.

gade.[1] We also note that the time when ammunition was exhausted, and General Brannan ordered resort to the bayonet in case of necessity, corresponds with the time that he is represented to have appealed to General Granger, and received the orders in question. "After night had well set in" and orders were "received from General Brannan in person" have no reference to Horseshoe Ridge as the position of their delivery. General Brannan's own testimony is that "shortly after sunset" he was in rear of Snodgrass house.

We now come to the consideration of the testimony which concerns the position and record of the fragment of Stanley's Brigade, Negley's Division.

We call it a fragment advisedly, according to the description of its colonel, Stanley, who, when wounded in the vicinity of the Snodgrass house, turned the command of his brigade over to Colonel Stoughton, of the 11th Michigan, and testifies[2] to the gallantry of Colonel Stoughton and his men in making "such a fight as is seldom made by so small a number of men."

General John Beatty in his Report describes the period prior to the brigade's movement southerly toward the Snodgrass house, when[3] "Colonel Stanley's Brigade, considerably scattered by the last furious attack of the enemy, was gathered up by its officers and retired to the ridge on the right and in rear of the original line of battle."

Stoughton's position has already been proven,[4] according to the testimony of General Brannan,[5] to have been on the middle hill on the same line with himself and Colonel Harker on Horseshoe Ridge, facing south.

[1] The Official Records furnish no data fixing the relative alignment of these fragmentary regiments of Croxton's Brigade. See Major R. M. Kelly's account. Notes to chapter XIII, Note C.

[2] No. 50, p. 880, l. 35.

[3] No. 50, p. 870, l. 9.

[4] Chapter XII, p. 276.

[5] No. 50, p. 1041, l. 32.

Our further record of official information is mostly derived from the Reports of Colonel Stoughton and General Beatty, as there are no regimental reports of record from Stanley's Brigade.

As there has been so much misrepresentation, without any foundation in fact based upon the statements made in Colonel Stoughton's Report, we shall present the same to the reader at considerable length, omitting only what does not concern the history of the brigade on Horseshoe Ridge.

Colonel Stoughton's Report[1] is as follows: —

(1) About 1 o'clock I advanced the command about fifty yards and drove the enemy, who had opened a scattering fire upon us, from our immediate front. (2) I then placed the Eleventh Michigan and the Nineteenth Illinois Regiments in line of battle, in a strong position, under cover of the hill, leaving the Eighteenth Ohio to support a section of the Fourth U. S. Artillery and watch the motions of the enemy. Soon after the brigade had taken this position the enemy made a spirited attack on a hill to my right, occupied by the left of General Brannan's Division, apparently driving our troops back. I at once ordered the Eleventh Michigan and the Nineteenth Illinois to their support. These regiments advanced at a double-quick and charged upon the enemy, driving him from the hill. (3) Immediately after this charge I was informed by General John Beatty that our position upon this hill must be maintained, and was directed to use the forces under my command for that purpose. I at once placed my forces along the crest of the hill, the Nineteenth Illinois on the right, and the Eleventh Michigan on the left, and constructed rude breastworks.

My brigade was by far the largest, if not the only, organized force on the hill, and I accordingly assumed command. The fragments of the regiments on the hill and all the men found in the rear were placed in the most available positions. (4) About 4 o'clock the enemy made a vigorous attack upon our position, and a contest ensued, which in its fierceness and duration has few parallels. Our troops, without exception, maintained their

[1] No. 50, p. 381, l. 10.

ground with unfaltering courage, and the few who recoiled from the storm of bullets were speedily rallied, and returned with renewed ardor. The enemy was in heavy force, and fought with the most determined obstinacy. As fast as their ranks were thinned by our fire they were filled up by fresh troops. (5) They pressed forward and charged up to our lines, firing across our breast-works, and planted their colors within one hundred feet of our own. A dense cloud of smoke enveloped our lines, and in some places the position of the foe could only be known by the flash of his guns.

At 6 P.M. the enemy still held his position, and as a last resort, I ordered up the Eighteenth Ohio, and rallying every man that could be got, charged forward with a cheer upon his colors. His flag went down. His lines broke and fell back from the hill. During the fight Brigadier-General John Beatty rode up on the hill and assisted materially in sustaining and inspiring the men. His assistance there, and also in sending men forward, was timely and very valuable.

Our ammunition became exhausted during the fight and every cartridge that could be found on the persons of the killed and wounded, as well as the boxes of the prisoners which we took, were distributed to the men.

Colonel Hunter, of the Eighty-second Indiana, and Colonel Hays, of the Tenth Kentucky, also rendered efficient service.

(6) About 8 o'clock orders came from General Brannan to retire, and the brigade was quietly formed and marched in good order to Rossville. About half an hour before we left, a raking fire was poured into our ranks by the enemy from a hill to our right, which had been occupied and as we supposed was still held by General Granger's Reserve Corps.

We shall analyze and comment, as we consider in order the various statements in the above Report.

(1) The position described at the opening was facing east and southeast, near the Snodgrass house, where the scattering fire received, came from the reconnaissance of General Humphreys' Brigade, as described in his Report and elsewhere.

(2) It was soon after this that Kershaw's Brigade made

GEN. JOHN BEATTY

COL. TIMOTHY R STANLEY

COL. WILLIAM L. STOUGHTON

LIEUT.-COL. ALEX. W. RAFFEN

A FEW BRIGADE AND REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS OF NEGLEY'S DIVISION

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its assault on Horseshoe Ridge, and as indicated in Colonel Stoughton's Report, his brigade was hurried to the right on Hill Number 2, and occupied a position on the left of General Brannan's Division. Stoughton's support to Brannan was very timely and drove Kershaw back down the hill. The regiments of the brigade at this time on Horseshoe Ridge were only two, the 11th Michigan and the 19th Illinois.

(3) General Beatty, who commanded a brigade in Negley's Division, was also with Colonel Stoughton on the ridge, the latter being subject to his commands. His statement in his Official Report[1] is to this effect: —

> I stationed myself near the Second Brigade of our division, then commanded by Colonel Stoughton, of Eleventh Michigan, and gave such general directions to him and the troops about me as under the circumstances I felt warranted in doing.

These instructions, we notice in Colonel Stoughton's Report, concern the maintenance of the hill and the disposition of the regiments of the brigade, the 19th Illinois on the right and the 11th Michigan on the left. Colonel Stoughton now claims that his brigade, consisting of these two regiments, was "the largest, if not the only, organized force on the hill." He advances this statement in view of the fact that he assumed command of all the other fragments of regiments who were then posted on the same hill with himself, viz., Hill Number 2. His statement is correct, for we have seen that the fragments, to which his Report also refers, were those of Colonel Hunter, of the 82d Indiana, about one hundred men, and those of Colonel Hays, of the 10th Kentucky, commanding Croxton's Brigade, the 4th Kentucky's forty-five men and the 10th Kentucky and 14th Ohio, perhaps one hundred more.

General Beatty's Report also mentions by name, Colonel

[1] No. 50, p. 370, l. 15.

Hunter, with his 82d Indiana detachment, and Colonels Hays and Wharton, of the 10th Kentucky, who were on this same hill with their troops and displayed the highest order of heroism. According to General Beatty's statement these detachments represented "nearly every division of the army,"[1] and he claims for his own division as strong a representation as that of any other division in the obstinate maintenance of the Horseshoe and Main Ridges, "except Brannan's and Steedman's." He here undoubtedly includes the 21st Ohio, which, as we have elsewhere seen, was equal to a brigade in its efficiency.

(4) The vigorous attacks which were made against this position conform to the Confederate description of those made by Kershaw's and Anderson's Brigades. According to his statements there was not a single occasion during Colonel Stoughton's occupancy of this hill that his troops did not maintain their position. The enemy fired across the Federal breastworks, charging up to the Federal lines within one hundred feet of the colors, but this was the enemy's high-water mark. These assaults were like the continuous billows of the sea, and approached nearer and nearer to the crest of the ridge.

We have the Confederate description of these assaults, corresponding in point of time, position, and circumstance with Beatty's and Stoughton's accounts. The assaulting columns on the Confederate right were men of Longstreet's Corps from Virginia, seasoned in many fights, including Gettysburg and other great battles fought by the Army of Northern Virginia. These men composed the South Carolina Brigade under General Kershaw, and Colonel Oates' 15th Alabama, of Law's Brigade. Three successive assaults were made, each exceeding the other in intensity. On the Confederate left was General Patton Anderson's large Mississippi Brigade, of Hindman's Division, who

[1] No. 50, p. 870, l. 21.

made heroic but vain efforts in three successive charges to win the heights on the west extremity of the Horseshoe.

(5) But there was one assault above the others more worthy of note which, according to Colonel Stoughton's own testimony, as well as that of Generals Brannan and Beatty, drove the Federals back from their position on this hill, though not off of it, and the Confederates succeeded in planting their colors almost on the crest of the ridge. The rally, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Grosvenor's 18th Ohio detachment, in which General John Beatty rendered material assistance, resulted in the Federals regaining their position on the summit, from which they had been driven for the first time, though only for a moment. This was the last fight made by this brigade, as appears from Colonel Stoughton's Report, as well as others, as his ammunition became exhausted.

We have a description of the same fight and incident in General Beatty's Report as follows:[1] —

> Once during the afternoon the enemy succeeded in planting his colors almost on the crest of the ridge on our immediate front, and for a moment drove our men from the summit. An extraordinary effort of the officers present was successful in again rallying them to the crest, and the timely arrival of a detachment of the Eighteenth Ohio, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Grosvenor, drove back the enemy, who only saved his colors by throwing them down the hill.

We notice General Beatty's statement that this was the only occasion on which the enemy almost gained the crest, and for a moment drove his men from the summit, and according to General Brannan's sworn testimony before the Negley Court of Inquiry,[2] General Beatty was on the Horseshoe, on the immediate left of his division, and "remained there until the troops retreated with my [Bran-

[1] No. 50, p. 570, l. 24. [2] No. 50, p. 1041, l. 32.

nan's] division, which was the rear guard of the army." It will also be noticed that General Beatty, as well as Colonel Stoughton, makes no reference to any further assault of the enemy. A reference to General Brannan's Report[1] presents the following statement: —

> Several charges were made by the entire command during the last attack of the enemy by which they were gallantly driven from the ridge where they had obtained a momentary lodgment.

This, as we have before shown, was undoubtedly the last attack witnessed by General Brannan, but it was by no means the last Confederate assault on Horseshoe Ridge. In General Brannan's testimony before the Negley Court of Inquiry,[2] he says that "during the afternoon I [he] was riding up and down in rear of the line of battle." Hence he also was a witness to this "momentary lodgment" described by General Beatty and Colonel Stoughton, when "for a moment" Brannan's men lost the crest and regained it.

In connection with this color-bearer incident we shall here introduce testimony, based on research outside of the Official Records, which also authoritatively confirms the location of this fragment of Stanley's Brigade on Hill Number 2.

When I learned of Lieutenant-Colonel Grosvenor's[3] connection with this incident, I had several interviews with him regarding it, and obtained his account of the location of his "detachment," so called by General Beatty and himself before its "timely arrival." He very courteously and carefully answered all my questions, describing the route taken and the position on the ridge.

The incident described in the Official Reports, according

[1] No. 50, p. 403, l. 23. [2] No. 50, p. 1041, l. 17.

[3] General Charles H. Grosvenor, then member of Congress representing the 11th Ohio District.

19TH ILLINOIS OFFICERS (GROUP I)

1. 1ST LIEUT. JOHN YOUNG
2. 1ST LIEUT. V. BRADFORD BELL
3. 1ST LIEUT. CORNELIUS V. LAMBERSON
4. CAPT. ALEXANDER MURCHISON, JR.
5. CAPT. DAVID F. BREMNER
6. CAPT. JAMES G. CAMPBELL
7. 1ST LIEUT. WILLIAM JACKSON
8. LIEUT.-COL. ALEXANDER W. RAFFEN
9. 2D LIEUT. JOHN T. THORNTON
10. 1ST LIEUT. SAMUEL L. HAMILTON
11. 2D LIEUT. JAMES W. RAFFEN
12. 1ST LIEUT. DICKERSON B. MOREHOUSE
13. 2D LIEUT. THOMAS M. BEATTY
14. CAPT. JAMES LONGHORN

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to his statement, occurred about 4 P.M., certainly not later, and the flag borne by the color-bearer, according to Colonel Grosvenor's recollection, had a palmetto tree design upon it. He repeated the statement that he could not possibly be mistaken in this fact. The information which I thus derived as to time, place, and circumstance indicated that the color-bearer incident happened on the Middle Hill of Horseshoe Ridge at the position which Brannan's testimony proved was the location of Stoughton's command. At this point in my interview, Colonel Grosvenor said: "I always told McElroy he had put that monument in the wrong place." The reference here made was to Captain J. C. McElroy,[1] of the 18th Ohio Infantry, who had much to do with the locating of Ohio monuments on the battlefield.

As the only South Carolina Regiments which assaulted Horseshoe Ridge belonged to Kershaw's Brigade, the next step taken in my research was to discover, if possible, the name of the regiment to which the color-bearer belonged; and after years of correspondence I was finally successful in fully establishing his identity and regiment, viz., Alfred D. Clark, of Co. C, 7th South Carolina Regiment, of Kershaw's Brigade. At the same time I obtained details of the incident showing this color-bearer's unexcelled bravery and heroism, which brought commendation from friend and foe alike. These details will be found in volume II, which contains the Confederate viewpoint of the battle.

Letters from the messmate (J. S. Gibert) of Ensign Clark, and from his comrades in the regiment, describe the gallant deed which he performed and the crowning act of self-possession in the assault of Kershaw's Brigade on the Federal position on Horseshoe Ridge, as follows: —

Here Ensign Clark, as was his custom in battle, was several paces in advance of the regiment, with his flag so near the line

[1] Author of *Chickamauga. Record of the Ohio Chickamauga Park Commission.*

of the enemy that their commanding officer announced loudly that he would give a captain's commission to any man who would capture the flag which Ensign Clark held. Several of his men sprang forward, and at this moment Ensign Clark received a mortal wound; and as he fell he threw the flag backwards over his head and landed it safely in the hands of his comrades, he falling dead, heroically dead at the muzzle of the guns of the enemy.

An account of my interview with General Grosvenor, and a copy of the letter written by Ensign Clark's messmate, was sent by me to General John Beatty, who replied:

I remember very distinctly the incident to which you refer. General Grosvenor's statement with respect to the matter is substantially correct. Colonel Stoughton was not so conspicuous in the affair as one might be led to infer from reading his report. He was there, however, on foot, with fragments of Stanley's Brigade, but there were a few men from other companies who did not recognize Stoughton as their commander and who made the charge referred to, not because they were ordered to do so, but because they felt it necessary to do so to maintain the Union line.

I then wrote to General Grosvenor describing the result of my investigation, and on June 21, 1907, he wrote me his reply, from which I quote the following: —

I had gathered about eighty men of my regiment, which, may it be known, was a pretty good-sized crowd for any regiment on that battle-field on the afternoon of Sunday, September 20. We had gathered them at the old straw stack at the foot of the hill near the spring.[1] The object of our assembling there was for the purpose of getting water.

Suddenly an order reached me, and I do not know who by, that General Beatty, of Ohio, ordered me to come up to the top of the hill as rapidly as possible with whatever men I had. Of course we moved up there rapidly, and as we fairly cleared the crest on the north side and made our appearance, General Beatty in great shape made his appearance, swinging his hat and wav-

[1] See Notes to chapter XIII, Note D.

18TH OHIO OFFICERS

LIEUT.-COL. CHARLES H. GROSVENOR

CAPT CHARLES A. CABLE

2D LIEUT. W. F. QUIGLEY

MAJ J M WELCH

1ST LIEUT. JOHN E. BARRON

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ing his sword and cried out: "Colonel Grosvenor, there is a brigadier-general's commission for the man that will capture that flag." Of course, he did not say he would give anybody that commission, but he used just that language which I have given you and which I have never forgotten, and cannot be mistaken about it.

We made a rush for the parties contending on the hill. The South Carolina troops had climbed over the little wooden works that we had built and were encountering a hand-to-hand fight. We made a rush right down into the angle of the works and drove the poor fellows over the works outward down the hill. I saw a young fellow with their flag, and I saw him indicate the receipt of a bullet. At the minute he did so, he turned partly around and threw his flag, saving it, over the works down the hill. I, of course, was exceedingly busy holding on as well as we could to the top of the hill; but I saw the young fellow lying there and supposed he was badly wounded, but did not know he was mortally wounded. I did not know his name, but I am satisfied that he is the young man you are talking about. Whoever he was, whatever he was, and whichever he was, he is one of the most excellent young men I ever saw. No one of the war showed greater courage and bravery in a greater degree than this young fellow did.

Thus the identity of the Confederate organization nearly gaining the summit, and "succeeding in planting his colors almost on the crest," is fully established as Kershaw's South Carolina Brigade,[1] after whose repulse, about 4 P.M., Preston's Division received orders to move forward, and whose final assault carried the whole of Horseshoe Ridge and captured all the Federal organizations thereon at sunset.

Let us now resume the completion of our study of Colonel Stoughton's Report.

(6) Again we come to the question of time. In his errors in this respect, this officer, with one exception,[2] out-

[1] See Notes to chapter XIII, Note E.

[2] Colonel Dunlap, 3d Kentucky. See chapter XII, p. 259.

does all others in their Official Reports; and though there is no evidence which supports his statement, the Government Map and the Park Commission have accepted it, and have recorded on their monuments, that Brannan's order for retirement of the troops under his command was not received and obeyed until "about 8 o'clock," and yet it is not recorded that aeroplanes had at that early date been adopted for warfare. Why should General Boynton and the Park Commission have so misinterpreted Colonel Stoughton as to put him on Horseshoe Ridge at this time, when Colonel Boynton himself officially reports that 7 o'clock was the time of withdrawal, and that Van Derveer's Brigade was the last of the Federal army to leave this position, though General Hazen also presents his claim that his brigade was the rear guard of the army in its retirement from the battle-field?

General Brannan in his Official Report says that he withdrew the forces under his command from Horseshoe Ridge at sunset and from the field soon thereafter. If the statement were true that the fragments of Stanley's Brigade, numbering about two hundred men, were not withdrawn from Horseshoe Ridge until 8 P.M., this would be the basis of another charge against him, that of abandoning every organization that fought under his command, interposing them between his own division and the enemy, by which his own escape was effected. He has had to bear the burden of sufficient charges without having this one as to Stanley's Brigade imposed upon him, for which there is no authority of record whatever.

A critical examination of Colonel Stoughton's Report concerning time indicates, from our study and from conclusions derived from the preponderance of evidence elsewhere, that his afternoon time-table was, in every instance, two hours in advance. The context of his Report indicates that after the first Confederate assault on Gen-

eral Brannan's position, there was no second one until 4 o'clock, and he places the last assault, Kershaw's, at 6 P.M., when we know almost positively that this occurred about 4 P.M.

General John Beatty's Report describes the color-bearer incident as occurring "during the afternoon." It seems unlikely also that, as late as 6 P.M., with the pall of smoke which filled the woods, objects could be so distinctly seen as represented in the description which is given to us; but it is from our study of General Beatty's statement and movements, in his Official Report and in his book, before quoted in these pages, that we are able to establish the fact that, at the hour which Colonel Stoughton mentions, he was marching on the Ridge road, to McFarland's Gap on the way to Rossville. In his Official Report[1] General Beatty says: —

> Near 8 o'clock in the evening I ascertained from General Wood that the army had been ordered to fall back towards Chattanooga. I immediately started to inform Colonel Stoughton to join the retiring column, but found that he had been apprised of the movement and was then in the road.

What road? Why, of course, the Ridge road, as we shall presently show. Does General Beatty state that he was on Horseshoe Ridge when he obtained his information from General Wood, or that Colonel Stoughton was also there at this time? By no manner of means. Let us refer to what General Wood says as to the time and place when General Beatty met him. In his Official Report[2] General Wood says: —

> Near sundown of the 20th I met General John Beatty not far from where I had fought the enemy all the afternoon. . . . At the moment I met him I was engaged halting some troops that were crossing the valley north and east of my position.

[1] No. 50, p. 370, l. 43.

[2] No. 50, p. 641, l. 34.

From this statement, and others in the context, there can be no doubt that this place of meeting was north of the Snodgrass house; and yet, according to before-quoted sworn testimony of General Brannan, General Beatty had remained on Horseshoe Ridge until the last of the troops there had retreated, with his (Brannan's) division the rear guard of the army.[1]

Thus the evidence is that when General Beatty met General Wood before sundown in Snodgrass cornfield, Colonel Stoughton was already on the Ridge road.

General Beatty's account in his book,[2] taken from his daily record of events, and his Reports do not countenance any such misrepresentation of Colonel Stoughton's "8 P.M." statement.

Referring to the "fragment of the Second Brigade," Stanley's, and detachments from a "dozen different commands," he says: —

> I filled up an unoccupied space on the ridge between Harker, of Wood's Division, on the left, and Brannan, on the right, and *this point we held obstinately until sunset.*[3]

From the foregoing testimony in this and other chapters, we are able to complete, according to the best available evidence of official record, the relative alignment and respective positions of all the Federal regiments and fragments thereof, which fought on the Horseshoe and Main Ridges on the afternoon of September 20, 1863.



[1] No. 50, p. 1041, l. 32.

[2] John Beatty, *The Citizen Soldier, or Memoirs of a Volunteer*, p. 340. Cincinati: Wilstach, Baldwin & Co. 1879.

[3] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.

The foregoing diagram represents that portion of the alignment of Brannan's command, from the testimony just given,[1] showing the various fragments which fought on Hill Number 2 between Harker's Brigade on the left and Van Derveer's on the right.

[1] See also Notes to chapter xiii, Note B.

CHAPTER XIV

CLOSING SCENES OF THE BATTLE

In the preceding chapters I have presented the proof that the last Federal line of battle was located on Harker's Hill in Snodgrass field, after the forces under Harker, Brannan, and Steedman had been driven from their positions on the heights of the Horseshoe and Missionary Ridges. It has also been shown that Hazen's and Harker's Brigades, on the break-up of their last line, withdrew further north into Snodgrass field, where Brannan had already preceded them. Hazen's Brigade, on the left of this last line of battle, had fired only a few volleys, which seemed to silence the enemy's fire, though lack of ammunition was the reason why no reply was made by the Confederates holding their own on the east extremity of the Horseshoe, waiting for the expected reinforcements which presently came.

In the breaking-up of this last line of battle, there is evidence presented in the Reports which shows that the 125th Ohio and the two guns of the 18th Ohio Battery, being at the centre of the line near Snodgrass house, were the last to leave their positions. The movement of the right flank of this line is indicated in the statements made by the officer commanding the 65th Ohio, whose report we have quoted. Whether this movement had anything to do with the proximity of Bushrod Johnson's Division, located not far from that quarter, after driving Steedman's division down the north slope of the Main Ridge, does not appear in the Official Records, but we do know that these Confederates, shortly before six o'clock, were in the before-described "deep hollow," from whence no Federal force

was "in reach." This, from other circumstances and from my knowledge of the ground, I take to indicate that the 64th and 65th Ohio were at this juncture retiring in Snodgrass field, at a considerable distance to the right and rear of Snodgrass house.

The statements, already quoted in the Reports,[1] of the officers commanding the 6th Kentucky and the 124th Ohio[2] show that after their brigade's "front line," viz., "the 41st Ohio and the 9th Indiana," had ceased firing, they faced to the rear and formed in Snodgrass field, somewhere north of the Snodgrass house, where General Hazen awaited the 9th Indiana, in order to assemble his brigade and march from the field. Therefore, leaving the troops in line on his right, Colonel Suman with his regiment had "filed two rods" to the rear of the 125th Ohio at the Snodgrass house, when they met Brannan's officers, "apparently holding a council of war." "At this point" were both Colonels Van Derveer and Boynton.

Evidence that the 125th Ohio and the two guns of the 18th Ohio Battery were the last of this line to break up is also contained in the statement of Colonel Opdycke, just quoted, which indicates that the 41st Ohio and the 9th Indiana, after being in the front line on the left, passed to the 125th Ohio's rear "at the time of the last assault."[3]

What we may call the Confederate counterpart viewpoint of the final breaking-up of the last Federal line of battle, and in confirmation of the statement that the 125th Ohio and 18th Ohio Battery were the last troops of that line, is contained in the description given thereof in the Report[4] of Colonel Finley, then commanding the 54th Virginia as well as his own regiment, the 6th Florida: —

> For a part of the time during our advance we were exposed to a hot fire not only from small-arms and a battery in front, but

[1] No. 50, p. 772, l. 17.
[2] No. 50, p. 758, l. 57.
[3] No. 50, p. 777, l. 1.
[4] No. 51, p. 436, l. 48.

also from a battery which was on our right in an oblique direction. At this moment I ordered the firing to cease, and the guns to be loaded and bayonets fixed, in order to take the gun which had been playing upon our front, but before this could be accomplished the enemy had retired and succeeded in withdrawing his piece.

The opposing enemy here referred to can be none other than the 125th Ohio supporting the 18th Ohio Battery, which conclusion will be more fully set forth when we come to a consideration of the Confederate viewpoint. Still further confirmation of the presence of the 18th Ohio Battery[1] is found in the statement contained in General Preston's Report,[2] viz.: —

I learned . . . from captured artillerists at Snodgrass' house that the hill had been occupied by a battery of the Regular Army and another from Ohio.

When we study the Confederate viewpoint, it will be shown from this testimony in the Reports of Colonels Finley and Trigg that the three regiments of the latter's brigade were among the Confederate witnesses to what was, in fact, the end of the battle at the Snodgrass house. Colonel Trigg, with one part of his brigade, met Colonel Finley, with the other part of it, at this point and at this time, thereby accomplishing the movement of passing around both flanks and uniting in the rear of such Federal forces as were left on Horseshoe Ridge. The evidence of this junction is found in Colonel Finley's Report.[3]

Instead of immediate pursuit of the retiring Federals, Colonel Trigg turned his attention to the capture of the enemy whose rear he had gained. These were the two regiments from Ohio, the 21st and 89th, and the 22d Michigan, whose ammunition was exhausted when they were overcome. The time this consumed delayed the pursuit of the

[1] See Notes to chapter VII, Note B.
[2] No. 51, p. 417, l. 43.
[3] No. 51, p. 427, l. 6.

JUN. 1ST LIEUT. A. S. BIERCE

2D LIEUT. J. W. CHESNUT

SEN. 1ST LIEUT. JOS. McCAFFERTY

CAPT. C. C. ALEBIRDS

18TH OHIO BATTERY OFFICERS

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Federal forces who had just withdrawn north from Snodgrass house.

That Colonel Trigg at the same time as Colonel Finley saw the retirement of this last Federal line, but postponed pursuit until the accomplishment of the preconcerted plan of capture of the Federals then surrounded on Horseshoe Ridge, is in evidence in his Report[1] (which will be discussed in our Confederate viewpoint of the battle), from which we need quote only the following here:—

> . . . Darkness having fallen and the enemy having withdrawn from his position on my [then] left, no farther movement was attempted.

"The end of a battle" is so much a matter of opinion that a chapter might be written in a discussion over it. I have just used the expression, and that I may not be misunderstood I here state that the occasion referred to which I shall adopt for this purpose of definition, namely, from the Federal viewpoint, is at Snodgrass field when the last troops of the last Federal line of battle withdrew from their position on Harker's Hill. Both former presidents of the Park Commission, Generals Fullerton and Boynton, make use of the expression and similar ones, e.g., "when the battle was over," or "was ended." Furthermore, they are on record as defining it as at the same period which I have adopted.

For exemplification as to General Fullerton, I refer to a meeting of the Commission in Indianapolis, February 24, 1896, called in connection with the 9th Indiana's desire to locate its monument on the "high hill" at the position occupied by it "near the Tower";[2] at which meeting, in the stenographic report of proceedings, General Fullerton is thus quoted,[3] "I say when the regiment came to the

[1] No. 51, p. 432, l. 22.
[2] *Indiana's Appeal to Secretary of War*, p. 2, ll. 10, 23.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

point where the Indiana Commission want to put the monument the battle was over. There was no fighting after that." Again he says, there was "no fighting where you want the monument. There was a little volley fired there; that was all."

For exemplification as to General Boynton, I refer to the pamphlet, *Battle of Chickamauga, Organization of the Army of the Cumberland, and of the Army of Tennessee,* compiled by H. V. Boynton, etc. (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1895), which is dispensed to the public free of cost, with a sketch of the alleged positions and movements of the opposing organizations. In describing the final position of Harker's Brigade, General Boynton says that it was on the "bare ridge north of the Snodgrass house, [where] it fought till the battle ended."[1]

En passant, considering this statement, we notice that it is indeed in accord with the evidence exhibited by the Records that the battle ended at the place and at the relative time described, so far as Harker's and Hazen's Brigades are concerned, but the Park Commission make "the end of the battle" coincident with Brannan's withdrawal from Horseshoe Ridge, claiming that Harker on the bare ridge and Brannan on the Horseshoe withdrew simultaneously, which has been proven to be contrary to the Official Records.

But as I shall have occasion to use the term "end of the battle," I have defined the time and place so that the reference may be understood.

What we have now to describe in this chapter relates to several incidents, of an exceedingly interesting nature, which then occurred, after the battle ended, and which are classified under the title of "Closing Scenes of the Battle." These incidents are the sequel to the perilous mission of the 9th Indiana Regiment, which was ordered

[1] Page 12.

by Brannan or his lieutenant, Van Derveer, to occupy the position lately abandoned by Brannan's forces on Hill Number 2 of Horseshoe Ridge.

The incidents here referred to are: —

(1) Colonel Suman's experiences as a half-hour prisoner of the 54th Virginia in the Confederate lines.

(2) The 35th Ohio's mission, under Brannan's orders, to cover his right flank, on hearing, through the medium of the officer commanding the 9th Indiana, that the troops on his right had surrendered.

(3) The encounter of the 9th Indiana with the 5th Kentucky and 63d Virginia.

(4) The 35th Ohio's volley from the bushes at the edge of the little cliff southwest of Snodgrass house, which caused confusion in the 54th Virginia's ranks, and the escape of its prisoners.

(5) The recapture of the escaped prisoners by the 5th Kentucky and 63d Virginia Regiments.

(1) Colonel Suman of the Ninth Indiana, a prisoner within the Confederate lines

As the 9th Indiana was guided to its position by General Brannan's orderly or aide, it skirted the edge of the little cliff that looks down into the depression southwest of Snodgrass house, and from this edge of the little cliff, it moved along the northwest side of Hill Number 1, and on the "Hog's Back" to the "high hill." Colonel Suman then brought his regiment to a halt at a point some yards east of where the Observation Tower now stands. Here we will let Colonel Suman himself describe[1] what happened: —

It was while in this position that my attention was drawn to my right by an unnecessary amount of talking. I went over to

[1] No. 50, p. 700, l. 28.

see what it meant, and, to my surprise, I found the enemy demanding our troops to surrender. At that moment a rebel officer pointed a pistol at my head and demanded my surrender. I informed him that I had surrendered some time ago. He appeared satisfied with my explanation. At that moment something drew his attention, and I slipped away from him and brought two of my right companies to bear, and opened fire on them and scattered the party. Our men ran one way and the rebels ran another. The officer with whom I talked reported himself as colonel of the Thirty-fifth [Fifty-fourth?] Virginia Regiment, and said he was attached to Buckner's Corps. He said he was only off of the cars seven hours. One of my lieutenants went over to see what was going on, and the same officer took his sword from him. One of his men fired on the rebel colonel and killed him, retook the lieutenant's sword, and took the rebel's sword and pistol. At this moment the officer came up that I had reported to at that point. He appeared to think it impossible that the enemy had gained that point. I informed him that he had but thirty steps to walk to convince himself, but he seemed not inclined to convince himself by going to see.

General Hazen, in his book, relates the substance of this bloodthirsty tale and then makes the significant remark: "*This is Suman's version of the affair.*"[1] In a letter sent to me March 2, 1909, by Colonel Suman, — this letter written jointly by his adjutant, Hodsden, and himself, — the former takes credit to himself for having written this Official Report. As Adjutant Hodsden was not taken prisoner at the same time with his colonel, he must have obtained from the colonel an account of what had happened to him while the latter was absent from his regiment, a prisoner in the enemy's lines. The story is full of inaccuracies of a more or less important nature, some of which I will now point out.

As the lieutenant-colonel of the Confederate regiment which captured Colonel Suman wrote the Official Report

[1] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.

of his regiment, — viz., the 54th Virginia, which he commanded in the battle, — the statement that he was killed is an evident error. Further than this, Lieutenant-Colonel Wade's report shows that no officer of his command was either killed or wounded during the whole day. A careful study further convinces me that at this juncture, when the 9th Indiana was on Horseshoe Ridge, this Virginia regiment suffered no casualty whatever. I think that the careful reader, as he continues his research with me, will be convinced that there is no possibility of Colonel Suman's having been made a prisoner by any regiment other than this 54th Virginia; but assuming that I may be mistaken, I have taken pains to study the Official Reports and to investigate, by correspondence with survivors, the question as to whether any other commissioned officer of the regiments of either Trigg's or Kelly's Brigades could have been killed as circumstantially described in Colonel Suman's Report. A lengthy recital of the evidence does not seem to be necessary: I will simply state the result, that every possibility of such an occurrence as is quoted is eliminated by my research.

From a previously quoted letter of August 12, 1907, written by Adjutant Hodsden to General Suman, his former colonel (his letter embodying his recollections), I cull the following, which is a somewhat different story from the official one, viz.: —

> Yourself uncertain as to which army these troops belonged, passed for the moment the command of the regiment to the major, and on foot proceeded well into their lines, to ascertain if they were of us or not. You found them decidedly not.
>
> Lacking the shibboleth of Southern gentlemen, an officer, presumably a colonel, took you in, and turning you over to two guards, ordered you taken to their rear. You gave them the slip, and by continuous inquiry for the 54th Virginia, worked your way back into the ranks of the 9th Indiana.

In studying the corresponding Confederate reports, for the purpose of corroboration of the salient statements in Colonel Suman's official story, we find only contradictions thereto. On the other hand, this account of the affair written by Adjutant Hodsden to Colonel Suman, and by the latter forwarded to me, contains a story which fits in with the picture given from Confederate sources.

(2) *The Ninth Indiana promptly reports to Brannan the surrender of Federals on its right, and as a consequence the Thirty-fifth Ohio is ordered back from Snodgrass field*

The Official Records contain a statement, made by General Brannan, defining the reason and occasion for his order given in Snodgrass field to the 35th Ohio to go back toward Horseshoe Ridge. This order resulted from the information that the Federal troops whom he had abandoned on Horseshoe Ridge had surrendered, this information having been communicated to him by the officer commanding the regiment on the "immediate left" of the captured prisoners.

Writing to an officer of one of these captured regiments, General Brannan says[1] that the surrender was noticed by "*the regiment* on your immediate left, the colonel of which promptly reported the fact to me, whereupon I sent the 35th Ohio Volunteers to hold the position." The 9th Indiana is the only regiment that could possibly be referred to. It was the only Federal regiment on Horseshoe Ridge at this time, except the captured ones which Colonel Suman discovered on his scouting tour to the right; but it is evident that the information, promptly reported to General Brannan, could not have come from Colonel Suman, then a prisoner in the enemy's hands, but the statement — viz., that the 9th Indiana Regiment noticed this

[1] No. 50, p. 392, l. 50.

surrender — is evidently correct, and General Brannan says that it was the only regiment that did notice it, which is a still further clincher to the fact that the 9th Indiana was the only regiment on Horseshoe Ridge when the other regiments were captured.

I wrote to General Suman, calling his attention to General Brannan's statement, and requesting his explanation of it. He sent me his reply in the joint letter of May 2, written by his adjutant, Hodsden, and himself in behalf of the 9th Indiana, as follows: —

> If General Brannan got word of the surrender of these regiments, and if ours was the colonel to report, it was in an indirect way through his orderly, who had acted as our guide. Colonel Suman has no recollection of having sent any such report, and he made none personally to General Brannan.

In another part of the same letter, Adjutant Hodsden describes his own movements after the colonel's departure, leaving the regiment in command of its major, Carter, as follows: —

> I placed some skirmishers to the right and rear of the regiment to prevent a surprise, and when I got back to the centre rear of the command, the major was in charge and the guide gone; leastwise we saw nothing more of him. If any report was made to General Brannan, it was from the major through this orderly.

This is good evidence that General Brannan's orderly, having performed the duty assigned to him and witnessed the surrender, returned to his proper station, and reported to General Brannan what he had seen, with the possible communication, from the officer commanding the 9th Indiana, of the fact that the regiments on his right had surrendered. This was almost a request to General Brannan for support, and in consequence he sent the 35th Ohio. This, on the testimony of the best witness thereto, is a direct statement of cause and effect. General Brannan

knew the necessity for his action, and the purpose for which he sent the 35th Ohio, viz., "to hold the position." Colonel Van Derveer admits[1] that General Brannan ordered him "to place the 35th Ohio across the right flank"; but the cause assigned by Colonel Van Derveer, and the purpose, are at variance with General Brannan's statement, for the former says that, in consequence of the silence on that flank where Steedman's Division had been, General Brannan suspected that all might not be right; and his assigned reason for the move was "to prevent a surprise." Colonel Boynton[2] has this to say concerning the same point: "The troops having been moved on the right, the 35th was ordered to protect the right flank, and was wheeled accordingly." Thus the actual movement in response to Brannan's order was only a wheel which protected the right flank of his forces in Snodgrass field.

The statements of Colonels Van Derveer and Boynton are in the nature of an explanation that their own withdrawal was due to the exposure of their right flank by the retirement, "without our [their] knowledge," of Steedman's Division.

Now the evidence of the Official Reports is against Colonels Van Derveer and Boynton, and it is extraordinary that the former should make a statement so much at variance with the facts. His withdrawal had nothing to do with Steedman's withdrawal, nor with the withdrawal of the troops on his right. The officers commanding the 21st Ohio give convincing statements to the effect that *Brannan's* men deliberately sacrificed these Federal regiments, and that *Brannan's* men were the ones who withdrew without notification, and that they did so "stealthily." The fact seems to be that the part taken by Colonel Van Derveer in connection with his orders to the 21st Ohio and the 9th Indiana, is so discreditable that he entirely avoids

[1] No. 50, p. 480, l. 55. [2] No. 50, p. 486, l. 20.

mention of any connection with either of these regiments, or of orders given them by himself which sent them on most perilous missions. Both he and Colonel Boynton, in their Official Reports, avoid any mention whatever of the capture of the three Federal regiments which had fought on their right all that afternoon, and, after exhausting their ammunition, still remained in position until captured. In fact, what could Colonels Van Derveer and Boynton say about their connection with the 21st Ohio and 9th Indiana Regiments, or about the Federal prisoners captured, without an exposure of facts discreditable to themselves? Hence their Official Reports completely ignore mention of their participation with the 21st Ohio and 9th Indiana in these significant closing scenes, and omit any telltale reference to their comrades thus disgracefully abandoned and taken prisoners.

While in its position on Horseshoe Ridge the 35th Ohio was the right flanking regiment of Van Derveer's Brigade,[1] and in the retirement towards the left and rear would be the last of the brigade to leave Horseshoe Ridge.

(3) *The Ninth Indiana encounters the Fifth Kentucky and Sixty-third Virginia at dusk on Horseshoe Ridge*

An account of what happened to Suman's regiment during his absence as a prisoner is not to be expected in his Official Report. The Confederate Official Reports of officers commanding the 5th Kentucky and 63d Virginia give accounts of their meeting at dusk with a Federal regiment on Horseshoe Ridge, which corresponds in time, place, and circumstances to such an extent as to assure us, even without the supplementary testimony from other authoritative sources, that the 9th Indiana was the Federal regiment concerned.

Leaving Colonel Suman a prisoner for a time in Confed-

[1] No. 50, p. 435, l. 55.

erate hands and, after escape, working his way back to the ranks of his regiment, let us, for the nonce, revert to the Confederate Official Reports, and see what happened to the 9th Indiana while drawn up in the woods, at its position on Horseshoe Ridge, in command of its major, Carter, in the absence of its colonel.

It was near 6.30 P.M. that two regiments of Kelly's Brigade, under Colonel Hawkins, with his 5th Kentucky Regiment, and Major French, of the 63d Virginia, advanced up the southern slope of Horseshoe Ridge from their position opposite the middle hill. Descriptions of the movement will be found in the Reports of Colonel Hawkins and Major French;[1] and we combine in condensed form their similar statements in practically their own words: —

> The 5th Kentucky changing its direction to the right (it being nearly dusk), the two regiments, with the 63d Virginia on the right, moved forward but a short distance up the slope of the ridge, when a line of battle of the enemy was discovered about forty yards distant, who first announced that they were friends and then proposed to surrender and lay down their arms. Stealing this advantage, they retook their arms and treacherously fired a heavy volley into the ranks of the Confederates, killing and wounding several officers and men of the 5th Kentucky.

The number killed and wounded in the 63d Virginia, by the heavy fire poured into its ranks, is not given by Major French.

That confusion was caused in the ranks of the 5th Kentucky is indicated by Colonel Hawkins' statement[2] that "temporary surprise [was] caused, [but] my men re-formed." The 63d Virginia, as Major French says, "fell back a short distance to their position on the hill, and continued to fire into the enemy."[3]

[1] No. 51, p. 448, ll. 5 to 11, 43 to 50.
[2] No. 51, p. 448, l. 51. [3] No. 51, p. 448, l. 9.

From my correspondence with Colonel Hawkins, of the 5th Kentucky, I quote the following: —

I had assumed command of the 63d Virginia, that regiment acting with the 5th Kentucky. I moved these regiments a short distance to the right and front, looking out for the enemy, when a mounted courier from Colonel Trigg came galloping to me, informing me that he had found the enemy, and that if I would move my two regiments forward we would capture them. The courier returned, speeding his horse, and I gave the command, moving the 5th Kentucky and the 63d Virginia forward. It was in the evening, nearly dusk, when the 5th Kentucky was treacherously fired on when it was encountering a Federal regiment in the woods. I was on foot with my men, and first supposed they were our own men, when one of my soldiers, being near the enemy, cried out: "They are Yanks!"

My correspondence with Captain J. T. Gaines, of Company K, 5th Kentucky, and my visit to the battle-field with him, helped to locate the position where the 5th Kentucky encountered the 9th Indiana at its position on Horseshoe Ridge. The locality was east of where the Observation Tower now is, and the encounter occurred while the 5th Kentucky was crossing the ridge. "I remember," says Captain Gaines, "a halt in our advance, where dead Federals were lying thick. It was long enough for me to allow Corporal Menzie to exchange shoes with a dead man. He removed his old shoes and put on the Federal soldier's leather, while we were halted." Of the same period, near 6.30 P.M., Captain Gaines also writes: —

When we finally advanced it was over the dead bodies of hundreds of the enemy. We afterward buried about two hundred of them found on the ridge and along Kelly's Brigade front. Some of these were Kentuckians[1] *and some Indianians.*[2] This we

[1] The same position where the encounter took place had been occupied that afternoon by regiments from Kentucky.

[2] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.

knew by the papers on their bodies and in their knapsacks. I read that night a copy of our home paper, *Louisville Journal*, two days old.

A very important statement is the following, from my correspondence with Captain J. M. White, of Company F, 5th Kentucky: —

I remember when we met the Federal regiment in the woods a little after sunset. At this time I heard and witnessed a parley between Colonel Hawkins and the Federal officer in command, who I thought was a major. After Colonel Hawkins' demand to surrender I heard this major say, "We surrender," and Colonel Hawkins, "then lay down your arms." The Federal major then stepped between files to the rear of his line, when the enemy immediately opened fire upon us. We were so confident that the enemy had surrendered that nearly all our men had come to an order arms; consequently this unexpected act of treachery caused confusion in our ranks.

From correspondence with Comrade S. I. Eals, Company F, 5th Kentucky, I quote the following: —

I visited the battle-field some eight or ten years ago, and located, to my entire satisfaction, the spot where the 5th Kentucky encountered the enemy at dusk, on the top of Horseshoe Ridge, about thirty-five or forty yards east of where the Tower now stands.

Other statements of a corroborative character could be quoted from other comrades of the 5th Kentucky. Correspondence with members of the 63d Virginia Regiment is also corroborative as to time, place, and circumstances connected with this encounter.

There is one point only of difference which may be mentioned, which is contained in my correspondence with Major French, who commanded the 63d Virginia, and who makes the general statement that he "never received orders from Colonel Hawkins during the fight." Yet it is to be noticed in Major French's Report that at this time

referred to, his regiment was advanced in line with the 5th Kentucky, and Colonel Hawkins, being the senior colonel of the brigade in the absence of Colonel Kelly, was by right in actual command.

The departure of Colonel Kelly (sent for by General Preston), leaving his brigade without giving orders or notification to his regimental commanders, impaired the efficiency of his brigade at an important crisis, which will be discussed in the next volume.

In the absence of information in Colonel Suman's Report about this encounter, it is from elsewhere that we obtain Federal corroboration.

In Adjutant Hodsden's recollections are found details as to time, place, and circumstances, which I need only mention and leave to the reader to note how the Confederate and Federal accounts correspond and thereby assure us of the truth of our picture.

In the Hodsden and Suman letter of August 12, 1907, which the latter forwarded to me, it is made plain that the major was left in command of the regiment in the woods, and that he received the Confederate officer's challenge and answered it.

In Adjutant Hodsden's letter to me of March 10, 1909, referring to the statements in Colonel Hawkins' and Major French's Official Reports that the 9th Indiana first announced that they were friends and then proposed to surrender, he says, "They [the Confederates] had already captured several of my [his] men who were searching in the darkness to discover who the Confederates were. In fact, we thought the Confederate officer rather urged it on us, offering 'kind treatment,' [and it] gave them a surprise when the major ordered the 9th Indiana to 'Fire!'" And referring to Major French's Report,[1] that the Federals, after proposing to surrender, "laid down their arms" and

[1] No. 51, p. 448, l. 7.

then "retook their arms and poured a heavy volley into our ranks," he offers "in explanation, that their [the Confederate] forces did not expect any great show of resistance, and so the fixing of bayonets which we did was thought to be stacking arms." This may be so, but what seems to me may have occurred is this: Colonel Suman, after his escape, rejoined his regiment at the precise moment that this parleying was in progress, and not only from Adjutant Hodsden's letter of August 12, but also from Colonel Suman's Official Report,[1] we have the evidence that after slipping away he "brought two of my [his] right companies to bear and opened fire" on his pursuers. Whereupon he adds, "Our men ran one way and the rebels ran another." "Immediately afterward," says Colonel Suman, "I was ordered to retire with my command, which I did in good order." When Colonel Suman ordered his two right companies, "A and F,"[2] to fire, the rest of the regiment in such an emergency could not avoid joining in, and poured a volley into the 5th Kentucky and 63d Virginia. It is most improbable that there could have been two distinct volleyings and two distinct scatterings, for if there had been, Colonel Suman's Report would undoubtedly have mentioned it, and we should find record of it elsewhere.

After this encounter the Records show that both parties to it were thrown into confusion, and both had the opportunity, and did re-form.

In answer to my question put to General Suman, asking him by whom it was that he "was ordered to retire,"[3] I received his reply, written by his adjutant, from which it appears that there was only "an implied permit to withdraw, after the safe retreat of the army had been achieved." Reference is here made to the order of Colonel Van Der-

[1] No. 50, p. 769, l. 30.
[2] No. 50, p. 769, l. 40.
[3] Hodsden, March 10, 1909.

9TH INDIANA OFFICERS (Group 1)

LIEUT LOUIS S. NICKERSON CAPT JAMES D. BRADEN LIEUT W. H. H CRESWELL
CAPT. JOSHUA HEALEY CAPT. DeWITT C HODSDEN CAPT JAMES MADDEN
LIEUT STEPHEN P. HODSDEN LIEUT. R. F. DRULLINGER

Google

veer, as General Brannan's "mouthpiece," sending the regiment to the "high hill." For there had been (as already noticed) an interchange of epithets, and Brannan's lieutenant had notified Colonel Suman that he would not promise how soon he could send him relief.

"Van Derveer's order (if it was Van Derveer) had about it the sting of a taunt, intimating that it was Suman's business to get out of the perilous position the best way he could. After Colonel Suman's return to his regiment and its encounter with the 5th Kentucky and 63d Virginia, this was the question discussed by him with his major and adjutant, and it was Colonel Suman's decision that it would be wise to withdraw to a more secure position, as everything indicated that no support would be sent to them. The colonel then faced his regiment to the left and marched it down the hill and out of the woods. He halted it a few minutes in Snodgrass field, east of Snodgrass house."[1]

According to Colonel Suman's Official Report, it was after his encounter with the enemy and when he was moving off Horseshoe Ridge that he again met the officer whom he had "reported to at that point"; as we have seen, this officer was Colonel Boynton.

As this regiment seems to have been practically the last full regiment of the Federal army to withdraw, we shall give the account of it, as written by the adjutant to his colonel: —

> Left with no word to retire, the whole of the 9th became not suspicious, but convinced, that we were placed there to be sacrificed for the good of the army. We looked to our colonel to safely lead us out. Emerging from the woods, everything became distinct, lighted up by the Confederate camp-fires kindled from the rails in our breastworks of the morning, they having taken possession of our lines soon after our men had consecutively retired.

[1] Hodsden.

As we scanned up and down our deserted lines and works, not a soldier was in sight, not even a straggler, none but the 9th Indiana. Keeping the low grounds, so as not to be observed by the triumphant rebels, we followed on for Rossville, not meeting a single soul till we had gone a full mile or more from the last traces of the battle-field.

(4) *Party of the Thirty-fifth Ohio, in the bushes near the edge of little cliff, southwest of Snodgrass house, interrupts Fifty-fourth Virginia and Sixth Florida, dividing prisoners*

The incident which we shall now describe was the last collision between the two forces. As to the locality where it happened, the Official Reports contain the evidence of it; but this requires some study to demonstrate. We have seen Colonel Suman's statement, that he met Colonel Boynton both before and after his regiment was "put in" on Horseshoe Ridge. We also notice Colonel Suman's statement to Colonel Boynton that he need but take thirty steps to reach a point whence he could see the enemy.

My study has shown me where this 54th Virginia was located when a volley from the bushes was fired upon them. From these sources, and from a description of the incident itself, I place the 35th Ohio at this period near the Snodgrass house. But it is from a letter of March 5, 1909, from Judge D. B. McConnell, of Logansport, Indiana (formerly captain of Company K, 9th Indiana Regiment), that I obtain the conclusive evidence, and also a knowledge establishing the precise point.

In describing Colonel Boynton's position, when the 9th Indiana passed from Horseshoe Ridge after its encounter with the Confederate regiments, Judge McConnell says: —

His [Boynton's] regiment was lying within ten feet of what seemed to be the edge of a cliff. The dark shadow lying out there

made it appear like an abyss. When I went back in 1887 and looked for the cliff, I could not find it.

Continuing (in the same letter), he says that he again looked for it in 1893, and on this latter occasion he was in company with General Boynton. I went forward [he says] to look at the ground. Boynton observed me looking for something and asked me what I was looking for. I told him that I thought there was a little cliff before us. He replied, "I have been looking for that cliff ever since I have been here." Now, if either of us had, in making a report, undertaken to describe the ground, we would have placed a cliff there.

Thus it appears that the memory of this "little cliff" ten feet from the edge of which Boynton and his men were lying down, impressed itself upon both McConnell's and Boynton's memories, independently of each other, for thirty years thereafter. The conclusion which *they* reached, when they neither of them found this "little cliff," was that there was no such cliff; but the conclusion which is reached by a study of the Official Reports, and a study of the ground in connection with both Colonel Boynton's and Captain McConnell's statements, shows that they did not go to the right place to locate this edge of a little cliff. Colonel Boynton looked for a little cliff beyond the western slope of the "high hill," "Hill Number 2." The absurdity of looking there is manifest, for the point where Colonel Suman met Colonel Boynton was on the route taken by the 9th Indiana to its position on the "high hill," and when it returned a half-hour later, Colonel Suman again met Colonel Boynton "at that point."[1]

In view of the great blot in the picture-scene which Colonel Boynton's misrepresentation has caused, let us endeavor to remove all possible trace of it. In 1893 and since then, Colonel Boynton has located the position of his 35th Ohio at this juncture as being on the western slope of

[1] No. 50, p. 769, l. 40.

the "high hill," where Colonel Suman could never have encountered him, as it was off the route taken by the 9th Indiana in going in and in withdrawing. Had the 35th Ohio been in this position, it would have been between the 9th Indiana and the Federal regiments which were captured; and after Colonel Suman left his regiment on Horseshoe Ridge, and, in person, scouted to the right, he would then have encountered the 35th Ohio and would not have been taken prisoner. Yet Colonel Suman knew where the enemy was, and Colonel Boynton did not. The whole statement seems too absurd to necessitate argument.

Let us take our stand, therefore, at the edge of this little cliff southwest of the Snodgrass house, and we have from this point the only rational view of the picture, which is described in Colonel Boynton's Report [1] as follows: —

> The hill was immediately occupied by a rebel regiment whose right flank rested only fifty yards from the front of the Thirty-fifth.
>
> A rebel general, believed to be General Gregg, here rode up and asked whose troops we were; at the reply, "Thirty-fifth Ohio," he wheeled, but received a volley from the Thirty-fifth which riddled him and his horse and raked the line of the rebels, striking them at an angle of thirty degrees, breaking their line, and sending all but three companies down the hill in confusion. The three remaining companies poured a volley into our front and left. With this fire the engagement ceased, it being 7 P.M.

Colonel Van Derveer's description [2] is practically the same as Colonel Boynton's: —

> This [ordering the 35th Ohio across that flank] had scarcely been done before a rebel force appeared in the gloom directly in their front. A mounted officer rode to within a few paces of the 35th Ohio, and asked, "What regiment is that?" To this some one replied, "The 35th Ohio!" The officer turned suddenly and attempted to run away, but our regiment delivered a volley

[1] No. 50, p. 436, l. 22. [2] No. 50, p. 431, l. 2.

that brought horse and rider to the ground and put the force to flight. Prisoners said this officer was the rebel General Gregg.

For the purpose of comparison of all official data, we here insert (what will be discussed again later) a statement of General Brannan,[1] that at this time he sent the 35th Ohio to hold the position where the 21st Ohio had been captured "after nightfall";[2] and that this regiment repulsed the rebels and successfully maintained this position. We notice from Colonel Boynton's own account that he did not repulse the rebels, and that three companies of the latter fired the last volley against him, to which he did not reply but withdrew. At this time General Brannan was north of Snodgrass house in Snodgrass field, and could not have seen what happened. It is doubtful, also, whether Van Derveer was then with Boynton, though it is from his statement, that Boynton's volley "put the force to flight," that General Brannan obtained this information. But nowhere else, excepting in General Brannan's record of it, will be found the statement that the 35th Ohio successfully held the position. Of course, the encounter did not take place at the position which had been held by the 21st Ohio, and in a previous chapter it has been shown that General Brannan did not know either the actual or relative position of this regiment. There are so many misrepresentations of fact and errors of omission and commission in the Reports of General Brannan and of these subordinates as to leave no doubt of their attempt, in connection with these closing scenes of the battle, to conceal the truth and to shield each other.

But let us now present the true story of the last collision to which Brannan's officers, Van Derveer and Boynton, refer. The nearest Confederate regiment to Colonel Boynton, and the one in whose hands Colonel Suman was pris-

[1] No. 50, p. 392, l. 52. [2] No. 50, p. 406, l. 28.

oner, was the 54th Virginia. Referring to the Report[1] of Colonel Wade, commanding this regiment, we find that some five hundred Federals laid down their arms, after some delay, following the surrender: —

> It was now dark [says Colonel Wade], and while Colonel Trigg was in the act of dividing the prisoners between the 6th Florida and my regiment, for the purpose of taking them off the field, a party of the enemy who lay concealed in a short distance from my regiment, poured a volley into us, evidently with the intention of producing some confusion in order to effect the escape of the prisoners.

According to this statement it was only a "party" of the enemy; and the officers of the 9th Indiana confirm it, for in writing about the 35th Ohio at this time they call it "Boynton's Squad." But it is from the following, in Colonel Wade's Report,[2] that light is shed upon the whole affair, which makes the incident interesting and amusing, but unworthy of the importance attached to it by Brannan's men, and by General Boynton as Park Commissioner. "Only one man," says Colonel Wade, "was injured by this fire, and he was a mounted orderly of the brigade commander."

Thus, after all that Colonels Boynton and Van Derveer and General Brannan have written about this 35th Ohio volley, it caused only this one casualty; and the mounted officer was not "the rebel General Gregg"; for General Gregg, who was a brigade commander in B. R. Johnson's Division, did not participate in this day's battle, having been badly wounded on the day before. The "rebel general," thus mistaken, was none other than this "mounted orderly" of Colonel Trigg, commanding the brigade in which were these 54th Virginia and 6th Florida Regiments. Could anything be more absurd than the statements of

[1] No. 51, p. 489, l. 44.

[2] No. 51, p. 488, l. 51.

Colonels Van Derveer and Boynton that the 35th Ohio fired upon a rebel regiment directly in their front and "only fifty yards" distant, resulting in the injury of only one man? This, too, is all there was to General Brannan's grandiose statement that the 35th Ohio held the position which it was sent to occupy after the abandoned regiments had been captured, and that the 35th Ohio repulsed the rebels in the most gallant manner, and reoccupied the position which had been lost.

Colonel Boynton, we notice, claims only a part of the rebel regiment was thrown into confusion; according to his description this was the right flank of this regiment, while the left flank, consisting of the three remaining companies, held their ground and poured a volley into the 35th Ohio's front and left.

We also notice Colonel Van Derveer's statement that this "mounted officer rode to within *a few paces*," and in spite of the fact that the whole regiment fired a volley on him, yet they did not kill him, though they supposed he was a rebel general. But they did not wait long enough (within the few paces) to find out his real rank, or how badly he was injured. The information as to his identity was obtained (according to Colonel Van Derveer) from prisoners whom they captured. As they captured no prisoners of Trigg's Brigade, — the one man only of the 6th Florida reported missing being afterwards accounted for among the wounded, — we must look for the truth elsewhere, and it does not take much of a detective to notice the similarity of the names Gregg and Trigg, which will show that the information obtained, as to the command to which their victim belonged, was ascertained by the latter's answer to their challenge, — "Trigg's Brigade!" — given before the alleged "riddling with bullets!"

The only Federal Report which mentions Trigg is McMahan's, the major of the captured 21st Ohio, who

surrendered to Trigg. The Federals did not know there was such a brigade as Trigg's engaged in the battle, as is evidenced by the fact that the provost marshal, General Wiles' Report,[1] mentions prisoners captured from every brigade that assaulted Chickamauga Heights except Trigg's, and no such brigade is mentioned in his Report, though he thought his record of Confederate organizations "perfect."

Having arrived at these conclusions from a study of the Official Reports, I obtained further information after much correspondence, enabling me to discover the name and establish the identity of this "mounted orderly." His name was James Chenault, as confirmed by several of his comrades, including the first lieutenant of his company, J. A. Pratt, who wrote me that he was detailed from Company F, 54th Virginia, as Colonel Trigg's orderly, and that he (Pratt) was a witness to the incident and heard Chenault challenge the Federals in the bushes and heard them ask who he was, and the reply, "Trigg's Brigade," followed by the volley.

Comrade W. B. Cecil, also of Company F, gave me Chenault's name; says he "remembered him well," and that "he was wounded and died three days afterwards." He says, "It was getting dark; we could not see the enemy, only the flash of their guns."

But it is from Captain Angus McMillan, captain of Company A, 6th Florida, that I obtained an account that sheds much light on the affair: —

> I was in command of all the companies of the left wing of this regiment [he writes]. James Chenault[2] was ordered to see who the men in the bushes were, when a party of Yankees asked who *he* was. When told, they said, "Damn him, shoot him." They fired some shots, and he, being on horseback, was the only man wounded. This fire did not have any effect upon our regiment

[1] No. 50, pp. 228–232.

[2] Notes to chapter XIV, Note A.

[the 6th Florida], which also fired upon the men in the bushes. There was an order not to fire. This order was given by Colonel Wade, who thought the firing was on our own men.

From this evidence and more that might be submitted, it appears that the affair dwindles into a matter of small proportions. The 9th Indiana sent word to Brannan through the latter's orderly that the troops remaining on Horseshoe Ridge on their right had surrendered. Brannan accordingly sent back the 35th Ohio, one of the regiments which at this time had some ammunition left, — "one or two rounds." The regiment had become so depleted that it was but a small party, and rightly called "Boynton's Squad." It was wheeled across the flank and posted on the edge of the little cliff that overlooks the deep depression near the Snodgrass house. Boynton did not enter the woods of the Horseshoe, for as Colonel Suman says, "he seemed not inclined going to see" where the enemy was. His men lay down ten feet from the edge of the cliff. But at this juncture, Boynton's party, concealed in the bushes, was seen by the enemy, and James Chenault, Colonel Trigg's mounted orderly, was sent to ascertain whether the party was friend or foe. When within a few paces he was challenged, and answered that he belonged to "Trigg's Brigade." The volley which followed brought horse and rider to the ground, but caused no other casualty in either the 54th Virginia or 6th Florida, which were in the depression, and the comparatively few shots fired passed over their heads. These were "the scattering shots" heard by the 68th and 101st Indiana Regiments just before arriving at the Snodgrass house.[1]

They were sufficient, however, to cause confusion in the ranks of the 54th Virginia, but had no effect upon the 6th Florida. The Confederates supposed that the enemy had

[1] See Notes to chapter VIII, Note D, second paragraph.

withdrawn from that point a long time before, at sunset. Some thought their own men had fired into them by mistake, and Colonel Wade gave the order not to fire.

This, I think, after sifting the evidence, is a fair summing-up of the "35th Ohio's volley," and the reply thereto by the 54th Virginia and 6th Florida, more especially by the latter, who fired the last shots of the battle.

The confusion caused in the ranks of the 54th Virginia was, however, sufficient to cause the temporary escape of this regiment's quota of Federal prisoners.

(5) *The Fifth Kentucky and Sixty-third Virginia recapture prisoners escaping from the Fifty-fourth Virginia*

When Colonel Suman returned to his regiment after his escape, he gave the command to fire, and his Report describes how the rebels ran one way and his men the other. "Having re-formed," says Colonel Hawkins' Report,[1] "with fixed bayonets the 5th Kentucky advanced on the enemy, joined by Major French," and the latter also says[2] that the same volley from the Federal regiment "caused us to fall back a short distance to our position on the hill, from which place we continued to fire into the enemy," and then "again advanced."

Colonel Hawkins' Report says that the Federals who had "surrendered to Colonel Trigg . . . would have made their escape had I [he] not *recaptured* them (249, including three field officers)."[3] From Major French's Report,[4] it appears that the 63d Virginia participated in the same capture, for *he* also says, "We succeeded in capturing 249 prisoners, including several field officers."

I am obliged to be thus specific, in view of the statements of some of my correspondents, which differ from the

[1] No. 51, p. 444, l. 2.
[2] No. 51, p. 444, l. 4.
[3] No. 51, p. 448, l. 9.
[4] No. 51, p. 448, l. 14.

Official Reports, though the preponderance of evidence favors the latter.

Some of these statements are to the effect that Kelly's Brigade participated in the original capture, not "recapture"; for the 5th Kentucky and 63d Virginia claim these Federals had their guns and ammunition and volleyed upon them.

Our account of the original capture is given elsewhere, showing that the three regiments had exhausted their ammunition before they surrendered to Colonel Trigg without firing a gun. Thus they certainly did not fire on these Kelly regiments when recaptured.

This misconception arises from the mistake of supposing that the Federal regiment — the 9th Indiana — encountered at dusk, and the direction of whose flight was followed after the Confederates recovered from surprise, was the same which was captured later.[1]

On the other hand, the fact that the 9th Indiana had plenty of ammunition, while the 22d Michigan and 89th and 21st Ohio regiments had none, is one of the many evidences as to which Federal regiment had this encounter in the woods. Just what assistance Colonel Kelly and his brigade rendered in the original capture of these regiments by Colonel Trigg will also be shown in the next volume.

The following is the information given me by Colonel Hawkins in my correspondence with him: —

There was some confusion caused by a supposed volley from the enemy on some of Trigg's command, which moved off leaving

[1] Indignation against Carlton and his fellow prisoners was such that the Confederates threatened to shoot them for an alleged act of treachery after surrender, which had application not to them but to the 9th Indiana. This mistake at the time, and since then, has caused confusion in the minds of Kelly's men. Colonel Carlton is, in part, authority for these statements. When I read my account to him and explained the 9th Indiana incident, he recalled the fact that Colonel Kelly had charged his men with pretending to surrender and then firing upon the Confederates, to which Colonel Carlton made denial.

quite a number of prisoners. I opened column of my regiment and took in the Ohio colonel, officers, and men mentioned in my Report, 249 in number. Colonel Kelly was not present at the capture of the prisoners; if he was, I had no knowledge of his presence at the time when I made my Report. He came to my command when I was moving off with the prisoners.[1]

He, Colonel Kelly, rode in between the lines, cordially greeting and shaking the hand of the Ohio colonel, Colonel Carlton, of the 89th Ohio, which seemed to be reciprocated by his West Point comrade, but under different surroundings than existed at West Point.[2]

I turned over to another command all the prisoners, and camped on the battle-field that night.[3]

We have already quoted Captain Gaines' statement as to the location where the Federal regiment was encountered, and the place where he halted long enough for Corporal Menzie to exchange shoes with a dead Federal soldier. He then continues his statement as follows: —

It was after we had advanced, I think about two hundred yards further, that we made the recapture before spoken of. This recapture took place in the clearing at the foot of the northern slope of the ridge in the bowl-shaped hollow southwest of the Snodgrass house.[4] It was then after sundown. Here occurred Colonel Kelly's greeting with Colonel Carlton, of the 89th Ohio. I remember well, forming on each side of them and our marching back with them.[5]

We also read in General Preston's Report:[6] "Colonel Hawkins of the 5th Kentucky, a brave and skillful officer of Kelly's Brigade, captured two colonels, one lieutenant-colonel, a number of company officers, and 249 prisoners." It is evident that one and the same recapture is referred to. The only explanation of this neglect to mention the

[1] Letter of October 20, 1907.
[2] Letter of June 16, 1906.
[3] Letter of October 3, 1907.
[4] From both Colonels Hawkins and Carlton I have had confirmation of the locality as in the depression or hollow north of the ridge.
[5] Letters of May 12, and July, 1906.
[6] No. 51, p. 417, l. 30.

63d Virginia's participation in this capture may be due to the fact that Colonel Hawkins was the ranking officer of the two regiments, and his assumption of command. It is, however, due to Major French, in support of the statement made in his Official Report, to hear what he has to say in corroboration of his statement. His Official Report, we have noticed, mentions the fact that the 5th Kentucky was the regiment on his left, and therefore, when he says,[1] "We again advanced in conjunction with Colonel Trigg's Brigade, when we succeeded in capturing 249 prisoners," our conclusion is that this capture was participated in by the 5th Kentucky.

In Major French's letter to me, in reply to my letter of July 11, 1908, he claims that his regiment alone made the capture: —

> I had two companies to open ranks to receive them [the prisoners] and guard them to the rear. There were several officers, their names and rank I do not remember. One of them dismounted, turned over to me his horse, bridle, and saddle; also a pair of large-size Smith and Wesson pistols and sword, saying to me when he did this, "Take good care of them, I hope to get them back some of these days." I replied, "I will certainly take good care of them and make good use of them." The sword was a very fine one and had the colonel's name engraved on it; it having been presented to him by the ladies of his native town. I do not remember his name. Just at this time Colonel Trigg rode up with a few Federal prisoners. . . . He seemed to be very much out of humor, saying to me, "Two or three regiments surrendered to me and I turned them over to the 54th Regiment to guard. They were fired on by the Federals and let the prisoners all escape."

Before deciding between the two regiments, rival claimants to the honor of recapturing these 249 prisoners, I should like to have received more testimony than has been available in the course of years of search for it. I have found it difficult to locate surviving members of the 63d

[1] No. 51, p. 448, l. 13.

Virginia who participated in the assault on Horseshoe Ridge and who witnessed the incident described. Besides Major French there is only one other correspondent of his regiment thus able to testify, viz., Rev. K. C. Atkins, who was an officer of the 63d, who writes in his letter of June 14, 1911, to me as follows: —

> I recall the incident, and what makes me remember it so well was the difficulty I had in keeping my men from firing on these prisoners. They were marched out through our company, and for this reason Major French thought we captured them, but I am sure he is mistaken about it.

The colonel to whom Major French refers in his account, according to my information from Colonel Carlton, "may be either Colonel Le Favour or Lieutenant-Colonel Glenn," but not Colonel Carlton himself, for his horse was not taken and he was not deprived of his sword until many days thereafter.

In various interviews which I have had with Colonel Carlton I have received corroboration of different points which are here mentioned. First, as to his being captured and then trying to escape, riding in company with Lieutenant-Colonel Glenn, in a confused mob of friend and foe. He was then recaptured by troops which belonged to Kelly's Brigade, and recalls his meeting with Colonel Kelly as is described by Colonel Hawkins and Captain Gaines. He also corroborates the locality of his recapture.

We have seen how the 54th Virginia allowed its prisoners to escape (when the position occupied was on the slope of Hill Number 2 and in the deep hollow southwest of the Snodgrass house), caused by a volley from a party of Boynton's men concealed in the bushes, ten feet from the edge of the little cliff at that point. If the prisoners escaped here, the locality of their recapture was accordingly in the same bowl-shaped hollow as described and corroborated by Captain Gaines.

APPENDIX

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APPENDIX

I. ROSTER OF THE FEDERAL ARMY

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, COMMANDED BY MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM S. ROSECRANS, AT THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA, GEORGIA, SEPTEMBER 19 AND 20, 1863 [1]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

1st Battalion, Ohio Sharpshooters, Captain Gershom M. Barber.
10th Ohio Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel William M. Ward.
15th Pennsylvania Cavalry, Colonel William J. Palmer.

FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

Provost Guard, 9th Michigan Infantry,[2] Colonel John G. Parkhurst.
Escort, 1st Ohio Cavalry, Company L, Captain John D. Barker.

FIRST DIVISION

Brigadier-General Absalom Baird.

FIRST BRIGADE

Colonel Benjamin F. Scribner.

38th Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Daniel F. Griffin.
2d Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Obadiah C. Maxwell, Major William T. Beatty, Captain James Warnock.

[1] No. 50, p. 40.

[2] Guarded trains and performed provost duty. On September 20, halted fugitives from battle-field and formed them near McFarland's Gap.

33d Ohio, Colonel Oscar F. Moore.
94th Ohio, Major Rue P. Hutchins.
10th Wisconsin, Lieutenant-Colonel John H. Ely, Captain Jacob W. Roby.

SECOND BRIGADE

Brigadier-General John C. Starkweather.

24th Illinois, Colonel Geza Mihalotzy, Captain August Mauff.
79th Pennsylvania, Colonel Henry A. Hambright.
1st Wisconsin, Lieutenant-Colonel George B. Bingham.
21st Wisconsin, Lieutenant-Colonel Harrison C. Hobart, Captain Charles H. Walker.

THIRD BRIGADE

Brigadier-General John H. King.

15th United States, 1st Battalion, Captain Albert B. Dod.
16th United States, 1st Battalion, Major Sidney Coolidge, Captain R. E. A. Crofton.
18th United States, 1st Battalion, Captain George W. Smith.
18th United States, 2d Battalion, Captain Henry Haymond.
19th United States, 1st Battalion, Major Samuel K. Dawson, Captain Edmund L. Smith.

ARTILLERY

Indiana Light, 4th Battery (2d Brigade), Lieutenant David Flansburg, Lieutenant Henry J. Willits.
1st Michigan Light, Battery A (1st Brigade), Lieutenant George W. Van Pelt, Lieutenant Almerick W. Wilbur.
5th United States, Battery H (3d Brigade), Lieutenant Howard M. Burnham, Lieutenant Joshua A. Fessenden.

SECOND DIVISION

Major-General James S. Negley.

FIRST BRIGADE

Brigadier-General John Beatty.

104th Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas Hapeman.
42d Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel William T. B. McIntire.

88th Indiana, Colonel George Humphrey.
15th Kentucky, Colonel Marion C. Taylor.

SECOND BRIGADE

Colonel Timothy R. Stanley.
Colonel William L. Stoughton.

19th Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander W. Raffen.
11th Michigan, Colonel William L. Stoughton, Lieutenant-Colonel Melvin Mudge.
18th Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles H. Grosvenor.

THIRD BRIGADE

Colonel William Sirwell.

37th Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel William D. Ward.
21st Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Dwella M. Stoughton, Major Arnold McMahan, Captain Charles H. Vantine.
74th Ohio, Captain Joseph Fisher.
78th Pennsylvania, Colonel Archibald Blakeley.

ARTILLERY

Illinois Light, Bridges' Battery (1st Brigade), Captain Lyman Bridges.
1st Ohio Light, Battery G (3d Brigade), Captain Alexander Marshall.
1st Ohio Light, Battery M (2d Brigade), Captain Frederick Schultz.

THIRD DIVISION

Brigadier-General John M. Brannan.

FIRST BRIGADE

Colonel John M. Connell.

82d Indiana, Colonel Morton C. Hunter.
17th Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Durbin Ward.
31st Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick W. Lister.
38th Ohio,[1] Colonel Edward H. Phelps.

[1] Not engaged; train guard.

SECOND BRIGADE

Colonel John T. Croxton.
Colonel William H. Hays.

10th Indiana, Colonel William B. Carroll, Lieutenant-Colonel Marsh B. Taylor.
74th Indiana, Colonel Charles W. Chapman, Lieutenant-Colonel Myron Baker.
4th Kentucky, Lieutenant-Colonel P. Burgess Hunt, Major Robert M. Kelly.
10th Kentucky, Colonel William H. Hays, Lieutenant-Colonel Gabriel C. Wharton.
14th Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry D. Kingsbury.

THIRD BRIGADE

Colonel Ferdinand Van Derveer.

87th Indiana, Colonel Newell Gleason.
2d Minnesota, Colonel James George.
9th Ohio, Colonel Gustave Kammerling.
35th Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry V. N. Boynton.

ARTILLERY

1st Michigan Light Battery D (1st Brigade), Captain Josiah W. Church.
1st Ohio Light Battery C (2d Brigade), Lieutenant Marco B. Gary.
4th United States Battery I (3d Brigade), Lieutenant Frank G. Smith.

FOURTH DIVISION

Major-General Joseph J. Reynolds.

FIRST BRIGADE [1]

Colonel John T. Wilder.

92d Illinois, Colonel Smith D. Atkins.
98th Illinois, Colonel John J. Funkhouser, Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Kitchell.
123d Illinois, Colonel James Monroe.
17th Indiana, Major William T. Jones.
72d Indiana, Colonel Abram O. Miller.

[1] Detached from its division and serving as mounted infantry.

SECOND BRIGADE

Colonel Edward A. King.
Colonel Milton S. Robinson.

68th Indiana, Captain Harvey J. Espy, Captain Edmund Finn.[1]
75th Indiana, Colonel Milton S. Robinson, Lieutenant-Colonel William O'Brien.
101st Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Doan.
105th Ohio, Major George T. Perkins.

THIRD BRIGADE

Brigadier-General John B. Turchin.

18th Kentucky, Lieutenant-Colonel Hubbard K. Milward, Captain John B. Heltemes.
11th Ohio, Colonel Philander P. Lane.
36th Ohio, Colonel William G. Jones, Lieutenant-Colonel Hiram F. Devol.
92d Ohio, Colonel Benjamin D. Fearing, Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas Putnam, Jr.

ARTILLERY

Indiana Light, 18th Battery (1st Brigade), Captain Eli Lilly.
Indiana Light, 19th Battery (2d Brigade), Captain Samuel J. Harris, Lieutenant Robert S. Lackey.
Indiana Light, 21st Battery (3d Brigade), Captain William W. Andrew.

TWENTIETH ARMY CORPS

Major-General Alexander McD. McCook.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

Provost Guard, 81st Indiana Infantry, Company H, Captain William J. Richards.
Escort, 2d Kentucky Cavalry, Company I, Lieutenant George W. L. Batman.

[1] See Notes to chapter VIII, Note B, footnote.

FIRST DIVISION

Brigadier-General Jefferson C. Davis.

FIRST BRIGADE[1]

Colonel P. Sidney Post.

59th Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Joshua C. Winters.
74th Illinois, Colonel Jason Marsh.
75th Illinois, Colonel John E. Bennett.
22d Indiana, Colonel Michael Gooding.
Wisconsin Light Artillery, 5th Battery,[2] Captain George Q. Gardner.

SECOND BRIGADE

Brigadier-General William P. Carlin.

21st Illinois, Colonel John W. S. Alexander, Captain Chester K. Knight.
38th Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Daniel H. Gilmer, Captain Willis G. Whitehurst.
81st Indiana, Captain Nevil B. Boone, Major James E. Calloway.
101st Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel John Messer, Major Bedan B. McDanald, Captain Leonard D. Smith.
Minnesota Light Artillery, 2d Battery, Lieutenant Albert Woodbury, Lieutenant Richard L. Dawley.

THIRD BRIGADE

Colonel Hans C. Heg.
Colonel John A. Martin.

25th Illinois, Major Samuel D. Wall, Captain Wesford Taggart.
35th Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel William P. Chandler.
8th Kansas, Colonel John A. Martin, Lieutenant-Colonel James L. Abernathy.
15th Wisconsin, Lieutenant-Colonel Ole C. Johnson.
Wisconsin Light Artillery, 8th Battery, Lieutenant John D. McLean.

[1] Engaged on September 20. See Colonel Phelps' Report, No. 50, p. 507, l. 30, and p. 509, skirmish casualties.

[2] Expended no ammunition, but on September 20 threatened enemy's cavalry. (No. 50, p. 508, l. 11.)

SECOND DIVISION

Brigadier-General Richard W. Johnson.

FIRST BRIGADE

Brigadier-General August Willich.

89th Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan J. Hall, Major William D. Williams.
32d Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Erdelmeyer.
39th Indiana,[1] Colonel Thomas J. Harrison.
15th Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Askew.
49th Ohio, Major Samuel F. Gray, Captain Luther M. Strong.
1st Ohio Light Artillery, Battery A, Captain Wilbur F. Goodspeed.

SECOND BRIGADE

Colonel Joseph B. Dodge.

79th Illinois, Colonel Allen Buckner.
29th Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel David M. Dunn.
30th Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Orrin D. Hurd.
77th Pennsylvania, Colonel Thomas E. Rose, Captain Joseph J. Lawson.
Ohio Light Artillery, 20th Battery, Captain Edward Grosskopff.

THIRD BRIGADE

Colonel Philemon P. Baldwin.
Colonel William W. Berry.

6th Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Hagerman Tripp, Major Calvin D. Campbell.
5th Kentucky, Colonel William W. Berry, Captain John M. Huston.
1st Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Bassett Langdon.
93d Ohio, Colonel Hiram Strong, Lieutenant-Colonel William H. Martin.
Indiana Light Artillery, 5th Battery, Captain Peter Simonson.

[1] Detached from its brigade and serving as mounted infantry.

THIRD DIVISION

Major-General Philip H. Sheridan.

FIRST BRIGADE

Brigadier-General William Lytle.
Colonel Silas Miller.

36th Illinois, Colonel Silas Miller, Lieutenant-Colonel Porter C. Olson.
88th Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander S. Chadbourne.
21st Michigan, Colonel William B. McCreery, Major Seymour Chase.
24th Wisconsin, Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore S. West, Major Carl von Baumbach.
Indiana Light Artillery, 11th Battery, Captain Arnold Sutermeister.

SECOND BRIGADE

Colonel Bernard Laiboldt.

44th Illinois, Colonel Wallace W. Barrett.
73d Illinois, Colonel James F. Jaquess.
2d Missouri, Major Arnold Beck.
15th Missouri, Colonel Joseph Conrad.
1st Missouri Light Artillery, Battery G,[1] Lieutenant Gustavus Schueler.

THIRD BRIGADE

Colonel Luther P. Bradley.
Colonel Nathan H. Walworth.

22d Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Swanwick.
27th Illinois, Colonel Jonathan R. Miles.
42d Illinois, Colonel Nathan H. Walworth, Lieutenant-Colonel John A. Hottenstein.
51st Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel B. Raymond.
1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery C, Captain Mark H. Prescott.

[1] Captain Henry Hescock, chief of artillery division.

TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS L. CRITTENDEN.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

Escort, 15th Illinois Cavalry, Company K, Captain Samuel B. Sherer.

FIRST DIVISION

Brigadier-General Thomas J. Wood.

FIRST BRIGADE

Colonel George P. Buell.

100th Illinois, Colonel Frederick A. Bartleson, Major Charles M. Hammond.
58th Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel James T. Embree.
13th Michigan, Colonel Joshua B. Culver, Major Willard G. Eaton.
26th Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel William H. Young.

SECOND BRIGADE [1]

Brigadier-General George D. Wagner.

15th Indiana, Colonel Gustavus A. Wood.
40th Indiana, Colonel John W. Blake.
57th Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel George W. Lennard.
97th Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Milton Barnes.

THIRD BRIGADE

Colonel Charles G. Harker.

3d Kentucky, Colonel Henry C. Dunlap.
64th Ohio, Colonel Alexander McIlvain.
65th Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Horatio N. Whitbeck, Major Samuel C. Brown, Captain Thomas Powell.
125th Ohio, Colonel Emerson Opdycke.

ARTILLERY

Indiana Light, 8th Battery (1st Brigade), Captain George Estep.

[1] Stationed at Chattanooga and not engaged.

Indiana Light, 10th Battery [1] (2d Brigade), Lieutenant William A. Naylor.
Ohio Light, 6th Battery (3d Brigade), Capt. Cullen Bradley.

SECOND DIVISION

Major-General John M. Palmer.

FIRST BRIGADE

Brigadier-General Charles Cruft.

31st Indiana, Colonel John T. Smith.
1st Kentucky,[2] Lieutenant-Colonel Alva R. Hadlock.
2d Kentucky, Colonel Thomas D. Sedgwick.
90th Ohio, Colonel Charles H. Rippey.

SECOND BRIGADE

Brigadier-General William B. Hazen.

9th Indiana, Colonel Isaac C. B. Suman.
6th Kentucky, Colonel George T. Shackelford, Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Rockingham, Major Richard T. Whitaker.
41st Ohio, Colonel Aquila Wiley.
124th Ohio, Colonel Oliver H. Payne, Major James B. Hampson.

THIRD BRIGADE

Colonel William Grose.

84th Illinois, Colonel Louis H. Waters.
36th Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver H. P. Carey, Major Gilbert Trusler.
23d Kentucky, Lieutenant-Colonel James C. Foy.
6th Ohio, Colonel Nicholas L. Anderson, Major Samuel C. Erwin.
24th Ohio, Colonel David J. Higgins.

ARTILLERY

Captain William E. Standart.

1st Ohio Light, Battery B (1st Brigade), Lieutenant Norman A. Baldwin.
1st Ohio Light, Battery F (2d Brigade), Lieutenant Giles J. Cockerill.

[1] Stationed at Chattanooga and not engaged.
[2] Companies B, D, G, and K engaged; others detached as wagon guard.

4th United States Battery H (3d Brigade), Lieutenant Harry C. Cushing.
4th United States, Battery M (3d Brigade) Lieutenant Francis L. D. Russell.

UNATTACHED

110th Illinois (battalion),[1] Captain E. Hibbard Topping.

THIRD DIVISION.

Brigadier-General Horatio P. Van Cleve.

FIRST BRIGADE

Brigadier-General Samuel Beatty.

79th Indiana, Colonel Frederick Knefler.
9th Kentucky, Colonel George H. Cram.
17th Kentucky, Colonel Alexander M. Stout.
19th Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry G. Stratton.

SECOND BRIGADE

Colonel George F. Dick.

44th Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Simeon C. Aldrich.
86th Indiana, Major Jacob C. Dick.
13th Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Elhannon M. Mast, Captain Horatio G. Cosgrove.
59th Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Granville A. Frambes.

THIRD BRIGADE

Colonel Sidney M. Barnes.

35th Indiana, Major John P. Dufficy.
8th Kentucky, Lieutenant-Colonel James D. Mayhew, Major John S. Clark.
21st Kentucky,[2] Colonel S. Woodson Price.
51st Ohio, Colonel Richard W. McClain, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles H. Wood.
99th Ohio, Colonel Peter T. Swaine.

ARTILLERY

Indiana Light, 7th Battery, Captain George R. Swallow.

[1] Not engaged.
[2] Stationed at Whiteside's and not engaged.

Pennsylvania Light, 26th Battery, Captain Alanson J. Stevens, Lieutenant Samuel M. McDowell.
Wisconsin Light, 3d Battery, Lieutenant Cortland Livingston.

RESERVE CORPS

Major-General Gordon Granger.

FIRST DIVISION

Brigadier-General James B. Steedman.

FIRST BRIGADE

Brigadier-General Walter C. Whitaker.

96th Illinois, Colonel Thomas E. Champion.
115th Illinois, Colonel Jesse H. Moore.
84th Indiana, Colonel Nelson Trusler.
22d Michigan,[1] Colonel Heber Le Favour, Lieutenant-Colonel Sanborn, Captain Alonzo M. Keeler.
40th Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel William Jones.
89th Ohio,[1] Colonel Caleb H. Carlton, Captain Isaac C. Nelson.
Ohio Light Artillery, 18th Battery, Captain Charles C. Aleshire.

SECOND BRIGADE

Colonel John G. Mitchell.

78th Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Carter Van Vleck, Lieutenant George Green.
98th Ohio, Captain Moses J. Urquhart, Captain Armstrong J. Thomas.
113th Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Darius B. Warner.
121st Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry B. Banning.
1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery M, Lieutenant Thomas Burton.

SECOND DIVISION

SECOND BRIGADE

Colonel Daniel McCook.

85th Illinois, Colonel Caleb J. Dilworth.
86th Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel David W. Magee.

[1] Temporarily attached. See footnote, chapter xi, p. 287.

125th Illinois, Colonel Oscar F. Harmon.
52d Ohio, Major James T. Holmes.
69th Ohio,[1] Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph H. Brigham.
2d Illinois Light Artillery, Battery I, Captain Charles M. Barnett.

CAVALRY CORPS

BRIGADIER-GENERAL ROBERT B. MITCHELL.

FIRST DIVISION

Colonel Edward M. McCook.

FIRST BRIGADE

Colonel Archibald P. Campbell.

2d Michigan, Major Leonidas S. Scranton.
9th Pennsylvania, Lieutenant-Colonel Roswell M. Russell.
1st Tennessee, Lieutenant-Colonel James P. Brownlow.

SECOND BRIGADE

Colonel Daniel M. Ray.

2d Indiana, Major Joseph B. Presdee.
4th Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel John T. Deweese.
2d Tennessee, Lieutenant-Colonel William R. Cook.
1st Wisconsin, Colonel Oscar H. LaGrange.
1st Ohio Light Artillery, Battery D (section), Lieutenant Nathaniel M. Newell.

THIRD BRIGADE

Colonel Lewis D. Watkins.

4th Kentucky, Colonel Wickliffe Cooper.
5th Kentucky, Lieutenant-Colonel William T. Hoblitzell.
6th Kentucky, Major Louis A. Gratz.

[1] Temporarily attached.

SECOND DIVISION

Brigadier-General George Crook

FIRST BRIGADE

Colonel Robert H. G. Minty.

3d Indiana Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Klein.
4th Michigan, Major Horace Gray.
7th Pennsylvania, Lieutenant-Colonel James J. Seibert.
4th United States, Captain James B. McIntyre.

SECOND BRIGADE

Colonel Eli Long.

2d Kentucky, Colonel Thomas P. Nicholas.
1st Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Valentine Cupp, Major Thomas J. Patten.
3d Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles B. Seidel.
4th Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver P. Robie.

ARTILLERY

Chicago (Illinois) Board of Trade Battery, Captain James H. Stokes.

II. ROSTER OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE, GENERAL BRAXTON BRAGG, C. S. ARMY, COMMANDING, SEPTEMBER 19–20, 1863[1]

HEADQUARTERS

ESCORT

Captain Guy Dreux.

Dreux's Company, Louisiana Cavalry, Lieutenant O. De Buis.
Holloway's Company, Alabama Cavalry, Captain E. M. Holloway.

RIGHT WING

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL LEONIDAS POLK.

Escort, Greenleaf's Company, Louisiana Cavalry, Captain Leeds Greenleaf.

CHEATHAM'S DIVISION[2]

Major-General Benjamin F. Cheatham.

Escort, Company G, 2d Georgia Cavalry, Captain Thomas M. Merritt.

JACKSON'S BRIGADE

Brigadier-General John K. Jackson.

1st Georgia (Confederate), 2d Battalion, Major James Clarke Gordon.
5th Georgia, Colonel Charles P. Daniel.
2d Georgia Battalion, Sharpshooters, Major Richard H. Whiteley.
5th Mississippi, Lieutenant-Colonel W. L. Sykes, Major John B. Herring.
8th Mississippi, Colonel John C. Wilkinson.

[1] No. 51, p. 11. [2] Of Polk's Corps.

SMITH'S BRIGADE

Brigadier-General Preston Smith.
Colonel Alfred J. Vaughan, Jr.

11th Tennessee, Colonel George W. Gordon.
12th Tennessee, 47th Tennessee, Colonel William M. Watkins.
13th Tennessee, 154th Tennessee, Colonel A. J. Vaughan, Jr., and Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. Pitman.
29th Tennessee, Colonel Horace Rice.
Dawson's (battalion) Sharpshooters,[1] Major J. W. Dawson, Major William Green, Major James Purl.

MANEY'S BRIGADE

Brigadier-General George Maney.

1st Tennessee, 27th Tennessee, Colonel Hume R. Field.
4th Tennessee (Provisional Army), Colonel James A. McMurry, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert N. Lewis, Major Oliver A. Bradshaw, Captain Joseph Bostwick.
6th Tennessee, 9th Tennessee, Colonel George C. Porter.
24th Tennessee Battalion, Sharpshooters, Major Frank Maney.

WRIGHT'S BRIGADE

Brigadier-General Marcus J. Wright.

8th Tennessee, Colonel John H. Anderson.
16th Tennessee, Colonel D. M. Donnell.
28th Tennessee, Colonel Sidney S. Stanton.
38th Tennessee, and Major Thomas B. Murray's (Tennessee) Battalion, Colonel John C. Carter.
51st Tennessee, 52d Tennessee, Lieutenant-Colonel John G. Hall.

STRAHL'S BRIGADE

Brigadier-General Otho F. Strahl.

4th Tennessee, 5th Tennessee, Colonel Jonathan J. Lamb.
19th Tennessee, Colonel Francis M. Walker.
24th Tennessee, Colonel John A. Wilson.
31st Tennessee, Colonel Egbert E. Tansil.
33d Tennessee, Colonel Warner P. Jones.

[1] Composed of two companies from the 11th Tennessee, two from the 12th and 47th Tennessee (consolidated), and one from the 154th Senior Tennessee.

ARTILLERY

Major Melancthon Smith.

Carnes' (Tennessee) Battery, Captain William W. Carnes.
Scogin's (Georgia) Battery, Captain John Scogin. (Same as "Griffin Light Artillery.")
Scott's (Tennessee) Battery, Lieutenant John H. Marsh, Lieutenant A. T. Watson, Captain William L. Scott.
Smith's (Mississippi) Battery, Lieutenant William B. Turner.
Stanford's (Mississippi) Battery, Captain Thomas J. Stanford.

HILL'S CORPS

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL DANIEL H. HILL.

CLEBURNE'S DIVISION

Major-General Patrick R. Cleburne.

Escort, Sanders' Company, Tennessee Cavalry, Captain C. F. Sanders.

WOOD'S BRIGADE

Brigadier-General S. A. M. Wood.

16th Alabama: Major John H. McGaughy, Captain Frederick A. Ashford.
33d Alabama, Colonel Samuel Adams.
45th Alabama, Colonel E. B. Breedlove.
18th Alabama Battalion, Major John H. Gibson, Colonel Samuel Adams.[1]
32d Mississippi, 45th Mississippi, Colonel M. P. Lowery.
15th Mississippi Battalion, Sharpshooters, Major A. T. Hawkins, Captain Daniel Coleman.

POLK'S BRIGADE

Brigadier-General Lucius E. Polk.

1st Arkansas, Colonel John W. Colquitt.
3d Confederate, 5th Confederate, Colonel J. A. Smith.
2d Tennessee, Colonel William D. Robison.
35th Tennessee, Colonel Benjamin J. Hill.
48th Tennessee, Colonel George H. Nixon.

[1] 33d Alabama.

DESHLER'S BRIGADE

Brigadier-General James Deshler.
Colonel Roger Q. Mills.

19th Arkansas, 24th Arkansas, Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. Hutchison.

6th Texas, 10th Texas, 15th Texas Cavalry,[1] Colonel Roger Q. Mills and Lieutenant-Colonel T. Scott Anderson.

17th Texas Cavalry, 18th Texas Cavalry, 24th Texas Cavalry, 25th Texas Cavalry, Colonel F. C. Wilkes, Lieutenant-Colonel John T. Coit, and Major William A. Taylor.

ARTILLERY

Major T. R. Hotchkiss.
Captain Henry C. Semple.

Calvert's (Helena, Arkansas) Battery, Lieutenant Thomas J. Key.

Douglas' (Texas) Battery, Captain James P. Douglas.

Semple's (Alabama) Battery, Captain Henry C. Semple and Lieutenant R. W. Goldthwaite.

BRECKINRIDGE'S DIVISION

Major-General John C. Breckinridge.

HELM'S BRIGADE

Brigadier-General Benjamin H. Helm.
Colonel Joseph H. Lewis.

41st Alabama, Colonel Martin L. Stansel.

2d Kentucky, Lieutenant-Colonel James W. Hewitt, Lieutenant-Colonel James W. Moss.

4th Kentucky, Colonel Joseph P. Nuckols, Major Thomas W. Thompson.

6th Kentucky, Colonel Joseph H. Lewis, Lieutenant-Colonel Martin H. Cofer.

9th Kentucky, Colonel John W. Caldwell, Lieutenant-Colonel John C. Wickliffe.

[1] Dismounted.

ADAMS' BRIGADE

Brigadier-General Daniel W. Adams.
Colonel Randall L. Gibson.

32d Alabama, Major John C. Kimbell.
13th Louisiana, 20th Louisiana, Colonel Randall L. Gibson, Colonel Leon von Zinken, and Captain E. M. Dubroca.
16th Louisiana, 25th Louisiana, Colonel Daniel Gober.
19th Louisiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Richard W. Turner, Major Loudon Butler, Captain H. A. Kennedy.
14th Louisiana Battalion, Major J. E. Austin.

STOVALL'S BRIGADE

Brigadier-General Marcellus A. Stovall.

1st Florida, 3d Florida, Colonel William S. Dilworth.
4th Florida, Colonel W. L. L. Bowen.
47th Georgia, Captain William S. Phillips, Captain Joseph S. Cone.
60th North Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel James M. Ray, Captain James Thomas Weaver.

ARTILLERY

Major Rice E. Graves.

Cobb's (Kentucky) Battery, Captain Robert Cobb.
Graves' (Kentucky) Battery,[1] Lieutenant S. M. Spencer.
Mebane's (Tennessee) Battery, Captain John W. Mebane.
Slocomb's (Louisiana) Battery, Captain C. H. Slocomb.

RESERVE CORPS

Major-General William H. T. Walker.

WALKER'S DIVISION

Brigadier-General States R. Gist.

GIST'S BRIGADE

Brigadier-General States R. Gist.
Colonel Peyton H. Colquitt.
Lieutenant-Colonel Leroy Napier.

46th Georgia, Colonel Peyton H. Colquitt, Major A. M. Speer.

[1] Not engaged.

8th Georgia Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Leroy Napier, Major Z. L. Watters.
16th South Carolina,[1] Colonel James McCullough.
24th South Carolina, Colonel Clement H. Stevens, Lieutenant-Colonel Ellison Capers.

ECTOR'S BRIGADE

Brigadier-General Matthew D. Ector.

Stone's (Alabama) Battalion, Sharpshooters, Major T. O. Stone.
Pound's (Mississippi) Battalion, Sharpshooters, Captain M. Pound.
29th North Carolina, Colonel William B. Creasman.
9th Texas, Colonel William H. Young.
10th Texas Cavalry,[2] Lieutenant-Colonel C. R. Earp.
14th Texas Cavalry,[2] Colonel J. L. Camp.
32d Texas Cavalry,[2] Colonel Julius A. Andrews.

WILSON'S BRIGADE

Colonel Claudius C. Wilson.

25th Georgia, Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. Williams.
29th Georgia, Lieutenant George R. McRae.
30th Georgia, Lieutenant-Colonel James S. Boynton.
1st Georgia Battalion, Sharpshooters, Major Arthur Shaaff.
4th Louisiana Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel John McEnery.

ARTILLERY

Ferguson's (South Carolina) Battery,[1] Lieutenant R. T. Beauregard.
Howell's (Georgia) Battery (formerly Martin's), Captain Evan P. Howell.

LIDDELL'S DIVISION

Brigadier-General St. John R. Liddell.

LIDDELL'S BRIGADE

Colonel Daniel C. Govan.

2d Arkansas, 15th Arkansas, Lieutenant-Colonel Reuben F. Harvey and Captain A. T. Meek.

[1] Not engaged; at Rome. [2] Serving as infantry.

5th Arkansas, 13th Arkansas, Colonel L. Featherston and Lieutenant-Colonel John E. Murray.
6th Arkansas, 7th Arkansas, Colonel D. A. Gillespie and Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Snyder.
8th Arkansas, 1st Louisiana Regulars, Lieutenant-Colonel George F. Baucum,[1] Major A. Watkins.

WALTHALL'S BRIGADE

Brigadier-General Edward C. Walthall.

24th Mississippi, Lieutenant-Colonel R. P. McKelvaine, Major W. C. Staples, Captain B. F. Toomer, Captain J. D. Smith.
27th Mississippi, Colonel James A. Campbell.
29th Mississippi, Colonel William F. Brantly.
30th Mississippi, Colonel Junius I. Scales, Lieutenant-Colonel Hugh A. Reynolds, Major James M. Johnson.
34th Mississippi, Colonel Samuel Benton, Major William G. Pegram, Captain H. J. Bowen, Lieutenant-Colonel Hugh A. Reynolds.[2]

ARTILLERY

Captain Charles Swett.

Fowler's (Alabama) Battery, Captain William H. Fowler.
Warren Light (Mississippi Battery), Lieutenant H. Shannon.

LEFT WING

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JAMES LONGSTREET

HINDMAN'S DIVISION[3]

Major-General Thomas C. Hindman.
Brigadier-General Patton Anderson.

Escort, Lenoir's Company, Alabama Cavalry, Captain T. M. Lenoir.

ANDERSON'S BRIGADE

Brigadier-General Patton Anderson.
Colonel J. H. Sharp.

7th Mississippi, Colonel W. H. Bishop.
9th Mississippi, Major T. H. Lynam.

[1] 8th Arkansas. [2] 30th Mississippi. [3] Of Polk's Corps.

10th Mississippi, Lieutenant-Colonel James Barr.
41st Mississippi, Colonel W. F. Tucker.
44th Mississippi, Colonel J. H. Sharp, Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. Kelsey.
9th Mississippi Battalion, Sharpshooters, Major W. C. Richards.
Garrity's (Alabama),Battery, Captain James Garrity.

DEAS' BRIGADE

Brigadier-General Zach. C. Deas.

19th Alabama, Colonel Samuel K. McSpadden.
22d Alabama, Lieutenant-Colonel John Weedon, Captain Harry T. Toulmin.
25th Alabama, Colonel George D. Johnston.
39th Alabama, Colonel Whitfield Clark.
50th Alabama, Colonel J. G. Coltart.
17th Alabama Battalion, Sharpshooters, Captain James F. Nabers.
Dent's (Alabama) Battery (formerly Robertson's), Captain S. H. Dent.

MANIGAULT'S BRIGADE

Brigadier-General Arthur M. Manigault.

24th Alabama, Colonel N. N. Davis.
28th Alabama, Colonel John C. Reid.
34th Alabama, Major John N. Slaughter.
10th South Carolina, 19th South Carolina, Colonel James F. Pressley.
Waters' (Alabama) Battery, Lieutenant Charles W. Watkins.

BUCKNER'S CORPS

Major-General Simon B. Buckner.

Escort, Clark's Company, Tennessee Cavalry, Captain J. W. Clark.

STEWART'S DIVISION

Major-General Alexander P. Stewart.

Escort, Foules' Company, Mississippi Cavalry, Captain H. L. Foules.[1]

[1] See No. 51, pp. 965-66.

BATE'S BRIGADE

Brigadier-General William B. Bate.

58th Alabama, Colonel Bushrod Jones.
37th Georgia, Colonel A. F. Rudler, Lieutenant Joseph T. Smith.
4th Georgia Battalion, Sharpshooters, Major T. D. Caswell.
15th Tennessee, 37th Tennessee, Captain B. M. Turner, Lieutenant Joel Towers, Colonel R. C. Tyler, Lieutenant-Colonel R. Dudley Frayser, and Captain R. M. Tankesley.
20th Tennessee, Colonel Thomas B. Smith, Major W. M. Shy.

BROWN'S BRIGADE

Brigadier-General John C. Brown.
Colonel Edmund C. Cook.

18th Tennessee, Colonel Joseph B. Palmer, Lieutenant-Colonel William R. Butler, Captain Gideon H. Lowe.
26th Tennessee, Colonel John M. Lillard, Major Richard M. Saffell.
32d Tennessee, Colonel Edmund C. Cook, Captain Calaway G. Tucker.
45th Tennessee, Colonel Anderson Searcy.
23d Tennessee Battalion, Major Tazewell W. Newman, Captain W. P. Simpson.

CLAYTON'S BRIGADE

Brigadier-General Henry D. Clayton.

18th Alabama, Colonel J. T. Holtzclaw, Lieutenant-Colonel R. F. Inge, Major P. F. Hunley.
36th Alabama, Colonel Lewis T. Woodruff.
38th Alabama, Lieutenant-Colonel A. R. Lankford.

ARTILLERY

Major J. Wesley Eldridge.

1st Arkansas Battery, Captain John T. Humphreys.
T. H. Dawson's (Georgia) Battery, Lieutenant R. W. Anderson.
Eufaula (Alabama) Battery, Captain McDonald Oliver, Lieutenant W. J. McKenzie.
Company E, 9th Georgia Battalion (Billington W. York's Battery), Lieutenant William S. Everett.

PRESTON'S DIVISION

Brigadier-General William Preston.

GRACIE'S BRIGADE

Brigadier-General Archibald Gracie, Jr.

43d Alabama, Colonel Young M. Moody.
1st Alabama Battalion,[1] Lieutenant-Colonel John H. Holt, Captain George W. Huguley.
2d Alabama Battalion,[1] Lieutenant-Colonel Bolling Hall, Jr., Captain W. D. Walden.
3d Alabama Battalion,[1] Lieutenant-Colonel John W. A. Sanford.
4th Alabama Battalion,[2] Major John D. McLennan.
63d Tennessee, Lieutenant-Colonel Abraham Fulkerson, Major John A. Aiken.

THIRD BRIGADE

Colonel John H. Kelly.

65th Georgia, Colonel R. H. Moore.[3]
5th Kentucky, Colonel Hiram Hawkins.
58th North Carolina, Colonel John B. Palmer.
63d Virginia, Major James M. French.

TRIGG'S BRIGADE

Colonel Robert C. Trigg.

1st Florida Cavalry,[4] Colonel G. Troup Maxwell.
6th Florida, Colonel J. J. Finley.
7th Florida, Colonel Robert Bullock.
54th Virginia, Lieutenant-Colonel John J. Wade.

ARTILLERY BATTALION

Major A. Leyden.

Jeffress' (Virginia) Battery, Captain William C. Jeffress.
Peeples' (Georgia) Battery, Captain Tyler M. Peeples.
Wolihin's (Georgia) Battery,[5] Captain Andrew M. Wolihin.

[1] Hilliard's Legion.
[2] Artillery Battalion, Hilliard's Legion, serving as infantry.
[3] Not engaged in the battle.
[4] Dismounted.
[5] Not engaged. (See No. 51, p. 449, l. 17.)

RESERVE CORPS ARTILLERY

Major Samuel C. Williams.

Baxter's (Tennessee) Battery, Captain Edmund D. Baxter.
Darden's (Mississippi) Battery, Captain Putnam Darden.
Kolb's (Alabama) Battery, Captain R. F. Kolb.
McCants' (Florida) Battery, Captain Robert P. McCants.

LONGSTREET'S CORPS[1]

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN B. HOOD.

McLAWS' DIVISION

Brigadier-General Joseph B. Kershaw.
Major-General Lafayette McLaws.[2]

KERSHAW'S BRIGADE

Brigadier-General Joseph B. Kershaw.

2d South Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel Franklin Gaillard.
3d South Carolina, Colonel James D. Nance.
7th South Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel Elbert Bland, Major John S. Hard, Captain E. J. Goggans.
8th South Carolina, Colonel John W. Henegan.
15th South Carolina, Colonel Joseph F. Gist.
3d South Carolina (battalion), Captain Joshua M. Townsend.

HUMPHREYS' BRIGADE

Brigadier-General Benjamin G. Humphreys.

13th Mississippi, Lieutenant-Colonel Kennon McElroy.
17th Mississippi, Lieutenant-Colonel John C. Fiser.
18th Mississippi, Captain W. F. Hubbard.
21st Mississippi, Lieutenant-Colonel D. N. Moody.

WOFFORD'S BRIGADE[2]

Brigadier-General William T. Wofford.

16th Georgia.
18th Georgia.

[1] Army of Northern Virginia. Organization taken from return of that army for August 31, 1863. Pickett's Division was left in Virginia.

[2] Did not arrive in time to take part in the battle. See Longstreet's Report, No. 51, p. 288, ll. 18, 50; also see Kershaw's Report, No. 51, p. 505, l. 24.

24th Georgia.
3d Georgia Battalion Sharpshooters.
Cobb's (Georgia) Legion.
Phillips (Georgia) Legion.

BRYAN'S BRIGADE[1]

Brigadier-General Goode Bryan.

10th Georgia.
50th Georgia.
51st Georgia.
53d Georgia.

HOOD'S DIVISION

Major-General John B. Hood.
Brigadier-General E. McIver Law.

JENKINS' BRIGADE[2]

Brigadier-General Micah Jenkins.

1st South Carolina.
2d South Carolina.
5th South Carolina.
6th South Carolina.
Hampton Legion.
Palmetto Sharpshooters.

ROBERTSON'S BRIGADE[3]

Brigadier-General Jerome B. Robertson.
Colonel Van H. Manning.

3d Arkansas, Colonel Van H. Manning.
1st Texas, Captain R. J. Harding.
4th Texas, Lieutenant-Colonel John P. Bane, Captain R. H. Basset, Captain J. T. Hunter.
5th Texas, Major J. C. Rogers, Captain J. S. Cleveland, Captain T. T. Clay.

[1] Did not arrive in time to take part in the battle. See Longstreet's Report, No. 51, p. 288, ll. 18, 50; also see Kershaw's Report, No. 51, p. 305, l. 24.

[2] Did not arrive in time to take part in the battle. Jenkins' Brigade assigned to the division September 11, 1863.

[3] Served part of the time in Johnson's provisional division.

LAW'S BRIGADE

Brigadier-General E. McIver Law.
Colonel James L. Sheffield.

4th Alabama, Colonel Pinckney D. Bowles.
15th Alabama, Colonel W. C. Oates.
44th Alabama, Colonel William F. Perry.
47th Alabama, Major James M. Campbell.
48th Alabama, Lieutenant-Colonel William M. Hardwick.

ANDERSON'S BRIGADE[1]

Brigadier-General George T. Anderson.

7th Georgia.
8th Georgia.
9th Georgia.
11th Georgia.
59th Georgia.

BENNING'S BRIGADE

Brigadier-General Henry L. Benning.

2d Georgia, Lieutenant-Colonel William S. Shepherd, Major W. W. Charlton.
15th Georgia, Colonel Dudley M. Du Bose, Major P. J. Shannon.
17th Georgia, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles W. Matthews.
20th Georgia, Colonel J. D. Waddell.

JOHNSON'S DIVISION[2] (HOOD'S CORPS)

Brigadier-General Bushrod R. Johnson.

GREGG'S BRIGADE

Brigadier-General John Gregg.
Colonel Cyrus A. Sugg.

3d Tennessee, Colonel Calvin H. Walker.
10th Tennessee, Colonel William Grace.
30th Tennessee, Lieutenant-Colonel James J. Turner, Captain Charles S. Douglass.
41st Tennessee, Lieutenant-Colonel James D. Tillman.

[1] Did not arrive in time to take part in the battle.

[2] A provisional organization, embracing Johnson's and part of the time Robertson's Brigades, as well as Gregg's and McNair's. September 19, attached to Longstreet's Corps, under Major-General Hood.

50th Tennessee, Colonel Cyrus A. Sugg, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas W. Beaumont, Major Christopher W. Robertson, Colonel Calvin H. Walker (3d Tennessee).
1st Tennessee Battalion, Major Stephen H. Colms, Major Christopher W. Robertson (50th Tennessee).
7th Texas, Colonel H. B. Granbury, Major K. M. Vanzandt.
Bledsoe's Missouri Battery, Lieutenant R. L. Wood.

McNAIR'S BRIGADE

Brigadier-General Evander McNair.
Colonel David Coleman.

1st Arkansas Mounted Rifles (dismounted), Colonel Robert W. Harper.
2d Arkansas Mounted Rifles (dismounted), Colonel Jas. A. Williamson.
25th Arkansas, Lieutenant-Colonel Eli Hufstedler.
4th and 31st Arkansas and 4th Arkansas (battalion), consolidated, Major J. A. Ross.
39th North Carolina, Colonel David Coleman.
Culpeper's (South Carolina) Battery, Captain James F. Culpeper.

JOHNSON'S BRIGADE[1]

Brigadier-General Bushrod R. Johnson.
Colonel John S. Fulton.

17th Tennessee, Lieutenant-Colonel Watt W. Floyd.
23d Tennessee, Colonel R. H. Keeble.
25th Tennessee, Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Snowden.
44th Tennessee, Lieutenant-Colonel John S. McEwen, Jr., Major G. M. Crawford.

ARTILLERY CORPS[2]

Colonel E. Porter Alexander.

Fickling's (South Carolina) Battery.
Jordan's (Virginia) Battery.
Moody's (Louisiana) Battery.

[1] Johnson's Brigade was a part of Buckner's Corps, Stewart's Division, in East Tennessee before the battle.

[2] Did not arrive in time to take part in the battle.

Parker's (Virginia) Battery.
Taylor's (Virginia) Battery.
Woolfolk's (Virginia) Battery.

RESERVE ARTILLERY

Major Felix H. Robertson.

Barret's (Missouri) Battery,[1] Captain Overton W. Barret.
Havis' (Georgia) Battery, Captain M. W. Havis.
Lumsden's (Alabama) Battery, Captain Charles L. Lumsden.
Massenburg's (Georgia) Battery.

CAVALRY[2]

MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH WHEELER.

WHARTON'S DIVISION

Brigadier-General John A. Wharton.

FIRST BRIGADE

Colonel C. C. Crews.

Malone's (Alabama) Regiment, Colonel J. C. Malone, Jr.
2d Georgia, Lieutenant-Colonel F. M. Ison.
3d Georgia, Colonel R. Thompson.
4th Georgia, Colonel Isaac W. Avery.

SECOND BRIGADE

Colonel Thomas Harrison.

3d Confederate, Colonel W. N. Estes.
3d Kentucky, Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Griffith.
4th Tennessee, Lieutenant-Colonel Paul F. Anderson.
8th Texas, Lieutenant-Colonel Gustave Cook.
11th Texas, Colonel G. R. Reeves.
White's (Tennessee) Battery, Captain B. F. White, Jr.

MARTIN'S DIVISION

Brigadier-General William T. Martin.

[1] "Not engaged." See vol. LII, part I, p. 86.
[2] From return of August 31, 1863, and reports.

FIRST BRIGADE

Colonel John T. Morgan.

1st Alabama, Lieutenant-Colonel D. T. Blakey.
3d Alabama, Lieutenant-Colonel T. H. Mauldin.
51st Alabama, Lieutenant-Colonel M. L. Kirkpatrick.
8th Confederate, Lieutenant-Colonel John S. Prather.

SECOND BRIGADE

Colonel A. A. Russell.

1st Alabama (Russell's Regiment), Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. Hambrick.
1st Confederate, Captain C. H. Conner.
J. H. Wiggins' (Arkansas) Battery, Lieutenant J. P. Bryant.

FORREST'S CORPS

Brigadier-General Nathan B. Forrest.

Escort[1] Jackson's Company, Tennessee Cavalry, Captain J. C. Jackson.[2]

ARMSTRONG'S DIVISION[2]

Brigadier-General Frank C. Armstrong.

ARMSTRONG'S BRIGADE

Colonel James T. Wheeler.

3d Arkansas, Colonel A. W. Hobson.
2d Kentucky, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas G. Woodward.
6th Tennessee, Lieutenant-Colonel James H. Lewis.
18th Tennessee (battalion), Major Charles McDonald.

FORREST'S BRIGADE

Colonel George G. Dibrell.

4th Tennessee, Colonel William S. McLemore.
8th Tennessee, Captain Hamilton McGinnis.
9th Tennessee, Colonel Jacob B. Biffle.
10th Tennessee, Colonel Nicholas Nickleby Cox.
11th Tennessee, Colonel Daniel Wilson Holman.

[1] *Forrest Guards*, No. 51, p. 929.
[2] From return for August 31, 1863, and Reports.

Shaw's Battalion, O. P. Hamilton's Battalion, and R. D. Allison's Squadron (consolidated), Major Joseph Shaw.
Huggins' (Tennessee) Battery (formerly Freeman's), Captain A. L. Huggins.
Morton's (Tennessee) Battery, Captain John W. Morton, Jr.

PEGRAM'S DIVISION [1]

Brigadier-General John Pegram.

DAVIDSON'S BRIGADE

Brigadier-General H. B. Davidson.

1st Georgia, Colonel J. J. Morrison.
6th Georgia, Colonel John R. Hart.
6th North Carolina, Colonel George N. Folk.
Rucker's (1st Tennessee) Legion, Colonel E. W. Rucker (12th Tennessee Battalion, Major G. W. Day, and 16th Tennessee Battalion, Captain John Q. Arnold.)[2]
Huwald's (Tennessee) Battery, Captain Gustave A. Huwald.

SCOTT'S BRIGADE

Colonel John S. Scott.

10th Confederate, Colonel C. T. Goode.
Detachment of John H. Morgan's command, Lieutenant-Colonel R. M. Martin.
1st Louisiana, Lieutenant-Colonel James O. Nixon.
2d Tennessee, Colonel H. M. Ashby.
5th Tennessee, Colonel George W. McKenzie.
N. T. N. Robinson's (Louisiana) Battery (one section), Lieutenant Winslow Robinson.

[1] Taken from Pegram's and Scott's Reports and assignments, but the composition of the division is uncertain.

[2] Captain Company B, 12th Battalion.

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NOTES AND ADDENDA

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NOTES TO PRECEDING CHAPTERS

INCLUDING MOST INTERESTING DATA FROM AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES CORROBORATING OR SUPPLEMENTING THE FOREGOING EVIDENCE OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS

CHAPTER I

NOTE A (p. 6)

"CHICKAMAUGA was a battle almost unparalleled in modern times. Volumes have been written to prove how those who fought were marshaled. Such efforts are mostly vain. Those who commanded knew little more about it than those in the ranks. What happened under the shadow of the brown-leaved trees in that rugged amphitheatre between Missionary Ridge and West Chickamauga Creek, only the Recording Angel can truly declare. Confusion grows worse confounded with each attempt to reduce order out of impenetrable chaos."[1]

"No battle of the late war has given rise to so many controversies and conflicting reports as the battle of Chickamauga. In my judgment, no correct map of that battle has ever or ever will be drawn, and no full and complete history of that engagement will ever be written, much of which is owing to the dividing-up of commands and changing of divisions and brigades from right to left during the battle. Many regiments and brigades occupied the same positions at different times, and during the battle there was a lack of any systematic plan in the manœuvring and fighting the different parts of our army on the part of General Rosecrans."[2]

"I examined both the Official War Records and other works relating to it, and, in so doing, was struck by the imperfections of all the existing narratives of the memorable battle. I found them incomplete, incoherent, and contradictory in a greater degree than those of almost any other of the great actions of the Civil War.

" . . . I was not long in finding out . . . I had undertaken a most difficult task. . . . I am obliged to confess, however, that [the] result

[1] Albion W. Tourgée, *A Story of a Thousand*, pp. 228, 229.

[2] *Address* (p. 53), by Captain Amasa Johnson, at the Fourth Annual Reunion of the Ninth Indiana Regiment, at Delphi, Indiana, August 24–25, 1887.

[of my labor] is not as satisfactory as I could wish it to be as regards fullness and accuracy. . . . Its shortcomings are . . . due to . . . the impossibility of making up a consecutive, complete, and absolutely clear and true account from the material at my command."[1]

Note B (p. 11)

I find that my statements derived from the Records are still further confirmed by Van Horne:[2] "The five divisions that fought the battle of Stone River were with him [Bragg], two joined him from Mississippi,[3] and Buckner's two divisions from East Tennessee joined immediately south of Chattanooga. He had an army of nine divisions of infantry immediately after leaving that town."

Again, Van Horne[4] says: "His [Bragg's] army now comprised about fifty thousand men."

Note C (p. 12)

Reference is herein made to a newspaper interview which appeared, according to Colonel Gilbert C. Kniffin, of the Bureau of Pensions, in the Washington *Post* sometime in the 80's, a copy of the article referred to being loaned by him to me. In this interview Generals Rosecrans and Longstreet are represented as discussing the Battle of Chickamauga together. The former is represented as saying: "It makes me sick to talk about Chickamauga, and I have many times thought that I would have nothing more to say on the subject. I have been so outrageously lied about in connection with that battle that I lose my patience and my temper sometimes when I talk about it. The battle itself has never been properly represented. It is almost universally spoken of as a defeat and a disaster, — 'disastrous Chickamauga!' Faugh! Chickamauga was the successful culmination of one of the greatest campaigns of the Rebellion, and it will be so regarded when the dispassionate historian of the future writes about it."

In this interview General Rosecrans represents General Longstreet as saying that he "begged for three weeks to be allowed to go to Bragg's assistance with my [his] corps before I [he] could obtain permission," and that he was sorry he went, for his "going cost the lives of ten thousand of my [his] brave soldiers."

[1] *Memoirs of Henry Villard*, vol. II, pp. 172–73.

[2] *Life of General G. H. Thomas*, p. 108. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons. 1882.

[3] For further corroboration of Rosecrans' knowledge of the arrival of Confederate reinforcements from Johnston's army, and their inclusion in this accurate and credited report of the enemy's strength, see Crittenden's information to Rosecrans, September 10. (No. 52, p. 497, l. 21.)

[4] *History of the Army of the Cumberland*, vol. I, p. 330.

Besides General Longstreet other Confederates are represented as "never having looked upon Chickamauga as a victory for their arms."

(Commenting upon this statement I call attention to the fact that General Longstreet's Official Report describes the final issue as follows:[1] "A simultaneous and continuous shout from the two wings announced our success complete. The enemy had fought every man he had and every one had in turn been beaten." Again,[2] we find a dispatch sent by him on September 28 to the Secretary of War, in which he says: "We gained a complete and glorious victory, — the most complete victory of the war, except, perhaps, the first Manassas." Again we find in volume LII, part II, p. 549, a congratulatory letter from General R. E. Lee to General Longstreet, under date of October 26, 1863, replying to three letters of the latter, under dates September 26, October 6, and October 11: "I rejoice in your great victory deeply. It seems to me to have been complete. I wish it could have been followed up by the destruction of the Federal army." That any other Confederate officer, "at the time of the exchange of prisoners, which took place near Chattanooga soon after the battle, when several confederate and union officers met under a truce," could have expressed any other opinion, is also incredible. The falseness of any statement to the contrary is proven by the Official Report of the Confederate officer especially mentioned. Further than this, this officer was the recipient of congratulations in the newspapers and in letters received by him because of the success achieved by his command.[3]

[1] No. 51, p. 289, l. 4. [2] No. 53, p. 705, l. 30.

[3] General Gracie is the officer whom Rosecrans here singles out by name, quoting an alleged conversation between him and Colonel Bond. My research into General Gracie's history shows that the statement is untrue, and that he was not present at this meeting. His staff officers, James N. Gilmer, A.I.G., and A. M. Macmurphy, his "efficient ordnance officer," who were engaged in the battle, are also authority for this statement, and the latter writes me that "the Battle of Chickamauga was universally looked upon by our army as a complete victory."

But it was through the courtesy of my fellow club member (the Union, of New York), Colonel Bond, that I have been put in possession of the original correspondence between himself and General Rosecrans, which enables me to relegate the whole statement to the realm of fiction, so far at least as concerns General Gracie.

On November 23, 1888, General Rosecrans wrote a letter to his staff officer, the said Major Frank S. Bond, asking him to corroborate the statement attributed to General Gracie in a copy of *Boynton's Letters on Chickamauga and Chattanooga*, which he had sent to him. Rosecrans says: "Please write me what you think of the statement as to what General Gracie told you." Several years later, Major Bond replied that he did not answer this, for he did not understand what

The interviewer concludes, making the following inquiry of General Rosecrans: "Did you, on your return to Chattanooga on the afternoon of the 20th, telegraph Secretary Stanton, as he has stated, and as has been charged, 'that the army was routed and destroyed?'" — to which the General replied: "If any such dispatch is in existence with my name attached, it is a base and infamous forgery. Secretary Stanton's hatred of me was malignant and unreasoning, and I believe he was capable of perpetrating any infamy for my injury. If he ever had such a dispatch

he referred to and did not remember meeting General Gracie. On August 26, 1891, General Rosecrans' letter to Major Bond gives the details of what he had referred to in his letter of 1888 as to the meeting with General Gracie and the statement attributed to him. The following is what he asked Major Bond to corroborate: "General Gracie, Confederate, met you at the flag station where we received our wounded soldiers from Chickamauga. He asked you which side our folks thought had the advantage in the result of the battle. You said, 'General, there has been no time in the last two years when we would not have given for the possession of Chattanooga all that it has cost us, and I believe we have it'; to which General Gracie replied, 'I believe you are right, Major. It is a mooted question in our command.'" Major Bond in the mean time having found his diary, returned General Rosecrans' letter with a note thereon calling the General's attention to his mistake. This note reads as follows: "It was not General Gracie, but Captain Wooley, of General Wofford's staff, whom I met under the flag of truce September 27, when we received our wounded after the Battle of Chickamauga. F. S. B."

And now, under date of June 6, 1911, Colonel Bond writes me, giving me the full text from his diary as follows: —

"*September 27th.* At 7 A.M. started for Rebel lines with flag of truce. Colonel McKibbin and Captain Swain. Spent day there. Subject: endeavor to get our wounded. Did not get inside Rebel lines. Met Major Dorn, Colonel Hutchins, Captain Wooley, and Lieutenant Haskett, of General Wofford's staff.

"*September 28th.* Ambulances went into Rebel lines to get our wounded."

Thus it appears there was no general officer in the Confederate detail and that the probable spokesman, by virtue of rank, was Colonel Nathan L. Hutchins, Jr., of the 3d Battalion, Georgia Sharpshooters. Hence, if any such statement was made at all, it is to be attributed to staff officers of a brigade which did not participate in the battle, for Wofford's Brigade did not arrive in time for it. These staff officers did not know as much about the battle as those of General Rosecrans' staff. There are probably two sides to the tales that they told each other during the day's festivities outside "the Rebel lines." This fictitious story of General Gracie's being "sent" by General Bragg to Rosecrans, requesting an exchange of prisoners, and General Gracie's alleged conversation with Major Bond, appears first in the *Century Magazine* of May, 1887, p. 136, in "The Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga," by Major J. S. Fullerton, later president of the Chickamauga National Park Commission. Both Rosecrans and Fullerton attribute the source of their information to Major Bond, who presents the true version as quoted from his letters and war diary.

as the one he is said to have shown Governor Morton and General Steedman, it was a forgery, as I have said, and I do not believe the forgery was committed at the other end of the line. In short, I believe the dispatch — if ever there was such a dispatch — was manufactured in the War Department, and I think I know who did it."

Note D (pp. 14, 18)

Judge Tourgée's account of Thomas' protest in his consultation with Rosecrans, on September 9, is as follows: —

"On the 9th of September, the Army of the Cumberland had accomplished all it had set out to do — all it was prepared to attempt. It had only to turn the heads of Thomas' columns towards Chattanooga and withdraw McCook the way he had come, to complete one of the most remarkable campaigns ever planned. By the fifteenth, all the trains of the army might have been safely parked in the valley between Chattanooga and Missionary Ridge. Instead of this, the order was given to push on and 'attack the enemy in flank.'

"Thomas hurried to protest. He pointed out what had been won; showed what might be risked; what might be lost. Here were five fair roads leading to Chattanooga, less than twenty miles away. In forty-eight hours the objective of the campaign could be made secure beyond a peradventure. The army was not prepared for a further advance. It was needful to secure its base, its material, its communications. He pointed out the unfitness of the terraine for an offensive movement toward Lafayette or Rome, the whole country being rough and broken, cut by transverse mountain ranges, with few gaps, and those easily defensible; the whole region covered with dense forest or blinding chaparral; without available roads, except the few that lead north and south in the valleys and on the crests; that mutual support of the flanks of the army would be almost impossible; that the army could only be supplied through Chattanooga, and must at all events fall back there within a short time for mere want of subsistence, and especially that the enemy had the advantage of a railroad in his rear, and could concentrate on either flank in half the time that would be required to collect a force to meet him.

"It was in vain: the triumphant general was drunk with overconfidence. A good fortune so great as to be almost incomprehensible made him believe his luck was invincible. His fancy pictured his enemy fleeing in confusion and disorder along the roads that crossed his front, the remnant rushing pell-mell to seek safety in Rome. This straggling crowd of fugitives he fancied he could annihilate by striking them in the flank with Thomas' and McCook's Corps, while Crittenden fell

upon their rear. Such fatuity was unaccountable until, months afterward, the Confederate commander furnished the key. 'War is a game of wits,' said a great soldier, 'in which he wins who is able most effectually to deceive his antagonist.'

"General Bragg was playing this game of wits. He knew his opponent's weakness and made it the prime element of his gambit. He had two instruments with which to carry out the deception — his army and the ubiquitous deserter. He made his army serve his purpose by marching in hot haste toward Lafayette, until he had crossed West Chickamauga Creek, and then cunningly hiding behind the wooded heights of Pigeon Mountain. The business of the deserter was to make General Rosecrans believe this headlong haste was to continue until the rear guard of his army reached Rome and the last wagon was parked in the valley of the Coosa, out of the reach of that military marvel who had 'flanked him out of Tullahoma and Chattanooga' as easily as the hunter flushes a covey he has marked down.

"The Confederate deserter was an institution which has received too little consideration. Taken altogether he was of far greater value to the Southern cause than the best corps in the Confederate army. He was ubiquitous, willing, and altogether inscrutable. Whether he told the truth, or a lie, he was almost equally sure to deceive. He was sometimes a real deserter and sometimes a mock deserter. In either case he was sure to be loaded."

Note E (p. 18)

"Strange as it may seem, for three whole days after the occupation of Chattanooga, neither our general-in-chief nor the commanders of the Fourteenth and Twentieth Army Corps suspected that, instead of trying to elude their pursuit, the Rebel army was lying like a crouched lion in their path, ready to spring with all its might upon the first hostile body coming within reach. . . . Absolute was Crittenden's delusion. . . . Happily for the Union cause [Thomas] was two days behind time. . . . As late as the 10th, he [Rosecrans] chided[1] Thomas for not having reached Lafayette more promptly, and later on expressed doubt as to the necessity of Negley's retreat."[2]

[1] No. 52, p. 511, l. 23. "This delay imperiling both extremes of the army," etc., sounds more like a severe censure; and September 12th (p. 564, l. 55), "after maturely weighing the notes [Thomas' that a large part of Bragg's army opposed Negley], the commanding general is induced to think that General Negley withdrew more through prudence than compulsion."

[2] *Memoirs of Henry Villard*, vol. II, pp. 90, 91, 97. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1904.

Note F (p. 20)

Since this was written, as a result of my study of the Official Records, I find that the whole subject has been dealt with in much detail by Chaplain Van Horne, in his *Life of General Thomas*, chapter VI, p. 102, from which I make the following excerpts: —

"General Bragg abandoned Chattanooga in the expectation of soon regaining it. His supplies were not sufficient for a siege and his army was not large enough to hold Chattanooga and cover his communications. He consequently moved south a few miles to save his communications and meet expected reinforcements, where his army might face the mountain passes and strike unsupported corps as they should debouch from different mountain gaps into the eastern valley. . . . But to give strategical force to a retreat that was imperative, General Bragg used various stratagems to conceal his purposes. He sent men into the National army to induce the belief that his army was retiring far to the south and moved his forces as far as practicable to manifest such a purpose.

"The strategy which had compelled the evacuation of Chattanooga was consummate. . . . The only effect of this strategy which had not been favorable to the ultimate success of Rosecrans had been the reinforcement of Bragg's army before Rosecrans', by Buckner's command. To gain Chattanooga, the strategy was perfect, but for immediate offensive operations south from that point, it was radically defective.

"When Rosecrans' army was in Lookout Valley and his detached forces — four brigades — on the north bank of the Tennessee, with open ways into Chattanooga from the north and the south, he had gained the objective of his campaign, and the concentration of his army in that town could have been effected without resistance by the enemy. But the pursuit of the enemy, not the occupation of Chattanooga in force, became his objective as soon as he was informed that the town had been abandoned."

After quoting Rosecrans' 3.30 A.M., September 9, dispatch to Thomas, directing the latter to call on him at once to consult in regard to arrangements for the pursuit, the account continues: —

"Thus before General Thomas was invited to consult with General Rosecrans, it had been decided to pursue the enemy, and he was invited to consult only in reference to the pursuit. But when the two generals met, Thomas opposed the pursuit altogether, and presented military considerations of palpable weight against the measure.

"At the time of the abandonment of Chattanooga by the enemy, two corps of the Army of the Cumberland were within a day's march of that place; one of these being very near, since Wood's Division of the Twenty-

first Corps occupied Chattanooga at noon of the 9th. The Twentieth Corps was about forty miles distant and could have marched to Chattanooga by noon on the 10th. . . . The concentration could have been effected if it had been the purpose of General Bragg to oppose; but that it was not his intention is expressly stated in his Official Report, and was evinced at the time by his retreat far towards Lafayette, Georgia. Bragg was not ready for battle in proximity to Chattanooga, and his army was not in a position to prevent the concentration of the Army of the Cumberland in the town, had that been General Rosecrans' objective. . . . There was not, therefore, a single obstacle to the concentration. . . . General Rosecrans had gained his objective before he ordered the pursuit of the enemy. He must have thought so himself or he would not have established his headquarters at Chattanooga behind his army."

Thomas' protest has already been recorded.

See also E. Hannaford, *The Story of a Regiment*, p. 445 (Cincinnati: published by the Author. 1868): —

"Mr. Whitelaw Reid's statement (in *Ohio in the War*, vol. 1, p. 340), that the Battle of Chickamauga was fought *to enable the Union army to concentrate at Chattanooga*, is altogether erroneous. General Wood is substantially correct in saying (in a private manuscript, now lying upon the writer's table): 'There is abundance of evidence in existence to prove that, at the date of the occupation of Chattanooga by the leading division of the Twenty-first Corps, neither the Fourteenth nor the Twentieth Corps had become involved in the laborious passage of the Lookout Mountain range. Both were in Wills' Valley. The assertion that the Battle of Chickamauga was the unavoidable price of the permanent possession of Chattanooga is a fallacy.' Mr. Swinton, one of the ablest and most careful writers upon the war, advances identically the same opinion. Greeley's *American Conflict* also contains an expression of similar import."

Again, see John Fiske's *The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War*, p. 263 (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1900): —

"But Rosecrans in an evil hour chose the alternative of pushing through the mountains, in the hope of cutting off Bragg's southward retreat and annihilating his army on the spot.

"In adopting this hazardous course, Rosecrans was duped by appearances and by treacherous information. Bragg in evacuating Chattanooga had not the slightest intention of retreating. He had come out full of the spirit of fight, to cover his communications and find his antagonist. But he sent scores of pretended deserters through the mountains and into Chattanooga, telling sad stories of the headlong flight and utter demoralization of the Confederate army. This notion was even, and in some unknown way, disseminated in Washington, and

Rosecrans received telegrams from that city which confirmed him in his false impressions."

Finally, I copy the following excerpt from an address delivered by Colonel Smith D. Atkins at Mendota, Illinois, February 22, 1907, as contained in a pamphlet before me entitled, *Chickamauga. Useless, Disastrous Battle* (Journal Printing Co., Freeport, Illinois): —

"At 10 o'clock A.M. the flag of the Ninety-second Illinois Volunteers was floating from the top of the Crutchfield house, the first Union flag to float in Chattanooga since Bragg's army occupied that place.

"I had brought to me every person I could find, and sent word back to Rosecrans that Bragg had evacuated the city and fallen back beyond Chickamauga, with the intention of giving battle as soon as his reinforcements came from Lee's army in Virginia.

"Now, keep this date carefully in mind, — September 9, 1863, — while the Battle of Chickamauga was not begun until ten days after that, on September 19, 1863. I believed then, and I believe now, that General Rosecrans could have put the Army of the Cumberland into Chattanooga by the evening of September 10, 1863, without the loss of a man or a wheel. I know that he could have done that, and the Battle of Chickamauga, with its awful loss of life, have been wholly avoided. It was a useless battle, and because it was useless and disastrous, Rosecrans was relieved from the command of the Army of the Cumberland, and was never again restored to favor as an army commander. These views are not new; they were entertained and expressed by me at that time, and I have entertained them ever since, and never hesitated to express them. The Battle of Chickamauga was a useless battle, the broken and shattered Army of the Cumberland driven from the field and cooped up and nearly starved to death in Chattanooga, that Rosecrans was in full possession of on September 9, 1863, and which might have been held by him with his full army intact, with abundant force to protect his line of supplies, and where he never could have been or would have been assaulted by the Confederate army. That was my deliberate judgment at that time, and it will be, in my opinion, the deliberate judgment of history."

Note G (p. 26)

If General Rosecrans had read this dispatch of his, it is difficult to understand how he could have had the effrontery to claim that the Battle of Chickamauga was necessary for the possession of Chattanooga. The text of this dispatch indicates as plainly as words can tell that the possession of Chattanooga was not then his objective, nor was it such during all the period preceding the battle when his headquarters

were established there. Further than this, these words of his show his purpose of concentrating in McLemore's Cove to fight a general battle. All his orders and the actual movements of his troops indicate this purpose. The only other historian who refers to this concentration in McLemore's Cove is Major Thomas L. Livermore, who, in his article, "General Thomas in the Record," February 2, 1892,[1] writing of this date says: —

"Rosecrans then ordered Crittenden and McCook to close on Thomas, and the latter to await them in the position then held by him in front of Stevens' and Cooper's Gaps in Lookout Mountain. This accomplished, Rosecrans moved the whole line to his left down the Chickamauga River, which he says was 'with a view to covering the Lafayette road toward Chattanooga, and facing the most practicable route to the enemy's front.'[2] This movement was begun on the 18th and was continued until the next morning, when the enemy were encountered and the battle began," etc.

Note H (p. 31)

"As between the rival claims to victory of the two generals-in-chief, the balance of truth no doubt inclines in favor of Bragg. For even the one basis of Rosecrans' boasts, the possession of Chattanooga, became a doubtful advantage and threatened to prove a fatal trap for him. . . . He certainly would never have extricated himself from the Rebel toils with his reduced force, and, but for the reinforcements which were hurried to his relief from the east, west, and south, would have been compelled to choose between starvation and surrender or retreat. Historic justice must, indeed, award the palm to General Bragg. . . . Nor can it be denied that the Rebel triumph was due to superior generalship. . . . Rosecrans had no plan of battle beyond the protection of his lines to Chattanooga. Bragg adopted a bold one for the 20th, justified by the situation and the rules of the art of war, and substantially carried it out."[3]

Note I (p. 32)

Evidence of Rosecrans' collaboration with Boynton is strikingly furnished in the former's correspondence with his staff officer, Major Frank S. Bond, the original letters being now before me, through the latter's courtesy.

On November 23, 1888, General Rosecrans, then Register of the

[1] See *Some Federal and Confederate Commanders*, p. 220. Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1895.

[2] No. 50, p. 55.

[3] *Memoirs of Henry Villard*, vol. II, pp. 170, 171.

Treasury, wrote to Major Bond, sending him copies of Boynton's *Letters on Chickamauga and Chattanooga*, requesting his recollections of the battle, and significantly suggesting what the trend thereof should be, to wit: "Just cover the ground of our campaign and of Chickamauga as incident thereto, — an item of cost in obtaining Chattanooga." On November 30, following, the General again wrote, stating that the occasion for his writing and making the request for his staff officer's recollections was because of a statement made by General Devens in his eulogy on General Sheridan, then lately deceased, a statement which General Rosecrans pronounced as "very untrue." Reference to the address in question shows the statement referred to to have been the following: "The defeat received at Chickamauga by us was, on the whole, in its anticipated results, the most severe ever inflicted on the Union arms, for it threatened destruction to our control of the Mississippi Valley, which had been won at so much expense of blood and treasure."[1]

Still another letter in this correspondence, that of August 26, 1891, shows General Rosecrans' assistance to Colonel Donn Piatt in furnishing material (including this correspondence kindly lent me) to Colonel Piatt for his history of the *Life* of General George H. Thomas, wherein, so far as relates to Chickamauga, General Boynton collaborated with him.

A reference to the *Reprint* of Boynton's letters to the Cincinnati *Commercial Gazette*[2] shows in the preface thereto that General Rosecrans indorsed all the extraordinary statements contained therein, and which are also to be found in Donn Piatt's and Boynton's book, above referred to. It was through General Rosecrans that these letters were printed in pamphlet form, so that each member of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland might have a copy thereof. Therefore when we hear the reiterated words, "Chickamauga was the price of Chattanooga," it is well to recall that the voice is Boynton's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau (Rosecrans).

Note K (p. 37)

General Buckner's statement has frequently been corroborated in Senator Blackburn's conversations with me on the subject, and at my request to confirm the same in writing he has done so in a letter to me

[1] Charles Devens, *Orations and Addresses*, p. 214. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1891. Address before the Loyal Legion in memory of General Sheridan, November 7, 1888.

[2] Second edition, with corrections. Washington: George R. Gray, printed 1881.

under date of February 7, 1911: "I have yours of the 2d. The quotation that you make from General Buckner's letter, dated September 20, 1905, accords exactly with my recollection. You are also correct as to my meeting General Cleburne in the dark as I was returning from the interview with General Buckner, where the matter of the pursuit of the enemy was discussed, General Cleburne expressing himself in terms alike to those expressed by General Preston, viz., that the pursuit should be made promptly and vigorously."

Note L (p. 38)

I am indebted to Mr. D. P. Montague, of Chattanooga, for obtaining the following memorandum for me from the Nautical Almanac Office of that city, dated October 14, 1905: —

Latitude of Chickamauga, 35.05 North.
Longitude of Chickamauga, 85.43 West of Greenwich.

	h.	m.	
Sunset	6	0.6	local mean time, Sept. 20, 1863.
End of twilight	7	25.5	
Duration of twilight	1	24.9	
High noon	11	53.4	

CHAPTER II

Note A (p. 47)

Garfield's viewpoint of his chieftain's lack of success is indicated a month later in a telegram of official record,[1] from Secretary of War Stanton to his Assistant Secretary, Watson, dated Louisville, Kentucky, October 21, 1863, in which he says: "Generals Garfield and Steedman are here on their way home. Their representations of the incidents of the Battle of Chickamauga *more than confirm the worst that has reached us from other sources as to the conduct of the commanding general.*"[2]

Note B (p. 48)

"At the close of the first day, it is true, the battle might be considered a drawn one, but the issue of the second warrants no other verdict than that the Army of the Cumberland suffered a complete defeat. The incontestable facts were that fully one third of it was overwhelmed in one attack and driven off in great disorder, and that the remainder had to abandon the whole field, with its dead and severely wounded, and numerous trophies to the enemy."[3]

[1] Vol. xxxi, part i, p. 684. [2] Italics are mine. — Author.
[3] *Memoirs of Henry Villard*, vol. ii, p. 170. Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1904.

CHAPTER IV

Note A (p. 74)

The *Century Magazine* of May, 1887, page 129, contains an article "The Campaign for Chattanooga," by General W. S. Rosecrans, which by comparison with the Official Records, will be found to contain distortions of the truth and omissions of various points. Referring to Chickamauga, as an inevitable incident in the campaign for Chattanooga, he says, "The publication of reports, correspondence, orders, and dispatches relating to these events will soon be made in a forthcoming volume of the *Records of the Union and Confederate Armies during the Rebellion*, which will enable an interested public to verify the accuracy of what I shall state."

Let us investigate this alleged accuracy of his so far as it relates to the dispatches which passed between himself at Chattanooga and General Garfield on the battle-field. Omitting all mention of his first and most important dispatch containing the original order of withdrawal,[1] he says that he "awaited Garfield's report, which, dated 3.45 P.M. from the battle-field, reached me at 5 P.M., saying, 'We are intact after terrific fighting, getting short of ammunition, and the enemy is going to assault our lines once more. Our troops are in fine spirits and fighting splendidly.'" Compare this with the true record of this dispatch,[2] and we find that more than half of Rosecrans' statement — viz., the last part of it — is manufactured out of whole cloth. Think of Garfield, or any one else who has any knowledge of the battle, stating at 3.45 P.M. "the enemy is going to assault our lines once more." The construction which he placed upon this telegram at 5 P.M., September 20, 1863, is quite different from that of 1887, for the Record shows[3] that this is the way he then looked upon it: "Thomas remained intact at last news. We have met with serious disaster. Enemy overwhelmed us. Drove our right, pierced our centre, and scattered troops there. Every available reserve used when men stampeded," etc. But from the urgency of the case his reply to Garfield must have preceded the news sent to Halleck at 5 P.M. In this respect as to time, we note that he confirms our deductions derived from other sources. Senselessly disregarding all mention of the fact that he had sent a peremptory order of with-

[1] No. 50, p. 140, l. 19. [2] No. 50, p. 141, l. 10. [3] No. 50, p. 142, l. 23.

drawal[1] in his "first dispatch," before 4.15 P.M., direct to General Thomas, then on Horseshoe Ridge, he publishes the statement that nearly an hour thereafter, when Thomas had already obeyed and withdrawn, he dispatched Thomas to use his discretion, pretending to imagine that Thomas was still on the battle-field; for he says, "I ordered Garfield by dispatch to tell Thomas to use his discretion at the close of the fight, whether to stop on the ground he occupied or to retire on Rossville, and said that I would send ammunition and troops accordingly." There is nothing of the truth in the whole manufactured statement. The telegram to which he refers is to be found in the Records, volume XXX, page 140, line 30, and the full text also is given in chapter VI, page 155.

NOTE B (p. 103)

Bragg's Official Report and conduct after the battle indicate his expectation of receiving the capitulation of Rosecrans' army and Chattanooga by cutting off his supplies before Federal reinforcements could arrive. Evidence is not lacking to show that Rosecrans at one time contemplated surrender in view of the desperate condition of his army. Bragg's strategic position (holding "the only communication the enemy had with his supplies in the rear") warranted his belief in this expected result without the necessity of his losing another man in battle. The disposition of his plans in this direction "was confided to Lieutenant-General Longstreet's command," and General Bragg positively asserts that if the same "had been faithfully sustained," the enemy's speedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and forage" would have followed.[2] There was still another factor which brought defeat to Bragg's hopes. A feat in transportation, hitherto unparalleled, was performed by a future railroad king and president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, Thomas A. Scott, which is thus described by that interesting writer, Judge Tourgée:[3] "When the Army of the Cumberland fell back to Chattanooga, it was determined to transfer the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, under the command of General Hooker, from the Army of the Potomac, to Tennessee. Mr. Scott found here the opportunity of his life. In eight days he had collected the transportation, and over the worst roads, in the face of incredible obstacles, had landed the two corps, in all 16,000 men, with their artillery transportation and equipment, in Middle Tennessee. The blow at our own line of supply which Bragg had neglected to strike in sufficient force at the outset was now impossible."

[1] No. 50, p. 140, l. 19, and p. 256, ll. 44–49.
[2] No. 51, p. 56, ll. 46 *et seq.*
[3] *The Story of a Thousand*, p. 254. Buffalo: S. McGerald & Son. 1896.

CHAPTER V

Note A (p. 112)

General Hazen's Account of his Brigade's being the Rear Guard Withdrawing through McFarland's Gap

In his *Narrative*[1] General Hazen says: "For carrying my brigade across to help the right on the 20th, General Thomas, who at the time was not aware of it, afterward recommended me for promotion to a major-generalship, — a fact unknown to me until after the close of the war."[2] From this statement it follows that it was near the Ridge road at sundown that Thomas met Hazen in person, supposing him to have come direct from Kelly's field with the other brigades of his division. Hence it was to this time and place that General Hazen refers in his account, as follows: "The battle had ceased and the great volume of cheers of the enemy on the left, just after the withdrawal of that portion of our line, was almost appalling. The cheers would start up again at different points for an hour afterward. I now received an order from General Thomas in person to withdraw to Rossville, following Brannan. *It was then sundown*[3] and it seemed a long time before Wood and Brannan were on the road;[4] and the stars were shining brightly when my troops moved off. . . . As I marched northward in the middle of the field where the Snodgrass house is situated, and reached the lane[5] which divided it from east to west, Reynolds, at the head of his division, came up and sung out, 'Hold on, Hazen; it's my turn now!' so again I halted in the same field till *his whole division*[3] filed past, and it seemed a very long time; and then it was full night.[6] The 9th Indiana held its position also till Brannan had withdrawn. . . . We then marched to Rossville, where we arrived precisely at 11 P.M. *There were no troops behind us*,[3] and the bivouac at Rossville was wrapped in sleep. The night was now intensely dark."

[1] Page 186. [2] See chapter VII, pp. 165–171. [3] Italics are mine. — Author.

[4] This may mean on the march, or refer to the road from Snodgrass house, north.

[5] "The lane" refers to the Ridge road. [6] Night was at 7.25.

COL THOMAS A. SCOTT

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CHAPTER VI

Note A (p. 150)[1]

The story of the battle, and the events of that afternoon and night, have been told many times and in many different ways from that day to this. Dana's dispatches give the essential details as they came to his knowledge, but there is on the whole no better nor more comprehensive summary of what actually took place than is contained in a letter which he wrote to me just a fortnight after the battle. It is dated Chattanooga, October 3, 1863, and as it has not been previously printed I give it at length as a part of this narrative: —

" . . . I have been here now some four weeks, having witnessed the movements of the campaign for some ten days previous to the Battle of Chickamauga, and seen the greatest but not the best part of that battle. I was standing with General Rosecrans just in rear of the right of Jeff. C. Davis' division when it was broken by the Rebel columns and fled in utter panic. Bull Run had nothing more terrible than the rout and flight of these veteran soldiers. The enemy came upon them in columns six lines deep, formed with brigade fronts, three brigades being massed behind each other, firing as they advanced. The fire was more violent than I ever heard before, but I do not think our lines would have been broken but for a gap in them caused by taking Wood's Division from the centre to reinforce the left, and not entirely filling up the space thus vacated. Through that gap the Rebels came in, and then Davis' division broke and ran in helpless panic. I never saw anything so crushing to the mind as that scene. I was swept away with part of Rosecrans' staff, and lost in the rabble. Some of these officers, and especially Drouillard and Porter, drew their swords and worked like good fellows trying to rally and reorganize the fugitives; but as often as they got a squad together a shell crashing through the tree-tops (for the battle was fought mainly in a forest), or a few canister-shots dropping on the dry leaves, would send the cowards packing again.

"I rode twelve miles to Chattanooga, galloping my horse all the way, to send dispatches to Washington, and found the road filled all the distance with baggage-wagons, artillery, ambulances, negroes on horseback, field and company officers, wounded men limping along, Union

[1] Extract from the *Life of Charles A. Dana* (p. 268), by James Harrison Wilson. Harper & Bros.

refugees from country around leading their wives and children, mules running along loose, squads of cavalry, — in short, every element that could confuse the rout of a great army, not excepting a major-general commanding an army corps, . . . while part of the corps . . . remained to cover themselves with glory and save everything by fighting on the left under the lead of that magnificent old hero, General Thomas, and of Gordon Granger, the Marshal Ney of the war. It was a great fight which these twenty-five thousand men waged there against eighty thousand (Bragg had sixty-seven thousand veterans and fifteen thousand militia) till darkness covered the field, and it saved everything for us. In this fight the men who most distinguished themselves were Generals Thomas, Granger, Steedman, Brannan, Palmer, Hazen, Turchin, and Colonel Harker. The last-named commanded a brigade which got out of ammunition, and at the end three times repulsed the columns of Longstreet with the bayonet. But they were all heroes, and we owe them a debt of gratitude we can never sufficiently pay. They punished the enemy so awfully that if our forces had remained on the ground, it is the opinion of General Thomas, as well as of many others less judicious and reserved than he, that the enemy must have retreated. But Thomas was not sure that he could get up supplies of ammunition in season, and retired accordingly.

"Our loss in this battle was about fourteen thousand killed, wounded, and missing, and forty pieces of artillery. But we repulsed the enemy even after one half our line of battle was dissolved, and saved Chattanooga. The conduct of McCook and Crittenden in leaving their commands is to be investigated by a court of inquiry, and the order relieving them from command and consolidating the two corps (now together about fifteen thousand strong) into one under Granger is now on its way here from Washington.

"I should also tell you that General Rosecrans came to Chattanooga after the rout of the left [*sic*] and consequently bore no part in the glory of the afternoon's battle. He seems in consequence to have lost some of his great popularity with the soldiers, whose idol is now very naturally the man who saved them, and indeed saved us all, Thomas. For my own part, I confess I share their feeling. I know no other man whose composition and character are so much like those of Washington; he is at once an elegant gentleman and a heroic soldier.

"But I shall let my pen run on in a protracted scrawl which you will find it very difficult to read, I fear. I must tell you that I am charmed with Porter, and that some of us are trying to make him, or have him made, a colonel. As for the general condition of this army, I must write you another time. There is much to say about it. But at the bottom it is essentially the same sort of an army as that of the Tennessee.

"Some of your troops will now come this way, of course. I wish it were possible for you to come with them. This is a much more difficult country to campaign in than Louisiana and Mississippi. Here it is all mountain warfare, to be waged over high ridges with few passes and in narrow valleys. It is a most picturesque region, rich in minerals, but of little worth for agriculture.

"Your letter is so good that I shall send it to the Secretary of War. Remember me kindly to the general, to Rawlins, and to Bowers."

Note B (p. 150)

For still further corroboration of the extraordinary part played by Charles A. Dana, see Henry Villard's account:[1] —

"Justice calls for the statement that he was entirely wrong in some of his animadversions upon those corps commanders, and showed strong, bordering on malignant, bias against them. He received and conveyed impressions, like the professional journalist that he was, hastily, flippantly, and recklessly. He thus involved himself in glaring inconsistencies and contradictions and humiliating self-corrections.

"This criticism certainly holds good of his official correspondence relative to the Chickamauga and Chattanooga campaigns as reprinted in the War Records . . . His zeal often degenerated into officiousness, and he fell at times into the rôle of the informer, without perhaps being conscious of it. . . . I cannot help remarking that, as my own eyes observed at the time, Dana had intimate intercourse, day and night, with General Rosecrans, and that he enjoyed his personal hospitality, sitting at the same table and sleeping in the same building. His reports also prove that he deliberately drew the General into confidential communications, the substance of which he used against him, and that he held talks with general officers regarding Rosecrans which were nothing less than insubordination on their part. It can hardly be admitted that patriotic motives were a sufficient excuse for such a course."

Note C (p. 151)[2]

"We had advanced about a hundred yards, when a hatless, red-headed man came rapidly on horseback from the direction of Chattanooga, to me at the front of my force, and excitedly asked me what commands we had [were]. I told him it was [we were] the 1st Brigade, 4th

[1] *Memoirs of Henry Villard*, vol. II, pp. 166, 188, 189, 210, 211.

[2] Extract from *Paper* of John T. Wilder, Colonel 17th Indiana Volunteer Infantry; Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. A. Read before the Ohio Commandery of the Loyal Legion, November 4, 1908.

Division, of the Fourteenth Corps, Wilder's Brigade of Mounted Infantry, on foot.

"He immediately announced himself as Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War. I had halted the command on his arrival, and I told him in a few words that I knew him, and also what I intended doing, and asked him the whereabouts of General Rosecrans and how the battle was going. He again stated that he was Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, and he had been with Rosecrans and that the enemy had run over them, and that General Rosecrans was either killed or captured, and the army badly routed, as bad, if not worse than at Bull Run, and that my brigade was the only portion of the army left intact. He then said I must take him at once to Chattanooga to enable him to telegraph the situation to Washington. I told him he had been going in the opposite direction of Chattanooga, and would have been in Bragg's lines before he had gone much farther; also that the heavy firing to the north had not changed position for an hour. With a scared look he insisted that it was the enemy pursuing, and killing Thomas' men, and again asserting that he was Assistant Secretary of War, directed me to move with my command, escorting him to Chattanooga, that he might communicate with Washington at once. I told him I had scouts who knew the country to Chattanooga, and that they could guide him there in as little time as it would take me to get up my led horses and mount my men. He agreed to go with the scouts, and again directed me to fall back to Chattanooga as quickly as possible and place my command on Lookout Mountain and hold it at all hazards, and to send my transportation across the Tennessee River, and then left in the direction of Chattanooga with the scouts."

Note D (p. 158)

The evidence of official record which thus furnishes an estimate of General Granger's character, from his actions on the afternoon of September 20, is corroborated on another occasion by the following-described incident.[1]

"We reached Rossville Gap, September 14. The wagon train did not reach us, and we were necessarily thrown on our own resources. It was 'root hog or die.' Our Colonel Dan said, 'Get to the woods, boys, and keep out of sight.' The boys kept coming in all day with meat and forage of all kinds, necessary to satisfy a hungry soldier. General Gordon Granger, who was in command of the Reserve Corps, of which we were

[1] See *History of Dan McCook's Regiment, Fifty-second Ohio Volunteer Infantry*, p. 59. By N. B. Stewart, Sergeant, Company E, 52d Ohio. Published by the author. 1900.

now a part, began to arrest the foragers, and by four o'clock had quite a number of them tied up by the thumbs with cords stretched over the limb of a tree in front of his tent.

"Our men fell in and marched with fixed bayonets column in front to the General's tent, without an officer, and demanded the release of the men who were being punished. The General in a rage ordered a section of our own battery, the 2d Illinois, commanded by Captain Barnett, to open fire with blank cartridge on the complainants; then if they did not disperse, with grape and canister. But the battery refused to move, to a man. The cords were cut by our men and they quickly moved back to their quarters. The officers of the regiment were ordered to deliver up their swords, but the Battle of Chickamauga coming on in a few days, the whole matter was lost sight of." [1]

[1] For corroboration of this incident and further insight into Gordon Granger's character, see *History of the 85th Illinois Regiment*, p. 102. By Henry J. Aten. Hiawatha, Kansas.

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CHAPTER VII

Note A (p. 162)

In this volume we shall use only the suggested nomenclature for these hills, but our final selection from the various names by which most of these hills have been known in bygone years will be governed by considerations of (1) propriety, (2) fitness, and (3) comprehensibility.

Kershaw's Hill is the name we shall give the east extremity of the Lower Ridge, called the "dominant hill" in General Wood's Report. On this hill is the monument to Kershaw's South Carolina Brigade, which took permanent possession of this point about high noon, occupied it to the end of the battle, and bivouacked there.

Gracie's Hill is the name selected for "Hill Number 1," the east extremity of Horseshoe Ridge. This was the first permanent foothold gained on the heights by the Confederates. This brigade alone took possession of this hill at 5 P.M., never relinquished its maintenance of the position, and bivouacked on its summit. The one recollection of historical fact concerning the Battle of Chickamauga known to the author before his study, was the designation of this hill as Gracie's Hill. This information was derived through his father and mother and corroborated by contemporaneous newspaper clippings in his possession. To see this hill was the moving cause of his first visit to the battle-field. Since that day, over seven years ago, further corroboration has been obtained to the effect that this hill was first called Gracie's Hill at the time of the battle and thereafter. This name was given because of the conspicuous personal bravery and ability of General Gracie, as set forth in the Official Reports, notably that of General Kershaw.[1]

The Tower Hill, on which is the Observation Tower, is the name selected for the "high hill," "Hill Number 2," the middle hill of Horseshoe Ridge. Any other name given would be questionable as to propriety, accuracy, and comprehensibility. The only other name ever given to it within my personal knowledge is "The Battery Hill," so represented by the National Commission during my visits. As the Official Records and other authorities give no indication that any battery was ever located thereon, the history of the hill would not possess

[1] For the testimony of Bishop Quintard to the same effect, see Notes to chapter XII, Note A.

the attributes of such a designation, which would serve only as an illustration of *lucus a non lucendo*.

Le Favour's Hill is the name I give to "Hill Number 3," the west extremity of Horseshoe Ridge. Le Favour's semi-brigade, the 22d Michigan and 89th Ohio, fought at this position from about 3 P.M. until sunset, and the 22d Michigan when captured then occupied the summit, where its monument now is.

Harker's Hill is the name selected for the "open" or "bare hill" (in the cornfield), on the summit of which is the Snodgrass house. On this hill from about 5 P.M. to 6 P.M. was located the last Federal line of battle, where Harker's Brigade was re-formed when Hazen opportunely arrived to its support. Frank Smith's 4th U. S. Battery and Aleshire's 18th Ohio Battery also fought at this location during the afternoon, at times dragging some of their guns into the woods on the east extremity of the Horseshoe. A line of monuments to the organizations mentioned is now located on this hill.[1]

It may be mentioned that the Confederate General Preston in his Official Report uses the designation "Battery Hill" in referring to "Gracie's Hill." It would evidently cause confusion to denominate any of the hills as "The Battery Hill."

The names thus finally selected are, therefore, believed to be thoroughly comprehensible and to answer all other requirements as set forth above.

Note B (p. 164)

There is no Official Report of Aleshire's 18th Ohio Battery, which, the latter part of this day, took a prominent part in the defense of Horseshoe Ridge. Years of research brought little to light. Finally, after much correspondence, I found among the few survivors, two comrades whose courtesy has provided me with important and reliable information. I refer to Lieutenant A. S. Bierce and Comrade Frank B. Delaplane. It is from their letters in their own words that I present the following: "The 18th Ohio Battery, six guns, came on the battle-field with its division at about 1.30 P.M."[2] It took position, by order of General Thomas, in the Kelly field, supported by troops of Hazen's Brigade.[3]

[1] For frequent use of the name "Harker's Hill" see *Indiana's Appeal to the Secretary of War*, referred to in chapter VIII, pp. 176, 180, etc.

[2] This is Bierce's statement, agreeing with Steedman's, and others. Comrade Delaplane places it at half an hour earlier, as does Major Fullerton, Granger's chief of staff.

[3] General Fullerton says: "Granger quickly sent Aleshire's Battery . . . to assist in repelling another assault about to be made on the Kelly Farm front." *Century Magazine*, April, 1887, p. 968.

"Thence the battery was taken," says Bierce, "by, I think, General Granger's chief of artillery [1] towards the Snodgrass house. Here the guns were double-shotted with canister and a continual fire kept up until our guns were getting hot and water scarce. From this position, the right section, — two guns, — which the writer, as first lieutenant, had the honor to command, was moved, drawn by horses, to the right to within probably one hundred and fifty yards of the Snodgrass house. *Then turned south and went up the wooded hill almost south of the house.*[2] Here I could do but little execution on account of the steepness of the ridge on the enemy's side and the almost hand-to-hand conflict. When I brought my guns down [back], I passed near the Snodgrass house on the east and joined Captain Aleshire. The last position of the battery was near the eastern base of the hill above referred to [i. e., Harker's Hill]. In this position the battery remained until ordered to retire by the McFarland Gap road, which order came, I think, about 6 P.M., when the battery retired with the last troops to leave the field."

[1] "The aid and assistance rendered me by Colonel James Thompson, my chief of artillery, was timely and of great importance. His well-known ability and former experience rendered him a most efficient officer on the field." — Granger. No. 50, p. 857, l. 16.

[2] Italics are mine. — AUTHOR.

CHAPTER VIII

Note A (p. 179)

Instead of stating that the 9th Indiana "reported to" Colonel Boynton, of the 35th Ohio, at that point, it would have been more comprehensive and accurate to have said that the 9th Indiana "relieved" the 35th Ohio. Brannan and Van Derveer needed it. They had withdrawn from Horseshoe Ridge and were located in the open field where they met the 9th Indiana. The 35th Ohio was the right flank regiment and the last of Brannan's to withdraw from the Horseshoe. The 9th Indiana was thus interposed between the Confederates and the 35th Ohio at or near Snodgrass house. Captain D. B. McConnell, of Company K, 9th Indiana, before his comrades in reunion on August 27, 1891, made "an interesting historical address,"[1] wherein the following statement occurs: "The regiment was sent over to the right (after the last attack), and relieved a regiment which claimed to be out of ammunition, but had held back the enemy with the bayonet. . . . That regiment seemed to fear that we would not hold the position as well as they would do it; we assured them that we were pretty good to stay where we were placed, and they fell back. Well, my comrades, that regiment was the 35th Ohio. It was nearly dark when they left us and swung back to our rear and north at right angles to us nearest to our left."

It was after this that Brannan's aide acted as guide and started to take the 9th Indiana down the deep hollow southwest of Snodgrass house, and it was here that Colonel Suman protested, and the regiment was guided on high ground over the "Hog's Back" to the Tower Hill. No extended argument is here necessary to prove that the point of this relief was *not* on the Horseshoe, or Tower Hill thereof. The 9th Indiana was guided to the "high hill," not beyond or down the south slope of the Horseshoe, and it was east of where the Tower now is that it was halted and Colonel Suman made his prospecting tour to the right. It seems to have been a whole half-hour that the 54th Virginia and the 6th and 7th Florida Regiments were occupied in corralling their prisoners, Colonel Suman during the interval being a prisoner in their hands. He escaped and rejoined his regiment where he had posted it.

[1] *Address* (p. 37), delivered at the Eighth Reunion of the 9th Indiana Regiment, Veteran Volunteer Infantry, at Logansport, Indiana. Wateska Republican Steam Book Print.

Thence its movement was toward the rear and toward the Snodgrass house. It was during this withdrawal that what Captain McConnell described, occurred, and when his comrades "must have heard Colonel Suman's voice right behind saying, 'March right out this way, men; march right out this way; I'm not going to surrender my regiment!'" To this Captain McConnell adds: "Then Colonel Suman's voice [was heard] explaining that the troops across the ravine had just been overwhelmed by Rebel troops who came upon them from the west and that they had surrendered, and that the Rebels were trying to capture us;[1] quite a number of voices then began to declare that there were no Rebels there; that those were Steedman's men; I then made out the position of the 35th Ohio;[2] they were just over a little rise of ground behind us and were facing nearly westward, while we had been facing south; Suman protested that he knew what he was talking about; that he had been over there and was captured with them. A loud voice, which I afterward learned was Colonel Buell's, disputed Suman's statement."

Whatever may be our difficulties encountered in reconciling the successive order of details so far as to meet every comrade's reminiscences, we are assured of the locality referred to by every one of them belonging to the 9th Indiana, the 21st and 89th Ohio, and the 22d Michigan Regiments, when he mentions "the ravine" in connection with these closing scenes of the battle. This can be none other than the deep ravine and hollow that borders the north slope of the two west hills of the Horseshoe, since Colonel Trigg marched up in their rear and captured them.

Note B (p. 180)

The 9th Indiana's Controversy with General Boynton on the Subject of a Selection of a Site for their Monument.[3]

"'As some of you know, when we became convinced the National Commission was inclined to stand by General Boynton in his apparent determination to hold Snodgrass Hill sacred to the regiments of Van Derveer's Brigade, his regiment being one, and saying this we do not

[1] Colonel Suman's Report (No. 50, p. 769, l. 45) gives only six as missing on the 20th, but it appears (see Note B of this chapter) that Comrade McCormick, with fifteen others, was captured at the same time the three regiments of Steedman's Division were taken.

[2] See the corroborative testimony of the 21st Ohio, 89th Ohio, and 22d Michigan, chapters x, xi, xiv, Notes thereto, and especially Notes to chapter x, Note I, footnote.

[3] Excerpt from *Report* (p. 6) of Captain D. B. McConnell, Company K, 9th Indiana, to the Eleventh Annual Reunion of the 9th Regiment Indiana Veteran Volunteer Infantry Association, on October 2, 1897, at Hebron, Indiana.

disparage the brave men of this brigade or Boynton himself, but common fairness seemed to dictate, that these brave fellows should be ready to extend a soldierly courtesy and divide honors with another regiment or regiments who played a like part with them in holding the hill against overwhelming odds.' The Captain here mentioned other troops who had been crowded off of Snodgrass, as he thought, in a selfish, ungenerous manner. 'As a last resort an appeal was had to the Secretary of War, and a brief, collating the proofs of our claim, had to be prepared and sent on, and most of you are familiar with all this, and have learned that the Secretary also seemed to be dominated by the Boynton influence. There is no hope left to the Ninth to place its monument where it has elected to, while General Boynton lives to combat us. General Boynton, as I have before stated, until he was absolutely driven to it by uncontrovertible proof from both Federal and Confederate sources, ignored the fact of our regiment having relieved his own late in the evening in that dangerous position on Snodgrass Hill. I do not wonder so many of you boys who were there feel indignant and outraged that the action of the regiment should be thus ignored. I can understand why Comrade McCormick and his fellow skirmishers, who were captured there that dark night only a few rods in front of the regiment, feel that an injustice is being done him and his brave comrades, especially such of them as died in Andersonville. But so it is, Comrades. General Boynton seems to have effectually steeled his heart against you, and although only a Lieutenant-Colonel then, he has now attained, as the chronicler of the late war and as a politician, an influence at Washington that enables him to practically dominate the National Chickamauga Commission. You need not flatter yourselves you are the only soldiers who have encountered General Boynton's opposition.' Captain McConnell then read a letter of General Turchin's, in which the old warrior seemed to intimate that General Boynton proposed to make history to suit his own plan and idea whether all the facts actually upheld him or not. He expressed a determination to carry the matter into Congress and let the claim of his brigade[1] be made the subject of Congressional investigation, that the facts of history might thus be given to the world, and suggested that the Ninth in his opinion had better take a like course, for he felt assured there was no hope for the regiment to get its monument on Snodgrass Hill while Boynton lived.

"In conclusion, Captain McConnell said, 'Comrades, I agree with General Turchin that General Boynton's influence at Washington is such we cannot hope while he lives to secure the desired location of our monument on the field of Chickamauga. General Hunter, formerly

[1] In the Battle of Missionary Ridge.

president of the Indiana Commission, 'who labored so earnestly with me in your behalf, is now dead. General Fullerton is also dead, but Boynton lives and will not recede from his unjust position as respects this regiment. Unless, as General Turchin suggests, we carry our appeal to Congress, I can see no possible hope for our success in carrying out your choice of location. And as General Boynton himself seems willing to credit the regiment with good conduct at the Brotherton house, I submit whether under existing circumstances it is not wise, and especially just to our comrades who gave their lives on that battle-field, that we put a marker, with the most favorable inscription on it that the National Commission will consent to, on Snodgrass Hill and our monument near the Brotherton house. [Strong cries of disapproval.] Funds will be required to carry your claim through Congress with the National Commission and General Boynton opposing you. It means some one must give time and able effort to establish such a just claim as yours is. By combining with other organizations who feel injustice has been done them, you may win. If you fail, you will have spread the truth of history upon the records where just chroniclers in the future will give credit where it is deserved. I stand ready as a man and a member of the Indiana Commission to do whatever I can honorably to secure in some way a just recognition of the gallant conduct of my regiment on Snodgrass Hill.' A motion was seconded and an animated discussion followed, participated in by Captains Madden, Hodsden, Major Braden, Lieutenant Hemlick, and Comrades James and McCormick; the latter, who with fifteen[1] others of the regiment's skirmishers, was captured on Snodgrass the same time the three regiments of Steedman's Division were taken, was emphatic in his declaration that the monument should go where the regiment had elected to put it. The sentiment of the members present seemed to be with Captains Hodsden and McCormick to refuse to put up a monument, and either appeal to Congress or wait for the death of General Boynton, or for something to happen which would insure the regiment fair treatment in the location of its monument."

The National Park Commissioners' final solution of the difficulty in an alleged "interest of historical truth, which in a broad sense is in the interest of all the troops of the states represented there," was demonstrated by "yielding to Comrade McConnell's request that the regimental marker on Snodgrass Hill [i. e., Tower Hill of Horseshoe Ridge] be a large one and (we understand it is) 3 x 3 feet and four feet high, making it almost as conspicuous as a monument." Thus this historical

[1] In his *Speech* (p. 11) at the regiment's First Reunion at Elkhart, Indiana, August 27, 1884, Lieutenant A. S. McCormick, of Company A, is represented as stating that thirty-four of the regiment were captured with him September 20, and the Official Records show that this was on Horseshoe Ridge.

9TH INDIANA OFFICERS (GROUP II)

LIEUT. THOMAS THOMPSON
1ST SERGT. J. M. WHARTON

CAPT. D. B. McCONNELL

CAPT. W. H. MERRITT
LIEUT.-COL. W. P. LASSELLE

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controversy was not settled on its merits by the Commission's professed standard of truth nor on any other authoritative source, but simply by a sort of political, log-rolling compromise.

The *Records* of these annual reunions of the 9th Indiana include still further matter of historical interest about Chickamauga, and also contain still further data, along with correspondence between the Indiana and National Commissions. Any one who studies the evidence will be convinced that the gist of it all, backed by the Official Reports, is contained in my exposition of it in these pages.

These *Records* of the 9th Indiana's annual reunions have preserved the history of that regiment and the individual members comprising it. The corresponding secretary of the association, Comrade Alex. L. Whitehall, is especially to be commended for this work. It is a matter of regret that the example has not been followed by other organizations in preserving similar records.

Note C (p. 186)

In view of the fact that there is no Official Report of E. A. King's Brigade, or any regiment thereof, and in order to show that the 68th and 101st Indiana Regiments, Turchin to the contrary notwithstanding, participated in the action of the left wing on that day and afternoon of September 20, I take pleasure in inserting the following description of the positions and movements of these regiments, contained in a letter written me by Major George W. Steele of the 101st Regiment: "We made more than one counter-charge, or assault, on the enemy, who assaulted our position several times from ten o'clock, I think, until three o'clock, the left of the 101st being on the left of King's Brigade, and its left resting on the Lafayette road. There were troops to our left in échelon in the front, with a supporting line in the rear; the right of the rear supporting line nearest to us being in the Kelly field. Just where the right of the line in échelon to our front was, I am unable to state. I know there was furious fighting there. We were moved off to the left and the troops to our left still further to the left, and our right refused when we got to the Kelly field. King's Brigade stood its ground all day on Sunday, supporting several batteries, including the 19th Indiana, the 21st Indiana, and the 4th U. S. Battery M, holding our position for five hours. There was not a twig or blade of grass or bush that was not shot off, nor a tree that had not been hit many, many times between our line and that of the enemy. The regiment performed most heroic service. A goodly portion of the time no troops were in sight on our left. There was almost continuous dueling between our battery and that of the enemy for several hours, and charges and counter-charges were

made by the supporting line. The only protection furnished was a few logs, rotten and half-rotten, and limbs of trees that we could gather together and carry to our lines as a protection against rifle shots."

Note D (p. 191)

My efforts for five years past to find some surviving members of the 68th and 101st Indiana Regiments for the desired detailed information have been unrewarded until quite recently, when through the courtesy of Colonel George W. Steele, who in the battle was major of the 101st Indiana, I have found what I have so long sought for. From several letters which he has loyally and patriotically written me I have taken excerpts, embodying his description of the positions and movements of his regiment when it was with the left wing of the army prior to the withdrawal. As these Indiana regiments and the brigade to which they belonged have not received the recognition which they deserve for the great services they rendered when thus engaged, by reason of the neglect of the division commander to forward the written regimental reports of this brigade to the proper authorities,[1] I have desired to preserve what I can of the history of these gallant men.

The following contains Colonel Steele's account of "King's detachment," i. e., the 68th and 101st Indiana Regiments, sent by Thomas to Brannan. His description fully corroborates the evidence and conclusions reached from the small amount of testimony found in the Official Records. He says that he was with his regiment, the 101st Indiana, as well as the 68th Indiana, when posted at "the head of McFarland's Gap," and that he "personally saw General Thomas talking to General Reynolds, who in turn communicated an order to the 68th Indiana and the 101st Indiana" to proceed toward the Snodgrass house and "report to General Brannan." The troops thus detached were placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Doan, of the 101st Indiana, "a brave officer and always at his post of duty."[2] "There was no field officer with the 68th Indiana."[3] From McFarland's Gap the detachment passed through the woods into the open field.

[1] Colonel Milton S. Robinson, in a letter of November 26, 1891, is authority for the statement that these regimental reports were written, and for General Reynolds' statement that he had misplaced or lost them. Rev. D. B. Floyd, formerly sergeant, Company I, 75th Indiana, *History of the Seventy-fifth Indiana*, p. 196.

[2] See General Reynolds' Report, No. 50, p. 442, l. 54.

[3] Captain Edmund Finn commanded the regiment after Captain Harvey J. Espy was wounded, at 4 P.M. Saturday. See *History of the Sixty-eighth Indiana*, p. 71.

REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS OF E. A. KING'S BRIGADE

LIEUT.-COL. THOMAS DOAN

COL. MILTON S. ROBINSON

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"Owing to the coming darkness, Colonel Doan mistook his way and became lost, and did not come to us until after we had relieved the troops belonging to General Brannan's Division. It was nearly dark when we passed the Snodgrass house, on our right. It was so nearly dark that we could not discern men at any great distance. A few minutes before we arrived at the Snodgrass house (a very few minutes, I think), we heard a few scattering shots, but I know that the 35th Ohio, the troops we relieved, claims to have fired them. It might be called a volley, yet I consider that they were only scattering shots. There was certainly no volley, followed by any counter-volley. There was not a shot fired that we heard after these scattering shots until the next morning, so far as I remember. If there was any volley, and a counter-volley fire, it was all before we arrived at the Snodgrass house, and there were none while we were in hearing of it. After we left the head of McFarland's Gap, we learned from the officers and men of the 35th Ohio that the few scattering shots we heard were on account of a Rebel officer approaching the lines in the dusk of the evening, and ascertaining that he was in the presence of Union troops, undertook to escape and was fired upon. My recollection is very clear that neither the 68th nor the 101st Indiana fired a shot. We passed from where we received orders from General Brannan under the guidance of an officer on foot, to relieve his troops. It was so dark as to make it impossible to distinguish persons at any considerable distance, and it was with more or less difficulty that we found our way to the line of the troops, which we struck first in going straight ahead past the Snodgrass house, the officer with us asking us to wait frequently until he made investigation; owing to the irregularity of the ground, the line was not straight. The 101st and 68th Indiana were marched as near to the line as could be done without danger of running onto it. I have not any doubt about our relieving the 35th Ohio; my regiment took the place of it, and the 35th then had about one hundred and twenty-five men. The troops whom we relieved were lying just close enough to the crest of the ridge to see over it. There may have been a little cliff. I may have seen it, but I do not remember anything about it if I did. We remained after all the troops were gone for ten minutes, by order, when we marched on to Rossville, covering the troops who had gone before us without ammunition in their cartridge-boxes. We got our ammunition from a wagon in Kelly's field. There were only two boxes of it. My regiment had secured both. General King suggested it would be fair to give one to another regiment, which we did, and the 68th Indiana got it, not a shot of which was fired so far as I remember. We saw no other troops thereafter until we were well into McFarland's Gap, where we found the 82d Indiana, and no one after them until we arrived at or near Ross-

ville.[1] After seeing General Thomas at the head of McFarland's Gap, when the order was delivered to General Reynolds for the movement of our detachment, I did not see him again until the 22d of September. As no two men in a regiment in the same battle remember events just alike, I would have it understood that the occurrences referred to above are only in accordance with my own recollections of them."

Comrade High's *History of the Sixty-eighth Indiana Regiment*, before quoted in footnotes, also contains a sketch of King's Brigade in general in the Battle of Chickamauga, and in particular — which is of interest to us — refers to the detachment of King's Brigade, the 68th and 101st Indiana Regiments, which General Thomas sent to Brannan's support. There are certain statements in the nature of corroboration of evidence from the Official Records and of Colonel Steele's account, just given, which are noteworthy: (1) That it took two hours for this detachment to make the movement from the Kelly field to the Snodgrass house via McDonald's field and the Ridge road. (2) That the detachment reported at Thomas' headquarters, which was this side of the Snodgrass house, "just at the last fire," which occurred near this point, and that it was a "scattering volley."[2]

[1] General Hazen, in his *Narrative*, says his brigade was the last to leave McFarland's Gap and that there were no troops behind him on his arrival at Rossville "at precisely 11 P.M." See Notes to chapter v, Note A.

[2] See High, *History of the Sixty-eighth Indiana*, p. 119; also p. 110.

CHAPTER IX

Note A (p. 201)

I have preserved these letters to me from the War Department as amusing curiosities furnishing an exhibition of red tape and evasion, proving my claim of an attempt at suppression of the truth even at this late date. This correspondence finally culminated in the following statement: "We are not willing that any stranger should overhaul and make extracts from these documents, which would doubtless and almost certainly lead to confusion rather than to light." It is unnecessary to call my reader's attention to the fact that the contents of these documents would be useless to me wherever they might be in conflict with the Official Records. It will be noticed that the War Department's statement is a base reflection upon the veracity of the gallant Indians who gave their testimony before the Commission.

CHAPTER X

INTRODUCTION[1]

First Position. "I will not go back of the time, about 9 A.M., of our taking position in the lane on the east of Snodgrass house" (Mahony). "The house is a small one, and there were several peach trees standing near. A road passes through this farm on the east of the house, running in a northwest direction. The 21st Regiment was deployed on this road directly east of this house, with the right reaching to the south end of the lane and near the woods. At that time there was severe fighting going on between three and four hundred yards to the southeast of our line. We could see the Confederate troops moving to the left, and we were expecting to have to fight where we were at that time. We threw down the fences on the east of us and placed the rails so as to protect us from the balls of the enemy. Soon after we had arranged the fences to suit us, we were then ordered away from our position (were detached from our brigade), and saw no more of the brigade that day."

Second Position. "We were marched by the right flank out of the lane, and moved in a southwesterly direction in the woods about one fourth of a mile southwest of the Snodgrass house; there we met, as we supposed, a part of Brannan's Division retreating in great disorder. The first man I saw I recognized was Colonel Walker, of the 31st Regiment, O.V.I., who was making a great effort to stop the broken lines. As he noticed the 21st moving in, he rode up to us and said: '*Twenty-first, stand firm as adamant;* this line must be stopped right here.' Colonel Walker assisted in establishing the line on the south slope of the ridge."

(In confirmation of the above and of the Official Records as to Colonel Walker, I have the following from Captain Vance: "As we went up the hill to take position first, we passed General Walker (then colonel, and under arrest on some trivial charge, and from which he was afterwards cleared by court-martial), who was serving as a volunteer aide on Brannan's staff. Walker was from our town, — Findlay, Ohio, — where the regiment was organized in the summer of 1861 at Camp Vance, and he called to us as we went up the hill, exhorting us to hold it.")

"We remained there but a short time, and then moved to the south, down the slope of the ridge to a flat, or low piece of ground at the foot

[1] See footnote, chapter x, p. 209.

of said ridge. Although we had to fight our way down the ridge, the enemy appeared very careful and slow to attack us, as though they did not know what was in their front." (Cusac.)

(The enemy referred to here was Robertson's Brigade of Hood's Division,[1] who were the first Confederates to occupy the lower ridge, but were unsupported and fell back.[2])

"Captains Alban, Cusac, and Mahony, and Lieutenants Bolton, Welkers, and others think that this attack was about 11 o'clock, Captain Alban saying: 'The first attack was repulsed about 11.30 o'clock.'" (Canfield.)[3]

Third Position. "Our position in the flat not being a good one, we fell back on the ridge in good order and formed our line along the south crest of the ridge. It was now about 11 o'clock. We saw no Union troops on that part of the ridge at that time except a part of a battery that was placed near us on our left. I do not know where they belonged, but I do know that the time they were most needed they were not there, as they had left that part of the ridge." (Cusac.)

(The *History* of the 82d Indiana shows that it was formed on the ridge to the left of the 21st Ohio, with a small detachment under General Walker, of the 31st Ohio.)

"We had been on the ridge but a short time when the enemy made a desperate attack upon us, but was repulsed. Again and again did they attempt to drive us from the ridge, but we were not to be moved by lead or demon-like yells, but we lay close to the ground, and with our Colt's revolving rifles repelled and repulsed every attack." (Cusac.)

[It was during this period, between 12 M. and 1 o'clock P.M., according to Mahony, Comstock, and Canfield, or at 2 o'clock, according to Bolton,[4] that the lieutenant-colonel of the regiment, Dwella M. Stoughton, was wounded by a sharpshooter, and the command devolved upon Major McMahan.]

In his letter to me of July 10, 1908, Major Vance describes a movement which was made at this time and which is described by others, as well as himself. When on the hill, about 2 o'clock P.M., the regiment received a cross-fire by which it was being assaulted on its right, as well as in the front. To counteract the effect of this fire, the three companies of the 21st Ohio on the right wing were thrown back like a gate on its hinges, thereby protecting Brannan's flank from being assaulted in the rear. The effect of this movement was not only to prevent the turning of Brannan's troops, but also to prevent — which it did — the Confed-

[1] No. 51, p. 511, l. 56. [2] No. 51, p. 400, l. 35.
[3] *History of the Twenty-first Ohio Volunteer Infantry*, p. 116.
[4] Major Cusac also says "2 P.M."

erates from seizing the Dry Valley road, and thereby cutting off the whole Federal army from withdrawing to Roosville via McFarland's Gap. Captain Vance's detailed account of this incident, contained in his book and in his correspondence with me, is a very interesting and important one. His regiment unquestionably rendered a signal service by this movement, and the credit of suggesting it seems to belong to Captain Vance himself.

(It was after 2 o'clock P.M., as indicated by General Steedman's Report and other corroborative evidence, that the 22d Michigan and the 89th Ohio of Steedman's Division came in on the 21st's right.)

NOTE A (p. 211)

Captain Vance, in his letter of July 10, 1908, says: "Coming out of the battle, we had only five officers in the 21st Ohio, so it fell to the lot of each one of us to command two companies. I was made acting adjutant. Under orders from Captain Vantine and officers of brigade headquarters, I wrote and signed Vantine's name to the Official Report. He was frequently in no condition to sign his name in those days. Peace to his ashes!"

NOTE B (p. 211)

Captain Cusac, June 7, 1890, says: "The 22d Michigan charged over us as we lay on the ground, but remained in front of us only a short time, when they fell back over us. The enemy then followed up and made a desperate effort to break through our lines. . . . We kept up a constant and terrific fire upon them, compelling them to fall back."

NOTE C (p. 211)

Captain Cusac, in the same letter, continues: "About this time a regiment formed on our left and did some good work, but later in the day they disappeared. I have always been of the opinion that this was the 9th Ohio." Mahony, April 1, 1892, in confirmation of this, says: "On our left at this time I remember a regiment, said to have been the 9th Ohio, making a charge and coming back in some disorder. I gave orders to help them by turning an oblique fire to the left on the enemy, who were following them up."[1]

NOTE D (p. 212)

I find interesting matter as well as further corroboration of the fact that the 21st was relieved by the 35th Ohio and the 2d Minnesota.

[1] "I gave that order myself to Companies G and B, who were very near them." (Cusac.)

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General Boynton, in an article in the *Chattanooga Times*, of September 18, 1889, headed "Horseshoe Ridge," clears up what he calls a "Mystery of the Battle," saying, "The 21st Ohio was relieved by the 35th Ohio, the right regiment of Van Derveer's brigade . . . The 21st then withdrew to the rear of the Union line for a short time."

Captain Canfield, in his book,[1] also refers to these two regiments, about equal in numbers to the 21st Ohio, which "came and laid down in our rear," and, after describing how the 21st "retired singly as their ammunition was exhausted, I[2] ordered in the two regiments lying in reserve which I afterward learned were the 35th Ohio on the right and the 2d Minnesota on the left . . . The firing ceased soon after we left, and the smoke of the battle settled down among the trees."

Captain Cusac's letter, June 7, 1890, also describes the two regiments which were in his rear and "began firing over us, their balls passing very near our men. We feared they would kill some of our men. I requested those in the rear of my company to cease firing, or else to rise up and fire."

Note E (p. 212)

The full text of Vantine's Report[3] reads: "The enemy sent up messengers to Brannan's men stating that some of them were waiting for them (our men) to cease firing in order to give themselves (i.e., the enemy) up. The firing ceased and the enemy came up, but instead of giving themselves up, they fired a volley and charged up the hill, gaining possession of it entirely."

Were it not for this official authority we should not give place to the following details of Comrade Vance's improbable story, which is as follows: —

"Very soon after this, as the enemy, in a long, compact and well-kept line were discovered coming up to the charge, paying no heed to the frantic firing of the fresh (?) troops, a man was seen to spring out in advance of them. He was unarmed, clad in Confederate uniform, and quick of foot as a deer. As he approached the Union line swinging his hat, he yelled constantly: 'Cease firing! Cease firing!' The men looked at each other in surprise, not knowing what this might mean, and in the uncertainty thus engendered, the firing slackened up, and had truly almost ceased by the time the daring messenger had reached the Union commander to explain his errand and give an account of himself. The substance of what he had to say was that a large body of the enemy was coming up the hill to surrender, and he bore the request of their com-

[1] *History of the Twenty-first Ohio Volunteer Infantry*, p 120.

[2] "What right had a captain to order a superior officer?" (Cusac.)

[3] No. 50, p. 395, l. 4.

mander that the Union troops should cease firing in order to enable them to do so. The order was accordingly given, and it is too late to spend breath in criticising the judgment of the Union commander, whose name I never heard.

"The Confederates came steadily up the hill amid a silence at once grown so profound that their measured tread and the rustling of the bushes as they marched could be heard plainly, although they were still distant. The messenger himself quietly lay down upon his face behind a huge tree very near to the front of the Union line.

"It was clear that he was well chosen. He was, perhaps, not more than twenty years old, rather tall, but by no means awkward, lean and lithe and quick as a cat. As he lay there, his face glowed with the activity of his mind, and his eyes darted hither and thither, taking in every feature of the scene and on the alert for whatever might happen.

"Lieutenant Lamb, of the 21st, stood near this keen-eyed fellow, and, after observing him for a moment, said to an officer at hand: 'The Johnnies are not going to surrender; they are deceiving us.' The quick eyes of the envoy flashed in Lamb's face for an instant and then turned elsewhere. 'I reckon our colonel knows his business,' answered the officer, somewhat stiffly. Lamb looked again at the messenger, then at the rapidly nearing line of Confederates, and then back to the boy, so coolly kicking his heels under the tree. 'Well, it's my private opinion that your colonel 's a fool,' he replied, and turned away. 'Come on, boys, let's go back; I'm not going to let you be taken prisoners'; and collecting the men of the 21st, he went quietly back to his regiment."

Referring to his book account in a letter to me under date of July 6, 1908, Captain Vance writes: "I personally saw the Confederate lad who came loping up the hill to request that we should cease firing, as described, and Lieutenant Lamb and I were standing elbow to elbow, he commanding the fragment of his company, B, and I commanding the fragment of my company, D, and the details stated by me there are absolutely correct, even to the language spoken, amended only by the leaving out of my name. Lamb was a fellow townsman of mine and a few years older than I, — I was seventeen years old when I commanded my company in that battle. Lamb's language concerning his private opinion of the colonel commanding the two regiments was made to an officer of one of those two regiments, but his concluding remarks about getting our men off the hill and not allowing them to be captured were addressed to me. There were probably other officers of the 21st who had taken up men as we did, that used up their ammunition on another part of the line of the two regiments, but of these I have no knowledge. The men who were taken up from the 21st to fight out their ammunition

2D LIEUT. WILSON VANCE

were taken up by the company officers and not the regimental commander."

There is nothing which I find improbable in the statement that a messenger or messengers were sent up by the Confederates and that Lieutenant Lamb may have seen one of them, but it is my belief that Captain Vance and Lieutenant Lamb misunderstood the purport of the message which was conveyed to the Union commander. So far as relates to the parley between friend and foe on the summit of the ridge, it appears from Captain Vance's own statement that the conversation which passed was unquestionably a matter of hearsay, for at the time described he had marched back to his regiment, three or four hundred feet away. "I had scarcely got there," he says, "when voices were heard in excited question and reply, and then came a tremendous volley, followed by a wild cheer and hundreds of men came flying back over the hill for their lives."

The following is the story that was related to him of what had happened: "Observing that the Confederates who were represented to be so anxious to surrender were still bearing their arms, the Union commander, as soon as they came within hailing distance, called out, 'Lay down your arms if you wish to surrender,' a request by no means out of place, one would say. Then followed the volley, the rush up the hill, and it was taken."

In volume II, from the Confederate viewpoint, will be found a more reasonable interpretation of what actually happened. Our study proves that at this time and place, the only Confederate regiments which could have been a party to this episode were the 58th North Carolina and the 5th Kentucky,[1] of Kelly's Brigade. This fact is narrowed down by a

[1] Referring to this extraordinary circumstance, Judge Comstock writes to me: "During one of these close encounters, a great, long, lank 'Johnnie' in a butternut suit threw down his gun, threw up his hands and ran into our line yelling, 'I surrender! Don't shoot! I surrender!' I should say he was a man of thirty or thirty-five years of age, dark and swarthy, and we were told he was a Mississippian. . . . This man turned and looked over our line in great surprise and said: 'Good God! whar's all yo men?' He was told he could see for himself; he then said, 'If they all knew how few we were, yo all would n't last five minutes; they all think there is a whole division massed on this line.'"

Commenting on the statement that the messenger was a Mississippian, it is noticeable that Anderson's Mississippi Brigade fought in front of this position before 4 P.M., when it was relieved by Kelly's Brigade, one regiment of which, the 5th Kentucky, was supported (No. 51, p. 322, l. 33) by Colonel Bishop's 7th Mississippi, which "remained until the enemy withdrew from their position on the ridge." We know that this regiment assisted the 5th Kentucky in its first charge near 4.30 P.M., but it does not appear that they were together in the second charge, which occurred one hour later.

process of elimination, not necessary to enter into here. The 58th North Carolina appears to be the one which participated in the parleying, the 5th Kentucky the other one which made the charge and took complete possession of the hill. The account of the parley is given in Colonel Kelly's Official Report,[1] and is as follows: "When I arrived at the base of the hill, the enemy was heard to cry, 'We surrender! we surrender!' I immediately stepped to the front, my horse having been previously killed, and up to the officer who seemed to be in command, and demanded that if he proposed to surrender, he should lay down his arms. He came to the front and said, 'Wait a minute.' I replied, 'No, sir; lay down your arms instantly or I will fire upon you,' and turned to my command, but before I could give the command, 'Ready!' he poured upon it a terrific fire which, on account of its suddenness, threw the brigade [i.e., the 58th North Carolina] for an instant into confusion; but they rallied and re-formed within thirty yards of this position. I am confident that the enemy intended to surrender, and that his fire was drawn by an unauthorized shot from his ranks."

What appears more likely than the unauthorized shot is the probability that just at this juncture a new supply of ammunition for the Federals had arrived and a parley was resorted to in order to gain time. This is indicated by Colonel Boynton's Report referring to the same period of time and place,[2] as follows: "The fighting continued for nearly two hours, when our ammunition became exhausted. Nothing daunted, the regiment fixed bayonets and awaited the shock. Fortunately a load of ammunition arrived and the fire was renewed with vigor. Still the rebels pressed us hard and maintained their position at close quarters."

It was the 5th Kentucky's second charge that took the position on the hill as described in Colonel Hawkins' Official Report,[3] which, according to further evidence obtained by exhaustive correspondence with members of this regiment, occurred at this time and place. "I ordered my command forward," says Colonel Hawkins, "swinging a little to the right, and again drove the enemy across the ridge more than forty paces in advance of the brigade and nearly silenced the fire in my front, and was directing my fire to the right, when part of Trigg's command passed to my left, covering part of my front."

That this Confederate version is the true account, no reasonable person can doubt. Colonel Van Derveer was a tried soldier who had participated in the Mexican War, and it is ridiculous to suppose for one instant that he could have been imposed upon in the way described in Vantine's Report, for the veriest tyro in military tactics would know the duty of a soldier under such circumstances. Had any Federal officer

[1] No. 51, p. 441, l. 35. [2] No. 50, p. 436, l. 5. [3] No. 51, p. 448, l. 38.

made a fool of himself in such a performance as is described, he would have become the laughing-stock of both armies, and it would have been impossible to hide his identity. My correspondence with other officers of the 21st Ohio, and all my research, have resulted in finding no corroboration of Captain Vance's version;[1] but whatever may be the version as to the argument in the parley, the fact remains, which is fully established by the evidence, that at the end of it the Confederates were in complete possession of the hill.

Note F (p. 213)

The 21st Ohio's Official Reports, particularly that of Major McMahan, who states that Colonel Van Derveer assumed command over him, prove that this brigade commander under General Brannan was responsible for the brutal order to the 21st, which was delivered directly or indirectly by Van Derveer himself. Further corroboration, however, with convincing details is furnished by officers of the 21st Ohio as follows: —

Captain Vance, in his book,[2] and in my correspondence with him, describes how it was the commander of the two regiments, flying from their position on the hill, who ordered the commander of the 21st to "take your regiment and make a charge; re-take the hill; we will rally and re-form and support you! 'I have no ammunition,' began McMahan, more in explanation than objection. 'But you have orders!' responded the colonel."

Captain Cusac in his letter of June 7, 1890, referring to the point in the hollow northwest of his previous position on the summit, says: "While in this position I was standing in front of the regiment when a colonel, whom I was unable to recognize, rode up to me, somewhat excitedly, saying, 'Move those men up on the line.' I said to him, 'Colonel, we have no ammunition.' His reply to me was, 'It does n't make a G——d d——n bit of difference; have the men fix bayonets and hold that line.' The language and the manner that the command was given in stirred up my 'Irish blood,' and I said to him, 'Go and talk with the officer in command.' He then rode to the rear of the regiment to where Major McMahan was and gave him the same orders, though not in the same language. Then the Major gave the order to 'Fix bayonets,' which was promptly obeyed, but when the order was given to 'Forward march,' not a man moved. About that time some of the men on our right shouted, 'Boys, don't leave us,' and when the second command was given, every man moved forward double-quick and was met by a

[1] On the other hand, Major Cusac denies its accuracy.

[2] *God's War*, p. 286.

murderous fire which killed and wounded many of our brave men, myself being wounded in my left hand."

Mahony's description, April 1, 1892, is as follows: "Near us and a few steps to the north were two large trees,[1] and close to them were two mounted officers. They were talking to some one who I thought was Major McMahan. One of them, who wore colored glasses, was saying, 'An advance must be made,' etc. I could not distinguish all that was said, but I heard enough to interest me very much. Knowing that all the ammunition of the regiment was now exhausted, I stepped up to the officer who wore the colored glasses and said, 'It will be murder to take men in again.' Turning in his saddle he replied in a very emphatic manner, 'It must be done, sir.' 'If it must be done, we can do it,' I replied, and formed the company with others of the regiment."

Finally, Comrade Comstock, April 16, 1892, adds his testimony as follows: "When the Major was ordered to re-take our position, by this time occupied by the enemy, by a staff officer, brave and obedient to orders as he was, and typical soldier as he was, Major McMahan protested against taking the regiment back on the front line without ammunition, but orders being imperative, he looked at the staff officer in his inimitable way and said, 'G——d d——n it, you rank me.' 'Boys, we will have to go back.' Ordered 'Fix bayonets,' 'Forward,' 'Charge.'"

NOTE G (p. 213)

Captain Vance [2] describes the first repulse and the successive charges, as follows: "Of course, it was an utterly useless movement, and in almost less time than it takes to write it, the numerous, compact, and well-equipped Confederates had repulsed them [the 21st] and sent them whirling, . . . closing up the gaps, they charged twice again with not even a shot being fired."

NOTE H (p. 214)

Captain Vance [3] presents a graphic account of the 21st's waiting in vain for Van Derveer's "flying regiments" rallying to their assistance. The statements of other officers whom we have been quoting corroborate their comrade in general, while Lieutenant Bolton confirms the

[1] "They stand northeast of the 21st's monument seventy-five or eighty yards. One leans to the south, the other to the north; one pine, the other a red oak. When we were in the flat they were more than one hundred yards east of us." (Cusac.)

[2] *God's War*, p. 287. [3] *Ibid.*

details as to Captain Alban and the sergeant of Company D, whose name was Celestine Crochard. Captain Vance says: —

"Presently a line was seen filing through the depths of the great ravine on the right — a long line of soldiers carrying their muskets at right shoulder shift, marching 'left in front' and making no noise. The fog distorted them somewhat, but they seemed to be in dark uniforms, and came from the direction in which Steedman's Brigade had gone. They showed up at least two thousand men.(?)

"The men of the Twenty-first regarded them with a curiosity that was almost listless and calmly debated as to who they were, some maintaining that they were Rebels, who, acting with those who had just taken the crest of the hill, were about to fall upon our right and crush it; while others, arguing from the color of their uniforms and the direction from which they came, were as strongly impressed that they were Union troops. After facing to the front they slowly moved up the hill, marching in line with a precision that would have been creditable to a grand parade or review; and all that could be heard was the occasional word of command or caution — 'Dress on the centre,' 'Steady, there' — in a tone that seemed suppressed and guarded.

"At last Captain Alban determined to know who they were. So announcing, he plunged down the hill and was soon lost to view. Presently, hearing nothing from the Captain, a sergeant of Company D said to his commander, 'I think I will go and see who they are.' 'I'd rather you would n't, Bob; the thing looks very dangerous. I'm afraid we would lose you.'

"A pause ensued. 'Well,' resumed the sergeant, 'somebody ought to take the risk, and I might as well do it as anybody. May I go?' 'I don't like to see you go, but you may do as you please'; and shouldering his piece the brave young fellow stepped blithely off, for all the world as if he were going a squirrel hunting as he used to do in the Putnam County woods. And so he was lost to view as Captain Alban had been; and from neither of them came back a word or a cry to tell what they had found.

"As Alban moved forward he was lost to sight of his comrades some time before he reached the mysterious column. He pursued his way calmly till he got near enough to make himself heard without yelling. Then he asked, 'What troops are you?' In an instant a gun was put to his head. 'Git back hyar in the re-ar; and if ye open yer head we'll blow yer brains out!' And what had happened to him happened in like manner to the sergeant.

"At last a man in the Twenty-first, raising his voice, hailed them, 'What troops are you?' The reply came back promptly, 'Jeff Davis' troops.' Now, as the Union general, Jeff. C. Davis, had in the early part of the day been on the right with his division, it was thought at

once that the ghostly column was made up of his command, and the men lapsed again into quiet but eager watchfulness.

"And so the line came steadily on and the scene each moment grew more weird and impressive.

"Suddenly from the Twenty-first the command rang out sharp and clear, 'Fire!' Now who it was that gave the command, or why he should do so has never been found out, since there was not a cartridge in any man's gun or box; but it had a prompt and most decided effect, for instantly the approaching column lay down and seemed to melt and disappear into the earth. Then waiting for the fire which they had expected and hearing no sound, the troops of ghosts sprang to their feet, delivered a crashing volley, and charged on and up wildly and furiously. It was quick work. At least a third of those present of the Twenty-first were captured with their colors, the rest saving themselves by flight."

Note I (p. 218)

From my correspondence with Captain Vance (letter of June 11, 1908), I present, in connection with his interesting account of his personal escape from being captured, evidence furnished by him as to the position of Brannan's men, that they were not on the Horseshoe at this time but on the bare hill beyond the ravine and north of the Horseshoe. He says: "I turned to my men and said, 'Get out of this, boys, and save yourselves the best way you can.' I remember very distinctly how I ran, myself, alongside of Wilson W. Brown,[1] of F company, who had been commissioned second lieutenant, but not mustered, — who had been one of the engineers who ran the captured locomotive up toward Chattanooga from Big Shanty in 1862, when O. M. Mitchell [2] made his raid, as you remember. I recall distinctly how finally, with one or two moans, he fell (it was afterwards found that he was wounded in five different places), and how I kept on running. My steps got longer and longer until I whirled, as it seemed to me, head over heels, and finally brought

[1] "This certainly must have been Lieutenant Mark Wood, of Company C, and not Wilson W. Brown, of Company F, both of whom were Mitchell raiders. It was Lieutenant Wood who was wounded five times almost simultaneously, which ultimately caused his death. Lieutenant Vance was not the only one who took long steps or quick ones either." (Judge Comstock.)

[2] This regiment supplied nine of the nineteen enlisted soldiers participating in the thrilling adventure to which Comrade Vance refers, — W. W. Brown, Company F (engineer); John Scott, Company K (executed); M. J. Hawkins, Company A; J. R. Porter, Mark Wood, J. A. Wilson, John Wollam, Company C; William Knight, Company E, and William Bensinger, Company G. See William Pittenger, *Capturing a Locomotive*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1882.

up against a bush. When we got back to Brannan's position we found, as I had predicted, his division was filing down the hill, and making mighty little noise in doing so. I first tried to lead my men to the rear, but was halted by one of our own pickets, who told me that I was going into the enemy's camp."

In another letter, July 21, 1908, he says: "*There were no other Union troops on our hill unless they were far over to our left and in the ravine between us and Brannan.*[1] I found none of them there when I went over to Brannan's hill."[2]

Further confirmation referring to the same period just before the capture is contained in Lieutenant Bolton's letter in Captain Canfield's *History*,[3] and is as follows: "A short time previous to this the most of Brannan's division had been ordered back off the field, and General Steedman's troops also had been withdrawn from the right, thus leaving us without any protection or support, with the only orders that we must hold the place at all hazards."

In his letter of June 7, 1890, Captain Cusac adds his testimony: "It is a fact that cannot be truthfully disputed that all the troops that remained on that part of the ridge after sundown were captured."

Mahony's testimony is also to the same effect in point of time when he says, April 1, 1892, "Our capture must have been effected just before the moon rose." And in this connection, Lieutenant Bolton, as well as others, tells us how the woods were full of smoke which made the hour appear much later than it actually was. He says: "The dry leaves in front of our lines caught fire towards evening and the smoke from their burning, in connection with that from the artillery and musketry fire, very materially added to the darkness and gloom."

[1] Italics are his. — AUTHOR.

[2] Major Cusac is very emphatic in pronouncing this statement as correct. "Where," he says, "were the 85th Ohio and the 2d Minnesota at this time? It is a fact that there was not a soldier in sight nor near us on our left. I could see some distance to the left but could see no one. Lieutenant Lamb and those who escaped with him all say that they saw no troops to the left of us. Since I wrote you last I went to North Baltimore to see a man that was taken prisoner with me; he says that he is positive that there were no men on our left. I also went to Findlay to see L. Perry who escaped with Lieutenant Lamb. Perry says that they ran some distance directly to the left and then turned north but did not see a man beside themselves. H. B. Thomas, one of my men, says that after we were out of ammunition he slipped back to look for water and while returning he met Lieutenant Lamb and others near the regiment. He turned and escaped with them. He says he saw no other troops east of us and is satisfied there were none." Letter of Major Cusac, May 26, 1911.

[3] Page 144.

CHAPTER XI

Note A (p. 227)

The colonel of this 89th Ohio Regiment is now General Caleb H. Carlton, on the retired list of the United States Army, and I take this opportunity of acknowledging my indebtedness to him for many hours' assistance rendered in establishing the record of the positions and movements of his regiment. I also take pleasure in presenting a well-deserved tribute, confirmed by authoritative testimony elsewhere, paid to him by an officer of his regiment, Captain J. C. Oliver, in a recent letter to the author: "Nothing stands out so prominently in my memory as the heroic figure of Colonel Carlton sitting his horse and smoking his pipe in the midst of the storm of bullets which were decimating our ranks. Well do I also recall his shrill voice of command when some part of the line would waver under a severe blast of leaden hail."

Note B (p. 228)

This is the statement made by Rev. E. S. Scott, late second lieutenant, Company G, and subsequently adjutant of the 89th Ohio, in a letter dated June 9, 1897, to General Turchin. It is to be found in the latter's book.[1] He says therein: "I have always been of the opinion that we were deliberately left there, since we were 'orphans' away from our regular commands, in order to facilitate the withdrawal of other troops." Similar statements have been made by him in direct correspondence with me.

Note C (p. 229)

The following is a quotation from an extract from Colonel Caleb H. Carlton's letter, dated Fort Elliott, Texas, May 18, 1887, to General Turchin, and which is to be found in the latter's book.[2] I have already quoted from the same letter in chapter VI, page 141. The statement which this extract contains is of such importance that I give it in full, corroborating as it does my deductions from Official Records in regard to General Granger, as well as other points. "Colonel Le Favour, of the Twenty-second Michigan, was senior to me in rank and commanded his regiment and mine as a brigade from the time I reported to [General]

[1] *Chickamauga*, p. 205. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 206.

COL. CALEB H. CARLTON

LIEUT. J. C. OLIVER

LIEUT. E. S. SCOTT

39TH OHIO OFFICERS

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Gordon Granger on the north bank of the Tennessee River until we were captured. [General] Steedman told me, when I met him at Chattanooga after I was exchanged, that he had claimed, and that Granger had admitted it, that the only order Granger gave to the division after it went in, 'caused Carlton and Le Favour to be captured.'[1] We had sent Lieutenant Drake, adjutant of the Twenty-second to [General] Granger for ammunition. Granger said he had no ammunition and to 'tell Carlton and Le Favour they must use bayonet and hold their position at all hazards.' This was the last order we received. Drake, on returning to us, was fired on from both sides, that is, the Rebels had a cross-fire in our rear. That was about half-past four. I mention my name first as it was mentioned first in the message."

Note D (p. 229)

History of the 22d Michigan

Comrade William B. Hamilton, first lieutenant of Company F, 22d Michigan Regiment, kept a diary which he has consulted in his correspondence with me, and it is from him that I quote the following interesting details of the period just before and after Whitaker's Brigade, of Steedman's Division, on his right were driven from their position down the north slope of the Main Ridge. "It must have been about five o'clock when a terrific burst of musketry broke out in the woods to our right while all was quiet in our front. There was a heavy advancing roar from the south and a feeble retiring reply to the northward. The distance of the combatants from our position might be about fifty rods; we could not see them for brush and smoke. This was the last heavy firing I heard. Within fifteen or twenty minutes the storm of musketry had swept round to the northward and quieted down. Pretty soon after this we could perceive columns of Confederates hurrying northward through the woods towards our right and rear where there was no 89th

[1] This statement is directly in line with Granger's testimony in his Official Report, wherein he mentions but two orders delivered by himself that fateful afternoon, — the one (No. 50, p. 855, l. 27; p. 860, l. 30) which formed Steedman's two brigades before they went in on the charge, and the other which Carlton and Steedman refer to and which Granger describes as follows: "Anticipating another attack, I ordered the command to be given to the men to stand firm, and to use the cold steel" (p. 856, l. 17). Granger times this (p. 856, l. 14) at "almost dark" and when "not a round of ammunition [was] left." We know he abandoned the field about 5 P.M., and all other evidence is that his order was delivered prior thereto, near the Snodgrass house. There is no truth in his statement of what followed, as applied to Le Favour, Steedman, Brannan, or Harker, that "with fixed bayonets our troops gallantly charged them [the enemy] and drove them back in confusion. Twice more were these charges repeated," etc.,

Ohio to hinder them. Over some ridges we could plainly see, twenty or thirty rods off, the muskets and occasionally a head or hat. Some of our men of Companies A, F, and D, who had a few cartridges left, opened fire on them, and they kept out of sight after that. This must have been between 5.30 and 6 o'clock, for the sun had gone down behind the trees on the Main Ridge. Our right flank was truly in the air. The movement of Confederate troops northward on our right no doubt convinced Colonel Le Favour that it was time for us to be getting out of there, so without orders the movement toward the rear was begun, and we were faced about and marched down the hill."

This statement is confirmed by all the 22d Michigan comrades with whom I have been in correspondence for several years, including R. G. Spalding, second lieutenant, Company C; George W. Button, lieutenant, Company A; James J. Potter, sergeant-major; R. W. Malcolm, Company A; and O. W. Tock, of Company H.

"Our ammunition was exhausted about 4.30 P.M.," says Comrade Tock, of Company H. "I filled my cartridge-box from that of a dead comrade of my company. My bunk-mate and beloved comrade, Color-Sergeant Stansell, of Company C, was shot while I was talking to him, a little to the south of the crest of the hill. With the assistance of Richard Peer, I carried him twenty or twenty-five yards and laid him at the foot of a large oak. He was not dead, but unconscious. When we were ordered to fall back down the north slope, our company passed where Stansell lay. He was still alive. When we reoccupied our position, I returned to Stansell with Comrade Peer and took from him his watch and other trinkets. These, particularly the watch, were returned at our request by the Confederates to Stansell's widow. It was a commendable and gallant act."

NOTE E (p. 229)

In view of the fact that there is no Official Report whatever of record describing the 22d Michigan Regiment's action in the battle, I continue to quote more extensively from my correspondents of this regiment, referred to in Note D. Quoting Comrade Hamilton, whose sketch is the most complete and generally in accord with the majority viewpoint, I present his account of his regiment's march from McAfee's church to Snodgrass house and from that point of time when "put in" action until it took position on the right of the 21st Ohio, and with that regiment and the 89th Ohio maintained Brannan's right flank on Horseshoe Ridge.

A preliminary statement concerning questions of time is inserted here for the purpose of correcting an error that I have frequently met with, which places Steedman's arrival several hours later than it actually

22D MICHIGAN OFFICERS (GROUP I)

2D LIEUT. E. O. SPALDING LIEUT. T.-COL WILLIAM SANBORN 1ST LIEUT W. B. HAMILTON
LIEUT. L. O. MEADE CAPT. A M. KELLER LIEUT. GEO. W. BUTTON

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was.[1] The Official Reports of Generals Granger and Steedman and of the latter's brigade and regimental commanders are unanimous in stating that they left McAfee's church at 11.30 A.M., or earlier, and arrived on the field and went into action at 2 P.M., or earlier.[2] The preponderance of evidence of record and from authoritative sources, the participants in the march themselves, support Steedman's own statements in his Report[3] that 11.30 A.M. was the hour that the column began its "rapid" movement to the battle-field,[4] and that 1.30 P.M.[5] was when Steedman reported to Thomas.

"About noon on September 20, 1863, the 22d Michigan was on its way from McAfee's church with eighty rounds of cartridges per man, and about four hundred and fifty strong. One company, B, was left at Granger's headquarters as guard. Much of the way we went double-quick in the direction of heavy firing, — both artillery and rifle. When we had arrived within about half or three fourths of a mile of the line of smoke, there was some delay while the other regiments of Steedman's Division came up and the division was deployed. At this point there was a large open space extending east and south from the main Ridge (which was close on our right), for nearly half a mile. Down through this opening the division advanced — brigade front — in splendid order up toward the line of fire on Horseshoe Ridge, with Steedman riding ahead. I think there were three lines, and the 22d Michigan in the second line. Much of this space was obstructed by fallen timber and the regiment had to perform some evolutions to avoid it. A Confederate battery on our left kept the ground ploughed and the air filled with shot and shell as we advanced. When we reached the firing-line there was a move made to form a line of battle in a cornfield facing us to the east.[6] Then came a sudden change of action and the 22d was rushed into the woods to the west in column of fours by the right flank. This could not have been much after 2 o'clock P.M.

"We had advanced perhaps sixty or eighty rods when we were halted and faced to the left in line of battle. Then the order to advance was given, and as we began the ascent, Lieutenant-Colonel Sanborn shouted, 'Fix bayonets.' With the rattle of the steel the men began to yell, and in the next two minutes they were over the ridge and chasing

[1] D. H. Hill's *Century Magazine* article, for example.

[2] Colonel Carlton's testimony as to time agrees with his fellow officers of same command. [3] No. 50, p. 860, l. 19, and l. 27. [4] No. 50, p. 860, l. 22.

[5] No. 50, p. 860, l. 27.

[6] This agrees with Steedman's Report, showing Thomas' original purpose of closing the three fourths of a mile gap between Reynolds' Division and Harker's Brigade on Horseshoe Ridge, but the order for the movement which had been begun was countermanded in consequence of the more immediate danger which threatened Brannan's right flank.

the Confederates down the south slope.[1] But here we met a sudden check. A terrific fire was poured into us from front and flank,[2] and in the few minutes we stood there endeavoring to return the fire about one third of our brave fellows went down, killed or wounded. Our lieutenant colonel, William Sanborn,[3] was shot through the foot and ankle. Captain William A. Smith, Company H, was mortally wounded. The whole color guard was shot down; four or five of them killed. All this during the ten or fifteen minutes we tried to hold the position. While attending to some wounded men, the next thing I knew our men had faced about and were slowly retiring up the hill. Colonel Le Favour was riding back and forth along the line straightening out some confusion. I was one of the last to reach the ridge and had a good chance to look around. I could see no regiment to the west of us at that time. There was a lull in the firing as we fell back, reaching the ridge again somewhere about three o'clock, where Le Favour promptly faced us about and ordered us to lie down or shelter ourselves as best we could and stay there.

"The order of companies when charging over that hill was the usual one, as follows, from left to right, G, K, E, H, C, I, D, F, A. I was then the left file closer of my Company F, next to A Company on the flank. I saw only what seemed to be a thin skirmish line extending along the ridge, lying down facing south and said to be the 21st Ohio.[4] Soon after we had settled down there on the summit I saw a regiment fall in on the right of our position. It must have been the 89th Ohio. Its line extended to the southwest by west toward the Main Ridge.

[1] Malcolm says: "The 115th Illinois was on our right when we charged down the south slope." [2] "Enfilading fire." (Spalding.)

[3] "Captain A. M. Keller succeeded in command." (Spalding.)

[4] Spalding says: "In this charge we passed directly over a regiment which lay upon the crest of the hill, but its number I do not know. After the battle, one of its officers informed me that the 21st Ohio was on our immediate left and were armed with five-shooters. I heard the firing of the five-shooters all that afternoon and knew that the regiment carrying them were doing effective service."

Malcolm says that "the 21st Ohio was the left regiment on the Ridge when 22d Michigan was forced back from its advanced position, on the south slope, where it lost so heavily." (His statement is in harmony with the 21st Ohio Official Reports.)

"When we moved back from the south side and formed on the summit of the ridge, I was ordered by the captain to go back to the Snodgrass house and have my wound dressed. I followed our line around to it and the 21st Ohio was on our left at that time. All the artillery we had there then was one battery of six guns, posted on the left of the Snodgrass house. I believe I know what was taking place on our line at 3 P.M. as well as most of our officers. I returned to my regiment about 3.35 P.M."

22D MICHIGAN OFFICERS (GROUP II)

LIEUT. GEORGE W. ROBERTSON
CAPT. H. P. WANDS

1ST LIEUT E. SNELL
CAPT. A. S. MATTHEWS
CAPT JOS. GOETZ

LIEUT. LOUIS DRAKE, A. D. C
SERGT.-MAJ. EDW. E. ANDREWS

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History of the 89th Ohio

As the 89th Ohio was in the same brigade and was, as has been mentioned, in the second line following the 22d Michigan when the grand charge was made over the ridge, let us describe its action during the same interval prior to its taking position on Horseshoe Ridge on the right of the 22d Michigan. This description is given us by Rev. E. S. Scott, and is contained also in the before-quoted letter which he wrote to General Turchin on June 9, 1887: "The line in front went over the crest and down on the other side, and immediately became heavily engaged; we stopped on the crest and lay down.[1] In a few minutes the line in front, being, as I understand, the 115th Illinois, came falling back and retired over the 89th.[2] As soon as they were passed, we of course opened on the enemy and the pursuit was checked. General Steedman presently came along the front of the line on foot, calling to us to cease firing. Twenty-five were wounded in this part of the engagement in the regiment; the colonel's horse was shot under him. Captain Russell, General Granger's adjutant-general, was killed just to the right of our regiment. Not three minutes before, he had delivered an order to Colonel Carlton, saying 'that he thought General Steedman had asked for us to hold that position, and that he had better stay there.'

"The line that had fallen back over our regiment soon rallied and was moved off somewhere else, leaving us without any support in rear. Before long there was tremendous firing on our right and it was soon evident that the troops on our right were giving way. Soon the tide of battle swept over us again. We were, perhaps, a little too far back on the crest of the hill, and, through the thick underbrush in front, could not see the enemy till they were quite near us. The troops on our immediate right gave way, exposing our flank, so that our regiment changed front slightly to meet this enfilading fire on our right and rear. This was the last we saw of any of our troops on our right.

"We held this position for some time, when the Rebels came with such force that we were obliged to retire still further, falling back slowly, till we reached a sort of hollow, where we stopped, our line making an angle with the crest of the hill and the right (my company) being, per-

[1] This agrees with Colonel Carlton's account in my interviews with him. The 22d Michigan's charge beyond the crest is said to have been unintended. This is from Comrade Button's account: "Our lieutenant-colonel, Sanborn, who had command of the regiment when it made the charge, had a very poor voice, and when we reached the summit we did not hear his orders to halt. He was wounded about that time.

[2] The front line of Whitaker's Brigade, from left to right, was 22d Michigan, 115th Illinois, and 96th Illinois, and the second line, from left to right, was 89th Ohio, 84th Indiana, and 40th Ohio.

haps, halfway down the hill.[1] (See Hamilton's "southwest by west.") The 22d Michigan was on our left, more toward the top of the hill, and the 21st Ohio on their left (I suppose)."

Here then we have the relative positions of these three regiments about 3 P.M. on the west extremity of Horseshoe Ridge, maintaining General Brannan's right flank.

NOTE F (p. 232)

Just before the time that the 21st Ohio made its charge to re-take the position on the ridge, from which the 55th Ohio and the 2d Minnesota had been driven about 5.30 P.M., these were the relative positions[2] of the three Federal regiments on Horseshoe Ridge: —

NOTE G (p. 232)

This incident is of such importance that we consider it necessary, for purposes of corroboration, to give the testimony of the officers of the 22d Michigan who have written to me about it: —

Captain Spalding's letter of May 20, 1909, reads: "About sunset it became apparent to Colonel Le Favour that the remainder of our division had withdrawn leaving our flank in the air. He accordingly ordered us to march toward the rear for the purpose of rejoining our division. We had not proceeded further than the foot of the hill when an aide rode up and, saluting the colonel, who was not more than twenty feet from me, so I could distinctly hear every word, said: 'Colonel, the orders are to hold that hill.' 'But my ammunition is completely exhausted,' replied Le Favour. 'Then orders are to hold it at the point of the bayonet,' said the aide."

[1] This also was read by Colonel Carlton and approved.

[2] This diagram showing the 89th's position is copied from drawings by Colonel Carlton and Rev. E. S. Scott.

Captain Hamilton's sketch, continuing his account quoted above in Note E, reads: "We marched down the hill till halted by an officer on horseback in Federal uniform. He said, 'The orders are to hold the hill at all hazards; use the cold steel if necessary; reinforcements and ammunition will be here soon.' I heard no general's name mentioned as giving the order, though I stood within thirty feet and heard all that was said. The colonel may have known him, but I never conversed with him on the subject."

Assisting my efforts at identification, Comrade Hamilton wrote me in April, 1909: "I got the impression that the aide was tall and good looking, but Lieutenant Button could see more distinctly and describe his features." Lieutenant Button, being in Company A, accordingly wrote me how he "was close to the colonel riding on the right of the regiment, now the left of the line facing to the rear," and continuing says, "I heard the conversation of the colonel and the aide. He was quite a large man, dark and swarthy, with black hair and beard."

The question is whether the order delivered by this aide was one and the same as that described by Colonel Carlton. There are several points of difference which militate against this theory: (1) Carlton says that this order from Granger was sent through Lieutenant Drake, Colonel Le Favour's aide. Had it been the latter, these officers of the 22d Michigan Regiment would have recognized their comrade; (2) Granger's order was received "about 4.30 P.M.," Carlton says. On the other hand, the unidentified aide delivered his order to Le Favour after 5.30 P.M. and after the 22d Michigan had marched down the hill.

Finally, this unidentified aide could not have come from Steedman or Whitaker, because (1) Le Favour was at this time cut off from his brigade and division, so that Steedman's orders failed to reach him, and (2) if such orders had reached Le Favour, and if what Captain Spalding says is correct, such orders which Steedman tried to deliver were for Le Favour to withdraw, and not for him to hold his position. By a process of elimination, it therefore follows that if the unidentified aide did not belong to Granger's or Steedman's command, he must have belonged to Brannan's.

In Note F to chapter X, a description is given of two mounted officers who, a few minutes before, were in the hollow north of Horseshoe Ridge where one of them delivered a similar order, which consigned the 21st Ohio to its fate. Does it not appear probable that the order to Le Favour came from the same source?

NOTE H (p. 232)

That there was no contact with the enemy during the interval of the 22d Michigan's departure and return to the summit, and the brief

period which elapsed, is indicated by the following testimony of Comrade Hamilton: "He faced us about again and marched us back to the identical spot we had left ten or twelve minutes before. We found it still unoccupied, and in less than twenty minutes we were prisoners. The sun had gone down and the full moon was just rising." Similar statements are made by all my other correspondents.

Note I (p. 232)

The details of the capture of the 22d Michigan, the 89th and part of the 21st Ohio Regiments are given in chapters X and XI, and Notes thereto; it is from the testimony of General Carlton, Rev. E. S. Scott, of the 89th Ohio, Major Cusac, of the 21st Ohio, Comrades Hamilton, Malcolm, and others of the 22d Michigan, corroborating Major McMahan's statement of official record,[1] that I have finally established the relative positions of the three Federal regiments when they were surrounded and captured on Horseshoe Ridge by the 54th Virginia and the 6th and 7th Florida Regiments, of Trigg's Brigade. In Note F of this chapter, we have established their relative positions when the 21st

Ohio, under Van Derveer's order, with one round of ammunition, charged to re-take the hill from which his own men had been driven. After the 21st Ohio's repulse, "just at this moment," says Rev. E. S. Scott's letter[2] of June 9, 1887, "the 21st Ohio came down the hill and Colonel Carlton told the major in command to go to our right." General Carlton says this is so, and adds that he told the major that as the 21st had no ammunition it mattered little what position it did take. Major Cusac, of the 21st Ohio, in his correspondence with me, writes that at this juncture his regiment struck the left and rear of the 89th Ohio, which caused a separation of the 21st into two parts, whereby Companies B and G (he was captain of Company B) remained on the left of the 89th Ohio, while the balance of the companies moved to the right of

[1] No. 50, p. 388, l. 4. [2] Turchin's *Chickamauga*, p. 207.

that regiment. This movement of the 21st Ohio was on the north slope towards the west, according to the statements of General Carlton and Comrades of the 22d Michigan who witnessed this movement in their rear. All statements from the various sources mentioned, after laborious study, I believe are now finally reconciled with each other and the official record. The diagram opposite is copied from a draft of one made by General Carlton, the relative position of the 89th thereon being exactly the same as a draft by Rev. E. S. Scott, and the two parts of the 21st Ohio being as depicted by Major Cusac.

CHAPTER XII

Note A (p. 242)

The identity of this Confederate brigade, which at this time and place drove Harker's Brigade from its position on the Horseshoe, and was thus the first to effect a permanent lodgment on the heights, is fully established by the Official Records and other authoritative sources, including affidavits of competent, reliable witnesses, which will be found in volume II.

It will suffice here to state that the Confederates referred to belonged to General Gracie's Brigade. A son's pardonable pride in the achievements of his father will, I trust, be overlooked in inserting in this connection the following excerpt (recently brought to his attention) from Bishop Quintard's account of this battle, in which he was a participant: "The troops led by Brigadier-General Archibald Gracie fired the last gun and stormed the last strong position held by the enemy at the Battle of Chickamauga, and so memorable was his conduct on that day that the people in that vicinity have given the hill the name of Gracie Hill. It was a great privilege to know General Gracie as I did. He was a character that old Froissart would have delighted to paint. Chivalrous as a Bayard, he had all the tenderness of a woman. A warrior by nature as well as a soldier by education (he graduated at West Point in 1854) and profession, he had a horror of shedding blood and would almost shed tears in the hour of victory over the thin ranks of his brigade. A few months before his death[1] he became a communicant of the Church."[2]

Note B (p. 248)

This Fourth United States Battery is brigaded on the Roster with Van Derveer's Brigade, but was posted during the afternoon near the Snodgrass house, about two hundred and fifty yards, or more, in rear of Harker's Brigade on Hill Number 1 of Horseshoe Ridge. So far as I can learn from General Smith, some of his guns were at times moved into the woods and upon this hill. The Official Report of Lieutenant

[1] At Petersburg, Virginia, December 2, 1864.

[2] Doctor Quintard, Chaplain, C.S.A., and Second Bishop of Tennessee, *Being His Story of the War (1861–1865)*, p. 89. Edited and extended by the Reverend Arthur Howard Noll. The University Press of Sewanee, Tenn. 1905.

LIEUT. FRANK G SMITH

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Smith[1] shows it in the morning to have been moving, under orders, toward the left of the line to the support of Baird's Division, when an aide, Captain Williams, of the 19th U. S. Infantry,[2] directed the battery to the vicinity of the Snodgrass house where, under Thomas' orders, General Negley also collected[3] Bridges', Marshall's, and Schultz's Batteries. While these and other batteries were moved to the heights of the Main Ridge beyond, and finally thence withdrawn in safety, narrowly escaping capture, this one battery alone remained on this ground "during the rest of the day," its front being changed "from time to time to meet the different attacks of the enemy." While Lieutenant Smith's Report reads, "We fought almost constantly from noon until sunset, when we withdrew with but six rounds of ammunition to the gun," he has informed me since that he withdrew his battery before 5 P.M., in a statement which is in accord with the sworn testimony of the above-mentioned Williams.[4]

Note C (p. 252)[5]

"On our march to the rear we heard to our [then] left quite heavy firing, and directed our march to that point; found it to be General Wood's command contesting the possession of a hill, a very important point. We arrived very opportunely and took position with General Harker's Brigade. Placing our flag on the brink of the hill, our men nobly rallied and fought like veterans. We repulsed the enemy three times with great slaughter. They finally abandoned the ground. I must say I never saw troops fight more determinedly than did Colonel Harker's Brigade. We remained here till after dark, sometime after the firing ceased, till the enemy fell back, when we also proceeded to the rear, and reached Rossville about 10 or 11 o'clock at night."

Compare the above statement with the following from Colonel Harker's Report:—[6]

"I should mention that soon after taking our position on the hill referred to, we were joined by about forty men and stand of colors of the 44th Indiana Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Aldrich commanding. This little squad of men behaved most handsomely, and Lieutenant-Colonel Aldrich deserves great praise for his conduct."

A construction which might be put upon Colonel Aldrich's Report is that he and his forty men fought on Horseshoe Ridge until after dark;

[1] No. 50, p. 438, l. 33.
[2] No. 50, pp. 1007, 1008.
[3] No. 50, p. 361.
[4] No. 50, p. 1008, l. 16.
[5] Report of Lieutenant-Colonel S. C. Aldrich, 44th Indiana, J. F. Dick's Brigade, Van Cleve's Division, Crittenden's Corps (21st). No. 50, p. 828, l. 17.
[6] No. 50, p. 695, l. 42.

yet it would appear that such a construction was never intended. To submit an argument based upon the movements of Harker's Brigade with which this 44th Indiana Regiment was associated, seems entirely unnecessary. I have been unable to get in touch with any members of this detachment, and, therefore, utilize what I find in the Report of the Indiana Commissioners of the Chickamauga National Military Park, describing the movements of this fragment. The following excerpt is quoted from the legend on the monument for September 20: "When Colonel Aldrich led it to General Thomas' right, it went into action with Harker's Brigade, and *fought until ordered from the field about 5 p.m.*"[1] Again, there is a marker "on Harker's Hill" east of Snodgrass house with the time, Sunday, September 20, 1863, "2 P.M. to 5 P.M."

Note D (p. 258)

"There was an incident in our life at Brandy, connected with Gettysburg, which is worth relating. Batchelder, whose map of the battlefield of Gettysburg is authority, and whom we had fallen in with while we were there, asked to join our mess at Brandy when he came to the army to verify the positions of the various commands. One night we had just sat down to dinner when he entered our big hospital tent, quite tired. 'Well,' he announced, after taking his place at the table, 'I have been down in the Second Corps to-day, and I believe I have discovered how Joshua made the sun stand still. I first went to —— regiment and had the officers mark on the map the hour of their position at a certain point. Then I went to —— regiment in the same brigade. They declared positively it was one or two hours earlier or later than that given by the other. So it went on; no two regiments or brigades agreeing, and if I hinted that some of them must certainly be mistaken, they would set me down by saying, with severe dignity, 'We were there, Batchelder, and we ought to know, I guess," and I made up my mind that it would take a day of at least twenty hours instead of thirteen at Gettysburg to satisfy their accounts. So when Joshua's captains got around him after the fight and they began to talk it over, the only way under the heavens that he could ever harmonize their statements was to make the sun stand still and give them all a chance.' Any one who has ever tried to establish the exact position or hour when anything took place in an engagement will confirm Batchelder's experience, and possibly, if not too orthodox, accept his explanation of Joshua's feat." [2]

[1] Italics are mine. — Author.

[2] Morris Schaff, *Atlantic Monthly*, July, 1909, p. 96.

Note E (p. 269)

Besides McLoughlin's map, all others of official record bear similar testimony. In the atlas accompanying the Official Records of the Union and Confederate armies (Plate 46, Sheet No. 2) is represented a map of the battle-field of Chickamauga on September 20, 1863, compiled under the direction of Colonel W. E. Merrill, chief engineer, Department of the Cumberland, by Edward Ruger, superintendent topographical engineer office, Department of the Cumberland. (*Authorities:* Survey of the battle-field by Major C. H. Boyd, United States Coast Survey; Official Reports of corps, division, and brigade commanders, etc.)

Also a similar map (Plate 47, Sheet No. 3), by Walter J. Morris, captain of the Engineer Corps, and chief Engineer officer of Lieutenant-General L. Polk. In both of these maps the position of the Federal army on Horseshoe Ridge is designated as facing south in the form of a crescent, with Harker's Brigade in the woods on the east extremity of the ridge, and Brannan's Division on the right, and the Snodgrass house in their rear. Thus many years of research on my part show a unanimity of testimony from all authoritative sources, indicating the true position of Harker's Brigade on the east extremity of Horseshoe Ridge, while the only testimony to the contrary is that of this ridiculous Government map designated as Plate VIII[1] which seems to have been the product of General Boynton's fertile imagination.

[1] See page 242 of this chapter.

CHAPTER XIII

Note A (p. 291)

For some unexplained reason the usually accurate Indiana Commissioners, with the approval of the National Commission, have placed the 58th Indiana on Harker's Hill, near the Snodgrass house, and not on Horseshoe Ridge. On the other hand, the same Commission[1] have located the 10th and 74th Indiana Regiments as at one time on Horseshoe Ridge, east of the Tower about two hundred and fifty feet. What their authority is, I do not know; nor has inquiry for information brought anything to light. Yet that the Commission are in error would appear from the following statements in the record, contained in the Official Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Myron Baker, of the 74th Indiana.[2] He reports that the 10th and 74th Indiana Regiments left the Kelly field about 4.30 P.M, "and halted and formed line of battle facing the enemy on a hill where General Steedman's Division had been fighting." Here we have the statement of the commanding officer, who indicates that these regiments moved from the Kelly field across the Snodgrass field, and when they reached a point opposite to the hill on which Steedman's Division had been fighting, the Indiana regiments were halted there and faced south towards the enemy. Now, we know that Steedman's troops fought on the Main Ridge, west of the Horseshoe. How, then, in view of Colonel Baker's statement, can the 74th and 10th Indiana be located on Horseshoe Ridge two hundred and fifty feet east of the Tower?

Note B (p. 292)

Cheers marked the close of the battle after the last Federal line of battle had left Snodgrass' and after the Confederate right wing crossed the Lafayette road at Kelly's house, meeting the Confederate left. Time about 6 P.M. See General Hazen's account,[3] describing the same "almost appalling" cheers at sundown when Wood and Brannan preceded him in their withdrawal from Snodgrass field.

The following is the interesting Confederate corroboration thereof:—

[1] *Report*, pp. 139, 140, 212.
[2] No. 50, p. 421, ll. 9 *et seq.*
[3] Notes to chapter v, Note A.

General D. H. Hill's Account

"Owing to a delay in the adjustment of our line, the advance did not begin until 4 o'clock. The men sprang to their arms with the utmost alacrity, though they had not heard of Longstreet's success, and they showed by their cheerfulness that there was 'plenty of fight in them.' Cleburne ran forward his batteries, some by hand, to within three hundred yards of the enemy's breastworks, pushed forward his infantry, and carried them. J. K. Jackson had a bloody struggle with the fortifications in his front, but had entered them when Cheatham with his two brigades, Maney's and Wright's, came up with shouts and cheers. Breckinridge and Walker met with but little opposition until the Chattanooga road was passed, when their right was unable to overcome the forces covering the enemy's retreat. As we passed into the woods west of the road, it was reported to me that a line was advancing at right angles to ours. I rode to the left to ascertain whether they were foes or friends, and soon recognized General Buckner. The cheers that went up when the two wings met were such as I never heard before, and will never hear again."[1]

General S. B. Buckner's Accounts

"We encountered in our advance the right wing of our army, which joined in the assault on the enemy's works, and was moving in a direction perpendicular to our line of march. The continued cheers of the army announced at dark that every point of the field had been gained. Stewart bivouacked within the intrenchments he had assaulted, Preston upon the heights he had so gallantly won."[2]

"The battery was about to fire on a body of men, rapidly moving westward across the road. But I directed Williams to withhold his fire, saying, 'Those men are not beaten; they are cheering'; — and galloping forward I found them to be the 'Orphans' Brigade' of Kentucky Confederates. It was here that I soon afterwards met General D. H. Hill. In the mean time Preston's Division, including Gracie's Brigade, had charged and driven the enemy from Horseshoe Ridge. Their final position is shown on the map."[3]

Note C (p. 299)

The following interesting data is taken from my correspondence with Colonel R. M. Kelly, who was division inspector on General Brannan's staff. On the wounding of Lieutenant-Colonel P. B. Hunt, on Septem-

[1] General D. H. Hill, "Chickamauga, the Great Battle of the West," *Century Magazine*, April, 1887, p. 961.

[2] Buckner's Official Report.

[3] General Buckner's letter to the author, September 20, 1905.

ber 19, Major Kelly asked and received permission from General Brannan to go back to his regiment. "Hearing firing on Snodgrass Hill, Van Derveer, whose front was clear, determined to move to the support of the troops there. I marched with him. Passing around the east end of the hill he halted at the north base a short distance west of the Snodgrass house. Our line was then on top of the ridge, and firing was heavy. Van Derveer reported, and was ordered to move up and take place in the line. He gave me no orders, and I remained at the foot of the hill until his brigade was up, when a staff officer came and ordered me to move up and close up in the line in front of me. The slope of the hill to the front enabled the rear line to fire over those in front of them. My men were put in behind the left of the 9th Ohio, of Van Derveer's Brigade. I did not have time to inquire about the rest of our brigade, but towards dark, when the firing ceased, things began to be straightened out. I was on the right of the 10th Kentucky."

The relative position of his 4th Kentucky detachment, with respect to the 9th Ohio, was fixed in Colonel Kelly's mind by the following incident which he describes: "I was walking about in rear of the line when Colonel Kammerling, who was sitting down behind a tree on the slope to the right, holding his horse's bridle, called me to this effect, 'Come here, Kelly; don't pe a tam fool and got shot for nuddings; you do no goot valking dere! Come, sit mit me.' I sat with him a few moments, but something toward the left attracted me and I left him and saw him no more."

On the other hand, the proximity of the third regiment, the 14th Ohio, of this brigade, is indicated by another incident affording at the same time an illustration of heroism and indifference to danger: "I do not know where the 14th Ohio was, but it was pretty near, for a lieutenant in that regiment, moved to compassion by the cries of the wounded Confederates, who lined the slope in front of us (the dry leaves had caught fire), jumped over the barricade of rails and began sweeping the burning leaves away from them. He grew interested in his work and went on down the hill until he got in range of the enemy's skirmishers, when one banged away and shot him through his backsides. I was near when two of his men brought him to our line and he was one of the angriest men I ever saw. With a volley of oaths he exclaimed, in substance, 'The idea of a man going through two days of battle without a scratch, and then, while engaged in a work of mercy, getting shot so that when he goes home on furlough he cannot tell the girls where he was shot!'"

As Colonel Kingsbury's Official Report of casualties shows that only one commissioned officer of his 14th Ohio was wounded on September 20, his comrades ought to be able to establish his identity.

Governed principally by Colonel Kelly's account, we present the fol-

4TH KENTUCKY OFFICERS (GROUP II)

CAPT. JOHN A. ROBERTS, CO. D.

ADJ. GEORGE F. ROWLAND

1ST LIEUT. CHARLES T. SCHABLE

LIEUT.-COL. P. B. HUNT

MAJ. JO H. TOMPKINS

2D LIEUT. JAMES M. DUKE, CO. B.

CAPT. LUTHER JENKINS, CO. C.

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lowing diagram to represent the relative alignment of the regiments of Croxton's Brigade: —



Note D (p. 310)

I am under obligations to Lieutenant C. E. Stivers, acting aide to Colonel Stoughton during the battle, for a statement of his recollections. It was he who bore the order from Colonel Stoughton to Lieutenant-Colonel Grosvenor. He recalls the position then occupied by the 18th Ohio as being about one third of a mile northwest of this spring and strawstack. "Colonel Grosvenor's regiment was in reserve, to be used if necessary to repel an attack from the rear, or go to the support of the 4th U. S. Artillery. On receipt of the order, Colonel Grosvenor replied at once, 'Come on, boys,' and they immediately started on the run, with a tremendous yell, for the top of the ridge. I was out of breath and could not keep up with them."

Note E (p. 311)

From 19th Illinois sources also we have confirmation of the incident described and of the identity of Kershaw's Brigade, the only one of "Longstreet's men" assaulting the Horseshoe that afternoon. Further testimony is also given that this was the last fight witnessed by the "portion of Stanley's Brigade under Colonel Stoughton." The following is the description referred to in a most graphic account sent me by Captain J. G. Campbell, concerning his regiment's participation in the battle: —

"From this bold attack and a flank fire just opened by those who had turned our left flank, our men sullenly gave way, leaving a box of cartridges, from which the 19th were being supplied, between the contending forces. An officer of the 19th rushed forward and dragged the box to the rear of the line, for the line had again formed only a few steps backward. Within a few minutes a little band (I understood of an Ohio regiment) with a Union flag in front made a charge on our left in gallant style. The colors of our regiment were seized by Captain Bremner, who, with a rush, joined the color-bearer of the little band referred to. The men of the 19th followed. For an instant the flags, Rebel and Union, were close enough to mingle folds; but just for an instant and the awful

suspense is over. The balance so evenly poised is turned. The Rebel flag is lowered in haste and rapidly but bravely borne away and its defenders with it: but not all, for thickly lie the dead and wounded. We were informed by some of the wounded that this attacking force was Longstreet's men. Whoever they were they made a desperate charge and a determined stand. Along the whole line the Rebels have retired and the battle may be said to be over."

Captain D. F. Bremner, of Company E, has also added his testimony in letters to me, stating that he personally witnessed the incident described, and saw the color-bearer go down, but of his own knowledge does not know to what Confederate organization he belonged.

Lieutenant Stivers, mentioned in the previous Note, aide to the brigade commander, Colonel Stoughton, also makes the statement in a letter to me that this was the "final charge which closed the fighting for the day." As shown in the body of my work, while this was the last encounter in which Stanley's Brigade was engaged, it was by no means the final one on the part of others. Thus, undoubtedly, it was only Longstreet's men from Virginia who struck Stanley, who never came in contact with Buckner's men from East Tennessee.

While the question of location of monuments forms no part of this history, attention may be called to the fact that the 7th South Carolina Regiment located its marker, under the supervision of the Park Commission, on the south slope of the Tower Hill, while the magnificent monuments to the regiments of Stanley's Brigade, the opposing Federal organization at this point, are located on another hill of the ridge, which was not their position at any time during the battle.

MAJ. JAMES V. GUTHRIE

LIEUT. JOHN DEDRICK

ADJUTANT LESTER G. BANGS

19TH ILLINOIS OFFICERS (GROUP II)

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CHAPTER XIV

Note A (p. 340)

That some of the 9th Indiana Regiment, as well as some of Boynton's 35th Ohio, were concerned in the wounding of James Chenault, Colonel Trigg's mounted orderly, appears from the following statement by Lieutenant Samuel Dustan, of Company F., 9th Indiana: —

"A mounted officer — at least he carried a revolver and sword — rode up the hill under a big tree where I stood with Company F men. He halted and asked, 'What command is this?' and on being told it was the 9th Indiana, started to back off, but I had hold of his bridle rein, and just then I heard the report of a gun close behind, and as the man fell forward I caught him and asked some of the men near to help 'ease him' to the ground, and when asked who he was my memory is he said, 'General Twiggs or Briggs,' or some name like that. Whether he meant that for his own name or his commander's I can't say. I always regarded the shooting as absolutely inexcusable and unnecessary on the part of the man who did the shooting, as I had already grasped the bridle rein and we so outnumbered him that his escape would have been impossible."

Lieutenant Dustan made a diagram like this: —



ADDENDA

(See page 228, footnote 3)

I HAVE received the following corroborative testimony from Colonel Edward L. Anderson, adjutant of Dan McCook's Brigade at Chickamauga: —

"Granger was *not* on the Horseshoe Ridge when I reported to Thomas, say at 2 P.M., and I do not think from what he said that he had accompanied Steedman. Colonel J. Taylor Holmes, Columbus, Ohio; Major Frank B. James, 52d Ohio; Captain Barnett, of the 2d Illinois Battery, and hundreds of others can substantiate the statements made in paragraph marked 2 in your letter of October 7th."

The paragraph referred to is the second in the following excerpt from my letter: —

"Your recollections are very valuable to me. I was glad to obtain your statement, through Comrade Aten, which showed that Colonel McCook, on September 20th, received direct orders, transmitted by you, from Generals Granger and Thomas, to occupy the position which he held south of Cloud's house and west of the Lafayette road. The matter was one of official record that what McCook had done met with the approval of every one of his superior officers. I very much regret that I have not been in touch with you sooner, though I do not believe I could state the case more strongly than I have already done. The details which you have given in your letter of September 29th certainly would have been inserted if I had received them in time. General Granger's adjutant, to whom you refer, was Captain William C. Russell,[1] and the time, place and circumstances of his death have been told me by General Carlton, of the 89th Ohio. Your testimony would have been very useful to me in connection with another important point, locating General Granger's position on the battle-field. I have plenty of testimony showing that he at no time was on the heights of the Horseshoe, or Main Ridges, with his command under Steedman.

"Your timetable, compared with the evidence of the Official Records, is wonderfully accurate, and it is most unfortunate that I could not have made use of your statements. You say, '*About 5 o'clock*, General Reynolds told McCook that Thomas would withdraw to Rossville and

[1] Granger's Report, *War Records*, No. 50, p. 856.

NEPHEWS OF MAJ. ROBERT ANDERSON OF FORT SUMTER FAME

CAPT EDWARD L. ANDERSON, ADJT

COL. NICHOLAS L. ANDERSON

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that the brigade was to hold the position until after dark.' '*About 6 o'clock*, General Granger came up and ordered Barnett's Battery to give the enemy a "salvo," ' etc. These statements of yours differ from all published histories of the battle except the Official Records. It has been the cause of my writing my history to prove that just such statements as you have made, embody the truth. It follows from what you say that General Reynolds must have been near McCook's position about 5 o'clock in order to have communicated the fact to him of Thomas' purpose to withdraw to Rossville; yet so-called history, adopting Thomas' error, says that Thomas did not send the withdrawal order to Reynolds in the Kelly field until 5.30 P.M. Again, you say, 'About 6 o'clock, Granger came up.' Here also we have proof from the evidence of the Records that this statement of yours is true, whereas Granger's Official Report states that he was with his troops on the Main Ridge until after dark. On the other hand, the proof is not lacking that General Granger, after he had been left in command at the front, abandoned his troops about 5 P.M., after having given orders to Le Favour and Brannan to charge with the bayonet."

(See pages 157, 159, footnotes)

My picture of this doughty warrior "Granger mighty in battle" taken from General Dana's and General Rosecrans' description is not overdrawn. A gallant Federal officer, who saw him, describes his appearance "wearing a steeple-crowned hat with a stiff brim, a piece of the brim flopping about his face, *having been cut by a piece of shell*, as he afterwards explained. . . . he was a roaring lion and reminded me of Panurge after the storm, in *Pantagruel;* the hat brim interfering with his view, but very effective."

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